Dear Reaching Critical Will friends and advisors,
In this E-news:
1. The UN General Assembly First
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security prepares
for an exciting upcoming session; and
2. The Conference on Disarmament closes its relatively productive
2006 session.
Once again there is reason for hope, and once again that
hope must be realized through action. In the midst of the
debate among the leaders of the world, and coming up on the
world's disarmament consensus-building body, there are glimmers
that we will succeed in building the world in which we want
to live. Despite all the rhetoric, diplomacy may prevail in
the Iran situation: the European Union is resuming negotiations
with Iran. Seven governments are introducing an that would regulate trade in small arms and
light weapons for the first time. The world's disarmament
treaty negotiating body, the Conference
on Disarmament, just concluded its most productive year
in nearly a decade, and is building towards negotiating again.
The has recommended governments
hold a Review Conference on the 40th anniversary of the 1967
Outer
Space Treaty to deal with weapons in space.
All of these glimmers are just hopes until we create them.
They are flashing possibilities that civil society and like-minded
governments need to work into reality. Educate yourself and
others, and then act. Use our General Assembly Disarmament
Index, to help you find out what your government's position
is, and then, with all your friends, call your Foreign
Ministry and tell them what it should be. Tell
them work for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle
East. to support and strengthen the Arms Trade Treaty.
Tell them to work on the four core issues in the Conference
on Disarmament- the Prevention
of an Arms Race in Outer Space, a Fissile
Materials Treaty, Negative
Security Assurances and, of course, Nuclear Disarmament.
Tell them to block weapons in space. We create the world we
want.
Best wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate
1. The UN General Assembly's First
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security prepares
for an exciting upcoming session.
The international consensus-building committee on disarmament,
peace and security is meeting soon. The UN General Assembly's
First Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security meets every
October for 4-5 weeks, after the September General Assembly
General
Debate. The governments of the world haggle over priorities,
policy, and language, to develop consensus on weapons, peace,
and security. With disarmament diplomats from around the world,
the First Committee offers one of the best opportunities for
outreach, education, and advocacy efforts on disarmament and
nonproliferation issues.
Governments are poised to struggle over guns and conventional
weapons at this year's First Committee. People are frustrated
about the failed June 2006 Small Arms and Light Weapons, and will likely use this October as
an opportunity. Also, seven governments (Argentina, Australia,
Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya, and the United Kingdom)
are proposing
an that would govern the sale of small arms
and light weapons, from revolvers to rifles to anti-tank missile
systems, for the first time.
On nuclear issues, governments might debate nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and weapons in space issues. A Preparatory Committee
for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is scheduled for
the spring of 2007, and although the General Assembly does
not oversee the NPT review process, governments will likely
discuss the upcoming preparatory committee and possibly affirm
it. Also, the recently recommended governments
hold a Review Conference on the 40th anniversary of the 1967
Outer
Space Treaty to deal with weapons in space. Although it
remains to be seen if any government will pick up this call,
the First Committee would be the place to do it.
Reaching Critical Will follows the First Committee and publishes
issue-based summaries of the negotiations, resolutions and
votes. We send our First
Committee Monitor to our email lists in HTML and
PDF form, and make it available online. The HTML version is
chock-full of hyper-links to more information, treaty texts
and organizations, and the PDF version prints into an accessible
attractive newsletter. We encourage you to use this easy resource
to see what your government is saying and doing on disarmament
in the international arena. There is no other source following
these issues as closely. To receive this weekly newsletter
by email, send an email to jennifer@reachingcriticalwill.org
with « First Commitee subscribe » in the heading,
indicating whether you prefer the HTML or PDF version.
Reaching Critical Will also closely monitors the Heads of
State and Foreign Ministers' statements during the UN General
Debate, which is happening right now. We produce a Disarmament
Index of all references to disarmament and non-proliferation.
This index is published online by the beginning of the First
Committee, and, searchable by country
and by topic,
is a guide to countries' priorities.
We hope you will take advantage of this opportunity to become
a participant in the UN First Committee process through Reaching
Critical Will. Not only will The Monitor help you
with your work efforts towards disarmament, Reaching Critical
Will represents civil society at the UN, helping us create
a stronger voice of disarmament for the future. If you want
to be more involved than a regular subscriber, please contact
our Project Associate at jennifer@reachingcriticalwill.org.
This year the Conference on Disarmament did more substantive
work than it has done in years. After encouragement
from the 2005 General Assembly's First Committee on Disarmament,
Peace and Security, all six 2006 presidents got together and
developed a coordinated timetable
for debates.
This allowed governments to plan ahead, prepare papers, bring
experts from capital to talk to one another, and all debate
the same subject at the same time. Although this sounds like
it should be the regular state of affairs, the world's only
multilateral disarmament treaty negotiating body has not approached
this level of substantive debate in years. The 2006 presidents
brought the Conference back to addressing substance, if not
to negotiating it.
Next year's presidents (South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Switzerland, and Syria) must do more. They will have the power
and the opportunity to move the disarmament agenda forward
at a time when we desperately need it. We hope the CD, which
has been so embarassingly deadlocked for so long, will lead
the international disarmament community as it should, by showing
that its members can effectively work together on the four
core issues. Good faith here could generate good faith
elsewhere, and vice versa.
Civil society would like to know how the CD intends to use
to build on the work of this year and begin work next year.
As Canada
said on
August 22 and The
Netherlands said on September 6, a repeat of this year's
exercise will not be good enough. We are pleased governments
are finally discussing substantive issues in a way that will
build a foundation for negotiations, but we expect more.
August 31
Dear Reaching Critical Will friends and advisors,
In lieu of our regular E-news this month, we are asking you
to support the work we do and the resources we provide for
the global community of disarmament experts, analysts and
activists. We have a great opportunity through a challenge
grant, meaning every dollar you give to RCW is twice as powerful!
Your contribution to RCW will be matched dollar for dollar
from the challenge grant.
With your support, our work in the upcoming 2006 UN General
Assembly First
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security will be even
stronger. We will:
Index
every disarmament statement made at the UN General Assembly
General Debate and post it so you can access it on line
and know what your government is saying on a myriad of issues;
Report on the disarmament-focused debates in our First
Committee Monitor in topic based weekly summaries;
Keep you updated on any disarmament action-items via our
General
E-news list;
Coordinate a NGO Working Group for the duration of the
First Committee to collectively strengthen our advocacy;
and
Facilitate access to rooms at the UN for NGO
side events during the First Committee.
RCW continues to cover the Security Council's dealings with
Iran, on our website and through our General E-news list.
You can access our background page here
and our Iran Action Pack here.
We need your support to continue our full range of reporting
and advocacy work!
created the Reaching
Critical Will project in 1999 to “improve the quantity
and quality of NGO engagement in multilateral disarmament
decision making fora”, to serve your needs, and to increase
global transparency on global security by connecting you to
information about multilateral disarmament processes and the
governments that drive them. We are asking the community that
knows the value of our work and uses it regularly to contribute
give a tax-deductible (for US residents), end of the summer,
here comes that First Committee sprint, contribution to the
project.
Please help us keep up our work for global disarmament, and
serve you better. You can either send us a check made out
to:
Jane Addams Peace Association
777 UN Plaza, 6th floor
New York, NY 10017 USA
(Be sure to put RCW in the memo line of the
check!)
Or contribute via PayPal by clicking on the Donate Now! button
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Best wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate
August 1
Dear Reaching Critical Will friends and advisors,
Last week we reported on the Security Council's struggle to
agree on a resolution on Iran's nuclear programme. Yesterday,
July 31, the Council passed Resolution 1696, although they
have not yet taken action on the escalating crisis in Gaza
and Lebanon. The Security Council, with ultimate responsibility
for maintaining peace and security, must do everything possible
to prevent violence and its escalation instead of taking action
that could raise tensions. It is past time to demand an immediate
ceasefire to build sustainable peace on a regional basis.
Iran must be approached as a stakeholder in the peace process.
It is not time to heighten the stakes and spread conflict.
Best wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom, Program Associate
1. Security Council demands Iran
stop enrichment and reprocessing, threatens sanctions
On July 31, the Security Council passed Resolution
1696 demanding Iran stop uranium enrichment and reprocessing
activities by August 31, and threatened sanctions if Iran
does not comply. The Council also called on Iran to implement
the confidence-building measures recommended by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA Board of Governors' Resolution
).
The Security Council resolution passed 14 to 1, with Qatar
as the sole vote against.
As forewarned in our last e-news (July
26), this Security Council resolution takes action under
Article 40 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, “in order
to make to make mandatory the suspension required by the IAEA”.
Article 40 is the weakest form of a Chapter VII mandate, as
it only authorizes “interim measures” before sanctions
and the use of force (Articles 41 and 42). The initial draft
security council resolution authorized action under Article
39, but Russia insisted it be removed because it refers to
sanctions and the use of force. As a compromise, the above
“mandatory” clause was inserted to imply the resolution
is legally binding. However, to make a resolution binding,
an Article 39 finding of a threat to international
peace and security. In the final version of the resolution,
the Security Council removed language calling the Iranian
nuclear programme a threat to peace and security. In its statement
following the vote, Russia said it was crucial to note the
resolution ruled out the use of force as a response.
However, the resolution threatens sanctions if Iran does
not comply by August 31, and includes a paragraph that could
be described as either limited sanctions or an embargo. This
paragraph calls on all states to prevent the transfer of any
items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute
to Iran's enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and
ballistic missile programmes.
Iran had promised to respond to a package proposed by the
permanent five members of the Security Council and Germany
(called the P5+1) by August 22. Qatar, the sole Security Council
member to vote against the resolution and the sole Arab state
on the Council, asked the Council to wait to take action until
Iran responded to the package. Given the crisis in the Middle
East, Qatar said acting now did not serve the region's security.
Iran, in a lengthy and comprehensive statement that detailed
its contentious history with the Security Council and the
West, said that because its nuclear programme does not pose
a threat to international peace and security, dealing with
it in the Security Council was “unwarranted and void
of any legal basis or practical utility.” It said the
resolution “violates the fundamental principles of international
law, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA Board resolutions.”
On Sunday, July 30th, Iran warned that it would reject the
package offered by the P5+1 if the Council passed any resolution
against it. Iran has repeatedly responded negatively to increased
pressure. Passing this resolution now, when the Middle East
is in crisis and just three weeks before Iran's scheduled
reply to the P5+1 offer, decreases the potential for a peaceful
solution.
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate
Reaching Critical Will
July 26
Dear Reaching Critical Will Friends and Advisors,
The usually quiet summer months at the United Nations have
been busy for disarmament. Governments reviewed their progress
on controlling illegal gun trade at the end of June, and the
Security Council has been discussing both Iran and North Korea.
As we have all seen in the news, the Security Council is also
dealing with the unfolding crisis in the Middle East. It is
important to understand the ways in which regional security
issues link to one another, and also how regional security
connects with global security and empire. These links must
be part of pursuing larger peace and understanding, not hysteria
and war.
Best wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate
1. Security Council struggles
over resolution on Iran
On Thursday, July 20, the EU3 (Britain, France and Germany)
introduced a draft resolution on Iran to the Security Council,
which is similar to the previously problematic draft resolution
they introduced May 3. The permanent five members of the Security
Council, along with Germany which has been a negotiating partner
throughout this process (called the P5+1), are still divided
over the resolution's framework and some of its steps.
The still disputed draft decides Iran should suspend uranium
enrichment and calls on Iran to take the confidence-building
steps outlined by the International Atomic Energy Agency Board
of Governors. Although it does not take action under the Article
of the UN Charter that authorizes sanctions (41), it does
call on all states to embargo items that could contribute
to Iran's enrichment and reprocessing activities or ballistic
missile programmes.
The available draft takes action under Articles 39 and 40
of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but there is reportedly
agreement to remove Article 39. Article 39 gives the Security
Council the right to identify threats to peace and security
and decide what measures to take, including sactions or force.
Article 40 gives it the right to take "provisional measures"
before moving to sanctions or the use of force. The resolution
also expresses the intention to take further steps under Article
41 if Iran does not comply, and the P5+1 have reportedly agreed
on an August 31 deadline for compliance. Article 41 authorizes
action short of the use of force, including sactions.
Russia introduced a number of amendments to the draft resolution,
including removing "threat to peace and security" language
and Article 39. Reportedly, they have agreed to remove Article
39, while adding language to make it mandatory that Iran suspend
uranium enrichment. Another Russian amendment added national
and international law parameters to the paragraph calling
on all states to embargo enrichment and missile-related items.
The United States had hoped the Council would pass the resolution
last week, but Russia and China continued to disagree with
some of the more forceful language of the draft text. There
is still not a single agreed text among the permanent five
and Germany, although they all report "progress". They will
meet again tomorrow morning, and, if they have agreement,
will submit the text to the elected ten members of the Council.
Depending on how urgently they try to pass the text, particularly
given the escalating conflict in the Middle East, it may be
passed as early as Friday or be pushed to next week.
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will
2. Failed small arms conference
provides no progress, no new plan for controlling small arms
From June 26 through July 7, 2006, United Nations member
states gathered to review the illicit trade and transfer of
small arms for the first time since the Review Conference
in 2001, as well as the Programme of Action to combat the
trade in illicit small arms and light weapons. While progress
has begun to take place in at least half of the member states,
the trade of small arms continues to grow daily, as does the
number of victims of gun violence. The majority of small arms
and light weapons are in the hands of civilians and the gun
trade is worth about US$4 billion a year. While civil society
proved to be the most momentous working body at the conference,
member states failed to match this momentum in their negotiations
and ultimately could not agree on a final document.
The International Action Network for Small Arms (IANSA) led
the civil society movement during the conference. IANSA is
a global network of over 700 civil society organizations that
work for controls on the international arms trade and policies
to make people safer from gun violence. Rebecca Peters, the
Director of IANSA, led the NGO presentations at the conference
and reminded member states that "we are accountable to the
millions of people who are affected daily by gun violence"
and not to forget the human face of gun violence. NGO representatives
urged member states to highlight issues of human rights, international
law and gender differences within the the Programme of Action.
IANSA Women’s Network presented a side event on the
different effects of gun violence on women and men. Men represent
the vast majority of those who use and are killed or injured
by small arms, but women are particularly vulnerable to sexual
violence in regards to small arms. Women often become the
main breadwinners when male relatives are killed, injured
or disabled by gun violence. Displacement due to violent conflict
leaves them particularly vulnerable to starvation and disease
as they struggle to fend for their families.
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom-US hosted
a Youth Caucus. The Children’s Campaign Against Gun
Violence with 15 students from Jubilee School in Philadelphia
presented their anti-gun campaign to representatives from
governments, the Small Arms Survey and UN Development Program.
The Children’s Campaign Against Gun Violence is a student
initiated campaign responding to the ongoing street violence
in Philadelphia. Audience members invited the students’
participation in future anti-gun collaborations.
Overall, member states at the Review Conference lost the
opportunity to make significant strides on the small arms
and light weapons trade. While IANSA produced several position
papers on the necessary changes and key issues to be highlighted,
member states could not agree on a single issue. Ultimately,
the conference failed to reach an agreement on a final document.
A small group of member states, led by the United States,
refused to budge on their policies of trade and transfer regulations,
while touting that future Review Conferences would not be
necessary. Many states failed to exert any efforts for change
and hid behind the more vocal member states’ positions.
These distractions consistently blocked any progress or real
changes from being made at the conference. Without a 2006
Programme of Action, the 2001 Programme stays in place, but
is not updated nor is its progress to date documented. More
importantly, governments did not plan any future Review Conferences,
so there are currently no mechanisms in place to follow the
2001 plan of action and the work of the international process
for the last five years is without documentation or a mapped
future.
While the failure of the 2006 Review Conference is disappointing,
civil society is hopeful about bringing the small arms campaign
to the General Assembly First Committee this fall 2006. With
the first female General Assembly president in 35 years and
a female First Committee chair, conditions are favorable in
the fall for developing direction for future international
work on controlling the illegal arms trade. Reaching Critical
Will will monitor and report on the First Committee as always,
follow the particularly exciting events by subscribing to
the First Committee Monitor by contacting the Reaching Critical
Will Project Associate. To become involved with the Small
Arms and Light Weapons campaign, please contact Mark Marge,
IANSA/UN Coordinator through email: Mark.Marge@iansa.org.
-Jennifer Shin, Reaching Critical Will
3. Security Council passes
unanimous resolution on North Korea (Resolution 1695)
On July 15, the U.N. Security Council finally reached consensus
on the North Korea resolution (1695). After a week of serious
disagreements among the permanent five members, the Council
unanimously passed a resolution demanding North Korea suspend
its ballistic missile program and urging it to return to the
six-party talks. Japan originally introduced a resolution
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which would have
made the resolution legally binding and included the possibility
of sanctions and the use of force. However, because of a threatened
Chinese veto, the resolution is instead acting under Chapter
VI of the Charter. China and Russia originally wanted the
Council to respond to North Korea's unannounced July 4th missile
launches with a press statement, but agreed to a resolution
after failed diplomatic talks between China and North Korea.
Additionally, the resolution requires all member states from
trading missiles or missile related items with North Korea.
It stresses the importance of implementing the Joint Statement
(19 September 2005) and supports the six-party talks.
North Korea’s U.N. ambassador, Pak Gil Yon, rejected
the resolution after it passed and reportedly left the chamber,
saying Pyongyang would “bolster its war deterrent.”
Japan is discussing pursuing other sanctions if North Korea
does not abide by the resolution.
-Julie Friedlander, Reaching Critical Will
June 9
Dear Reaching Critical Will friends and advisors,
Last Thursday, June 1, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission
released its final report after two years of work among commissioned
experts from around the world, including several nuclear weapons
possessing nations. In collaboration with the Lawyers' Committee
on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) and Western States' Legal Foundation
(WSLF), Reaching Critical Will is analyzing and responding
to this important report. A summary of its key findings lies
below. Not only does the report insist we outlaw nuclear weapons,
it outlines the practical steps to do so, and recognizes the
role of NGOs, gender analysis, and alludes to the Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom's founding conference
in the Hague.
Also, at the end of this month, the UN will be reviewing
its work on regulating small arms and light weapons at the
“World Gun Summit”, the Review Conference of 2001
Programme of Action.
Best Wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate
1. Summary and Significance
"Before us lie two very divergent courses. One path can take
us to a world, in which the proliferation of nuclear weapons
is restricted and reversed, through trust, dialogue and negotiated
agreement.... The other path leads to a world, in which a
rapidly growing numbers of States feel obliged to arm themselves
with nuclear weapons, and in which non-State actors acquire
the means to carry out nuclear terrorism. The international
community seems almost to be sleepwalking down the latter
path -- not by conscious choice, but rather through miscalculation,
sterile debate and the paralysis of multilateral mechanisms
for confidence-building and conflict-resolution."
- United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, May 18, 2006
Hans Blix cited this warning in remarks to diplomats and
non-governmental organizations following his presentation
of Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological
and Chemical Arms to Mr. Annan at the United Nations on June
1. The report is a wake-up call. It identifies the dangers,
especially those posed by nuclear weapons, and outlines the
solutions, steps leading towards the total prohibition and
elimination of nuclear as well as chemical and biological
weapons. The findings and recommendations of this high-level
international panel reinforce many of the points civil society
groups have been making for more than a decade. The report
does not shy away from holding the nuclear weapon states -
including the United States and Israel - accountable for creating
conditions under which other countries may feel that their
security is threatened. These conditions may serve as incentives
to those countries to seek weapons of mass destruction of
their own.
At the heart of the Commission's findings: "So long as any
state has nuclear weapons, others will want them. So long
as any such weapons remain, there is a risk that they will
one day be used, by design or accident. And any such use would
be catastrophic.... The Commission rejects the suggestion
that nuclear weapons in the hands of some pose no threat,
while in the hands of others they place the world in mortal
jeopardy. Governments possessing nuclear weapons can act responsibly
or recklessly. Governments may also change over time. Twenty-seven
thousand nuclear weapons are not an abstract theory. They
exist in today's world.... The question of how to reduce the
threat and the number of existing nuclear weapons must be
addressed with no less vigour than the question of the threat
from additional weapons, whether in the hands of existing
nuclear weapon states, proliferating states or terrorists."
(pp. 60 - 61)
At the core of its recommendations: "Disarmament and non-proliferation
are best pursued through a cooperative rule-based international
order, applied and enforced through effective multilateral
institutions.... Accept the principle that nuclear weapons
should be outlawed, as are biological and chemical weapons,
and explore the political, legal, technical and procedural
options for achieving this within a reasonable time." (pp.
18 – 19)
A factsheet on the key implications and recommendations of
the report is available here:
The Blix Commission Report: Background
The release of Weapons of Terror, the report of the WMD Commission,
follows one of the most damaging years in memory for the international
disarmament and non-proliferation regime, a year in which
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference was unable to reach any agreements and the
UN World
Summit failed to include a single sentence about the regime
in its final document. The Commission's 60 recommendations
aim to find a way out of the stalemate. To begin this process,
the Commission calls for a World Summit to address disarmament,
non-proliferation and terrorist acquisition of nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons. (p. 18)
2. Three Waves of Nuclear Proliferation
The report identifies three waves of nuclear proliferation:
first, the United States, Soviet Union/Russia, Britain, France,
and China; second, India, Pakistan, and Israel; and third
Iraq, Libya, North
Korea, and possibly Iran.
While nuclear weapons programs have been reversed in Iraq
and Libya, the report conveys that the “third wave”
is sending an ominous signal. The Commission observes that
effective use of international institutions can help contain
the spread of nuclear and other weapons. The report says that
while international inspectors rely on national intelligence,
national governments should also pay attention to the findings
of international inspectors. They were, after all, proved
right in the case of Iraq. The United States should take this
lesson to heart with respect to Iran, where the IAEA has extensive
on the ground experience and so far has not concluded that
there is a nuclear weapons program. But fundamentally, the
Commission holds, the best way to prevent the proliferation
or use of nuclear weapons is to eliminate them globally. It
concentrates on the short and medium term steps on this road:
strengthening the NPT, dealing effectively and impartially
with non-compliance, delegitimizing nuclear weapons, controlling
existing nuclear weapons and nuclear material, and undertaking
verifiable and irreversible reductions on the way to elimination.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone
of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. To strengthen
the NPT, the Commission recommends that all parties: 1) “
revert to the fundamental and balanced non-proliferation and
disarmament commitments that were made under that treaty and
confirmed in 1995 when the treaty was extended indefinitely;”
2) reaffirm and implement the consensus outcomes of the 1995
and 2000
Review Conferences, including the resolution on the Middle
East as a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass
destruction, adopted in 1995, and "the
thirteen practical steps" for nuclear disarmament that
were adopted in 2000; 3) adopt strengthened safeguards (the ) as the new norm; and 4) create a standing Secretariat
for the Treaty. (pp. 65 - 66) Throughout the report the Commission
makes clear that in order to revive the regime, the initial
and fundamental balance between disarmament and nonproliferation
must be restored. The report largely blames the failure of
the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China to "seriously"
abide by their NPT commitments to nuclear disarmament for
the current crisis of confidence. While Israel, India and
Pakistan and not parties to the treaty, "they, too, have a
duty to contribute to the nuclear disarmament process." (p.
95)
4. Specific Challenges to the
Regime
The
Middle East
With regard to non-compliance and what the Commission calls
the third wave of proliferation, the report recommends firm
action based on verified international evidence. It calls
for suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment program,
and to induce Iran to agree, recommends assurances against
regime change and other security incentives. The Commission
also calls on all states in the region, including nuclear-armed
Israel, to suspend fuel cycle activities as a step towards
a regional zone free of WMD. (pp. 69 - 72)
The
Korean Peninsula
The report calls for negotiations with North Korea aimed at
making the Korean peninsula a zone free of weapons of mass
destruction. A verifiable agreement should include North Korea's
adherence to the Additional Protocol as well as a revival
and legal confirmation of the commitments made in the 1992
Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula,
notably, that neither North Korea nor South Korea should have
nuclear weapons or nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment
facilities. (p. 69) Security assurances from the United States
would be a vital part of a settlement.
With respect to the U.S.- India nuclear cooperation arrangement
currently under consideration, the report calls for the two
countries to promote and participate "without delay" in a
"verifiable" treaty stopping all production of fissile materials
for weapons. "Their adherence to such a treaty would dispel
any fear that the agreement could facilitate an increased
production of nuclear weapons in India and risk fueling an
arms race in Asia." The report goes on to call for both countries
to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, thus signaling
their intention to not pursue nuclear weapons development.
(p. 83)
The Commission recognizes that nuclear weapons have a perverse
and powerful prestige in international politics that inhibits
disarmament and propels proliferation. Therefore, it recommends
delegitimizing the weapons and the incentives for acquiring
them. States possessing them should reduce the role of nuclear
weapons in security doctrines and provide assurances
of non-use to states that have decided not to acquire
them. The Commission observes that affect other states' security assessments and
decisions, and “explanations by the nuclear-haves that
the weapons are indispensable to defend their sovereignty
are not the best way to convince other sovereign states to
renounce the option.” (p. 61)
The Commission recommends reductions of nuclear weapons leading
to their elimination. First, the United States and Russia
should and at least halve the numbers
allowed under the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(SORT). SORT allows each side to retain 1,700 - 2,000 strategic
deployed weapons by 2012, but does not require the destruction
of a single warhead, and has no verification mechanisms. "Under
SORT, deployments change but the weapons remain." The new
treaty should include a legally binding commitment to irreversibly
dismantle the weapons withdrawn under SORT. It should also
include transparent counting rules, schedules and procedures
for dismantling the weapons, and reciprocal verification measures.
(p. 93) The United States, Russia and the other nuclear weapon
states should publish their nuclear weapons holdings as a
baseline for future disarmament efforts, and should commit
to provisions in future disarmament agreements regarding transparency,
irreversibility, verification, and physical destruction of
nuclear warheads. (p. 94)
The Commission calls on all nuclear weapon states to remove
nuclear weapons from foreign soil, taking note of the more
than 400 U.S. nuclear weapons authorized for deployment at
eight U.S. air bases in six NATO countries. (p. 96) While
reducing nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon states should not
make weapons with new military capabilities, and to demonstrate
their commitment not to do so, should sign and ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
6. Controlling Existing Capabilities
In the meantime, the world should take measures to control
the nuclear weapons and materials it now has. The Commission
recommends that all nuclear weapon states categorically renounce
the first use of nuclear weapons. Only China has done this
so far; the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom
have reserved the option of using nuclear weapons first in
response to an attack with biological or chemical weapons,
and in some cases, to prevent such an attack. The Commission
also recommends that the United States and Russia work together
to take nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert. Right now,
weapons can be targeted and fired within minutes. (p. 92)
Greater control of the fissile materials used to make nuclear
weapons will help control nuclear weapons production by states
and prevent its acquisition by non-state actors. Fully effective
accounting and control of fissile materials is necessary (p.
84), and the Commission also recommends ending the use of
highly enriched uranium in research reactors and other measures
to accomplish a “global clean-out of fissile materials.”
(p. 78) It calls on the Conference
on Disarmament to begin negotiating a treaty verifiably
banning future production of fissile materials for nuclear
weapons. (p. 105) The United States introduced
a proposal for a Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty - without verification - in the
Conference on May 18, 2006.
The report points to the frequently overlooked but pressing
need to regulate ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and
other means of delivery. (pp. 140 - 144) These systems can
carry conventional or nuclear, biological, and chemical warheads,
as dramatically illustrated by recent reports of the Pentagon’s
interest in the destabilizing substitution of conventionally-armed
ballistic missiles for nuclear-armed ones on four Trident
submarines. While the Commission does not go so far as to
propose a ban on flight testing of ballistic missiles or other
steps towards a global missile disarmament regime, advocated
by this project, the Civil Society Review, it does say that
states should not deploy missile defenses without first attempting
to negotiate the removal of missile threats. (p. 146)
The Commission explores options for controlling uranium enrichment
and plutonium separation activities in order to minimize the
risks of proliferation associated with those activities. But
they fail to even mention the possibility of phasing out nuclear
energy. (pp. 73 - 77) The Commission is clear that nuclear
fuel cycle technologies are inherently dual-use. It notes
that non-nuclear weapons states including Brazil, Germany,
Japan and the Netherlands have extensive civilian uranium
enrichment capabilities, and that Japan has a massive reprocessing
operation to produce plutonium, all operating successfully
under IAEA safeguards. These countries are not currently viewed
as threats by the United States or its allies. Nonetheless,
as the report notes elsewhere, a "threat" is a combination
of capability and intent, which may change over time. (p.
35) The report also notes, in reference to Iran's right to
peaceful nuclear energy production, that "a right to do something
does not necessarily mean that this right must be exercised."
(p. 71) In the view of the Civil Society Review, in order
to truly address the inherent potential for diversion of nuclear
materials for weapons, as well as the environmental risks
and unresolved disposition issues associated with "peaceful"
nuclear activities, nuclear power must be phased out. In addition,
sustainable energy alternatives should be funded and promoted
at both the national and international levels.
The Commission calls on all states to start planning for
security without nuclear weapons. (p. 109) Moreover, because
the primary barrier to proliferation is political, the report
recognizes that the regime will be strongest and most sustainable
when nations make the decision not to acquire nuclear, biological
or chemical weapons because they do not feel a need for them.
"Promoting peace is the prime means of avoiding both the acquisition
and the retention of WMD (as well as other weapons... progress
is arms control and disarmament will often help to promote
peaceful relations. Action against terrorism is similarly
in vital need of a political, social dimension..." (p. 44)
The Civil Society Review believes that this presents an opportunity
to challenge the state-centric notion of national security
based on the threat and use of force, and to call instead
for an international system based on collective and human
security, with resolution of international conflicts through
multilateral institutions and nonviolent mechanisms, and the
promise of adequate food, shelter, health care, education,
clean water and air for all people everywhere.
The report acknowledges the important role played by non-governmental
organizations in "conveying views and proposals about WMD
from the grassroots to governments and international institutions,"
and in influencing official decisions in the direction of
eliminating WMD. The Commission gives special recognition
to women's organizations. "Women have rightly observed that
armament policies and the use of armed force have often been
influenced by misguided ideas about masculinity and strength.
An understanding of and emancipation from this traditional
perspective might help to remove some of the hurdles on the
road to disarmament and nonproliferation." (p. 160) The organizations
forming The Civil Society Review heartily agree with the Commission's
recommendation that "foundation's should substantially increase
their support for [non-governmental] organizations that are
working to eliminate global weapons of mass destruction threats."
(p. 161)
11. Small Arms and Light Weapons
From June 26 to July 7, governments will come to the UN to
review work on regulating small arms and light weapons at
the “World Gun Summit”, the Review Conference
of 2001 Programme of Action. The International Action Network
on Small Arms (IANSA) will be following it closely. See their
for information and updates. WILPF members helped establish
the IANSA Women's Network, which continues to do great work
and make connections between gender, weapons and violence.
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will
May 18
Dear Reaching Critical Will Friends and Advisors,
Below is a Reaching Critical Will report on the Conference
on Disarmament, the only multilateral disarmament treaty negotiating
body. We are sending it to you because today the United States
introduced a draft treaty on a Fissile Materials Cut-off.
Fissile Materials are the main component of nuclear weapons,
and a Fissile Materials Treaty is the third step of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty's 13 step action plan for nuclear
disarmament. We apologize if you are receiving this twice.
In this E-News:
The Text
Possibilities for Beginning Negotiations
The US and Iran
New US Ambassador to the CD
Back to Our Regularly Scheduled Speakers
Best Wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate
The United States introduced a draft
Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty and a draft
mandate for negotiating it in this morning's May 18th
discussion on existing stocks during the week of the Conference
on Disarmament's focused debate on a Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
US Acting Assistant Secretary of International Security and
Nonproliferation Stephen Rademaker traveled to the Conference
to present
the draft treaty. Following the introduction, the CD paused
its speaking list to give delegations an opportunity to react
to what Ambassador Landman of the Netherlands called “possibly
the most important statement in 3/4/5/6 years.” India,
United Kingdom, Iran, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea,
Australia, Italy, Japan, Spain, France, Pakistan, Germany,
Venezuela, Chile, Belgium, China, Russia, Bulgaria, Algeria,
and Canada reacted to the draft treaty, mandate and statement.
All welcomed the statement and text as a sign of US engagement
with the CD, even if many were not fully satisfied with its
content.
1. The Text
The draft treaty does not include existing stocks or provisions
for verification. The draft mandate is “to negotiate
a non-discriminatory and multilateral treaty banning the production
of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive
devises,” leaving out “internationally and effectively
verifiable” from the previously agreed-upon Shannon
Mandate for an FMCT. The draft treaty requires the ratification
of the five recognized Nuclear Weapon States (China, France,
Russia, the UK and the US) to enter into force and includes
a withdrawal provision. Interestingly, Assistant Secretary
Rademaker proposed either an ad hoc committee, or this plenary,
begin negotiations. He also suggested they aim to approve
a text by the end of this 2006 CD session.
As delegations only received the text this morning, most
were not able to officially comment on specifics because they
must send the draft to their capitols, but were interested
in further discussions. Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Germany,
the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Russia hoped the negotiating
mandate and draft treaty were a flexible starting point for
negotiations that “will help us to strike a balance”
among differing positions, as Algeria said. Germany was “happy
about some elements of flexibility in the mandate and draft
proposal.” Pakistan hoped neither the text nor the US
statement were “intended to support the notion that
it is a take it or leave it document” and Russian said
the draft treaty was “not the final word” on such
a treaty, hoping it was open for comments and ideas.
Australia, Belgium, and the Netherlands were particularly
concerned about the lack of verification in the draft treaty,
although all agreed with the Netherlands who said “it
seems we should, can and will discuss that” in negotiations.
Even Pakistan, who has long held that “the agreed upon
negotiating mandate [Shannon
Mandate] cannot be called preconditions”, today
said that “we believe all issues can be raised once
negotiations start.” Although Australia holds that an
effective FMCT should contain verification measures, it believes
the treaty could contain states' commitments, followed by
secondary agreements on verification, similar to the process
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty's initial commitments followed by secondary agreements
with the .
2. Possibilities for Beginning
Negotiations
As discussed yesterday, the CD must agree by consensus on
a program of work to establish the Ad Hoc Committees that
negotiate treaties, and has been unable to agree for ten years.
Many delegations expressed hope today that the draft text
and mandate would provide momentum and/or the opportunity
to “bring the Conference back to negotiating mode”
in the words of Italy. Some, like Spain and the UK, recommended
dropping the links among the CD's four core issues in order
to begin work, while others, like China, suggested the CD
“speedily begin work on an FMCT, the Prevention of an
Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS),
nuclear disarmament, and Negative
Security Assurances.” Belgium, Bulgaria and France
were ready to begin negotiations “immediately”,
“right away”, and “today”, respectively.
Russia said the introduction of a draft FMCT text “cannot
serve as an obstacle to our work on other issues”, and
Venezuela said that if a program of work is to be adopted
it “must address the concerns of all States Parties.”
The compromise Five
Ambassadors' proposal for a program of work with Ad Hoc
Committees on each of the four core CD issues has been rejected
by the US, who only wants to work on a Fissile Materials Cut-off
Treaty. Although all the other CD members agreed to the Five
Ambassadors' compromise, Rademaker said, “a package
approach will never work.” He called the linkage among
the issues “unconscionable hostage-taking... by proponents
of less worthy ideas”. The US saw no need for new agreements
on outer space, nuclear disarmament, or security assurances.
Canada and the Netherlands both suggested a more compromising
attitude. The Netherlands, reacting to the US characterization
of linking issues as hostage-taking, advised that “in
practice... insisting on not talking about anything but an
FMCT is exactly the same approach as insisting on multiple
subjects.” Canada reminded the Conference that the Five
Ambassadors' proposal contains a negotiating mandate for an
FMCT, but only discussion mandates for the other three subjects.
“Americans do not usually shy away from a good debate,”
said Canadian Ambassador Meyer. “If the US would signal
a willingness to engage, secure in the knowledge they would
not advance to negotiations without explicit US approval,
it would make an important contribution to bringing this body
back to productive channels.”
The text is indeed an opportunity. Although the Conference
may not be able to agree by the end of the session, it should
be able to use this text, in combination with the timetable
of scheduled discussions on all the issues, to find a way
to begin working.
3. The US and Iran
Rademaker's speech also accused Iran of having less than peaceful
intentions with its nuclear program, and said “the US
expects Security Council to live up to its responsibility
to address the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program. It
will be a defeat for effective multilateralism should the
Council fail to live up to this responsibility.” Iran
responded to Rademaker's list of reasons why Iran's nuclear
program is not logically about energy independence by recalling
the timeline of US accusations about weapons of mass destruction
leading up to its invasion of Iraq, telling the Conference
“not to take [the US's] words as real facts, and recalling
that the International Atomic Energy Agency had found no diversion
of nuclear materials to weapons purposes in Iran.
4. New US Ambassador to the
CD
Assistant Secretary Rademaker announced the new US Ambassador
to the CD as a sign of the US intention to begin negotiations,
and followed it with the veiled threat that hopefully the
former Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs Christina
Rocca would not “be the last US Ambassador to the CD.”
5. Back to Our Regularly Scheduled
Speakers
Following the discussion of the draft treaty and negotiating
mandate, South Africa, Brazil and Nigeria spoke. Egypt addressed
the Conference at its afternoon session devoted to “any
other FMCT matters”.
South
Africa offered that its experience destroying its nuclear
program and the following investigations would give some insights
for FMCT verification. Egypt said compliance must be strict
and with guarantees, requiring a complete inventory of stockpiles
in all states, including Nuclear Weapon States and states
that are not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). Nigeria
pointed out that “In other disarmament instruments stockpiles,
verification and compliance mechanisms have been incorporated
because of their importance in achieving the set of objectives
of such instruments. Why should these elements not be considered
in our work on fissile material?”
All four supported including existing stockpiles in an FMCT
as a step towards nuclear disarmament. South Africa said because
stockpiled material could be used for the production of future
nuclear weapons, in order for an FMT to be truly credible,
in should include stockpiles in its scope: “It is clear
that a complete halt in the production of fissile material
would leave enough of the material available to further increase
– and not decrease – the number of nuclear weapons.”
Egypt said not including existing stocks in an FMCT would
not reflect the majority of states' wish to reach complete
nuclear disarmament. “The fact that certain countries
insist on excluding stockpiles from the scope of the treaty
is not in conformity with the spirit of the NPT,” they
added.
Brazil
stated that the scope of an FMCT must clearly be defined in
order to preserve the inalienable right of States to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes.
Next Meeting
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament
will be held tomorrow morning, with a focused debate on compliance.
The afternoon session will address verification.
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching
Critical Will and
Beatrice Fihn, Disarmament and Economic Justice Intern
May 15
Dear Reaching Critical Will Friends and Advisors,
This is the second E-news devoted
to the Disarmament Commission, which finished its
2006 session at the end of April. In this E-news:
As always, this and all other General E-News
Advisories are archived on our website. We welcome any feedback,
questions, comments and concerns.
Best Wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate
1. Disarmament Commission Concludes
The 2006 UN Disarmament Commission (DC)
concluded on April 28, 2006, having produced a number of discussion
papers but with no consensus on anything but procedural reports.
The DC remained saturated with tension between the United
States and Iran, and the two engaged in a verbal duel at the
final session of the Commission. Working Group I on Nuclear
Disarmament forwarded 13 undifferentiated papers
to the 2007 session, while Working Group II on Confidence
Building Measures also forwarded a paper for possible consideration
next year. The Commission was only able to agree on recommendations
for improving the effectiveness of its Methods of Work, though
reaching that agreement was also fairly contentious.
Although the former Chair of the Commission,
Ambassador Rowe of Sierra Leone, was impressed by the quality
of the texts, and considered the Commission's ability to meet
at all a success, he also acknowledged that it was not enough.
Ambassador Rowe noted that the people of the world are not
impressed by diplomats “fiddling with linguistics while
nuclear weapons continue to threaten humanity.”
Other states questioned whether the Commission lived up to
its mandate this year; the Netherlands even characterized
States' posturing taking precedence over progress as “coming
close to being an insult to our taxpayers.” However,
the Republic
of Korea thought that efforts and discussions aimed
at narrowing the gap[s] among positions were invaluable. The
question now is whether delegations are effectively using
this opportunity for dialogue, or if they will in the future.
Certain states have a vested interest in avoiding compromise.
Will they be allowed to hijack our international institutions?
Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Tanaka characterized
the Commission's 2006 session as “a very difficult one”,
but advised the group that nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation
are long term goals. The Republic
of Korea, Chair of the Commission, reminded the delegations
that all the money governments spend on weapons could be better
spent on the countless starving people in the world.
The Security Council was considering International Atomic
Energy Agency ()
on Iran's nuclear programme while the Commission met, and
the confrontation between the US and Iran was the sub-script
during the Commission. The US’s final speech
was clearly prepared with a national audience in mind, criticizing
Iran's election as Vice Chair of the Commission given its
status with the IAEA, which had been recently noticed and
criticized in US media and Congress. Iran prepared a speech
defending its Vice-Chairmanship and its status with the IAEA,
and accusing the US of being the real problem in disarmament.
The speeches and their retorts included such
diplomatic parlance as “this Kafkaesque absurdity”,
“the US, the self-proclaimed arbitor of compliance”,
“you are either ignorant of the facts or liars”,
and “you are just going to look like a fool”.
Finally, it deteriorated to, “You started it.”
If the US and Iran do finally decide to negotiate directly
with each other, we hope the diplomacy improves at the negotiating
table.
Significantly, US Representative Robert Luaces also questioned
whether “the Disarmament Commission has finally outlived
its usefulness” in his final speech. Consistent with
its practice of undermining institutions it does not like,
the current US administration has been blocking progress in
other pieces of the disarmament machinery as well. In its
final statement to the Commission, Cuba implied the US has
proposed eliminating the Disarmament Commission as part the
mandate review process currently taking place as part of UN
Reform.
2. Nuclear Disarmament Working
Group I
Predictably, the Commission's Nuclear Disarmament Working
Group struggled to find agreement on anything. It eventually
submitted a procedural draft
report and forwarded all 13 of the 2006
documents to the 2007 Nuclear Disarmament Working
Group with no preference indicated among them. Next year the
delegations will likely face another lengthy struggle to decide
on which draft to begin their work.
During this session, the Chairman introduced three papers:
a Working
Paper entitled “Recommendations for Achieving
the Objective of Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons;” a Conference
Room Paper based on Member States' comments on the
first Working Paper and summarizing discussion; and a final
Conference Room Paper called “Draft
Outline.” Some delegations were highly critical
of the first two papers, from the titles to the details, so
the Chairman revised them both based on their comments and
amendments, and developed the final Draft Outline.
The Chair intended the Draft Outline to serve as a list of
topics for further discussion and consideration, to be annexed
to the report of the Working Group “without prejudice
to the position of any delegation and on the understanding
that it is non-binding.” Although there were suggestions
in the last session of how to change the draft outline to
make it acceptable as a reference for next year, in the end
Member States could not agree and sent on a procedural report
with all documents listed and undifferentiated. The current
draft report says the Chair's papers are “his sole responsibility
and do not represent a negotiated position nor command consensus.”
3. Confidence Building MeasuresWorking
Group II
Working Group II discussed confidence building measures based
on the Brazilian Chair's update of the 2003 Disarmament Commission
working paper on the same subject. At the second to last meeting
of the Working Group, the group decided not to attach the
paper to its report, but rather use it as a “possible
basis” for their work next year. The US
accused Pakistan of breaking the delicate compromises from
2003, while Pakistan asserted that the US was responsible
for not allowing the paper to be annexed to the report.
4. Methods of Work Despite being a “deceptively thorny issue”
and “very politically sensitive” in the words
of the biggest proponent of UN Reform, the United States,
the Disarmament Commission was able to agree on recommendations
for improving the effectiveness of its methods of work. This
agreement did not come without contentious negotiations, including
a tit for tat editing spat between the United States and Iran.
Eventually, the Commission decided on six bullet
point recommendations (in summary form):
Early election of Chairs and Vice-chairs,
if possible three months prior to substantive meetings.
Early adoption of the agenda.
Early distribution of national working documents.
Strengthen dialogue with the General Assembly
First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament.
Invite experts on disarmament, including
UNIDIR, to discussions at plenary meetings.
Request the UN Secretariat to improve the
Disarmament Commission website.
Delegations mainly disagreed over the format
of the recommendations and an European Union (EU) proposal
suggesting agenda items be relevant to the international security
environment. Delegations also discussed inviting experts to
participate in the Commission's discussions.
Some Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members, including Egypt,
Indonesia and Iran, did not want the recommendations to take
the form of a separate decision, as they were opposed to the
discussion in the first place and did not want it to have
any additional weight. The Commission then spent some time
discussing its own ability to take decisions about its methods
of work, and eventually settled that it would put the text
in the recommendations section of the report.
The contentious and eventually discarded
EU suggestion about “relevancy” of agenda items
recalls language that has previously been used to imply that
disarmament is no longer relevant in a post-September 11th
world, and that terrorism is the number one concern. The United
States supported the proposal and the “need for more
narrow focus of agenda items”. The Commission currently
only considers two agenda items, one on nuclear disarmament
and one on another topic. Several NAM members objected to
this language. Jordan clarified the underlying concern about
restricting the agenda or using the term relevant when it
defended the current two item set up: “discussing new
security issues should not negate or take precedence over
old security issues.” This struggle between “old”
and “new” security issues is taking place in all
the disarmament machinery as Member States try to negotiate
a cooperative course in the new geopolitics.
The United States, India and France objected to inviting
Non-Governmental Organizations and external experts to participate
in the Commission's discussions, while Indonesia and Egypt
supported it. Russia and Uruguay were concerned about possible
financial implications of such invitations, even though there
have not been any financial implications for any of the other
disarmament bodies that have already invited such experts
to participate in their discussions, including the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Process, the Review
Process, the First
Committee of the General Assembly and the Conference
on Disarmamen.
France incorrectly said the First Committee
was “not in a position to invite external experts”
to its discussions, even though it already did this without
difficulty in its 2005 thematic discussion on disarmament
education. Sierra Leone appropriately suggested the bullet
point begin “Consistent with the practices of the First
Committee.” Although this was not added to the bullet
point, “experts ”were not defined, leaving room
for the Disarmament Commission to mature and begin to formally
engage with civil society.
In a similar conversation about civil society participation
in the Conference on Disarmament on March
9, Syria noticed that "the states that objected to
such participation [in the CD] are the same states that daily
call on us to step up participation of NGOs in matters related
to democracy, human rights, peace and security. These states
seem to wish NGOs to be tools of their own policy.”
If States are truly impartially supporting or objecting to
NGO access, their positions should be consistent across issues,
from human rights to disarmament.
May 4
Dear Reaching Critical Will friends and advisors,
Yesterday a draft resolution on Iran put forward by France
and Britain and discussed in Security Council consultations
was informally circulated at the UN. It is posted at
The current version of the resolution is "Acting under Chapter
VII", which includes the possibility of sanctions and the
use of force. The Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom believes further coercive measures, particularly any
military action, will be disastrous and counterproductive.
A Chapter VII resolution leads in this direction. Talking
points on military action and Chapter VII are here: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/iranactionpack.html#talkingpoints
Now is the time to act. If the Security Council adopts a resolution,
it will set the precedent for further action. Send a letter
to the Security Council (names and addresses of current Security
Council members attached to this email, and online here:
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/govcontacts/SCcontact.html
Form letters to the United States Congress and the Security
Council are available here:
An initial reaction to the draft resolution by John Burroughs
of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy:
Best Wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate
April 24
Dear Reaching Critical Will Friends and Advisors,
The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC)
is kicking off its three year cycle of deliberations with
an agreed agenda for the first time in two years. Now in the
middle of its three week 2006
session the UNDC is discussing:
Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear
disarmament and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons; and
Practical confidence-building measures in the field of
conventional weapons.
The UN Disarmament Commission is a deliberative body that
considers and makes recommendations on various problems in
disarmament. Reaching Critical Will is monitoring and reporting
on the process, with the only website posting all governmental
statements
and papers.
The Commission has the most time allocated to multilateral
substantive consideration of nuclear disarmament in any of
the disarmament fora in years. The Commission can only make
recommendations, like the , but this opportunity
should be seized to find common ground and compromise on nuclear
disarmament at a time when international disarmament negotiations
(and even deliberations) are at an impasse. New Under-Secretary
General for Disarmament Affairs Nobuaki
Tanaka told the Commission they had a responsibility to
provide fresh momentum by using new and creative thinking
instead of allowing posturing to get in the way of results.
The Commission is also considering how to improve the effectiveness
of its work. While this may not sound political, some states
have used procedures to block substantive work on disarmament
in various disarmament fora, including the Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Conference, the Conference
on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission. In this
environment, procedure IS substance and is absolutely political.
Governments are choosing to fight over procedure because it
attracts less NGO attention, outrage and action, and makes
it more difficult to pinpoint blame.
This E-news covers the Disarmament Commission, including:
Member States do most of their work on substance in the Working
Groups, where they debate proposals, present and discuss papers
and formulate recommendations. Although NGOs are not allowed
to monitor the Working Groups of the Disarmament Commission,
delegations elaborated specific positions during their general
debate statements, and a few distributed the statements they
delivered in the Working Group. Recommendations are the final,
official product to come out of the Disarmament Commission,
and positions in statements can turn into and/or affect papers,
which the group can then edit and revise to come up with recommendations.
The United States has already submitted a Working
Paper, and the Nuclear Disarmament Working Group is debating
whether the Chair will also develop a Working Paper. The Non-Aligned
Movement and the EU have not yet submitted any papers.
In their statements, Member States generally reiterated their
support for the 1995
and 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty outcomes, particularly the
13
practical steps toward nuclear disarmament. They underscored
the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its
full implementation. The European
Union, in a statement delivered by Austria, recommended
the 2007 Preparatory Committee for the NPT be held in Vienna.
They also expressed a great deal of support for the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
and many states encouraged those whose ratification is still
required for the CTBT's entry-into-force to ratify it without
delay. Viet
Nam told the Commission it ratified the CTBT in late February
2006, leaving 10 states whose ratification is still needed
for the Treaty to enter into force.
Many delegations also supported immediately negotiating a
Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
in the Conference on Disarmament. Russia said the development
of such a treaty should be “the next multilateral measure
in the field of nonproliferation and disarmament”. Most
states said negotiations should begin “without preconditions”,
the new phrase that signifies the negotiating mandate need
not include verification because the United States opposes
it.
Several delegations made concrete proposals for moving along
on disarmament, including further reducing nuclear arsenals,
reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines,
and taking nuclear weapons off of hair trigger alert. The
Republic
of Korea said it “look[s] forward to further reductions
under the Moscow Treaty” and Sweden
recommended a follow-up to that treaty “so that the
number of nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia—as
an intermediary step—be counted in the 100s and not
the 1000s.” Unlike the Moscow Treaty, Sweden suggested
negotiations on a follow-up treaty “include non-strategic
nuclear weapons, and take irreversibility, transparency, and
verification measures into account.” Particularly since
the nuclear deterrence theory, or Mutually Assured Destruction
(MAD), belongs to the Cold War era, Bangladesh
called using nuclear weapons in security doctrines “not
only baneful, but also fallacious.”
Most of the disarmament deliberations are imbued with the
tension between the United
States and Iran,
with different delegations falling on a continuum between
the two sides. Some states are insisting on a middle ground
that holds both sides to the same standards of transparency,
verification, and compliance with all aspects of the NPT.
In the words of South Africa, “ Each article of the
NPT remains binding on all States Parties at all times and
in all circumstances and it is imperative that all States
Parties be held fully accountable for strict compliance with
their obligations under the Treaty.” New
Zealand suggested the Commission engage in dialogue on
“the need for greater transparency; both about compliance
with NPT requirements and about actual numbers of nuclear
weapons”.
The European Union once again called on all states in the
Middle East to create “an effectively verifiable zone
free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems” as laid out in the 1995
NPT Review Conference Resolution
on the Middle East. Many civil society organizations have
recommended
working through such a zone as an alternative to confrontational
approaches to the Iran situation.
2. Confidence-Building Measures
in Conventional Weapons Working Group II
During the general debate, many delegations identified confidence
building measures (CBMs) as a way to make progress toward
disarmament by reducing fear and suspicion and creating a
greater sense of security. The Chair of the CBM Working Group,
Ambassador Ronaldo Sardenburg of Brazil,
called CBMs “a powerful instrument to generate trust
... [whose] implementation has a positive impact in the consolidation
of a more cooperative environment”. He also asked delegations
not to link progress on CBMs to progress on nuclear disarmament.
China,
the European
Union, and the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) were among several delegations to highlight
the utility of CBMs in pursuing a new concept of security
based on mutual trust, equality, and cooperation. Ambassador
Rezlan Ishar Jenie of Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), stated: "The NAM believes that
CBMs, especially when applied in a comprehensive manner, can
be conducive to achieving structures of security based on
cooperation and openness and thus contribute to the wider
objective of the renunciation of the threat or use of force."
China stated that appropriate CBMs must make efforts to uphold
respect for individual nations' security interests while at
the same time striving to create global and regional security
environments favorable to disarmament and non-proliferation.
Many delegations recommended the Commission use the 2003
UNDC Chairman's working paper [annexed to the 2003 UNDC Annual
Report (A/58/42)] as a basis for further discussions on implementing
CBMs. Pakistan also submitted a Working
Paper on CBMs. Switzerland
pointed out the need for substantial updates to the 2003 UNDC
document, and proposed filling out the UN Register on Conventional
Weapons, creating a system of archives to provide an exhaustive
list of CBMs (see First Committee A/RES/60/82),
and including new developments like the Access to Technology
(ATT) Initiative and the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC). The
Republic of Korea recommended more participation in the UN
System for the Standardized Reporting of Military Expenditures.
3. Working Methods
Although it usually only considers two agenda items in Working
Groups, the Disarmament Commission is now also considering
“improving the effectiveness of the working methods
of the Disarmament Commission” in plenary sessions.
For two years the Commission has been unable to move forward
on substance because of disagreement on the agenda. Much of
the disarmament machinery is similarly deadlocked on procedural
matters that have been used to impede substantive progress.
During consultations on the agenda before the 60th General
Assembly in September 2005, the United States proposed considering
the above item in plenary sessions “with equitable time
allocated to it”. The United States has been a vocal
advocate of UN reform for years, and introduced has two resolutions
on the subject at the First Committee, one of which had to
be withdrawn. These reforms have been contested as some see
the restructuring as a way to shift power within the UN. The
NAM disputed the utility of reconsidering the Commission's
Working Methods after having just rearranged them in 1998
(in General Assembly Decision 52/492), but agreed to it to
facilitate consensus on the agenda and get the Commission
working again. However, in the debate on Working Methods,
members of the NAM have been resistant to the discussion itself
as well as to specific proposals.
So far, the Commission has considered improving its working
methods during two plenary sessions, one on Thursday, April
13, and a second on Monday, April 17. It has allocated three
more plenary sessions to consider the item, and the Chair
is developing a summary of the first two sessions to help
direct discussions.
Around 20 delegations have made interventions so far; some
have presented concrete proposals while others have generally
supported considering the topic. They discussed the general
role of the Disarmament Commission, its agenda, consensus,
organizational matters, participation, and its communication
with other disarmament bodies, particularly the First Committee
of the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva.
Role of the Commission
In his summary of the session, Chairman Oh of the Republic
of Korea noted that several delegations commented on the Commission's
general role, effectiveness and relevance in the context of
the Disarmament Machinery. He thought it related to Member
States' evaluation of working methods generally. The United
States, who advocated including this agenda item, said the
discussions were in keeping with “the lasting revolution
of reform at the UN” but did not offer any concrete
suggestions or proposals for improving the working methods.
The Netherlands noted that the Commission seemed to agree
that all efforts should strengthen, not weaken, the Commission,
a sentiment also expressed by China,
India,Pakistan,
the Republic
of Korea, and the United Kingdom.
Agenda
Delegations discussed the Commission's three year cycle of
deliberations and the number of issues it considers during
the cycle. At the last revision of its working methods in
1998, the Commission decided to consider two agenda items
each cycle, including one on nuclear disarmament, with the
possibility of adding a third. Last week, the United States
recommended the Commission explore a one year mandate discussing
one issue at a time. The Netherlands strongly cautioned against
moving to considering just one agenda item, because it would
make agreement on the agenda more difficult and has failed
to work as a process in other fora. Jordan
warned that if the Commission moves to one agenda item it
will “lose the balance and the balance is important”,
referring to the balance between the one agenda item on nuclear
disarmament and the other on another topic. The Republic of
Korea advised the Commission to consider a one year mandate
with the possibility of a one year extension, to avoid getting
caught in a three year cycle without a substantive outcome.
Japan suggested a one or two year mandate could better respond
to a rapidly changing international security environment.
Indonesia noted that the Commission's working methods (since
Decision 52/492) had only been in effect for one session,
from 2000-2003, and that it was too early to judge if they
were effective. Several other NAM members echoed this view.
Consensus
As much of our disarmament machinery is deadlocked, those
who want to make progress are beginning to question the rule
of 'consensus at all costs', particularly with regard to procedure.
The Disarmament Commission has practically operated by consensus,
and Decision 52/492 recommends that it could continue to do
so “according to circumstances... in the context of
the review of United Nations Disarmament Machinery.”
Indonesia reminded the Commission that it is a body of the
General Assembly and as such has the possibility of voting.
The United States told the Commission that because it deals
with “matters that cut to the heart of the security
of all of us... rules on paper and what it is important for
us to embrace” are two different things.
Organizational Matters
The Commission has been discussing organizational matters
including earlier Bureau and Chair elections and earlier document
distribution. Although the 1998 Decision on Working Methods
[52/492] recommends regional groups elect their Chairs as
early as possible, that did not happen this year. The Chair
of the Commission was still scrambling to find a Chair for
the Disarmament Working Group several days into the meetings,
and the schedule had to be switched until Benin was finally
elected on April 13. Earlier elections and document distribution
would allow consultations to begin before the meetings, which
could facilitate agreements more quickly.
Participation
Some Member States recommended the Commission follow the
slow progress being made in other disarmament fora to include
experts and broader public participation in the meetings.
One delegation disagreed.
Communication
Most delegations were open to considering proposals to improve
coordination and communications among the disarmament bodies,
particularly the UN Disarmament Commission, the General Assembly
First Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security, and the
Conference on Disarmament. Sierra Leone asked what could be
done with the reports the bodies send each other, and what
the three might do within existing resources that could improve
their efficiency.
As Kofi Annan aptly
following 2005's failures in disarmament and nonproliferation,
we cannot simply “lurch from crisis to crisis”
but must build consensus on a way forward for the regime.
In this E-news, we have updates on one of the crises endemic
to an embattled regime and on two institutions struggling
to find a way forward.
Although the situation with Iran does not bode well for the
regime, particularly in light of the contradictory US-India
nuclear sharing deal, there is still hope. Alongside these
challenges to the regime and international law, other governments
and civil society are struggling to strengthen the regime
and develop a more cooperative security framework. They are
doing this in the institutions designed to work on disarmament,
like the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission,
as well working in less traditional ways with other like-minded
states and civil society organizations.
We must work quickly, loudly and strategically in support
of the disarmament regime, international law and human security,
as the threats and challenges to these norms are accelerating
as well. Fortunately, we are the majority and have ethics
on our side.
As always, this and all other General E-News Advisories are
archived on our website. We welcome any feedback, questions,
comments and concerns.
Best Wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom
Project Associate
1. Security Council Presidential
Statement on Iran
The Security Council put Iran on its agenda this month and,
after much negotiation among the Permanent Five Members of
the Council, it released a on Wednesday, March 29. The statement:
notes the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA)
reports and resolutions including the ;
calls on Iran to take “the steps required by the
IAEA Board of Governors, notably in the first operative
paragraph” of the February 4th IAEA Board Resolution;
highlights the importance of suspending all uranium enrichment
activities under IAEA verification;
supports the work of the IAEA;
and requests the Director-General of the IAEA to report
to both the Board of Governors and the Security Council
on Iran's implementation of the February 4th Resolution's
steps within 30 days.
In essence, the statement calls on Iran to take confidence-building
measures to be verified by the IAEA within 30 days, in particular
to suspend all uranium enrichment activities. It also establishes
a mechanism—the report of the Director-General to both
the IAEA and the Security Council—to verify Iran has
taken these measures within the given time frame. It does
not contain a reference to a “threat to peace and security”
a phrase that would imply the issue would eventually fall
under a Chapter VII Mandate if the Council passes a resolution
on the situation. Chapter VII resolutions are binding and
include the possibility of sanctions and the use of force.
A Presidential Statement requires the unanimity of the Council,
and was delivered by current Argentinian President Ambassador
Mayoral. The statement is not legally binding, but elements
of it may be used as the basis of a future Security Council
resolution. The statement was drafted by the EU3 (France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom) and the United States, and
then negotiated with Russia and China. The received their first copy of the statement
several days after the negotiations among the Permanent Five
began.
Security Council Members say a Presidential Statement is
the first step of a gradual increase of pressure on Iran.
Although the US and EU insist this strategy is intended to
convince Iran to comply with the confidence building measures,
few expect Iran to comply with the request within the next
30 days. China and Russia have made it clear they do not support
sanctions and prefer this issue to be dealt with through the
IAEA. Many members of civil society are concerned that the
use of force not be considered under any circumstances. It
is unclear whether agreement on a Security Council resolution
is even possible, and if it is, what the next steps will be.
2. The Conference on Disarmament
Closes its first 2006 Session
The Conference on Disarmament (CD),
the sole multilateral disarmament treaty negotiating body,
closed its first 2006 session on March 31. The second session
will open on May 15, when the CD will discuss a possible Fissile
Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
for at least one week. Although the CD is still deadlocked
over the programme of work under which treaty negotiations
could begin, the new effort at focused substantive discussions
could be buds of new life for the forum.
By working together, the six 2006 Presidents of the Conference
have created the first year long timetable
for discussions without a programme of work. The CD rotates
its Presidents every four weeks according to the alphabetical
English language country name, historically causing problems
with continuity and planning. This year's six Presidents,
or P6, have been working since August of 2005 to address this
institutional deficiency and enable deeper substantive discussion
and debate. With a timetable of what will be discussed when,
delegations have the opportunity to prepare for discussion,
create working papers and bring experts from capitals. They
will also be discussing the same issues at the same time,
so they can interact and explore common positions and compromise,
ideally developing the basis for agreement on a programme
of work as well as future discussions on specific issues.
By contrast, much of the 'debate' over the past years has
been routine and repetitive or procedural in nature. The CD
has been unable to agree on a programme of work for nearly
a decade. A programme of work could establish Working Groups
with mandates to address crucial disarmament issues in varying
capacities including treaty negotiation. In the past, treaties
have even come out of Working Groups without a negotiating
mandate. However, without a programme of work, delegations
have simply been repeating broad national positions on disarmament
and non-proliferation and/or discussing different configurations
of a programme of work. There is some hope that with a timetable
for discussions, delegations will get into depth on substance,
including bringing in technical experts and politicians from
capitals. Ideally, these discussions will form the foundation
for future negotiations.
The outcome of this year remains to be seen, and governments
and civil society are watching the CD very closely. Progress
must be real and not just talk.
The Reaching Critical Will project continues to monitor and
report on every CD plenary session. To keep up to date on
the progress in developing disarmament treaties, subscribe
to our CD list by sending an email to our Project
Associate. All previous reports are archived on the website
at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches06/reports.html.
RCW has also compiled the following resources to enhance
civil society monitoring of the CD:
3. The United Nations Disarmament
Commission Ready to Open its 2006 Substantive Session
The UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC)
is a deliberative body that considers and makes recommendations
on various problems in disarmament. The UNDC will hold its
2006
substantive session from April 10 to April 28, kicking
off its three year cycle of deliberations with an agenda for
the first time in two years. In a surprise breakthrough, the
Commission finally agreed on an agenda at its December 2005
organizational meeting, and adopted a provisional agenda (A/CN.10/L.57)
at its March 28, 2006 organizational meeting.
The two agenda items are:
Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear
disarmament and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
Practical confidence-building measures in the field of
conventional weapons.
It has also agreed to allocate equitable time during the
plenary to consider improving the effectiveness of methods
of work of the Commission.
The UNDC last met with an agreed agenda in 2003, when it
discussed "Ways and Means to Achieve Nuclear Disarmament"
and "Practical Confidence Building Measures in the Field of
Conventional Arms", documents from that meeting are available
at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/dc/dcindex.html.
Gearing up for work in April, the Commission elected H.E.
Mr. Oh Joon (Republic of Korea), as Chairman of the Commission
and elected the representatives of Austria, Belarus, Israel
and Poland as Vice-Chairpersons. It established two Working
Groups (I and II) to consider its two agenda items. Brazil
will be chairing Working Group II on confidence building measures
in conventional arms. The Commission will elect a chair for
Working Group one, other Vice-Chairs and a Rapporteur at the
beginning of its substantive session on April 10.
As most disarmament machinery has been bogged down in politically
inspired procedural quibbles, this breakthrough offers the
most time to discuss disarmament in a multilateral setting
in years. Governments should seize this opportunity for substantive
debate and developing recommendations on how to achieve nuclear
disarmament and nonproliferation.
RCW will be reporting on the Commission throughout April,
on this email list and our First Committee email list. Write
to our Project Associate with Disarmament Commission in the
subject line to subscribe. We will post all governmental statements,
non-papers and working papers on our website here: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/dc/dcindex.html#2006
1. Iran: Intense Developments
2. Norway Divests its Oil Fund from Nuclear Weapons Producing
Companies
3. Russian Missiles and Missile Defense
4. Conference on Disarmament to Open 2006 Session January
23
5. Italian Citizens Sue US Government for Violating International
Law
We begin 2006 with hope. We hope the major powers of the
world will work to find a non-military solution to all nuclear
proliferation concerns, including the current international
concern about Iran’s nuclear program. We hope the world
will take the current crisis as a sign that new energy and
life must be invested in the Middle East peace process and
the realization of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle
East. We hope the Nuclear Weapon States will recognize the
best and only permanent way to stop proliferation, inspire
confidence and build trust is to irreversibly and verifiably
disarm.
We hope other nations and investors will follow the example
of Norway, making their wealth work ethically by divesting
from companies involved in producing nuclear weapons. We hope
the United States and Russia will also put their money where
their mouths are by reducing investments in Cold War architecture
as they so vociferously proclaim the Cold War is over. We
hope they will not just reduce their investments in weapons
and weapons upgrades, but will rather invest in weapons downgrades
and dismantlement. We hope the Conference on Disarmament will
end its decade of deadlock and agree on a programme of work,
and then begin working immediately. We even hope they start
negotiating a fissile materials treaty.
We hope governments begin listening to us. We hope people
across the world will follow five Italian citizens’
example and demand accountability from governments if they
do not listen to us. We remember that 2005 was supposed to
be a year of progress and renewal, and it was not. We expect
2006 will be a year of surprising advances, a year of growth
and new heroes, a year for cooperation and compassion, a year
without new war. And by turning our hope into action, we will
make it so.
best wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom
Project Associate
1. Iran: Intense Developments
The escalatory rhetoric we reported in the last
E-news advisory is turning to escalatory action. Last
week, Iran resumed nuclear research by breaking, under IAEA
supervision, voluntarily imposed International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) seals. The EU3 (Britain, France and Germany)
deplored this move as a violation of the between them and Iran, and said it could
not come “without consequences”.
On Monday, 16 January, the EU3 met with China, Russia and
the United States to discuss the issue. Coming out of the
meeting, China and Russia agreed that Iran should “fully
suspend its nuclear program” but still did not support
sanctions against Iran.
In a January 18 letter, the EU3 requested an extraordinary
meeting of the IAEA
Board of Governors on to "discuss the implementation of
IAEA safeguards in Iran and related Board resolutions". The
meeting is scheduled for February 2, 10:30 am, in Vienna.
The EU3 and the United States are expected to push for an
immediate referral to the Security Council. The United States
is the rotating President of the Security Council during February,
and therefore has greater discretion about what comes on the
Council’s agenda and when.
Russia will continue its negotiations with Iran on its proposal
to jointly enrich uranium in Russia. The two governments met
most recently to discuss this proposal on the weekend of January
7-8, after Iran had already announced its intention to resume
nuclear research. The EU3 and the US support this compromise
proposal which the Iranian Ambassador to Russia, Gholamreza
Ansari, recently called “constructive” and “a
good initiative to resolve the situation.” The next
round of talks between Russia and Iran is scheduled for February
16.
We are now facing a possible Security Council referral as
early as the first week of February. As we noted in our last
E-news Advisory, Iran has already passed legislation that
would limit IAEA access to its nuclear facilities if it is
referred to the Security Council. If the IAEA escalates the
pressure with a referral, we can expect to see Iran escalate
by limiting IAEA access and an international response. A spiral
of escalation must be avoided. Any spiral that results in
military confrontation will be extremely destabilizing for
the entire region, which is already tense and unstable.
The time for real answers to the issue of nuclear proliferation
in the Middle East, and generally, has come. In the Middle
East, Israel must give up its policy of ambiguity and work
with the international community in investing in a viable
Middle East peace process and developing the framework for
a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East. The Security
Council supported this in a 1991 resolution (687), and the
General Assembly unanimously adopts a resolution supporting
the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle
East every year (A/RES/60/52
this year).
Generally, Nuclear Weapon States must take the lead in non-proliferation
by living up to their end of the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty bargain, and totally, irreversibly and verifiably disarm
their nuclear weapons. There is no moral high ground in either
proliferation or nuclear weapons possession, but states with
nuclear weapons will have more credibility in their non-proliferation
efforts while they are disarming their own arsenals.
Civil society can influence this process by sending a letter
to the International
Atomic Energy Association Board Members opposing immediate
referral to the Security Council. Sample letters are available
on the Reaching Critical Will website: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/iran.html#ngo
If the matter is referred, you can send a letter to the Security
Council members asking that any response not involve the use
of force. We will keep you up to date on developments.
2. Norway Divests its Oil Fund
from Nuclear Weapons Producing Companies
On January 5, 2006, the Norwegian Minister of Finance, Kristin
Halvorsen, declared that the new Norwegian government will
divest its Norwegian Oil Fund from all companies connected
to nuclear weapons production. The Fund, which is owned by
the people of Norway, has an ethics panel that oversees its
investments. Due to this decision, Norway sold shares in US
giants Boeing and Honeywell, as well as France’s Safran
SA, Italy’s Finmeccanica SPA, the United Kingdom’s
BAE Systems PLC, and the United States’ Northrop Grumman
Corp. and United Technologies Corp. According to Halvorsen,
$500 million dollars was divested from the companies in what
she termed “an ongoing process” that “does
not exclude the possibility that there are more companies”
from which Norway will divest. Norway is the third largest
oil exporter, and the Fund is worth about $230 billion dollars.
3. Russian Missiles and Missile
Defense
On December 24, 2005, Russia put a new fleet of nuclear missiles
that can travel over 6,000 miles and evade missile defense
systems on combat duty. Designed to be the foundation of the
Russian strategic nuclear arsenal, the four new Topol-M missiles
may represent greater investment in the land leg of the Russian
nuclear triad, an effort to maintain strategic balance with
the United States, and/or a challenge to US missile defense
programs.
The missiles currently have a single nuclear warhead, but
just as Russian defense officials warned, as a consequence
of the 2002 US pullout from the 1972 , they plan to have multiple warheads on
the Topol-Ms. Although the international community has suspected
the Topol-Ms were intended to eventually carry multiple warheads,
General Nikolai Solovtsov, Commander of the Strategic Rocket
Force, publicly acknowledged this intention for the first
time in October 2005.
Russia will decide whether to add warheads to the missiles
in 2009 when the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty () expires. As the time draws near, they will be assessing
developments that could reduce the effectiveness of Russia’s
nuclear forces. “Such factors include deployment of
foreign missile defense systems, modernization of aerial and
space reconnaissance systems … and scientific breakthroughs
in the sphere of developing new arms,” Solovtsov said.
Creating new missiles with multiple warheads is banned by
the US-Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II,
but Russia annulled that treaty, which never entered into
force, the day after the US formally announced its unilateral
pullout from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The
ABM Treaty’s purpose was to prohibit Anti-Ballistic
Missile systems and the United States is currently pursuing
a missile defense program.
Russia claims that its Topol-M missiles can “pierce
any missile defense system” because they can change
course to thwart an enemy interception device, and have other
foils for the current missile defense technology. President
Vladimir Putin has said these new developments in their nuclear
missile systems are “of the kind that other nuclear
powers do not and will not have.”
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov told the BBC that
Russia is “seriously working on the development of fundamentally
different types of weapons, which will ensure for us reliable
and guaranteed security after 60 years, after 70 years, easily.”
The missiles are most vulnerable to attack during their launch,
meaning a counter-attack during the launch would have to either
come from very close to or in Russian territory, or, you guessed
it, from space. Russia has been working for a ban on weapons
in space in various international fora, including the Conference
on Disarmament and the First
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security in the General
Assembly of the UN. The United States was the only country
to vote
against the resolution
supporting Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)
in the First Committee.
The US has reacted very calmly to the Topol-Ms, saying they
are “familiar with Russian updates of its arsenal”,
and claiming the missile defense system is geared towards
“rogue states”, not Russia. The Russian missiles,
on the other hand, were developed specifically to circumvent
the US missile defense system, and adding multiple warheads
to them is most likely an effort to maintain strategic balance
with the US.
"The creation of the Topol-M missile with multiple warheads
is a justified and expedient step that will seriously reduce
the cost of maintaining a strategic nuclear balance with the
U.S.," said Russian military expert Vladimir Dvorkin, former
head of the Defense Ministry's 4th Research Institute.
In order to retain as many warheads as the 2002 Moscow Treaty's
limit (1,700-2,200), Russia will have to deploy more Topol-M
missiles per year to replace older missiles. Russia's current
land-based missiles will have all reached or exceeded the
end of their service lives by the end of the decade. Without
an accelerated deployment of the Topol-M missiles, Russia
will probably only have 1,200 warheads in 2013, which is even
less than Russia’s original Moscow Treaty proposal of
1,500 warheads, according to the .
Russia originally planned to build 350 of the missiles, then
drastically cut the funding for the Strategic Rocket Forces
in 2000 and increased funding for the navy. Only 46 single-warhead
Topol-M missiles have been deployed since their introduction
in 1998, but now Russia may be moving back to an emphasis
on the land leg of its strategic forces with plans for 350
more Topol-Ms armed with multiple warheads. This year the
first regiment of mobile Topol-Ms is scheduled for deployment,
and beginning in 2007 they plan to deploy up to nine Topol-Ms
per year. Not only does adding more warheads per missile reduce
costs, but the Topol-Ms are less expensive than new submarines.
Russia’s 2006 state defence budget increased by $1.88
billion over last year, which is about a 15 percent increase.
70 percent of this increase is supposed to go to new equipment
and serious upgrades like the missiles, which itself is an
increase of about 10 percent over last year’s allocation
for new equipment and upgrades, according to the .
While Russia was the first nation to declare no first deployment
of weapons in outer space, and continues to champion the prevention
of an arms race in outer space (PAROS)
in various international fora, this modernization of their
arsenal only serves to undermine calls for a PAROS and call
their motives into question.
While the Topol-M modernization is hardly on the scale of
the Cold War, flirting with new arms races is dangerous nonsense.
If the US and Russia plan to strut around proclaiming the
end of the Cold War, they both need to abandon arms competition
and verifiably and irreversibly disarm their nuclear weapons.
4. Conference on Disarmament
to Open 2006 Session January 23
The Conference
on Disarmament (CD) will open its 2006 session on January
23, 2006, with the first public plenary scheduled to be held
on Tuesday January 24th. The CD, the world’s sole multilateral
disarmament treaty negotiating body, was challenged by the
General Assembly’s First Committee to finally come to
consensus on a programme of work this year, its 10th year
without an agenda. Between the impetus from the First Committee
and the work of the CD presidents, surely the CD will be able
to finally come to consensus on a programme of work after
a decade of deadlock.
As avid First
Committee Monitor readers will recall, in October
2005, Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden
came together to present a proposal
to the First Committee to prod the CD back to work. Although
the proposal was not submitted as a resolution in the First
Committee this year, its contents created a stir we are hoping
will stimulate substantive movement.
Basically, they proposed the First Committee adopt a resolution
creating open-ended ad-hoc committees based on the CD programme
of work with the most support. This programme of work, called
the Five Ambassadors’ Agenda (A-5
Agenda), has near consensus support in the CD, but, because
the CD needs consensus to work, has not been adopted. The
First Committee resolution would bypass that block by creating
the same programme of work, with the same Ambassadors and
using the CD budget, to begin work.
The United States, the main block to the A-5 Agenda, circulated
a memo
threatening this would “spell the end for the CD”
and urging Member States not to support the proposal. Hopefully
in the CD this year, the US will live up to the urging of
its own memo to “focus on getting the CD to work”.
The Conference has rotating Presidents, each with a four
week term, throughout the year. Although many delegations
have complained this is too short a period for the presidents
to be most effective, in 2006 the six Presidents, Poland,
the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Senegal
and Slovakia, are working together to gain institutional memory
and make progress towards a programme of work. Between the
work of the Presidents and the prod of the First Committee,
the CD should be able to reach agreement this year. If not,
in 2006 the First Committee should bring the decade of deadlock
to a close by tabling and passing the ad
hoc committees proposal to initiate work in the CD.
2006 CD Schedule:
First Session: 23 January- 31 March
Second Session: 15 May - 30 June
Third Session: 31 July - 15 September
5. Italian Citizens Sue US Government
for Violating International Law
On December 22, 2005, five Italian citizens filed a lawsuit
against the US government for endangering their communities
and violating international law by keeping 50 B-61 bombs in
a non-nuclear weapon state. The Defendant is Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld. The
requests the first hearing to be scheduled on July 7th, the
day before the 10th anniversary of the International Court
of Justice Advisory Opinion on the illegality of nuclear weapons,
and is intended to highlight the presence of nuclear weapons
in the media as well as the courts. All five of the Plaintiffs
live within a 10 kilometer radius of Aviano airbase, and have
brought the action through the work of five lawyers from the
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms—Italy
(—Italy).
