Model Nuclear Inventory 2007
United States of America

Date of first nuclear explosion - 16 July 1945

1. Amount, Location, and Operational Plan of Nuclear Weapons
2. Compliance with Article VI of the NPT
3. Location and capability of nuclear facilities
4. Fissile material holdings
5. Nuclear activities
6. International non-proliferation efforts
7. Positions taken in international fora on various issues of disarmament

Foreign Deployment Sites
Around 400 US nuclear weapons are also deployed in Europe, in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. For deployment locations, weapons types, and numbers, see the chapters for those states.

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in National Security Strategy

Key documents: Nuclear Posture Review (January 2002), National Security Strategy (September 2002), National Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002)

Recent security policy documents such as these maintain the role of nuclear weapons in US national security policy, including the use of nuclear weapons in “immediate, potential or unexpected contingencies” against a number of named countries including Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) establishes a New Triad, composed of:

• Offensive strike system (both nuclear and non-nuclear)
• Defenses (both active and passive)
• A revitalized defense infrastructure that will provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet emerging threats.

In March 2005, the Department of Defense posted, and then removed, a controversial draft revision of its doctrine for nuclear weapons operations on its website.The draft used unusually clear language regarding policies on the use of nuclear weapons in a wide variety of circumstances other than retaliation for nuclear weapons use by another state. After much controversy, the DoD withdrew the draft nuclear doctrine documents and cancelled the revision of the doctrine.
http://www.wslfweb.org/nukes/nukeops.htm
draft DoD documents at: http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/doctrine/3_12fc2.pdf
DoD comments available at: http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/doctrine/cc312fc.pdf

The National Security Strategy (NSS) calls for:

• Proactive counterproliferation efforts...integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries
• Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people...(to) help deter those who possess such weapons... the United States must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our forces abroad

The NSS also recognizes that deterrence is no longer “an effective defense” in a post-Cold War scenario. It asserts that “rogue states...see these (WMD) as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.”

The National Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction has three principal pillars:

• Counterproliferation: Interdiction, deterrence, defense and mitigation
• Strengthened Nonproliferation: Active non-proliferation diplomacy, multilateral regimes, non-proliferation and threat reduction cooperation, controls on nuclear materials, US export controls, non-proliferation sanctions;
• Consequence Management to Respond to WMD Use: Coordination of all federal efforts.

The Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept, released in February 2004, is also useful in understanding the role of US nuclear weapons in its national security strategy. According to Western States Legal Foundation, the concept paper intends "to help guide decisions about force development and weapons acquisition. This paper lays out a broad vision of "deterrence" encompassing preemptive warfare and an integrated spectrum of high-tech force, from conventional weapons with global reach to more "credible" nuclear options, intended to allow the U.S. to overpower adversaries anywhere on earth." http://www.wslfweb.org/nukes/nukeops.htm

2. Compliance with Article VI of the NPT

Nuclear Weapons Modernization/Vertical Proliferation
In April 2006, the US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced its plans for "Complex 2030", a plan to design new nuclear weapons and resume industrial-scale bomb production. The NNSA subsequently published an October "Notice of Intent" to build this Complex, which would cost over US$ 150 billion over the next 25 years. Complex 2030 will revamp the US nuclear weapons infrastructure. According to a June 2006 NNSA press release, it will enable "a smaller, safer, more secure and more reliable stockpile [that] is backed up by a robust industrial and design capability to better respond to changing technical, geopolitical or military needs.”

The centerpiece of Complex 2030 is the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). Although the numbers and types of warheads remains unclear, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the US weapons labs see this as a way to rebuild every US nuclear weapon. One DOE report in 2005 envisioned a new-design RRW coming out of the weapons labs every five years, with up to 125 new nuclear weapons being produced each year. On 2 March 2007, the DOE selected a new design for the first nuclear weapon to be produced after the Cold War.

It should be noted that the DOE sees this as a way retain nuclear weapons indefinitely, while reducing their numbers. An NNSA factsheet even stated that, “Once it is demonstrated that replacement warheads can be produced on a timescale in which geopolitical threats could emerge, or the nuclear weapons complex can respond in a timely way to technical problems in the stockpile, further reductions can be made in reducing on-deployed warheads.” Thus, the United States will be able to point to weapons reductions while simultaneously planning for the indefinite retention of their nuclear weapons arsenal.

Weapons Systems Modernization

Missile Upgrades
Over the next six years, the warheads on the Minuteman III missile force will be changed to almost twice their current yield, and will be more accurate.

Submarine Upgrades
The Pacific-based nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) were upgraded to carry the newer and more accurate Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), with higher yield warheads. An even newer, modified D5 missile is being produced, with plans for 108 new missiles by 2011, to be deployed in 2013. An SLBM-based warhead is also being modified to include a groundburst capability, making it more lethal, and is scheduled to be delivered to the navy in September 2007.

The four older SSBNs that were converted to nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), entered into service in 2006, and can each carry up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles.

Bomber Upgrades
The airforce is upgrading both its B-2A Spirit and B-52H Stratofortress bombers' communications systems. The B-52's cruise missiles are undergoing service life-extension programs, extending them to 2030. A modified warhead, the W80-3, is scheduled for delivery in 2008.

Nuclear Weapons Reductions

• Reduced number of deployed strategic warheads to 6,000 by December 1991 as required by the START Treaty;
• Eliminated 1,032 launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 350 heavy bombers, and 28 ballistic missile submarines;
• Eliminated nearly 90% of US non-strategic nuclear weapons, reduced the number of non-strategic nuclear weapon storage sites in Europe by 80%, and the types of nuclear systems in Europe from 9 in 1991 to 1;
• Dismantled approx. 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1988;
• Halted production of plutonium for nuclear weapons in 1988;
• Halted nuclear explosive testing in 1992;
• Removed more than 200 tons of fissile material from military stockpile;
• Deactivated 42 of 50 MX (“Peacekeeper”) ICBMs and removed four ballistic missile submarines from strategic service; complete elimination of MX missile expected by end 2005;
• Under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, a.k.a. Moscow Treaty), the US will reduce about 80% of strategic nuclear warheads deployed from 1991 levels by 2012.

As noted in Statement by Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders, Special Representative of the President for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT, Main Committee I, New York, 20 May 2005. Available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/MCI/USA20.pdf

Missile-Related Reductions
The US will begin retiring 50 Minuteman III missiles in 2007. The airforce will also begin to reduce the number of warheads per Minuteman III, in order to meet the SORT limits. The US plans to reduce its deployed strategic warheads to 3,500–4,000 by the end of 2007. It looks like the future 450-missile force will carry 500 warheads, with 300 in reserve.

Submarine-Related Reductions
The navy downloaded the number of warheads per Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from 8 to approximately 6 in 2005, and is expected to download again over the next six years to about four warheads per D5 SLBM.

Major Nuclear Weapons Facilities Shut Down
· Rocky Flats (plutonium pit production)
· Mound, Pinellas, Fernald (weapons components)
· Hanford (plutonium production/reprocessing)
· Savannah River, F Canyon (plutonium production reactors)
· Oak Ridge (uranium enrichment)

Other Facilities Shut Down
· Portsmouth uranium enrichment plant
· Fernald uranium metal production for reactor fuel and target rods

3. Location and capability of nuclear facilities

Power Reactors
Operational: 103
Shut down: 29
Decommissioned: 0
Under Construction: 0
Planned: 0
http://www.iaea.or.at/programmes/a2/

Research Reactors
Operational: 41
Shut down: 117
Decommissioned: 69
Under Construction: 0
Planned: 0
http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/rrdb/

Uranium Enrichment Facilities
Currently, the United States uses the gaseous diffusion process to enrich uranium. There are two gaseous diffusion plants in the United States, at Piketon, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky. Both are operated by the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), which was created as a government corporation under the Energy Act of 1992 and privatized by legislation in 1996. The enrichment plant
in Portsmouth, Ohio closed on 11 May 2001.

In February 2004, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a license for United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to construct and operate a demonstration and test facility known as the Lead Cascade, to be located at the Piketon, Ohio plant. In February 2007, the NRC concluded that USEC's application met all safety requirements. However, the projected costs for the plant have increased from $1.7 billion to $2.3 billion, and USEC is looking for investment from other companies and the federal government to keep the uranium enrichment project alfoat beyond this year. The estimated completion date for the plant has been pushed back by a year, to 2012. In June 2006, the NRC issued a license to Louisiana Energy Services to construct and operate a commercial gas centrifuge enrichment facility in Lea County, New Mexico.
http://www.wise-uranium.org/epusecc.html
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/enrichment.html

4. Fissile Material holdings

Military Stocks of Fissile Materials
Plutonium: 47 tons
HEU: 700 (+/- 50) tons

Declared Excess
Plutonium: 52.5 tons
HEU: 174.3 tons originally; 123 tons remaining
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/military_pu.pdf (revised June 30, 2005)
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/military_excess_heu.pdf (revised June 30, 2005)

Unseparated Civil Plutonium: 403 tons
Separated Civil Plutonium: 4-5 tons declared excess, mostly produced in UK civil reactors decades ago
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/plutonium_watch2005.pdf (revised August, 2005)

Civil Highly Enriched Uranium
End of 2003: 124 tons
Projected for 2020: 22 tons
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/civil_heu_watch2005.pdf (revised August, 2005)

Radioactive Waste Management
Nearly 80 percent of the DOE's inventory of spent fuel is stored in Hanover, Washington.
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Almanac/USAFacilities.shtml

In February 2005, a federal licensing board approved a proposed nuclear waste dump on the Skull Valley Goshute Indian reservation, about 50 miles southwest of Salt Lake. The State of Utah, environmental groups, and the indigenous community fought the plans, and on 7 September 2006 the US Bureau of Land Management rejected transportation plans for shipping the proposed 44,000 tons of highly radioactive waste to the site.
http://www.nirs.org/radwaste/scullvalley/sv_victory91406.htm
http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2005nn/0502nn/050224nn.txt
Reed, Travis, “Board Backs Nuclear Waste Dump in Utah,” Seattle Post Intelligencer, February 24, 2005.

Low-level waste: There are three existing low-level waste disposal facilities in the United States in Barnwell, South Carolina, Richland, Washington and Clive, Utah, where LLW are buried in near-surface shallow trenches, usually in the containers in which they were shipped.
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal.html

High-level waste: Currently, most high-level radioactive waste is stored at the reactor sites. Plans for the underground engineered repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, continue to face delays and problems. Most recently, the project encountered one of its greatest setbacks when technical and environmental studies were proved falsified in spring 2005. The Department of Energy has a deadline of June 2008 to submit proposals to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for approval. The project may face more budget cuts in Congress in summer 2007.
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/hlw-disposal.html
http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/sun/2007/mar/18/566634792.html?yucca

5. Nuclear activities

Research Programs
The Department of Energy (DoE) has plans for two research programs: Generation IV (GenIV) and Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI), to identify, design, and deploy new and advanced commercial nuclear power reactor and fuel cycle technologies. The DoE’s Office of Nuclear Energy claimed in September 2003 that the first commercial Gen IV reactor could be deployed between 2020 and 2035. Under the DoE’s Nuclear Power 2010 program, it hopes to complete two new nuclear power plants by the end of the decade. Under the Vision 2020 plan, the Nuclear Energy Institute hopes to generate 50 GW of new US capacity by 2020 despite strong misgivings from some in the scientific and environmental communities.
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/bush/freprocessing.asp
http://afci.sandia.gov/

Nuclear Research Centers
AATDF - Advanced Applied Technology Demonstration Facility
AFRRI - Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Inst
AIMTech - Advanced Infrastructure Management Technologies
Amargosa Desert Research Site
Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium
Ames Lab
ANECL - Advanced Nuclear Engineering Computing Laboratory
ANL - Argonne National Lab
ANRC - Amarillo National Research Center
ASTD - Accelerated Site Technology Deployment
ATRP - Advanced Technology Research Project for Nuclear Technologies
Battelle Memorial Inst
Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory
BNL - Brookhaven National Lab
BNL - Energy and Nuclear Technology Division
CANES - Center for Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems EN
CCT - Center for Clean Technology
CDRH - Center for Devices & Radiological Health
CEB - Center for Environmental Biotechnology
CEEPR - MIT Center for Energy & Environmental Policy Research
CENTER - Center for Excellence in Nuclear Technology, Engineering, & Research
Center for Hazardous Waste Remediation Research
CeRaM - Center for Radioactive Waste Management
CERF - Civil Engineering Research Foundation
CGER - Commission on Geosciences, Environment & Resources
CISAC - Center for International Security & Cooperation
CNDE - Center for Non-Destructive Evaluation
CNRWA - Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses
Crocker Nuclear Laboratory
DARPA - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
ERL - NOAA Environmental Research Labs
ESTCP - Environmental Security Technology Certification Program
Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer EN
Fernald Environmental Management Project
FETC - Federal Energy Technology Center
FFTF - Fast Flux Test Facility
Floyd R. Newman Laboratory of Nuclear Studies
FNAL - Fermi National Accelerator Lab
Great Lakes Mid-Atlantic Center for Hazardous Substance Research
Hanford
HEI - Health Effects Institute
HSARPA - Homeland Security Advanced Research Project Agency EN
HSRC - Hazardous Substance Research Centers
IICER - Institute for International Cooperative Environmental Research
INEEL - Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Lab
I-NERI - International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative
INRA - Inland Northwest Research Alliance EN
INSPI - Innovative Nuclear Space Power & Propulsion Inst
Institute for Nuclear Theory
IRI - Industrial Research Institute
ISNPS - Inst for Space & Nuclear Power Studies
JLAB - Jefferson National Accelerator Facility
Kansas City Plant
KRL - Kellogg Radiation Laboratory
LANL - Los Alamos National Lab
LANL Geotechnical Engineering Research Group
LBL - Lawrence Berkeley Lab
LLNL - Lawrence Livermore National Lab
MEMP - Miamisburg Environmental Management Project
NAREL - National Air & Radiation Environmental Lab
NBL - New Brunswick Lab
NCERQA - EPA National Center for Environmental Research & Quality Assurance
NDCEE - National Defense Center for Environmental Excellence
NERAC - Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee EN
NERI - DOE Nuclear Energy Research Initiative EN
NERSC - National Energy Research Scientific Computing Center
NETL - National Energy Technology Laboratory
New Mexico Environmental Evaluation Group
[WIPP Review]
NIH - National Inst of Health
NIST Boulder Laboratories
NRC - National Research Council
NRL - Naval Research Laboratory
NRRI - National Regulatory Research Institute
NSF - National Science Foundation
NSTG - Nuclear Science & Technology Group
NTLF - National Tritium Labelling Facility
NTS - Nevada Test Site
ORF - Oceanic Resource Foundation
ORNL - Oak Ridge National Lab
ORNL Nuclear Analysis & Shielding Section
ORNL Radiation Information Analysis Section
Pew Center on Global Climate Change
PNNL - Pacific Northwest National Lab
REDC - Radiochemical Engineering Development Center
RESL - Radiological Environmental Sciences Lab
RFETS - Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site
SERDP - Strategic Environmental Research & Development Program
SLAC - Stanford Linear Accelerator
SNL - Sandia National Lab
SNL/CA - Sandia National Lab/California
SRS - Savannah River Site EN
SRTC - Savannah River Technology Center EN
SSC - Superconducting Super Collider Project
SSTI - State Science & Technology Institute
SWRI - Southwest Research Inst
TDC - INEEL Technology Deployment Center
TFA - Tanks Focus Area Technical Team
TFG - Tritium Focus Group
TUNL - Triangle Universities Nuclear Lab
US DOE Labs & Web Servers list
WMRC - Waste Management & Research Center
Yucca Mountain Project

Nuclear Cooperation
Under the 1950s-era Atoms for Peace program, the United States would lease HEU to foreign countries with the explicit provision that the spent fuel would be returned to the US for treatment and disposal. In 1964, this policy was revoked.

In May 1996, the DoE initiated a program, now known as the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Fuel Acceptance Program, whereby the US recovers foreign research reactor spent fuel containing HEU produced in the US. This program covers about 30% of the US-produced HEU, which had been provided to foreign countries. Memorandum for the Secretary, from Gregory H. Friedman, Inspector General, “Audit Report on ‘Recovery of Highly Enriched Uranium Provided to Foreign Countries,’” February 9, 2004.

The DoE organized the Generation IV International Forum- 10 countries to jointly develop six nuclear energy systems: South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Switzerland, Japan, Canada, United Kingdom, France, and US. In February 2005, only five participants of the Forum- the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, France, and Canada- signed the agreement to proceed with the Gen IV program. The agreements listed below are in the Gen IV framework.
http://gif.inel.gov/
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/Lavoy.asp
http://www.ig.energy.gov/documents/CalendarYear2004/ig-0638.pdf

Brazil: Agreement (20 June 2003) including cooperation on advanced reactor developments; advanced reactor fuel and reactor fuel cycle-integration; life management and upgrading of current operating reactors; advanced fuel and material irradiation and use of experimental
facilities; environmental and safety issues related to new reactor and fuel cycle technologies; and fundamental areas of nuclear engineering and science.

Canada: Agreement (17 June 2003) to collaborate on seven projects totaling approximately $20 million. The projects range in duration from two to four years and will focus on: Hydrogen Production by Nuclear Systems; Sustainable and Advanced Fuel Cycles; and Supercritical-
Water-Cooled Reactor Concepts.

EU: Agreement (24 February 2004) to collaborate on eight new projects, at approximately $2 million per year, including but are not limited to: Fuels & materials research and development for advanced nuclear reactors; Advanced Reactor design and engineering development; Research and development related to the transmutation of high-level nuclear waste; Transmutation related systems analyses.

France: Agreement (10 July 2001) to collaborate on eleven new projects totaling approximately $28 million over three years, focusing on: Advanced Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor; Hydrogen Production by Nuclear Systems; and Advanced Fuels and Materials Development.

India: In March 2006, the US announced a proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with India, despite the framework of international rules and institutions derived from the NPT that have prevented non-Member States from acquiring nuclear fuel and technology. US Congress has rewritten US law to make an exception for this deal, even though it will enable India to use its limited uranium supply for nuclear weapons. Several barriers still stand in the way, not least agreement from the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Japan: Agreement (24 November 2004) to collaborate on their first project titled “Development of Materials for Supercritical-Water-Cooled Reactor (SCWR)”.

South Korea: Agreement (16 May 2001) to collaborate on six new projects totaling approximately $12 million over three years, focusing on: Advanced Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor; Hydrogen Production by Nuclear Systems; Advanced Fuels and Materials Development; Supercritical-Water-Cooled Reactor Concepts.

6. International non-proliferation efforts

The US is also a participant in the G8 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, launched in Kananaskis, Canada 2002.

Treaties Signed and Ratified, Date of Deposit
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notification of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, 31 May 1988
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) Protocols I & II, not yet ratified, 11 April 1996
Antarctic Treaty, 18 August 1960
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 26 March 1975
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, 24 March 1995
Chemical Weapons Convention, 25 April 1997
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, not yet ratified
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980
The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, 1 June 1988
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 5 March 1970
Outer Space Treaty, 10 October 1967
Sea Bed Treaty, 18 May 1972
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) Protocols 1 & 2, not yet ratified, 25 March, 1996
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, 1 June 2003
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) Protocols I & II, with reservations, 12 May 1971
Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), 1 June 1988
Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I Treaty), 5 December 1994

The US signed the IAEA Additional Protocol 12 June 1998, but has not completed the ratification process.

Multilateral Groups
Conference on Disarmament
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
Missile Technology Control Regime
Nuclear Suppliers Group
Proliferation Security Initiative
Wassenaar Arrangement
Zangger Committee
http://first.sipri.org/index.php

7. Positions taken in international fora on various issues of disarmament

Non-Proliferation Treaty: "[W]e must remain mindful that the Treaty will not continue to advance our security in the future if we do not successfully confront the current proliferation challenges." - Statement by Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen G. Rademaker to the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT, New York, 2 May 2005. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/GDstatements/U.S.pdf

NPT Review Conferences: "NPT Review Conferences... facilitate a thorough exchange of views on Treaty implementation, and reaffirm the Parties' belief that the Treaty as a whole contributes to international security, as well as their own... Review Conferences, however are not amendment conferences, and any declarations or decisions or other text emanating from them neither supercede, nor reinterpret,nor add onto the explicit legal obligations of all Parties under the Treaty. The legal undertakings of the NPT are solemn commitments, requiring the approval of national political authorities and sovereign constitutional ratification processes. As we review Article VI progress, and consider how to shape discussions for the next five years, it will be important to keep these points in mind." -Statement by Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders, Special Representative of the President for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT, Main Committee I, New York, 20 May 2005. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/MCI/USA20.pdf

Nuclear Disarmament: "So what is the environment necessary for ongoing reductions in nuclear weapons to continue to their logical conclusion? ... It certainly requires a world in which states do not see increases in their security as a zero-sum equation requiring less security on the part of others. Fundamentally, we are talking about a world in which the lessening of international tension and the strengthening of international trust make it possible for us all to transcend the competitive military dynamics and concerns that have helped encourage reliance upon nuclear weapons to date." Statement by Ambassador Christina Rocca to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 23 March, 2007. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches07/1session/Feb6USA.pdf

Conference on Disarmament: "It is no secret that the United States would have preferred a clear cut decision to start negotiations on FMCT based on the mandate we tabled (CD/1776) without reference to any other issue. We have spoken against linkages for years and we are not convinced that all linkages have yet been broken as result of this plan - it bears a very close resemblance to the A-5 proposal,
something we oppose. Despite those concerns, the United States has decided it will not stand in the way of consensus on the P-6 proposal -- as you have presented it to us today... We understand that proposing amendments to the P-6 proposal, for ostensibly procedural reasons, would have the effect of preventing substantive work in the CD... [I]f the CD cannot agree to this compromise, we do not believe it will ever be able to break out of its stalemate." -Statement by Ambassador Christina Rocca to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 23 March, 2007. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches07/1session/Mar23US.html

Fissile Material: “The negotiation of a legally binding treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices is a goal that the international community long has endorsed as an important step to reduce nuclear dangers. At the same time, the United States has concluded that effective international verification of an FMCT is not realistically achievable. Our delegation
calls on the CD to begin such negotiations as soon as possible after it reconvenes in January.”- Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Stephen G. Rademaker to the Third Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 3 May 2004. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/usarticleIV.pdf

Additional Protocol: “The United States continues to work with others to advance other elements of the President's action plan, including universalizing adherence to the Additional Protocol and making it a condition of nuclear supply”. - Statement by Stephen G. Rademaker, United States Secretary of State for Arms Control to the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT, New York, 2 May 2005. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/GDstatements/U.S.pdf

Negative Security Assurances: “We wish to make clear, however, as we have made clear in other contexts, that the United States continues to oppose any proposal for an NSA treaty, or other global, legally binding security assurances regime.” United States explanation of vote in the 58th session of the General Assembly First Committee, on draft resolution 58/L.8 “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”; October 2003. (The United States has continued to use this explanation in subsequent sessions of the First Committee, up through 2006) http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com03/voting/L8USEoV.htm

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