Model Nuclear Inventory 2007
Russian Federation

Date of first nuclear explosion - 29 August 1949

1. Amount, Location, and Operational Plan of Nuclear Weapons
2. Compliance with Article VI of the NPT
3. Location and capability of nuclear facilities
4. Fissile material holdings
5. Nuclear activities
6. International non-proliferation efforts
7. Positions taken in international fora on various issues of disarmament

Because Russia has released very little information about its nuclear stockpile, there is less detailed information here than for some of the other nuclear weapon states, and a greater uncertainty range.

Deployment and Storage Sites
Missile sites (19)
Aleysk, Barnaul, Bershet, Dombraovskiy, Drovyanaya, Irkustsk, Kansk, Kartaly, Kostroma, Kozelsk, Krasnoyarsk, Nizhni Tagil, Novosibirks, Tatischevo, Teykobo, Ushar, Vypolzovo, Yoshkar-Ola, Yurya
Bomber sites
Engels Air Base, Ryazan, Ukrainka
SSBN sites
Gadzhiyevo, Rybachi, Severodvinsk
Storage sites
Russia has reduced the number of nuclear weapon storage sites from over 500 to under 100, likely about 80 sites. The following sixteen of these are thought to be large national storage sites that can hold between 240-400 warheads: Olenegorsk; Bulyzhino; Chebsara; Mozhaysk; Zhukovka; Golovchino; Borisoglebs; Krasnoarmeyskoye; Nizhnyaya Tura; Karabash; Yuryuzan; Dodonovo; Zalari; Malaya Sazanka; Khabarovsk; and Komsomolsk-na-Amure.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/storage.htm

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in National Security Strategy
In May 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin told Russia's Federal Assembly that nuclear deterrence and the "strategic balance of forces" are still central to Russian nuclear policy. However, in November, Putin clarified that balance means the capability to destroy "any potential agressor, no matter what modern weapon systems this agressor possesses," and not necessarily numeric parity.

At a conference on maintaining stable operation of the nuclear weapons industry in Novo-Ogarevo, 30 March 2006, President Putin said Russia "view[s] its nuclear deterrent as a fundamental element guaranteeing its security". He also said that "maintaining the minimum level of nuclear armaments required for nuclear deterrence remains one of the top priorities of Russian Federation policy."

However, in June 2006, Russia published a white paper on non-proliferation saying terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction is the "greatest threat faced by Russia".

On 10 January 2000, Acting President Vladimir Putin signed the new National Security Concept (NSC) of the Russian Federation, an updated version of the NSC signed by President Boris Yeltsin in 1997. The broad guidelines outlined in the NSC are developed in further detail in the Military Doctrine, approved in May 2000.

The key articles of the NSC pertaining to nuclear weapons are the following:

1) “The most important task of the Russian Federation is to implement deterrence in the interests of preventing aggression on any scale, including with the use of nuclear weapons, against Russia and its allies.”
2) “The Russian Federation should possess nuclear weapons capable of guaranteed infliction of a predetermined damage to any aggressor state or coalition of states under any circumstances.”
3) It also upholds the right to “the use of all forces and means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in case it needs to repel an armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted or proved ineffective.”

The third article implies a provision of use of nuclear weapons to deter smaller-scale wars that do not necessarily threaten Russia's existence and sovereignty- a revision from the previous concept outlined in 1997. The new mission also implies a limited use of nuclear weapons in contrast to an all-out nuclear strike in response to a massive attack.

The cornerstone of current Russian nuclear policy focuses on defending the country from a nuclear attack by NATO. On March 25, 2004, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov announced that Russia is considering revising its nuclear policy in light of NATO expansion and its “current offensive military doctrine”.

Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Russian nuclear forces, 2007,” from NRDC: Nuclear Notebook in Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, March/April 63(2), pp 61-67, available at: http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/d41x498467712117/fulltext.pdf;
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/concept.htm
http://www.bits.de/EURA/natsecconc.pdf

2. Compliance with Article VI of NPT

The 2000 NSC confirms Russia’s intention to implement arms control agreements, in particular noting its intent to “adapt the existing arms control and disarmament agreements to the new conditions in international relations, as well as develop, as necessary, new agreements, first of all with respect to confidence and security building measures.”
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/concept.htm

Nuclear Weapons Modernization/Vertical Proliferation
While reducing its nuclear stockpile, Russia has been developing new land- and sea-based forces, and modernizing its airforces. This is part of a doctrinal shift from a "substantially redundant" to a "minimally sufficient" deterrence posture, that maintains all three legs--land, sea, and air--of its nuclear triad for the foreseeable future.

Missile Upgrades
In June 2006, President Putin recommended that the US and Russia replace START I with a new treaty when it expires in December 2009, expressing particular concern about the "stagnation we see today in the area of disarmament". However, even though START I prohibits increasing the current number of warheads per missile, Russia declared in December 2006 that it will be putting multiple warheads on its single-warhead Topol-M ICBMs. Russia has already withdrawn from the provisions of START II so it could retain MIRVed ICBMs, and may also MIRV its SLBMs. By increasing the number of warheads on its missiles, Russia can save money and maintain strategic parity with the rapidly modernizing United States.

Russia also has plans to upgrade and extend the service life of many of its missiles. It is upgrading its SS-27s to manoeuvre in flight in order to penetrate missile defense systems. It has plans to extend the service-life of four more missiles, and has ordered almost 100 new missiles for deployment by 2015.

Submarine Upgrades
Russia is building three SSBNs of a new class, called Project 955 Borei, planed to be commissioned in 2007, 2009, and 2011. Russia plans to commission eight of these SSBNs, which can carry up to 16 missiles, by 2015. It is upgrading three other classes of SSBN. Along with these submarine upgrades, Russia is developing a new SLBM and modernizing another. The upgraded version of the SS-N-23 is currently being deployed, while a new three-stage, solid-propellant SLBM, the SS-NX-30, or Bulava, is being developed.

Nuclear Weapons Reductions
Based on statements from Russian generals, experts estimate that over the next fifteen years, there will be a 48% decrease in Russia's overall warhead levels, including an 86% decrease in warheads on ICBMs, a 19% increase in warheads on SSBNs, and a 17% decrease in warheads on bombers.

Program Truncations
Under the Moscow Treaty, Russia withdrew approximately 60 ballistic missiles from operational service. Russia also plans to withdraw most of the multiple-warhead SS-18 and -19 missiles, decreasing the total number of ICBMs by nearly 70% over the next five years. By 2008, all heavy SS-18 R-36MUTTH missiles will be withdrawn from service. Remaining heavy missiles, the SS-18/RS-20V, will remain in service for 10-15 years.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2004/12/strategic_rocket_forces_comman.shtml

Nuclear Systems Retired
In 2005, Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces completed retiring all SS-24 rail-mobile missiles. Russia's roughly 40 remaining R-36MUTTKh are scheduled to be decommissioned after 2007-2009. The Typhoon-class SSBN was decommissioned at the end of April 2004, retiring the 10-warhead capable SS-N-20 SLBM. Three Typhoon SSBNs are still technically part of the fleet, but they do not have operational missiles. Russia also decommissioned a sixth Delta III SSBN, and will likely decommission more (there are now five in operation) as the new Borey-class SSBN becomes operational.

Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Russian nuclear forces, 2007,” from NRDC: Nuclear Notebook in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 63(2), pp 61-67, available at: http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/d41x498467712117/fulltext.pdf

3. Location and Capability of Nuclear Facilities

Power Reactors
Operational: 31
Shut down: 5
Decommissioned: 0
Under construction: 5
Planned: 0
http://www.iaea.or.at/programmes/a2/

Research Reactors
Operational: 49
Shut down: 36
Decommissioned: 11
Under construction: 1
Planned: 0
http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/rrdb/

Sergei Kirienko, the head of Rosatom, the primary Russian agency responsible for nuclear weapons, estimated that Russia has a 615,000 tons of uranium, adding that mining uranium had become profitable.

At the same tiem, Kirienko announced that the Russian joint venture with uranium rich Kazakhstan, called Zarechnoe, will begin mining in January or February of 2007. He said Russia was prepared to cooperate with all countries engaged in uranium, including Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and said they "already have an active dialogue with Mongolia."
http://www.bellona.org/news/uranium_kirienko

On January 10, 2005, nuclear power minister Alexander Rumyantsev announced that a program on uranium mines development in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine should be drafted for many years ahead.
http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke_industry/co-operation/36889.html

Russia may also construct new large uranium-mining enterprises in South Yakutia, with production begun by 2015. If exploited, the deposits in these areas will double uranium production from the current 2200-2500 tons to 4000-4500 tons by 2010.
http://www.antenna.nl/wise/

4. Fissile Material Holdings

Military Stocks of Fissile Materials
Plutonium: 95 tons
HEU: 1070 (+/- 300) tons

Declared Excess
Plutonium: 50 tons
HEU: 500 tons originally; 300 tons remaining
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/military_pu.pdf (revised June 30, 2005)
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/military_excess_heu.pdf (revised June 30, 2005)

Unseparated Civil Plutonium: 88 tons
Separated Civil Plutonium: 38.2 tons (38.2 tons in country, 0.0006 tons in other countries)
Estimated by 2010: 45 tons nationally-owned
Estimated by 2015: 42 tons nationally-owned
Estimated by 2020: 38 tons nationally-owned
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/plutonium_watch2005.pdf (revised August, 2005)

Civil HEU: 15-30 tons
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/civil_heu_watch2005.pdf (revised August, 2005)

Radioactive Waste Management
Although Russian environmental law forbade the import of radioactive waste for storage in Russia, MINATOM fought to bring spent nuclear fuel (SNF) as a means of generating revenue. Environmentalists eventually lost the fight in June of 2001, when President Putin signed a package of laws that would allow Russia to import SNF for "technical storage" and "reprocessing". Subsequently, Russia made contacts with Switzerland, Germany, Spain, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan for deals.

Reprocessing takes place at Chelyabinsk-65 in Ozersk, with a second facility scheduled for start up at Krasnoyarsk this year.

In 2005, a spent fuel dry storage facility at Zheleznogorsk was approved, for completion in 2007 at a cost of US$ 360 million. It will take fuel from Leningrad and Kursk initially.

Russia is currently investigating several regions as potential sites for deep geologic disposal plans.

Low-level waste: Some LLW are condensed by evaporation and recyled; other waste is solidified and buried in concrete burial units or trenches. Untreated LLW are injected underground into porous rocks surrounded by clay.

High-level waste: Spent nuclear fuel is stored on-site, vitrified, or converted into solid form.
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/reactor/waste/snf.htm
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf45.html
http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/factsheets/pdf/doeymp0414.pdf

5. Nuclear Activities

Nuclear Research Centers
Budker Institute of Nuclear Physics
Center for Arms Control, Energy & Environmental Studies
Dubna Joint Inst for Nuclear Research
Federal Nuclear Center Snezhinsk - Chelyabinsk 70
Flerov Laboratory of Nuclear Reactions
IBRAE - Nuclear Safety Inst
INR - Inst for Nuclear Research
IPPE - Inst for Physics & Power Engineering
IPPE Fission, Fusion & Laser Studies Dept.
Khlopin Radium Inst
Kurchatov Inst
Moscow Power Engineering Inst
Research Inst of Atomic Reactors
Russian Academy of Sciences
SIA Radon
St Petersburg Nuclear Physics Inst
Troitsk Institute for Innovation & Fusion Research
VNIIEF - Sarov Inst of Experimental Physics
VNIIT - Inst of Technical Physics
VNIITF
http://www.radwaste.org/research.htm

Nuclear Cooperation
Bulgaria: Plans to construct a unit at the Belina nuclear power plant.
http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke_industry/co-operation/36913.html

China: Supply of experimental fast breeder reactor based on Russia’s BN-699; completion of enrichment facility. 1998 agreement to cooperate on two new reactor units in Lianyungang, and supply equipment and training.

Iran: Agreement to supply fuel for the Bushehr plant, signed February 27, 2005. In February 1998, Russia and Iran agreed the Russian company Atomstroyexport would construct the Bushehr plant.

India: June 1998 agreement to construct two reactor units at Kundakulam with an option to construct four more. August 2000 agreement to supply nuclear fuel for Tarapur, followed by December 2004 statement that it could no longer do so because of membership in the NSG. 1 February 2007 agreement to construct four more nuclear reactors for India's Kudankulam nuclear power plant, which will only be implemented if the the Nuclear Suppliers Group lifts its ban on nuclear cooperation with India. At the same time, President Putin and Prime Minister Singh adopted a joint statement agreeing to a bilateral program for civilian nuclear cooperation in 2007.
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/india-nuclear-miles.html
http://www.energy-daily.com/reports/Russia_To_Build_Four_More_Nuclear_Reactors_In_India_999.html

Indonesia: 16 August, 2003, cooperation agreement including: development, design, construction, and operation of research reactors and nuclear power plants, including small power plants that comprise the floating nuclear power units, and R&D; facilities and accelerators for irradiation in medicine and industry; administrative and scientific personnel training and retraining; the state regulation of nuclear and radiation safety. The agreement is to be concluded for 10 years with automatic extension for the next five-year period. Russian cooperation in planning for Indonesia's first nuclear reactor began in late 2006.
http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke_industry/co-operation/31260.html

Libya: Contract to modrenize Tajurah research reactor
Statement by Igor Khripunov, Associate Director, Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia at the Russian
American Nuclear Security Advisory Council Congressional Strategic Stability and Security Seminar Series, July 19, 2002, at:
http://www.ransac.org/Issues/Russian%20International%20Nuclear%20Cooperation/Other/seminar4_writeup2.html

Romania: In March, 2003, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov announced that Russia will provide a loan to Romania for the construction of two nuclear reactors.

Syria: Agreement to construct research reactor

United States: At a 15 July, 2006 press conference, Presidents Bush and Putin announced an intended nuclear cooperation agreement, including the development of advanced reactor technologies, production of mixed-oxide (MOX, a mix of plutonium and uranium oxides) fuel, and storage and possible reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel in Russia.
http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_78.html

Joint Research Centre (JRC): European Community research center that is cooperating with Russia on nuclear safety, materials accountancy, and physical protection of materials.
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/intnatl/intnatl.htm

Russia has also been the focus of a great deal of international assistance for nuclear safety, both in terms of energy and weapons. Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States all have national programs assisting nuclear safety in Russia. The United States' program, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership of February 2006, includes non-proliferation as one of its goals. The following multilateral initiatives also exist:

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Nuclear Safety Account (NSA): designed to fund short-term safety improvements to older nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Contributors include Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Denmark, Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Belguim, Italy, Japan, the United States, and the European Union.

PHARE of the European Union: nuclear assistance for improving the operational safety of nuclear power plants and the training of their operators.

Technical Assistance to the CIS (TACIS): assistance from the European Community to improve nuclear safety in the former Soviet Union, including Russia.

Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) Framework Agreement: Signed on 21 May 2003, this is the first general framework agreement covering European nuclear assistance projects in Russia. It was designed to address problems with radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Russia, Belgium, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States signed the agreement, although the United States opted out of one of the protocols.
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/intnatl/intnatl.htm

6. International Non-proliferation Efforts

In the 2000 National Security Concept, proliferation is included as a separate plank in the list of threats to national security, demonstrating Russia’s priority with non-proliferation and arms control. The concept also lists among priorities “measures to ensure international control over the export of military and dual-use products, technologies, and services.”
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/concept.htm

Russia is also a participant in the G8 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, launched in Kananaskis, Canada 2002.

Treaties Signed and Ratified
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notification of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, 31 May 1988
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) Protocols I & II, not yet ratified
Antarctic Treaty, 2 November 1960
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 26 March 1975
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, 10 June 1982
Chemical Weapons Convention, 5 November 1997
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 30 June 2000
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 25 May 1983
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 5 March 1970
Outer Space Treaty, 10 October 1967
Partial Test Ban Treaty, 10 October 1963
Sea Bed Treaty, 18 May 1972
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) Protocols 2 & 3, 21 April 1988
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT Treaty), 1 June 2003
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) Protocol II, with reservations, 8 January 1979
Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), 1 June 1988
Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I Treaty), 5 December 1994

Russia signed the IAEA Additional Protocol on 22 March 2000 but it has not yet entered-into-force.

Multilateral Groups
Conference on Disarmament
Hague Code of Conduct
Missile Technology Control Regime
Nuclear Suppliers Group
Proliferation Security Initiative
Wassenaar Arrangement
Zangger Committee
http://first.sipri.org/index.php

7. Positions Taken in International Fora on Various Issues of Nuclear Disarmament

Fuel Cycle: "[A]n objectively growing interest of many states in nuclear energy may, as a result of the trend for global proliferation of sensitive technologies, give rise to concern. Apart from the current purposeful steps in search of negotiationed solutions to individual problems, such as Iranian nuclear program, and the Korean Peninsula problem, there is a need for urgent internaitonal effort of the entire international community geared towards a systematic strengthening [of] non-proliferation regimes on a generally acceptable basis, while ensuring that the benefits of peaceful atomic energy [remains] legitimitely accessible to all states. President Vladimir V. Putin’s initiative to establish Multilateral Centers for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Services, similar ideas of the IAEA executives, and proposals by the U.S. President George W. Bush running in the same vein, have found support among the G8 leaders. We are confident that integration of such approaches and their practical implementations in cooperation with all countries, who have an interest in modern, safe nuclear energy, would allow it to resolve non-proliferation issues in a non-confrontational manner." - Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergey V. Lavrov to the 61st session of the General Assembly, 21 September 2006. http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/pdfs/russian_federation-e.pdf

Fuel Cycle: "We share the opinion of the IAEA Director General M. ElBaradei, that today there is no reason to create additional facilities for uranium enrichment or reprocessing of irradiated fuel. The world already has more than enough capacity. We thus support the idea of developing multilateral approaches and practical cooperation patterns in the sphere." - Statement by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, New York, 3 May 2005.
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/GDstatements/russiadepminister.pdf

Safeguards: The Additional Protocol being in place should serve as one of the factors to betaken into account when considering nuclear export possibilities. At present Russia is willing to regard it as one of the conditions for transferring sensitive nuclear technology and equipment." National Report on the Implementation of the NPT, submitted to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, New York, May 2005.

Nuclear disarmament: Despite implementation of its [START] obligations well ahead of schedule, Russia has pursued the policy towards further elimination of strategic offensive armaments. We proposed to our US partners to launch a negotiating process, because START expires in December 2009." - Statement by the Russian Representative to the First Committee of the 61st General Assembly, New York, 10 October 2006. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com06/statements/Russiaoct10.pdf

Nuclear disarmament: “In our view, general and complete nuclear disarmament is a goal to which we should move in a phased manner, on the basis of a comprehensive approach and without putting forward unrealisitic goals or targets. Nuclear disarmament, including non-strategic nuclear arms reductions, may not be pursued in isolation from other types of weapons or outside of the overall political situation in the world...I believe that the relevant provision of the Final Document of the previous Review Conference is worth mentioning, namely, that nuclear disarmament steps should be pursued ‘in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all.’”- Statement by H.E. Anatoly Antonov to the Third Preparatory Committee of the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT, New York, 28 April 2004. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/russia27.pdf

Universality: “Despite all the difficulties and growing skepticism, we hould not slacken our efforts toward making the NPT truly universal. We must engage in a joint search for ways and means of bringing the states remaining outside of the Treaty scope in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. I am referring, in particular, to expanding the IAEA verification activity in those states’ territories, strengthening national legislations in the field of accounting, verification and physical protection of the nuclear materials, as well as export control measures. We expect the governments of those states to realize the great responsibility they bear for the nuclear non-proliferation regime.” - Statement by H.E. Anatoly Antonov to the Third Preparatory Committee of the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT, New York, 28 April 2004.
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/russia27.pdf

777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
This site was created by Kache Productions ©2008