Brazil’s research in the nuclear field began as early
as the 1930s with nuclear fission research followed by the
discovery of uranium deposits by mid-decade. Throughout the
1940s, Brazil’s nuclear program grew, mostly through
technology transfers from the United States. By 1956, Brazil
decided to pursue an independent, indigenous program without
control and oversight by the US. In 1965, Brazil built its
first indigenous research reactor in Rio de Janeiro, though
the US supplied the medium-grade enriched uranium and maintained
strict control over their construction, in exchange for continued
supplies of natural uranium to the US.
Brazil and Argentina embarked on a bilateral nuclear arms
race in the 1970s and 80s. Through technology transfers from
West Germany, which did not require IAEA safeguards, Brazil
pursued a covert nuclear weapons program, replete with enrichment
facilities (including a large ultracentrifuge enrichment plant
and several laboratory-scale facilities), a limited reprocessing
capability, a missile program, a uranium mining and processing
industry, and fuel fabrication facilities.
By 1987, with Brazil able to enrich uranium to 20%, many predicted
a Brazilian nuclear weapon by the end of the century. In 1990,
President Fernando Collor de Mello symbolically closed a test
site at Cachimbo, in Pará and exposed the military’s
secret plan to develop an atom bomb. Through a series of agreements,
Brazil and Argentina renounced their nuclear rivalry. On 13
December, 1991, they signed the Quadripartite agreement, at
the IAEA headquarters, allowing for full-scope IAEA safeguards
of Argentine and Brazilian nuclear installations.
Brazil has the most advanced nuclear capabilities in Latin
America, with a multi-faceted fissile material production
program and the navy, air force and army involved in various
sectors of its nuclear research and development program. Until
2009, Brazil plans to invest US$8.2 billion annually to increase
the capacity of generation of electric energy in the country.
Currently, Brazil's two power reactors generate about 4% of
the nation's electricity.
In May 2006, Brazil inaugurated its first uranium enrichment
facility, which has actually been operating since 2004. Brazil
has not permitted complete access to its centrifuges to the
IAEA, claiming the need to protect proprietary information.
In November 2004, the IAEA reached an agreement with Brazil
on conducting safeguards inspections. Experts point out that
Brazil's technological capability seems to be ahead of Iran's,
yet Brazil's program has hardly been in the news, as the government
has managed to assure the international community its intentions
are industrial and commercial, not military.
Power Reactors
Operational: 2
Planned: 7
Research Reactors
Operational: 4
Planned: 0
Uranium Mines
Brazil embarked on systematic prospecting and exploration
of radioactive minerals in 1952. From 1974 to 1991, the total
amount spent in uranium exploration was equivalent to US$150
million. Brazil has been producing uranium since 1982, with
untapped uranium deposits believed to cover 50% of the Brazilian
territory, which is home to the fifth-largest known natural
reserves of uranium. Brazil has known resources of 143,000
tonnes of uranium - 4% of world total.
Uranium Enrichment and Reprocessing
In 2004, an enrichment plant opened at Resende; production
began in early 2004, though agreement on verification with
the IAEA was not reached until November and the plant was
not formally inaugurated until 2006. Until 2012, the plant
will supply about 60% of the enriched uranium needed by Brazil's
two nuclear power plants, and by 2015 the plant is expected
to be supplying 100%.
The uranium enrichment program is partly operated and controlled
by the Brazilian Navy, indicating possible military, as well
as civilian applications. In their public statements, navy
and civilian officials have suggested that Brazil sees uranium
enrichment as a promising source of income that could ease
those problems. The Brazilian Constitution bans the military
use of nuclear energy.
In 1975, West Germany agreed to provide Brazil with a reprocessing
plant, however, the facility was never constructed.
2.
Fissile Material Holdings
Irradiated plutonium end of 2003: 2.1 tons
Highly Enriched Uranium end of 2003
In country: 0-0.0001 tons
Supplied by: US
Radioactive waste disposal
Over the past 40 years, Brazil has generated about 14,000
cubic meters of nuclear waste, including material from nuclear
power plants and medical use. A radioactive waste accident
in 1987 in Goiânia, wherein 4 people died and at least
200 were contaminated, spurned greater care of radioactive
wastes in Brazil.
Nuclear waste is now disposed of in four temporary depositories
owned by the National Commission of Nuclear Energy (CNEN).
The goverment continues to explore options for the construction
of permanent deposit sites for radioactive waste.
3.
Nuclear Activities
Research Centers
CDTN: Centre for Nuclear Technology Development
CBPF: Centro Brasileiro de Pesquisas Fisicas
CENA: Centro de Energia Nuclear na Agricultura
IPEN: Institute for Energy and Nuclear Research
IEN: Institute for Nuclear Engineering
IRD: Institute for Radiation Protection and Dosimetry
LNLS: Laboratorio Nacional de Luz Sincrotron
Reator TRIGA IPR-R1
Nuclear Cooperation US: In 1940, President Getúlio Vargas signed
an agreement with the United States for cooperative mining,
including mining for uranium and monazite. During the 1940s,
Brazil signed four agreements with the United States relating
to mining and technology transfers.
In 1955, Brazil signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with
the United States, and in 1957 the Comissao Nacional de Energia
Nuclear (CNEN) began operation of Brazil’s first research
reactor, which was supplied by the United States under the
agreement.
In June 2003, the United States Department of Energy and the
Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology signed a bilateral
agreement jointly conduct research and development in the
field of advanced reactor developments for future-generation
nuclear energy systems; advanced reactor fuel and reactor
fuel cycle-integration; life management and upgrading of current
operating reactors; advanced fuel and material irradiation
and use of experimental facilities; environmental and safety
issues related to new reactor and fuel cycle technologies;
and fundamental areas of nuclear engineering and science.
West Germany: On 27 June 1975, West Germany agreed
to supply Brazil with eight nuclear reactors, a commercial-scale
uranium enrichment facility, a pilot-scale plutonium reprocessing
plant, and Becker “jet nozzle” enrichment technology.
This agreement was the first to ensure the transfer of technology
for a complete nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and
reprocessing. However, the deal collapsed before the reprocessing
technology was transferred, the “Becker jet-nozzle”
enrichment technology didn't work. Only one nuclear reactor
was completed.
Russia: In September 1994, Russia and Brazil agreed
to cooperate in the development of nuclear energy, including
nuclear safety. During talks in April 1995, the two sides
considered the construction of small nuclear power plants
in Brazil using low-capacity Russian reactors like those used
on icebreakers.
Argentina: Agreement in 1980 to cooperate in developing
the nuclear fuel cycle; Joint Declaration of Nuclear Policy
in 1985; Foz de Iguacu Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy
in 1990 renouncing nuclear weapons and pledging to develop
a system of safeguards; bilateral agreement in 1991 for the
exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, creating the Argentine-Brazilian
Accounting and Control Commission (ABACC) to verify implementation
of the agreed-upon safeguards.
4.
International Non-proliferation Efforts
Treaties Signed and Ratified, date of deposit
Antarctic Treaty, 16 May 1975
APM Convention, 30 April 1999
Biological Weapons Convention, 27 February 1973
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, 24 July 1998
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, 17 October 1985
Chemical Weapons Convention, 13 March 1992
Convention on Nuclear Safety, 2 June 1997
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,
8 February 1987
Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional
Weapons Acquisitions, 28 Nov 2006
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 18 September 1998
Outer Space Treaty, 5 August 1963
Seabed Treaty, 4 April 1988
Treaty of Tlatelolco, 29 January 1968, Amended 30 May 1994
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 26
March 1993
Brazil has not yet signed the IAEA Additional Protocol.
Multilateral Groups
Conference on Disarmament
Nuclear Suppliers Group
Missile Technology Control Regime
5.
Positions Taken in International Fora on Various Issues of
Nuclear Disarmament
Non-proliferation: “Horizontal proliferation
is a real, serious concern. Parties to the NPT must take a
sober look at current challenges to the regime and try hard
not only to find ways to ensure compliance with its prohibitions,
but also to make the Treaty universal. The threat posed by
enduring nuclear arsenals is perceived by a large majority
of NPT members to be at least as important as the risks of
further proliferation. Non-proliferation efforts must, however,
respect the basic and inalienable right of all States, to
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity
with applicable legal obligations.” –
Statement at the 61st session of the General Assembly First
Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 2 October
2006. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com06/statements/Braziloct2.pdf
Nuclear Disarmament: "Both individually and
as a member of the New Agenda Coalition, Brazil has called
upon the five Nuclear Weapon States to undo the effects of
the nuclear proliferation they have engaged in through the
accumulation of weapons, and hence to strive for nuclear disarmament.
As other types of weapons of mass destruction - which are
prohibited under their respective regimes - nuclear weapons
should be completely eliminated. There should be no excuse
for their use or for their indefinite possession; either for
their development, or for their acquisition. The NPT is the
main international instrument to achieving these ends."
- Statement by Ronaldo Sardenberg, Head of the
Delegation, to the Seventh Review Conference of the NPT, 2
May 2005. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/GDstatements/Brazil.pdf
New Nukes: "Although the NPT has no provision
that expressly prohibits modernization of nuclear weapons
and their means of delivery, the introduction of new weapon
types and the announcement of strategic doctrines that tend
to lower the threshold for the utilization of nuclear weapons
run counter to the "unequivocal commitment" to full
nuclear disarmament, and bypasses the "thirteen practical
step" towards that goal adopted in 2000." -
Statement by Ronaldo Sardenberg, Head of the Delegation, to
the Seventh Review Conference of the NPT, 2 May 2005. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/GDstatements/Brazil.pdf
