Reaching Critical Will

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Model Nuclear Inventory 2007
Canada

Location and capability of nuclear facilities
Fissile material holdings
Nuclear activities
International non-proliferation efforts
Positions taken in international fora on various issues of disarmament

1. Location and Capability of Nuclear Facilities

In 1944, Canadian engineers developed a pressurized heavy water nuclear reactor, which began operating in 1947. It provided the basis for Canada's CANDU reactors, which are now sought by many countries developing nuclear energy programs.

As of 2007, nuclear energy constitutes approximately 15% of Canada's energy supply. A "nuclear renaissance" may be on the horizon in Canada, as the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission accepted proposals in January 2007 for the first new power plants in over a quarter century. Recent estimates for next year’s federal spending indicate an increase of 20% in funding for the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, to $94.5 million from $78.7 million. http://www.uic.com.au/nip03.htm
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?chanID=sa003&articleID=95009134498CF8501942C4970B0110AC
http://www.edmontonsun.com/News/Canada/2007/03/06/3703290-sun.html

Power Reactors
Operational: 18
Shut down: 7
Under Construction: 0
Planned: 0
http://www.iaea.or.at/programmes/a2/
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.htm

Research Reactors
Operational: 8
Shut down: 5
Decommissioned: 3
Under Construction: 2
Planned: 1
http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/rrdb/
http://www.uic.com.au/nip03.htm

Nuclear Facilities
Cameco-owned and controlled uranium hexafluoride conversion facilities are located in Port Hope, Ontario and have the capacity to produce 10,500 metric tons of uranium per year. Zircatec Precision Industries-owned and controlled heavy water reactor fuel fabrication facilities are located in Port Hope, Ontario and have the capacity to produce 1,500 metric tons per year.

General Electric Canada-owned and controlled heavy water reactor fuel fabrication facilities are located in Peterborough, Ontario and have the capacity to produce 1,200 metric tons per year. http://www.antenna.nl/wise/uranium/efac.html

Uranium Mines
Canada is the world’s largest producer of uranium, producing about one-third of the world’s total.

http://www.wise-uranium.org/uocdn.html

2. Fissile Material Holdings

Irradiated Civil Plutonium: 135 tons
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/plutonium_watch2005.pdf

Highly Enriched Uranium end of 2003: 1.35 tons
Supplied by: US
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/civil_heu_watch2005.pdf

Radioactive waste disposal
Low-level waste: Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) stores some solid low-level radioactive wastes at its Chalk River Laboratories in Ontario. In 2001, AECL constructed a new facility for packaging and storing solid low-level waste at its Chalk River Laboratories (CRL), designed to hold up to two years of wastes. A longer-term facility for Ontario is envisaged for about 2015. A geological repository is being constructed near the Bruce power plant. A large amount of low-level waste from historic radium and uranium refinery operations at Port Hope, Ontario will be permanently emplaced in an above-ground repository.
http://www.uic.com.au/nip03.htm

High-level waste: High-level waste is stored in a pool of water at the reactor for six years before being transferred to dry storage in concrete containers, also at the reactor site. AECL has developed the MACSTOR (Modular Air-Cooled STORage) dry used fuel storage system, concrete units with a double containment system.

AECL has also been studying a deep geological repository for high-level waste, where waste would be buried 500 to 1000 metres deep in the stable rock of the Canadian Shield. This will be below the water table and with the containers packed in bentonite clay. A further 16 years of public dicussion to select a site is expected.

In June 2006, the Canadian government announced a five-year, CAN$520 million program to clean up wastes from research and development of nuclear power and medical isotopes and early military activities in the 1950s. It covers clean-up of AECL contaminated lands, radioactive wastes, and decommissioning old infrastructure which the government is responsible for.
http://www.uic.com.au/nip03.htm

3. Nuclear Activities

Research Centers
AECL: Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd
Canadian Water Network
Centre for Nuclear Energy Research
CERI: Canadian Energy Research Institute
CLS: Canadian Light Source
CNF: Canadian Neutron Facility
CTN: Canadian Technology Network
GSC Airborne Geophysics Section
ICLDRR: International Centre for Low Dose Radiation Research
IREQ: Institute de recherche d'Hydro Québec Kinetrics
LAFI: Laboratoire des Faisceaux d´lons
NRC: National Research Council
NSERC: Natural Sciences & Engineering Research Council
Neutron Program for Materials Research
OHT: Ontario Hydro Technologies
SNO: Sudbury Neutrino Observatory
TRIUMF
http://www.radwaste.org/research.htm

Nuclear Cooperation
Canadian nuclear cooperation is subject to the 1994 Export Controls on the Nuclear and Nuclearrelated Dual-use Equipment, Materials and Related Technology:

Since 1974 Canada has undertaken nuclear cooperation only with those Nuclear Weapons States and Non-Nuclear Weapons States that have signed a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) with Canada. The NCA contains several assurances including:
- A non-explosive use commitment;
- A provision for fall-back safeguards;
- Retransfer, enrichment and reprocessing controls; and,
- Assurance of adequate physical protection measures.
Since 1976 Canada has engaged in nuclear cooperation only with NNWS that have ratified the NPT or have taken an equivalent binding step and accepted IAEA safeguards on the full scope of their nuclear activities.
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/eicb/notices/ser72-en.asp

The states for which Canada has provided nuclear technology and materials include:

US: 65% of Canada’s uranium exports go to the US.

India: Canada assisted India with the construction of two reactors based on the CANDU design and a research reactor (CIRUS) based on the NRX design. Canada ceased cooperation with India in 1974, when India tested its first nuclear device using plutonium from the CIRUS research reactor.

Pakistan: Canada supplied a CANDU-type reactor to Pakistan in 1964 and currently provides limited safety assistance through the CANDU Owners Group. Canada terminated all other nuclear cooperation with Pakistan in the early 1970s when Pakistan did not agree to meet Canada’s non-proliferation policy requirements.

China: Canada supplied two CANDU-type reactors to China in 2002 and 2003 under a $4 billion contract between Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Crown Corporation and China National Nuclear Corporation.

South Korea, Argentina and Romania: All purchased CANDU reactors from Canada.

Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements: Canada has nuclear cooperation agreements with the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Euratom, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, United States.
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2002/index.htm

4. International Nonproliferation Efforts

Canada is also a participant in the G8 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, launched in Kananaskis, Canada 2002. http://www.g8.gc.ca/

Treaties Signed and Ratified, date of deposit
Antarctic Treaty, 4 May 1988
APM Convention, 3 December 1997
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 18 September 1972
Chemical Weapons Convention, 26 September 1995
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, 18 December 1998
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 24 June 1994
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 21 March 1986
Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, signed 14 November 1997 (not ratified)
Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions, 7 June 1999
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 8 January 1969
Outer Space Treaty, 10 October 1967
Seabed Treaty, 18 May 1972

Canada ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol on 8 September 2000.

Multilateral Groups
Australia Group
Conference on Disarmament
Missile Technology Control Regime
Nuclear Suppliers Group
Proliferation Security Initiative
Zangger Committee
Wassenaar Arrangement

5. Positions Taken in International Fora on Various Issues of Nuclear Disarmament

Nuclear Weapon States: “A number of nuclear weapon states have made significant and welcome progress in reducing their nuclear arsenals. However, there continue to be worrying signs as states demonstrate increased reluctance to consider further reductions, new doctrines are mooted which would assert a role for nuclear weapons as war-fighting tools, and plans for new nuclear weapons are discussed. These developments directly challenge our nuclear disarmament efforts. We encourage all states possessing nuclear weapons to continue to reduce and dismantle their nuclear weapons in a secure, irreversible and verifiable manner.” – Statement by Ambassador Paul Meyer to the 61st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 10 October 2006.
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com06/statements/Canadaoct10.doc

Fissile Material: “The next logical step in this suffocation strategy is, in our view, a ban on the further production of fissile material for weapons purposes, a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Nuclear weapons cannot be produced without fissile material. Quite simply, turning off the tap to such material makes nuclear weapons proliferation - both vertical and horizontal - more difficult. . . . While there is a need to be realistic and pragmatic in our approach, we should not from the outset artificially lower our expectations. An FMCT which proves ultimately to be merely a vague declaratory statement of good intentions about future production does the international community a disservice, and would be an indication that we are not serious about nuclear non- proliferation arms control and disarmament.” – Statement by Ambassador Paul Meyer to the Conference on Disarmament, 16 May 2006.
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches06/statements%2016%20may/16MayCanada.pdf

2005 NPT Review Conference: " We have let the pursuit of short-term, parochial interests override the collective long-term interest in sustaining this Treaty’s authority and integrity. We have seen precious time that might have been devoted to exchanges on substance and the development of common ground squandered by procedural brinkmanship. We have witnessed intransigence from more than one state on pressing issues of the day, coupled with the hubris that demands the priorities of the many be subordinated
to the preferences of the few. Our community is weakened by the refusal of the delinquent to be held to account by its peers and by the defection from that community of a state without suffering any sanction. We have been hampered, frankly, by a lack of imagination and will to break with the status quo and adopt new ways of conducting our business." - Statement by Ambassador Paul Meyer to the Seventh Review Conference of the NPT, 27 May 2005. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/GDstatements/canada27.doc