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Model Nuclear
Inventory 2007
France
Date of first nuclear explosion - 13 February
1960
- Amount, Location, and Operational Plan of
Nuclear Weapons
- Compliance with Article VI of the NPT
- Location and capability of nuclear facilities
- Fissile material holdings
- Nuclear activities
- International non-proliferation efforts
- Positions taken in international fora on
various issues of disarmament
1.
Amount, Location, and Operational Plan of Nuclear Weapons
France’s nuclear force consists mainly of its four
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), three
of which are deployed with sets of 16 submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs), with a capacity of 6 warheads each. The
fourth and final Triomphant Class SSBN, Le Terrible, will
replace L'Inflexible in 2010 with the M51 SLBM. France maintains
approximately 60 air-to-surface
supersonic missiles (ASMP) carried by fighter/bomber aircraft.
France is also the only country to continue to deploy nuclear
weapons on aircraft carriers, and the Charles de Gaulle carries
a squadroon of Super Étendards, thought to carry about
10 ASMPs. http://first.sipri.org/;
and Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "French
Nuclear Forces 2005" from NRDC: Nuclear
Notebook, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August
2005, volume 61(4), pp 73-75.
Nuclear Weapon Deployment/Storage Sites
Luxeuil les Bains- Mirage 2000 aircraft base and
nuclear weapons storage site
Istres- Mirage 2000 aircraft base and nuclear weapons storage
site
Landivisiau- Super Étendard aircraft
L’Ile Longue: SSBN bases
Toulon: Charles de Gaulle homeport naval base and nuclear
weapons storage site
Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "French Nuclear
Forces 2005" from NRDC: Nuclear Notebook, in Bulletin
of the
Atomic Scientists, July/August 2005, volume 61(4), pp 73-75.
http://abolition2000europe.org/index.php?op=ViewArticle&articleId=108&blogId=1
The Role of Nuclear Weapons in National Security
Strategy
Nuclear deterrence remains a central component of French national
defense, as outlined in the 1994 White Paper on Defense, Appended
report 2003-2008 Military programme, “Arms control,
disarmament, and non-proliferation: French policy.”
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/dossier/d54/sommaire_ang.html
Speaking at the Ile Longue nuclear submarine base in Brittany
on 19 January, 2006, President Jacques Chirac said France
was willing to use nuclear weapons as "a firm and appropriate
response from us" to an attack on France's "vital
interests". Chirac explicitly asserted that France has
reconfigured its nuclear forces in preparation for a tactical
nuclear strike against any country that it concludes has sponsored
an act of terrorism against France, or has used weapons of
mass destruction against France.
President Chirac also outlined the role of nuclear weapons
in French national security in a speech before L’Institut
des Hautes Études de la Défense Nationale, École
Militaire, Paris, 8 June 2001, including the following excerpt:
“Nuclear deterrence is first of all a major factor of
international stability. It is due to this deterrence that
Europe has been preserved for more than fifty years from the
ravages it had known in the course of the 20th century. Demanding
restraint, calling for reason, the credible nuclear threat
commands the peace... Our nuclear forces are not directed
against any country, and we have always refused that the nuclear
weapon be considered as a battle weapon used in a military
strategy… At the very time
when considerable arsenals still exist and others are being
developed in various parts of the world, this guarantee remains
fundamental...What I am affirming before you is that France,
while remaining faithful to its concept of non-use, has and
will conserve the means of maintaining the credibility of
its deterrence in face of all new threats…”
2.
Compliance with Article VI of NPT
Nuclear Weapons Modernization/Vertical Proliferation
France is planning to develop and deploy new nuclear weapons
for use through 2040, and shows no signs of planning to give
up its arsenal. In February 1996, French President Jacques
Chirac announced plans to consolidate French nuclear forces
and develop a new generation of nuclear weapons. France presented
a five-year military strategy in 2002, adopted in 2003, that
essentially extends these plans. France has a highly advanced
program to develop the capability to design and manufacture
modified or new nuclear weapons without explosive nuclear
testing. Notably, with the Laser Megajoule scheduled to be
fully operational in 2011, France and the United States are
the only states seeking to induce miniature thermonuclear
explosions in contained vessels in giant laser facilities.
Weapons Systems Modernization
Submarine Upgrades
France is building its fourth Triomphant-class nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) now. It is scheduled for
deployment in 2010. France is also developing two new missiles,
the M51.1 and M51.2, scheduled for 2010 and 2015 deployment
respectively, to replace the M45s. Although France had planned
to equip this new missile with an entirely new warhead, it
decided to use an upgraded Tête Nucléaire Oceanique
(TNO).
Bomber Upgrades
France is developing a longer-range version of its air-to-surface
missiles, or Air-Sol-Moyenne Portée (ASMP), the ASMP-A.
The ASMP-A will be equipped with a new warhead, the Tête
Nucléaire Aeroportée (TNA). France is also developing
a new multi-purpose fighter-bomber, the Rafale, which will
have both conventional and nuclear missions. The nuclear-equipped
squadroon (a configuration called the F-3) is scheduled to
be deployed in 2008. France eventually intends to replace
all its Mirage aircraft
with the Rafale, and has already ordered 243 aircraft for
the airforce and 60 for the navy.
Nuclear Weapons Reductions
France undertook major reductions and terminations in 1991-1992
and in 1996-1997.
The 1991 and 1992 measures include:
- abandonment of the strategic surface-to-surface S45 missile
program, which had been intended to replace the S3D missiles
on the Plateau d'Albion;
- early withdrawal of the Pluton short-range surface-to-surface
missiles;
- dismantling of the AN52 nuclear bombs carried by Jaguar
and Mirage III aircraft;
- reduction in the SSBNs in service from 6 to 5, and a longer
production timetable for new generation SSBNs;
- a cut in the Hadès short-range surface-to-surface
missile program from 120 to 130 units; &
- the decision to store rather than deploy this weapons system.
The 1996 measures include:
- limiting SSBNs maintained in the operational cycle to 4;
- withdrawing the Mirage IV strategic aircraft from nuclear
missions; and
- withdrawing from service the surface-to-surface component
on the Plateau d'Albion, the closure of this site and the
final withdrawal of the Hadès weapon system, followed
by the dismantling of its missiles.
France is now the only nuclear weapon state to have totally
eliminated its formerly deployed surface-to-surface nuclear
weapon systems.
Since the end of the Cold War, the total number of delivery
vehicles has been cut by over half.
Reducing the nuclear budget:
- the share of the defense budget allocated to nuclear expenditure
has been reduced by 58% since 1990; and
- the defense budget share in 2005 is 20.7% of the defense
equipment budget.
http://www.mvtpaix.org
The cessation of all nuclear testing and the dismantling
of the installations of the Pacific test site:
- following the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests decided
in April 1992 and after a final series of tests, France, on
29 January 1996, announced the cessation of all nuclear testing;
&
- the complete dismantling of the testing facilities in the
Pacific has been announced as early of 22 February 1996 and
completed by the end of July 1998.
France is the only nuclear weapon state to have closed down
and dismantled its nuclear testing facilities.
3.
Location and Capability of Nuclear Facilities
Power Reactors
Operational: 59
Shut down: 11
Decommissioned: 0
Planned: 0
http://www.iaea.or.at/programmes/a2/
Research Reactors
Operational: 14
Shut down: 12
Decommissioned: 5
Planned: 1
http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/rrdb/
Other nuclear facilities
CEA laser-based uranium enrichment research (SILVA)
AREVA NC* MOX fuel fabrication plant, Cadarache (Bouches-du-Rhône)
MELOX MOX fuel fabrication plant, Marcoule (Gard)
AREVA NC/SICN nuclear fuel fabrication plant, Veurey-Voroize
(Isère)
FBFC nuclear fuel fabrication plant, Romans-sur-Isère
(Drôme)
AREVA NC EURODIF enrichment plant, Tricastin (Drôme)
AREVA NC EURODIF George Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant
project, Tricastin (Drôme)
Comurhex uranium conversion plant, Malvési (Aude)
Comurhex uranium conversion plant, Pierrelatte (Drôme)
AREVA NC Pierrelatte TU5 conversion facility (Drôme)
AREVA NC nuclear spent fuel reprocessing facilities (La Hague)
Nuclear weapon research or production site (Limeil)
Megajoule Laser LMJ, Centre d’Etudes Scientifiques et
Techniques d’Aquitaine (Le Barp)
Nuclear weapon computer simulation testing facility, Ile-de-France
Center (Bruyères-le-Châtel)
Sub-critical testing facility (Moronvilliers)
http://www.antenna.nl/wise/uranium/epfr.html
*In spring 2006, COGEMA changed its name to
AREVA NC.
At Marcoule, the production of plutonium has been halted but
tritium production continues. The clean up of the site requires
the elimination of the stock of waste produced by the nuclear
fuel reprocessing plant. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/france/marcoule.htm
4.
Fissile Material Holdings
France suspended weapons-grade plutonium production in 1992
(Marcoule) and HEU production in 1996 (Pierrelatte uranium
enrichment plant), the first State to do so.
Military Stocks of Fissile Material
Plutonium: 5 tons
HEU: 29 tons
http://first.sipri.org/;
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/military_excess_heu.html
Declared Excess: 0
Unseparated Civil Plutonium: 183 tons
Separated Civil Plutonium: 80.1 tons: (48.1
tons nationally-owned, 32 tons foreign-owned)
Estimated by 2010: 48 tons nationally-owned
Estimated by 2015: 46 tons nationally-owned
Estimated by 2020: 43 tons nationally-owned
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/plutonium_watch2005.pdf
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/plutonium_watch2004.html
By significantly increasing the fraction of fresh plutonium
put into MOX fuel, France will have a large separated plutonium
stock well into the future. http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/separated_civil_pu.html
Civil HEU: 4.0-5.3 tons
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/civil_heu_watch2005.pdf
Waste Management
Low- and Medium-level waste: Since 1992, the Centre
de l’Aube Disposal Facility is currently France’s
site for LLW disposal. From 1969 to 1994, France used the
Manche Disposal Facility to store LLM and MLW, but it is now
full.
High-level waste: Spent nuclear fuel is kept for
one year on site in specially constructed storage pools. Following
storage, spent nuclear fuel is transported to the La Hague
and Marcoule reprocessing plants and stored in pools for two
to three years. High-level reprocessed waste is vitrified
(solidified) and stored at La Hague for several decades, where
it awaits final geologic disposal. The French Waste Management
Research Act of December 1991 authorized 15-year studies of
three management options for HLW, including separation and/or
transmutation, long-term storage, and geologic disposal. A
site at Bure (Meuse) under consideration for deep geologic
disposal in clay is currently being studied. The French were
also searching for a granite site to research, but strong
opposition from all 15 candidate sites in the West of France
forced the government to suspend the search
in mid-2006.
http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/factsheets/doeymp0411.shtml
http://www.francenuc.org/en_chn/waste_disp_e.htm
5.
Nuclear Activities
Nuclear Research Centers
BIOCLIM - Modelling Sequential Biosphere Systems under Climate
Change for Radioactive Waste Disposal
BRGM - Bureau de recherches géologiques et minières
WILPF Model Nuclear Inventory- 2007 38
CEA
CEA - Cadarache
CEA - Direction des Sciences de la Matière
CEA - DIST
CEA - Technologies Avancées
CECAM - Centre Européen de Calcul Atomique et Moléculaire
CENBG - Centre d'études nucléaires de Bordeaux
Gradignan
CEPN - Centre d'etude sur l'Evaluation de la Protection dans
le domaine Nucleaire
CESEN - Cercle d'étude sur l'énergie nucléaire
CNE - Commission nationale d'évaluation
CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
CRPG - Centre de Recherches Petrographiques et Geochiminiques
EDF Research Division
ESRF - European Synchrotron Radiation Facility
EVARISTE - Etude et Valorisation des Activités de Recherche
et d'Innovation Scientifique et Technique pour les Entreprises
GANIL - Grand Accélérateur National d'Ions Lourds
GdR FORPRO - Groupement de Recherches FORmations géologiques
PROfondes
Grenoble Hybrid Reactors Group
ILL - Institute Laue-Langevin
INERIS - Institut National de l'Environnement Industriel et
des Risques
L’Institut de Physique Nucléaire d'Orsay
LLB - Laboratoire Léon Brillouin
LURE - Laboratoire Français de rayonnement synchrotron
La Recherche
http://www.radwaste.org/research.htm
Nuclear Cooperation
Bulgaria: Agreement on nuclear power and safety.
China: France has had nine different nuclear cooperation
agreements with China from 1978 to 1994, including on nuclear
energy, nuclear safety, nuclear power supply and nuclear technology
for "peaceful purposes". http://www.nti.org/db/china/nca.htm
Germany: France is cooperating with Germany on a
program converting Russian weapon-grade plutonium into MOX*
fuel for civilian plants. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/france/nuke.htm
India: (February 2006) France and India signed an
agreement to pursue nuclear cooperation "for peaceful
purposes", but a more detailed agreement will not be
possible until after the results of the pending US-India nuclear
agreement. In the meantime, France will surely be supporting
India's pursuit of access to nuclear fuel and civilian technology.
Libya: (March 2006) Agreement on cooperation in civilian
nuclear technologies. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_04/francelibya.asp
Pakistan: Cooperation in nuclear technology for agriculture,
medicine, the environment, industry, and radiation protection.
Russia: France is participating in dismantling Russian
nuclear weapons by providing machine tools, radiological equipment,
containers, and a storage building, contributing 70 million
Euro to the project. France is cooperating with Germany on
a program converting weapon-grade plutonium into MOX* fuel
for civilian plants. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/france/nuke.htm
Ukraine: Cooperation in nuclear fuel cycle and waste
treatment techniques.
US: Agreement (24 August 2004) to provide DOE access
to the PHENIX fast spectrum test reactor.
Vietnam: Agreement (26 May 2004) to cooperate on
the construction of a nuclear power plant by 2020.
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf38.html
6.
International Non-proliferation Efforts
France is also a participant in the G8 Global Partnership
against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction,
launched in Kananaskis, Canada 2002.
Treaties Signed and Ratified
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)
Protocols I, with reservations, II & III, 31 July 1997
Antarctic Treaty, 16 September 1960
APM Convention, 23 July 1998
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 27 September 1984
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, 4 March 1988
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, 6 April 1998
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,
6 September 1991
Chemical Weapons Convention, 2 March 1995
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 3 August 1992
Outer Space Treaty, 5 August 1970
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)
Protocols 1 & 3, 20 September 1996
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) Protocols I &
II, with reservations, 24 August 1992 & 22 March 1974,
respectively
France ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol on 10 April 2004.
Multilateral Groups
Australia Group
Conference on Disarmament
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
International Atomic Energy Agency
Missile Technology Control Regime
Nuclear Suppliers Group
Proliferation Security Initiative
Wassenaar Arrangement
Zangger Committee
http://first.sipri.org/
7.
Positions Taken in International Fora on Various Issues of
Nuclear Disarmament
Nuclear Deterrence: “Since the end of the
Cold War, French deterrence doctrine has gone through several
stages of its formulation without any changes in its foundations:
the "White Book" of 1994, the President of the Republic's
speech of August 1995, that of the 8th of June 2001 at the
IHEDN, and lastly, the 19th January 2006 speech... The President
of the Republic recalled that the fundamental principles of
deterrence have not changed. The calling of French deterrence
is to secure the vital interests of France against any threat,
irrespective of where it may come from and what form it may
take. In the framework of this concept, French nuclear weapons
are not weapons to be used in a battle Our concept remains
the same; in no case shall there be question of using nuclear
means with military aims in a conflict.” - Statement
by Ambassador François Rivasseau to the Conference
on Disarmament, 7 February 2006. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches06/7FebFrance_Eng.pdf
Nuclear Disarmament: “I would remind you that
France has always underlined the considerable imbalance between
the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States
and its own, but that, should that imbalance be altered following
successive reductions, it might envisage drawing the consequences
of this.” - Statement by Ambassador François
Rivasseau to the 2005 NPT Review Conference New York, 19 May
2005. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/MCI/France19.pdf
Article VI Implementation: "In implementing
its commitments concretely, France is guided in particular
by the programme of action decided at the time of the NPT's
indefinite extension in 1995. That programme's three points
were: conclusion of the CTBT, negotiation of the Fissile Material
Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), and a determination to press forward
systematically and progressively towards the reduction of
nuclear weapons globally and to work for general and complete
disarmament." - Statement by Ambassador François
Rivasseau to the 2005 NPT Review Conference New York, 19 May
2005. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/MCI/France19.pdf
Security Assurances: "Must I also recall that
France reaffirmed and specified in 1995 the security guarantees
to non-nuclear weapon States that are parties to the NPT?
The French delegation, as well as that of other nuclear powers,
provides in particular negative security guaranteed to these
States. As we had then said, this does naturally in no way
affect our right, natural, of legitimate defense, as recalled
in article 51 of the United Nations Charter." -
Statement by Ambassador François Rivasseau to the Conference
on Disarmament, 7 February 2006. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches06/7FebFrance_Eng.pdf
Non-compliance: "The Security Council has a
central role in addressing cases of proliferation in the last
resort and to give an opinion on their implications for the
maintenance of international peace and security. It would
be useful for the Conference to call for the strengthening
of ties between the Council and the IAEA... Failure to fulfill
non-proliferation obligations will inevitably have repercussions
on the conduct of nuclear cooperation. France recommends that
from now on such cooperation be suspended
until sutable corrective measures are implemented by the State
concerned under the IAEA's control." - Statement
by Ambassador François Rivasseau to the 2005 NPT Review
Conference, New York, 5 May 2005. http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt05france.pdf
Export Controls: “[T]he role played by the
Zangger committee in the implementation of the provisions
of article III-2 is to be welcomed. This Committee could in
fact undertake some initiatives with a view to universalizing
the general principles governing export control. However,
the rules for controlling exports must be adapted and strictly
consistent with all the obligations imposed by the Treaty.
It is this constant goal concern that guides France in the
actions it undertakes among the Nuclear Suppliers
Group...” - Statement by Ambassador Patrick
Villemur to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Main Committee
II, New York, 20 May 2005. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/MCII/france20.pdf
Article IV: "Though my country recognises the
inalienable right of States--enshrined in article IV of the
NPT--to benefit from the development of nuclear energy for
peaceful ends and from international cooperation in this field,
it nevertheless considers that this right can only be legitimately
exercised through the scrupulous respect of the provisions
of articles I and II and the safeguard provisions contained
in article III of the Treaty, this being a fundamental condition
for installing a climate of confidence. On
the other hand, the right to nuclear energy may only be exercised
if a State is pursuing, in compliance with the principle of
good faith, "peaceful purposes". - Statement
by Ambassador Patrick Villemur to the 2005 NPT Review Conference,
Main Committee III, New York, 19 May 2005. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/MCIII/France.pdf
Fuel cycle: "France, together with other States,
is seeking to promote the adoption of the additional protocol
as a condition for supplying and exporting the most sensitive
technologies and products relating to the fuel cycle. -
Statement by Ambassador Patrick Villemur to the 2005 NPT Review
Conference, Main Committee III, New York, 19 May 2005.
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/
RevCon05/MCIII/France.pdf
Universality: "[D]o I need to remind you of
the importance of the issue of the NPT's universality? ...
It is desirable that we should, as of now and through dialogue,
bring India, Israel and Pakistan to com as close as possible
to international standards for non-proliferation and export
controls." - Statement by Ambassador François
Rivasseau to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, New York, 5 May
2005. http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt05france.pdf
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