

INTRODUCTION

The 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the world's oldest and most popular disarmament and arms control treaty. Through it, States without nuclear weapons pledged never to acquire them in exchange for the complete elimination of these weapons by those who already possess them- namely, the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China.

Thirty-five years after its entry-into-force, many governmental and non-governmental experts, analysts and activists perceive the Treaty to be in a state of crisis. Nuclear Weapon States are focusing much more heavily on the non-proliferation obligations, while Non-Nuclear Weapon States remain intent on assuring full implementation of the disarmament obligations of the Treaty. Meanwhile, other areas in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation remain stalled: a treaty banning the production of fissile materials has yet to be negotiated; the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, nine years after its negotiation, has yet to enter-into-force; political machinery such as the Conference on Disarmament or the UN Disarmament Commission cannot even obtain agreement on an agenda. Many in the international community are becoming increasingly anxious over suspected proliferation around the world, both by States as well as non-state actors, while many others remain fearful that the modification and additions to existing arsenals is violating, undermining and weakening the spirit and letter of the NPT itself.

What is needed now is a course to strengthen both disarmament as well as non-proliferation obligations. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, with the contribution and assistance of non-governmental organizations around the world, offer this Model Nuclear Inventory as a tool toward the achievement of a nuclear weapon-free world. This Inventory tracks the military and civilian nuclear materials, weapons, locations and policies in each of the 44 States listed as having significant nuclear capabilities in Annex II of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. As this is an NPT-targeted report, only NPT States parties are included.

At a time marked by inaction and indecision on the international level, wherein most all of our multilateral machinery remains deadlocked to the point of paralysis, an Inventory remains one of the few areas for possible agreement- and therefore possible collective action. Germany proposed the creation of such an inventory in a working paper to the 2002 Preparatory Committee conference. As part of their Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the United States proposed a global database of research reactors and their spent fuel. Canada remains a leading supporter of Article VI reporting, which they rightfully view as an important confidence-building, transparency and accountability measure. The verifiability of a Fissile Materials Treaty, which many States view as the next logical step in disarmament, will be enhanced with the creation of an Inventory such as the one contained in the following pages.

In this way, such an Inventory can help impel progress on many disarmament and arms control fronts. By tracking and securing fissile materials around the world, we can help prevent illegal acquisition of these materials. Likewise, irreversible, verifiable disarmament can be possible only after a full accounting of existing stockpiles is taken.

As a tool for progressing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the Model Nuclear Inventory must also include an assessment of the legal- as well as the technical- aspects of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Therefore, the Model Nuclear Inventory also includes a chapter that analyzes the Nuclear Weapon States' implementation of the Practical Steps to Disarmament, as unanimously agreed upon at the Sixth Review Conference of the NPT in 2000.

The information contained within the Model Nuclear Inventory is derived from publicly available sources. We encourage all governments, non-governmental organizations, academic research institutes or scientific-technical institutes to contribute to this database, which we view as a work-in-progress. If you would like to challenge any of the information contained herein, we strongly encourage you to contact us.

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