

Algeria

1. Location and capability of nuclear facilities

Between 1960 and 1965, Algeria was the testing ground for French nuclear weapons. Altogether, 14 nuclear weapons tests were conducted at two Algerian sites. In the early 1980s, Algeria officially launched its nuclear program and established the Commissariat for New Energy for further developments in nuclear energy production. Its first reactor, Es-Salam, was constructed in 1986.

The country has operated two research reactors since 1995. In January 1995, Algeria joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and agreed to inspections of the site by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In March 2005, Noureddine Bendjaballah, commissioner for Algeria's Atomic Energy, announced that Algeria intended to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol. However, as of January 2007, this has not happened yet.

<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/algeria>; <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf102.html>
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/algeria/index.html>; and
http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005/3/22/8D9E1616-4579-4792-A7D5-FE4D5D74973C.html

Power Reactors: 0

Research Reactors

Operational: 2 (Draria, Ain Ouessara)

Planned: 0

<http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/rddb/>

Uranium Mines

There are no active uranium mines in Algeria. However, an estimated 56,000 tons of uranium has been found in deposits in provinces west of Hoggar and on the border between Algeria and Niger. Uranium rich areas were identified in Eglab, Ougarta, southern Tassili (Tin-Seririne basin), Tamart-N-Iblis and Timouzeline sectors, Tesnou zone (northwest) and north of Timgaouine before 2001, after which there has been almost no exploration or prospecting. <http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcn/cnsc3alg.html>
<http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/publications/reports/ser/uranium/uranium.asp>

Reprocessing

Since the early 1990s, there have been suspicions that Algeria is keeping a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant next to the Es Salam reactor in Ain Oussera, where plutonium usable for weapons possibly could have been separated from the reactor's spent fuel. In 2001, satellite photographs of the facility were analyzed and buildings that could be part of a reprocessing program were identified, including a hot cell laboratory, an isotope production facility, and a suspected reprocessing plant.

<http://projects.sipri.se/nuclear/cnsc4alg.htm>

2. Fissile Material Holdings

Cumulative Plutonium Discharges from Civilian Power Reactors

The 15-megawatt Es Salam reactor has the theoretical capacity to produce as much as 3 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium a year. http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=mj01albright

3. Nuclear Activities

Research Centers

CERIST: Centre de Recherche sur l'Information Scientifique et Technique

<http://www.radwaste.org/research.htm>

Nuclear Cooperation

Argentina: Algeria purchased an Argentine-designed research reactor with 20% enriched U-235 fuel in 1985. Algeria was involved in negotiations with Argentina regarding the purchase of a pressurized heavy water reactor. <http://projects.sipri.se/nuclear/cnsc1alg.htm>

China: China has been Algeria's main supplier of nuclear technology. A secret accord was signed between the countries in 1983. In 1991, it was discovered that China assisted in the construction of a nuclear complex, which included a heavy water reactor with the ability to produce military grade plutonium, alongside a hot cell and radioisotope laboratory.

IAEA proceeded with inspections of the facilities and found little proof of a weapons program. Algeria subsequently acceded to the NPT and signed the CTBT. <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/algeria/elpais.html>

Russia: In January 2007, Russia offered to help construct nuclear facilities in Algeria and train Algerian scientists and technicians. The two countries also signed an energy memorandum of understanding. <http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/07/front2454125.1611111113.html>

South Korea: In 2006, an 11-member Algerian delegation visited South Korea to discuss bilateral nuclear cooperation. Algeria is interested in expanding its nuclear capacity, while South Korea is interested in gaining access to Algerian oil, gas, and mining resources. http://www.wmdinsights.com/16/16_AF2_AlgeriaSeeks.htm

4. International Non-proliferation Efforts

Treaties Signed and Ratified, date of deposit

APM Convention, 9 October 2001
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 22 July 2001
Chemical Weapons Convention, 14 August 1995
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 11 July 2003
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 30 April 2003
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 12 January 1995
Outer Space Treaty, 27 January 1992
Seabed Arms Control Treaty, 27 January 1992
Treaty of Pelindaba, 11 February 1998

Algeria has not signed the IAEA Additional Protocol.

Multilateral Groups

Conference on Disarmament

5. Positions Taken in International Fora on Various Issues of Nuclear Disarmament

Nuclear Disarmament: "Some made nuclear disarmament hostage to nuclear non-proliferation, others, whose views we share, stated that compliance by States with their obligation to achieve full nuclear disarmament was the only guarantee of non-proliferation. If nuclear non-proliferation is a security issue, nuclear disarmament is a question of global peace. The issue of nuclear disarmament is therefore more important than ever. Nuclear arsenals may have been reduced in quantitative terms, but the role they play in security policies has changed in qualitative terms, increasing our feelings of unease, particularly in the light of the development of such weapons and the affirmation of military doctrines authorizing their use, even against non-nuclear States, not to mention the concept of pre-emptive war." - **Statement by Ambassador Idriss Jazairy at the Conference on Disarmament, 2nd March 2006.** <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches06/2March.htm#>

"The third and final component of this strategy entails a gradual reduction of nuclear arsenals to the lowest possible level based on an agreed timetable which takes account of the principle of undiminished security for all. The ultimate aim of such a process would be to rid mankind of this devastating weapon once and for all. The process must include all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. During this phase, it will be necessary to conclude a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the use of military nuclear facilities and materials for peaceful purposes. The creation of a subsidiary body on disarmament with a mandate confined to discussion on the subject alone, without the balancing elements contained in the five Ambassadors' proposal, is unlikely to win consensus within the Conference. In conclusion, we note that multilateral cooperation on disarmament, human rights and other matters runs up against the problem of selectivity, discrimination and double standards, threatening to empty multilateralism, in spite of its vital importance, of any real content and to hamper efforts to achieve peace. We must all endeavour to overcome this problem so that this Conference can achieve its objectives." - **Statement by Ambassador Idriss Jazairy at the Conference on Disarmament, 2nd March 2006.**

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches06/2March.htm#Algeria>

Conference on Disarmament: (unofficial translation) "During the informal and formal meetings [on March 23], Algeria pointed out that the mandates concerning nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances in draft decision L.1 could be improved upon, in line with the conclusions of the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Algeria had also inquired into the annual periodicity of the programme of work. The President, in her statement today, said that the programme would be valid for 2007. On that score, according to the Rules of Procedure, the agenda and the programme of work were adopted on an annual basis. Algeria still has difficulty with the open-ended mandates for the Coordinators as formulated in the draft decision, and asks that there be specific language added to the draft decision that the Coordinators were "appointed for the duration of the current session". - **Statement by Hamza Khelif to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 27 March 2007.**

Universality: "Algeria strongly believes that the only way to preserve the authority and the credibility of the NPT is to pursue the full implementation of all its provisions and to ensure its effective universality." - **Statement by the Algerian Delegation to the Seventh Review Conference of the NPT, 27 May 2005.**

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/GDstatements/Algeria27.html>