

Introduction

Two years after the 2005 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) failed so spectacularly, governmental and non-governmental experts, analysts and activists are wondering how to pick up the pieces. It is imperative that we work together to salvage the most popular disarmament and arms control treaty by reinforcing its central bargain: the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in exchange for their disarmament. Thirty-seven years ago, states without nuclear weapons pledged never to acquire them, and in exchange, states with nuclear weapons, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China at the time, pledged to eliminate them.

Even as actors on both sides of the original bargain grow increasingly frustrated, the original bargain remains as relevant as ever. The original threats posed by nuclear weapons still exist, and now the possibility non-state actors acquiring and using nuclear weapons has been added to the threat of state acquisition and use. National, regional and international political dynamics within and among states also continue to evolve quickly, so neither is it safe for any state to possess the power to destroy all life. It is in the best interest of humanity to both contain and abolish these nightmarish weapons.

Regardless, the institutions and treaties that maintain and strengthen the original bargain have almost all stalled. Members of the Conference on Disarmament, responsible for negotiating new disarmament treaties, and the Disarmament Commission, responsible for recommending solutions to problems in disarmament and non-proliferation, are struggling to begin work after years of deadlock. Eleven years after its negotiation, the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty has yet to enter-into-force. Governments have been unable to even begin negotiating a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, after having agreed to do so over ten years ago. The World Summit, marking 60 years in the life of the United Nations, could not produce any agreement on disarmament, the subject of its first resolution. Most importantly, states parties to the NPT were unable to agree on any substantive review of that treaty in 2005.

We are not without cause for hope, however. This five-year review cycle of the NPT offers the opportunity to rescue the regime, and governments are showing signs of seizing what may be one of their last chances to do so. At the time of this publication, members of both the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission are coming closer to agreement than they have in years. New non-traditional groupings of states are working together to make progress. In this cycle, there will be a change in the leadership of four out of the five nuclear weapon states, opening the possibility for movement with new negotiating partners.

In this context, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom would like to offer this Model Nuclear Inventory as another tool for both bridge-building and accountability. In it, we track the military and civilian nuclear weapons, materials, locations, and policies in the NPT states parties of the 44 states listed as having significant nuclear capabilities in Annex II of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Because it tracks the compliance of the nuclear weapon states with their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT and the proliferation-sensitive activities and materials in non-nuclear weapon states, an Inventory is useful to all members of the NPT. As such, it is a possible area of agreement and collective action.

Moreover, an Inventory increases transparency, which is a tool for confidence-building and accountability. An extreme lack of trust pervades the disarmament arena, and transparent information exchange on nuclear programs can increase confidence among states honoring their obligations. It also offers an objective tool to hold those in non-compliance to account.

As we work to secure our common future, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom would like to highlight two points of this Inventory. First, reductions in nuclear weapons are a positive and appreciated step in the right direction, but we want the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Therefore, examining the role of nuclear weapons in national security and the state of planning for their

elimination are fundamental to evaluating compliance with Article VI of the NPT, and perhaps more important than numeric reductions. Second, any nuclear energy program can evolve into a nuclear weapons program with a political decision. A completed nuclear fuel cycle greatly increases the speed and ability to make this switch if it is so decided. Therefore, examining the state of nuclear energy programs is fundamental to assessing proliferation risks, regardless of current political leadership.

For nuclear weapon states, and non-nuclear weapon states with foreign nuclear weapons deployed on their soil, the Inventory takes account of the following categories:

1. Amount, Location, and Operational Plan of Nuclear Weapons

Strategic weapons

Tactical weapons

Deployment/storage sites

The role of nuclear weapons in national security strategies

2. Compliance with Article VI of the NPT

Nuclear weapons modernization/Vertical Proliferation

Weapons systems modernization

Nuclear weapons reductions

Major nuclear weapons facilities shut down

3. Location and capability of nuclear facilities

Quantity and status of power reactors

Quantity and status of research reactors

Fuel fabrication facilities, including uranium mines, enrichment, and reprocessing

4. Fissile Material Holdings

Plutonium and enriched uranium stocks

Declared excess stocks

Methods and policies for low-, intermediate-, and high-level radioactive waste disposal

5. Nuclear Activities

Research programs/centers

Bilateral and multilateral nuclear cooperation programs and agreements

6. International Nonproliferation Efforts

Treaties signed and ratified, date of deposit

Multilateral groups of which they are members

7. Positions Taken in International Fora on Various Issues of Nuclear Disarmament

Excerpts of statements made at NPT Preparatory Committee and Review Conferences, General Assembly sessions, Conference on Disarmament sessions, Security Council sessions and others

For non-nuclear weapon states, the Inventory takes account of the following categories:

1. Location and capability of nuclear facilities

Quantity and status of power reactors

Quantity and status of research reactors

Fuel fabrication facilities, including uranium mines, enrichment, and reprocessing

2. Fissile Material Holdings

Plutonium and uranium stocks

Methods and policies for low-, intermediate-, and high-level radioactive waste disposal

3. Nuclear Activities

Research centers

Bilateral and multilateral nuclear cooperation programs and agreements

4. International Nonproliferation Efforts

Treaties signed and ratified, date of deposit

Multilateral groups of which they are members

5. Positions Taken in International Fora on Various Issues of Nuclear Disarmament

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