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September 21
      1) The UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security prepares for an exciting upcoming       session.
      2) The Conference on Disarmament closes its relatively productive 2006 session.

August 31
      1) Reaching Critical Will needs your support to continue work for disarmament

August 1
      1) Security Council demands Iran stop enrichment and reprocessing, threatens sanctions

July 26
      1) Security Council struggles over resolution on Iran
      2) Failed conference provides no progress, no plan for controlling small arms
      3) Security Council passes unanimous resolution on North Korea

June 9: Weapons of Mass Destruction Report, civil society review
      1) Summary and Significance of the WMD Report
      2) Three Waves of Nuclear Proliferation
      3) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
      4) Specific Challenges to the Regime
      5) Moving to Elimination
      6) Controlling Existing Capabilities
      7) Delivery Systems
      8) “Peaceful Nuclear Energy”
      9) Redefining Security
      10) The Role of NGOs and Gender
      11) Small Arms and Light Weapons Review Conference

May 18: Conference on Disarmament Report, draft Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty
      1) The Text
      2) Possibilities for Beginning Negotiations
      3) The US and Iran
      4) New US Ambassador to the CD
      5) Back to Our Regularly Scheduled Speakers

May 15: Disarmament Commission Report
      1) Disarmament Commission Concludes
      2) Nuclear Disarmament Working Group I
      3) Confidence Building Measures Working Group II
      4) Methods of Work

May 4
      1) Security Council Resolution on Iran

April 24: Disarmament Commission Report
      1) Nuclear Disarmament Working Group I
      2) Confidence-Building Measures in Conventional Weapons Working Group II
      3) Working Methods of the Commission

April 5
      1) Security Council Presidential Statement on Iran
      2) The Conference on Disarmament Closes its first 2006 Session
      3) The Disarmament Commission Ready to Open its 2006 Substantive Session

January 19
      1) Iran: Intense Developments
      2) Norway Divests its Oil Fund from Nuclear Weapons Producing Companies
      3) Russian Missiles and Missile Defense
      4) Conference on Disarmament to Open 2006 Session January 24
      5) Italian Citizens Sue US Government for Violating International Law

September 21

Dear Reaching Critical Will friends and advisors,
In this E-news:

1. The UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security prepares for an exciting upcoming session; and
2. The Conference on Disarmament closes its relatively productive 2006 session.

Once again there is reason for hope, and once again that hope must be realized through action. In the midst of the debate among the leaders of the world, and coming up on the world's disarmament consensus-building body, there are glimmers that we will succeed in building the world in which we want to live. Despite all the rhetoric, diplomacy may prevail in the Iran situation: the European Union is resuming negotiations with Iran. Seven governments are introducing an Arms Trade Treaty that would regulate trade in small arms and light weapons for the first time. The world's disarmament treaty negotiating body, the Conference on Disarmament, just concluded its most productive year in nearly a decade, and is building towards negotiating again. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission has recommended governments hold a Review Conference on the 40th anniversary of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to deal with weapons in space.

All of these glimmers are just hopes until we create them. They are flashing possibilities that civil society and like-minded governments need to work into reality. Educate yourself and others, and then act. Use our General Assembly Disarmament Index, to help you find out what your government's position is, and then, with all your friends, call your Foreign Ministry and tell them what it should be. Tell them work for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East. Tell them to support and strengthen the Arms Trade Treaty. Tell them to work on the four core issues in the Conference on Disarmament- the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, a Fissile Materials Treaty, Negative Security Assurances and, of course, Nuclear Disarmament. Tell them to block weapons in space. We create the world we want.

Best wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate

1. The UN General Assembly's First Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security prepares for an exciting upcoming session.

The international consensus-building committee on disarmament, peace and security is meeting soon. The UN General Assembly's First Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security meets every October for 4-5 weeks, after the September General Assembly General Debate. The governments of the world haggle over priorities, policy, and language, to develop consensus on weapons, peace, and security. With disarmament diplomats from around the world, the First Committee offers one of the best opportunities for outreach, education, and advocacy efforts on disarmament and nonproliferation issues.

Governments are poised to struggle over guns and conventional weapons at this year's First Committee. People are frustrated about the failed June 2006 Small Arms and Light Weapons Review Conference, and will likely use this October as an opportunity. Also, seven governments (Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya, and the United Kingdom) are proposing an Arms Trade Treaty that would govern the sale of small arms and light weapons, from revolvers to rifles to anti-tank missile systems, for the first time.

On nuclear issues, governments might debate nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and weapons in space issues. A Preparatory Committee for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is scheduled for the spring of 2007, and although the General Assembly does not oversee the NPT review process, governments will likely discuss the upcoming preparatory committee and possibly affirm it. Also, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission recently recommended governments hold a Review Conference on the 40th anniversary of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to deal with weapons in space. Although it remains to be seen if any government will pick up this call, the First Committee would be the place to do it.

Reaching Critical Will follows the First Committee and publishes issue-based summaries of the negotiations, resolutions and votes. We send our First Committee Monitor to our email lists in HTML and PDF form, and make it available online. The HTML version is chock-full of hyper-links to more information, treaty texts and organizations, and the PDF version prints into an accessible attractive newsletter. We encourage you to use this easy resource to see what your government is saying and doing on disarmament in the international arena. There is no other source following these issues as closely. To receive this weekly newsletter by email, send an email to jennifer@reachingcriticalwill.org with « First Commitee subscribe » in the heading, indicating whether you prefer the HTML or PDF version.

Reaching Critical Will also closely monitors the Heads of State and Foreign Ministers' statements during the UN General Debate, which is happening right now. We produce a Disarmament Index of all references to disarmament and non-proliferation. This index is published online by the beginning of the First Committee, and, searchable by country and by topic, is a guide to countries' priorities.

We hope you will take advantage of this opportunity to become a participant in the UN First Committee process through Reaching Critical Will. Not only will The Monitor help you with your work efforts towards disarmament, Reaching Critical Will represents civil society at the UN, helping us create a stronger voice of disarmament for the future. If you want to be more involved than a regular subscriber, please contact our Project Associate at jennifer@reachingcriticalwill.org.

2. The Conference on Disarmament closes its relatively productive 2006 session

This year the Conference on Disarmament did more substantive work than it has done in years. After encouragement from the 2005 General Assembly's First Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security, all six 2006 presidents got together and developed a coordinated timetable for debates.

This allowed governments to plan ahead, prepare papers, bring experts from capital to talk to one another, and all debate the same subject at the same time. Although this sounds like it should be the regular state of affairs, the world's only multilateral disarmament treaty negotiating body has not approached this level of substantive debate in years. The 2006 presidents brought the Conference back to addressing substance, if not to negotiating it.

Next year's presidents (South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, and Syria) must do more. They will have the power and the opportunity to move the disarmament agenda forward at a time when we desperately need it. We hope the CD, which has been so embarassingly deadlocked for so long, will lead the international disarmament community as it should, by showing that its members can effectively work together on the four core issues. Good faith here could generate good faith elsewhere, and vice versa.

Civil society would like to know how the CD intends to use to build on the work of this year and begin work next year. As Canada said on August 22 and The Netherlands said on September 6, a repeat of this year's exercise will not be good enough. We are pleased governments are finally discussing substantive issues in a way that will build a foundation for negotiations, but we expect more.

August 31

Dear Reaching Critical Will friends and advisors,
In lieu of our regular E-news this month, we are asking you to support the work we do and the resources we provide for the global community of disarmament experts, analysts and activists. We have a great opportunity through a challenge grant, meaning every dollar you give to RCW is twice as powerful! Your contribution to RCW will be matched dollar for dollar from the challenge grant.

With your support, our work in the upcoming 2006 UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security will be even stronger. We will:

• Index every disarmament statement made at the UN General Assembly General Debate and post it so you can access it on line and know what your government is saying on a myriad of issues;
• Report on the disarmament-focused debates in our First Committee Monitor in topic based weekly summaries;
• Provide the only online access to all First Committee statements, resolutions and papers;
• Keep you updated on any disarmament action-items via our General E-news list;
• Coordinate a NGO Working Group for the duration of the First Committee to collectively strengthen our advocacy; and
• Facilitate access to rooms at the UN for NGO side events during the First Committee.

RCW continues to cover the Security Council's dealings with Iran, on our website and through our General E-news list. You can access our background page here and our Iran Action Pack here.

We need your support to continue our full range of reporting and advocacy work!

WILPF created the Reaching Critical Will project in 1999 to “improve the quantity and quality of NGO engagement in multilateral disarmament decision making fora”, to serve your needs, and to increase global transparency on global security by connecting you to information about multilateral disarmament processes and the governments that drive them. We are asking the community that knows the value of our work and uses it regularly to contribute give a tax-deductible (for US residents), end of the summer, here comes that First Committee sprint, contribution to the project.

Please help us keep up our work for global disarmament, and serve you better. You can either send us a check made out to:

Jane Addams Peace Association
777 UN Plaza, 6th floor
New York, NY 10017 USA
(Be sure to put RCW in the memo line of the check!)

Or contribute via PayPal by clicking on the Donate Now! button here: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/about/donate.htm and putting “RCW” in the “note to seller” line that comes up on the review page after you submit your donation and continue to checkout.

Best wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate

August 1

Dear Reaching Critical Will friends and advisors,

Last week we reported on the Security Council's struggle to agree on a resolution on Iran's nuclear programme. Yesterday, July 31, the Council passed Resolution 1696, although they have not yet taken action on the escalating crisis in Gaza and Lebanon. The Security Council, with ultimate responsibility for maintaining peace and security, must do everything possible to prevent violence and its escalation instead of taking action that could raise tensions. It is past time to demand an immediate ceasefire to build sustainable peace on a regional basis. Iran must be approached as a stakeholder in the peace process. It is not time to heighten the stakes and spread conflict.

Best wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom, Program Associate

1. Security Council demands Iran stop enrichment and reprocessing, threatens sanctions

On July 31, the Security Council passed Resolution 1696 demanding Iran stop uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities by August 31, and threatened sanctions if Iran does not comply. The Council also called on Iran to implement the confidence-building measures recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA Board of Governors' Resolution GOV/2006/14). The Security Council resolution passed 14 to 1, with Qatar as the sole vote against.

As forewarned in our last e-news (July 26), this Security Council resolution takes action under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, “in order to make to make mandatory the suspension required by the IAEA”. Article 40 is the weakest form of a Chapter VII mandate, as it only authorizes “interim measures” before sanctions and the use of force (Articles 41 and 42). The initial draft security council resolution authorized action under Article 39, but Russia insisted it be removed because it refers to sanctions and the use of force. As a compromise, the above “mandatory” clause was inserted to imply the resolution is legally binding. However, to make a resolution binding, international law requires an Article 39 finding of a threat to international peace and security. In the final version of the resolution, the Security Council removed language calling the Iranian nuclear programme a threat to peace and security. In its statement following the vote, Russia said it was crucial to note the resolution ruled out the use of force as a response.

However, the resolution threatens sanctions if Iran does not comply by August 31, and includes a paragraph that could be described as either limited sanctions or an embargo. This paragraph calls on all states to prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and ballistic missile programmes.

Iran had promised to respond to a package proposed by the permanent five members of the Security Council and Germany (called the P5+1) by August 22. Qatar, the sole Security Council member to vote against the resolution and the sole Arab state on the Council, asked the Council to wait to take action until Iran responded to the package. Given the crisis in the Middle East, Qatar said acting now did not serve the region's security.

Iran, in a lengthy and comprehensive statement that detailed its contentious history with the Security Council and the West, said that because its nuclear programme does not pose a threat to international peace and security, dealing with it in the Security Council was “unwarranted and void of any legal basis or practical utility.” It said the resolution “violates the fundamental principles of international law, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA Board resolutions.”

On Sunday, July 30th, Iran warned that it would reject the package offered by the P5+1 if the Council passed any resolution against it. Iran has repeatedly responded negatively to increased pressure. Passing this resolution now, when the Middle East is in crisis and just three weeks before Iran's scheduled reply to the P5+1 offer, decreases the potential for a peaceful solution.

-Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate
Reaching Critical Will

July 26

Dear Reaching Critical Will Friends and Advisors,

The usually quiet summer months at the United Nations have been busy for disarmament. Governments reviewed their progress on controlling illegal gun trade at the end of June, and the Security Council has been discussing both Iran and North Korea. As we have all seen in the news, the Security Council is also dealing with the unfolding crisis in the Middle East. It is important to understand the ways in which regional security issues link to one another, and also how regional security connects with global security and empire. These links must be part of pursuing larger peace and understanding, not hysteria and war.

In this E-News:

1. Security Council struggles over resolution on Iran
2. Failed conference provides no progress, no plan for controlling small arms
3. Security Council passes unanimous resolution on North Korea

Best wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate

1. Security Council struggles over resolution on Iran

On Thursday, July 20, the EU3 (Britain, France and Germany) introduced a draft resolution on Iran to the Security Council, which is similar to the previously problematic draft resolution they introduced May 3. The permanent five members of the Security Council, along with Germany which has been a negotiating partner throughout this process (called the P5+1), are still divided over the resolution's framework and some of its steps.

The still disputed draft decides Iran should suspend uranium enrichment and calls on Iran to take the confidence-building steps outlined by the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors. Although it does not take action under the Article of the UN Charter that authorizes sanctions (41), it does call on all states to embargo items that could contribute to Iran's enrichment and reprocessing activities or ballistic missile programmes.

The available draft takes action under Articles 39 and 40 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but there is reportedly agreement to remove Article 39. Article 39 gives the Security Council the right to identify threats to peace and security and decide what measures to take, including sactions or force. Article 40 gives it the right to take "provisional measures" before moving to sanctions or the use of force. The resolution also expresses the intention to take further steps under Article 41 if Iran does not comply, and the P5+1 have reportedly agreed on an August 31 deadline for compliance. Article 41 authorizes action short of the use of force, including sactions.

Russia introduced a number of amendments to the draft resolution, including removing "threat to peace and security" language and Article 39. Reportedly, they have agreed to remove Article 39, while adding language to make it mandatory that Iran suspend uranium enrichment. Another Russian amendment added national and international law parameters to the paragraph calling on all states to embargo enrichment and missile-related items.

The United States had hoped the Council would pass the resolution last week, but Russia and China continued to disagree with some of the more forceful language of the draft text. There is still not a single agreed text among the permanent five and Germany, although they all report "progress". They will meet again tomorrow morning, and, if they have agreement, will submit the text to the elected ten members of the Council. Depending on how urgently they try to pass the text, particularly given the escalating conflict in the Middle East, it may be passed as early as Friday or be pushed to next week.

-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

2. Failed small arms conference provides no progress, no new plan for controlling small arms

From June 26 through July 7, 2006, United Nations member states gathered to review the illicit trade and transfer of small arms for the first time since the Review Conference in 2001, as well as the Programme of Action to combat the trade in illicit small arms and light weapons. While progress has begun to take place in at least half of the member states, the trade of small arms continues to grow daily, as does the number of victims of gun violence. The majority of small arms and light weapons are in the hands of civilians and the gun trade is worth about US$4 billion a year. While civil society proved to be the most momentous working body at the conference, member states failed to match this momentum in their negotiations and ultimately could not agree on a final document.

The International Action Network for Small Arms (IANSA) led the civil society movement during the conference. IANSA is a global network of over 700 civil society organizations that work for controls on the international arms trade and policies to make people safer from gun violence. Rebecca Peters, the Director of IANSA, led the NGO presentations at the conference and reminded member states that "we are accountable to the millions of people who are affected daily by gun violence" and not to forget the human face of gun violence. NGO representatives urged member states to highlight issues of human rights, international law and gender differences within the the Programme of Action.

IANSA Women’s Network presented a side event on the different effects of gun violence on women and men. Men represent the vast majority of those who use and are killed or injured by small arms, but women are particularly vulnerable to sexual violence in regards to small arms. Women often become the main breadwinners when male relatives are killed, injured or disabled by gun violence. Displacement due to violent conflict leaves them particularly vulnerable to starvation and disease as they struggle to fend for their families.

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom-US hosted a Youth Caucus. The Children’s Campaign Against Gun Violence with 15 students from Jubilee School in Philadelphia presented their anti-gun campaign to representatives from governments, the Small Arms Survey and UN Development Program. The Children’s Campaign Against Gun Violence is a student initiated campaign responding to the ongoing street violence in Philadelphia. Audience members invited the students’ participation in future anti-gun collaborations.

Overall, member states at the Review Conference lost the opportunity to make significant strides on the small arms and light weapons trade. While IANSA produced several position papers on the necessary changes and key issues to be highlighted, member states could not agree on a single issue. Ultimately, the conference failed to reach an agreement on a final document. A small group of member states, led by the United States, refused to budge on their policies of trade and transfer regulations, while touting that future Review Conferences would not be necessary. Many states failed to exert any efforts for change and hid behind the more vocal member states’ positions. These distractions consistently blocked any progress or real changes from being made at the conference. Without a 2006 Programme of Action, the 2001 Programme stays in place, but is not updated nor is its progress to date documented. More importantly, governments did not plan any future Review Conferences, so there are currently no mechanisms in place to follow the 2001 plan of action and the work of the international process for the last five years is without documentation or a mapped future.

While the failure of the 2006 Review Conference is disappointing, civil society is hopeful about bringing the small arms campaign to the General Assembly First Committee this fall 2006. With the first female General Assembly president in 35 years and a female First Committee chair, conditions are favorable in the fall for developing direction for future international work on controlling the illegal arms trade. Reaching Critical Will will monitor and report on the First Committee as always, follow the particularly exciting events by subscribing to the First Committee Monitor by contacting the Reaching Critical Will Project Associate. To become involved with the Small Arms and Light Weapons campaign, please contact Mark Marge, IANSA/UN Coordinator through email: Mark.Marge@iansa.org.

-Jennifer Shin, Reaching Critical Will
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

3. Security Council passes unanimous resolution on North Korea (Resolution 1695)

On July 15, the U.N. Security Council finally reached consensus on the North Korea resolution (1695). After a week of serious disagreements among the permanent five members, the Council unanimously passed a resolution demanding North Korea suspend its ballistic missile program and urging it to return to the six-party talks. Japan originally introduced a resolution acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which would have made the resolution legally binding and included the possibility of sanctions and the use of force. However, because of a threatened Chinese veto, the resolution is instead acting under Chapter VI of the Charter. China and Russia originally wanted the Council to respond to North Korea's unannounced July 4th missile launches with a press statement, but agreed to a resolution after failed diplomatic talks between China and North Korea.

Additionally, the resolution requires all member states from trading missiles or missile related items with North Korea. It stresses the importance of implementing the Joint Statement (19 September 2005) and supports the six-party talks.

North Korea’s U.N. ambassador, Pak Gil Yon, rejected the resolution after it passed and reportedly left the chamber, saying Pyongyang would “bolster its war deterrent.” Japan is discussing pursuing other sanctions if North Korea does not abide by the resolution.

-Julie Friedlander, Reaching Critical Will
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

June 9

Dear Reaching Critical Will friends and advisors,
Last Thursday, June 1, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission released its final report after two years of work among commissioned experts from around the world, including several nuclear weapons possessing nations. In collaboration with the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) and Western States' Legal Foundation (WSLF), Reaching Critical Will is analyzing and responding to this important report. A summary of its key findings lies below. Not only does the report insist we outlaw nuclear weapons, it outlines the practical steps to do so, and recognizes the role of NGOs, gender analysis, and alludes to the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom's founding conference in the Hague.

Also, at the end of this month, the UN will be reviewing its work on regulating small arms and light weapons at the “World Gun Summit”, the Review Conference of 2001 Programme of Action.

In this E-news:

1. Summary and Significance of the WMD Report
2. Three Waves of Nuclear Proliferation
3. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
4. Specific Challenges to the Regime
5. Moving to Elimination
6. Controlling Existing Capabilities
7. Delivery Systems
8. “Peaceful Nuclear Energy”
9. Redefining Security
10. The Role of NGOs and Gender
11. Small Arms and Light Weapons Review Conference

Further analysis by Reaching Critical Will and our partners LCNP and WSLF, is available at www.wmdreport.org

The WMDC report and Blix’s UN press briefing is available at www.wmdcommission.org

Best Wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate

1. Summary and Significance

"Before us lie two very divergent courses. One path can take us to a world, in which the proliferation of nuclear weapons is restricted and reversed, through trust, dialogue and negotiated agreement.... The other path leads to a world, in which a rapidly growing numbers of States feel obliged to arm themselves with nuclear weapons, and in which non-State actors acquire the means to carry out nuclear terrorism. The international community seems almost to be sleepwalking down the latter path -- not by conscious choice, but rather through miscalculation, sterile debate and the paralysis of multilateral mechanisms for confidence-building and conflict-resolution."

- United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, May 18, 2006 www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10466.doc.htm

Hans Blix cited this warning in remarks to diplomats and non-governmental organizations following his presentation of Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms to Mr. Annan at the United Nations on June 1. The report is a wake-up call. It identifies the dangers, especially those posed by nuclear weapons, and outlines the solutions, steps leading towards the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear as well as chemical and biological weapons. The findings and recommendations of this high-level international panel reinforce many of the points civil society groups have been making for more than a decade. The report does not shy away from holding the nuclear weapon states - including the United States and Israel - accountable for creating conditions under which other countries may feel that their security is threatened. These conditions may serve as incentives to those countries to seek weapons of mass destruction of their own.

At the heart of the Commission's findings: "So long as any state has nuclear weapons, others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain, there is a risk that they will one day be used, by design or accident. And any such use would be catastrophic.... The Commission rejects the suggestion that nuclear weapons in the hands of some pose no threat, while in the hands of others they place the world in mortal jeopardy. Governments possessing nuclear weapons can act responsibly or recklessly. Governments may also change over time. Twenty-seven thousand nuclear weapons are not an abstract theory. They exist in today's world.... The question of how to reduce the threat and the number of existing nuclear weapons must be addressed with no less vigour than the question of the threat from additional weapons, whether in the hands of existing nuclear weapon states, proliferating states or terrorists." (pp. 60 - 61)

At the core of its recommendations: "Disarmament and non-proliferation are best pursued through a cooperative rule-based international order, applied and enforced through effective multilateral institutions.... Accept the principle that nuclear weapons should be outlawed, as are biological and chemical weapons, and explore the political, legal, technical and procedural options for achieving this within a reasonable time." (pp. 18 – 19)

A factsheet on the key implications and recommendations of the report is available here: http://www.wmdreport.org/pages/keypoints.htm

The Blix Commission Report: Background

The release of Weapons of Terror, the report of the WMD Commission, follows one of the most damaging years in memory for the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime, a year in which the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference was unable to reach any agreements and the UN World Summit failed to include a single sentence about the regime in its final document. The Commission's 60 recommendations aim to find a way out of the stalemate. To begin this process, the Commission calls for a World Summit to address disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist acquisition of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. (p. 18)

2. Three Waves of Nuclear Proliferation

The report identifies three waves of nuclear proliferation: first, the United States, Soviet Union/Russia, Britain, France, and China; second, India, Pakistan, and Israel; and third Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and possibly Iran. While nuclear weapons programs have been reversed in Iraq and Libya, the report conveys that the “third wave” is sending an ominous signal. The Commission observes that effective use of international institutions can help contain the spread of nuclear and other weapons. The report says that while international inspectors rely on national intelligence, national governments should also pay attention to the findings of international inspectors. They were, after all, proved right in the case of Iraq. The United States should take this lesson to heart with respect to Iran, where the IAEA has extensive on the ground experience and so far has not concluded that there is a nuclear weapons program. But fundamentally, the Commission holds, the best way to prevent the proliferation or use of nuclear weapons is to eliminate them globally. It concentrates on the short and medium term steps on this road: strengthening the NPT, dealing effectively and impartially with non-compliance, delegitimizing nuclear weapons, controlling existing nuclear weapons and nuclear material, and undertaking verifiable and irreversible reductions on the way to elimination.

3. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. To strengthen the NPT, the Commission recommends that all parties: 1) “ revert to the fundamental and balanced non-proliferation and disarmament commitments that were made under that treaty and confirmed in 1995 when the treaty was extended indefinitely;” 2) reaffirm and implement the consensus outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, including the resolution on the Middle East as a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, adopted in 1995, and "the thirteen practical steps" for nuclear disarmament that were adopted in 2000; 3) adopt strengthened International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards (the Additional Protocol) as the new norm; and 4) create a standing Secretariat for the Treaty. (pp. 65 - 66) Throughout the report the Commission makes clear that in order to revive the regime, the initial and fundamental balance between disarmament and nonproliferation must be restored. The report largely blames the failure of the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China to "seriously" abide by their NPT commitments to nuclear disarmament for the current crisis of confidence. While Israel, India and Pakistan and not parties to the treaty, "they, too, have a duty to contribute to the nuclear disarmament process." (p. 95)

4. Specific Challenges to the Regime

The Middle East
With regard to non-compliance and what the Commission calls the third wave of proliferation, the report recommends firm action based on verified international evidence. It calls for suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment program, and to induce Iran to agree, recommends assurances against regime change and other security incentives. The Commission also calls on all states in the region, including nuclear-armed Israel, to suspend fuel cycle activities as a step towards a regional zone free of WMD. (pp. 69 - 72)

The Korean Peninsula
The report calls for negotiations with North Korea aimed at making the Korean peninsula a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. A verifiable agreement should include North Korea's adherence to the Additional Protocol as well as a revival and legal confirmation of the commitments made in the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, notably, that neither North Korea nor South Korea should have nuclear weapons or nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities. (p. 69) Security assurances from the United States would be a vital part of a settlement.

The U.S. - India Deal
With respect to the U.S.- India nuclear cooperation arrangement currently under consideration, the report calls for the two countries to promote and participate "without delay" in a "verifiable" treaty stopping all production of fissile materials for weapons. "Their adherence to such a treaty would dispel any fear that the agreement could facilitate an increased production of nuclear weapons in India and risk fueling an arms race in Asia." The report goes on to call for both countries to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, thus signaling their intention to not pursue nuclear weapons development. (p. 83)

5. Moving to Elimination

The Commission recognizes that nuclear weapons have a perverse and powerful prestige in international politics that inhibits disarmament and propels proliferation. Therefore, it recommends delegitimizing the weapons and the incentives for acquiring them. States possessing them should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines and provide assurances of non-use to states that have decided not to acquire them. The Commission observes that nuclear doctrines affect other states' security assessments and decisions, and “explanations by the nuclear-haves that the weapons are indispensable to defend their sovereignty are not the best way to convince other sovereign states to renounce the option.” (p. 61)

The Commission recommends reductions of nuclear weapons leading to their elimination. First, the United States and Russia should renew disarmament negotiations and at least halve the numbers allowed under the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). SORT allows each side to retain 1,700 - 2,000 strategic deployed weapons by 2012, but does not require the destruction of a single warhead, and has no verification mechanisms. "Under SORT, deployments change but the weapons remain." The new treaty should include a legally binding commitment to irreversibly dismantle the weapons withdrawn under SORT. It should also include transparent counting rules, schedules and procedures for dismantling the weapons, and reciprocal verification measures. (p. 93) The United States, Russia and the other nuclear weapon states should publish their nuclear weapons holdings as a baseline for future disarmament efforts, and should commit to provisions in future disarmament agreements regarding transparency, irreversibility, verification, and physical destruction of nuclear warheads. (p. 94)

The Commission calls on all nuclear weapon states to remove nuclear weapons from foreign soil, taking note of the more than 400 U.S. nuclear weapons authorized for deployment at eight U.S. air bases in six NATO countries. (p. 96) While reducing nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon states should not make weapons with new military capabilities, and to demonstrate their commitment not to do so, should sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

6. Controlling Existing Capabilities

In the meantime, the world should take measures to control the nuclear weapons and materials it now has. The Commission recommends that all nuclear weapon states categorically renounce the first use of nuclear weapons. Only China has done this so far; the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom have reserved the option of using nuclear weapons first in response to an attack with biological or chemical weapons, and in some cases, to prevent such an attack. The Commission also recommends that the United States and Russia work together to take nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert. Right now, weapons can be targeted and fired within minutes. (p. 92)

Greater control of the fissile materials used to make nuclear weapons will help control nuclear weapons production by states and prevent its acquisition by non-state actors. Fully effective accounting and control of fissile materials is necessary (p. 84), and the Commission also recommends ending the use of highly enriched uranium in research reactors and other measures to accomplish a “global clean-out of fissile materials.” (p. 78) It calls on the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating a treaty verifiably banning future production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. (p. 105) The United States introduced a proposal for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty - without verification - in the Conference on May 18, 2006.

7. Delivery Systems

The report points to the frequently overlooked but pressing need to regulate ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and other means of delivery. (pp. 140 - 144) These systems can carry conventional or nuclear, biological, and chemical warheads, as dramatically illustrated by recent reports of the Pentagon’s interest in the destabilizing substitution of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles for nuclear-armed ones on four Trident submarines. While the Commission does not go so far as to propose a ban on flight testing of ballistic missiles or other steps towards a global missile disarmament regime, advocated by this project, the Civil Society Review, it does say that states should not deploy missile defenses without first attempting to negotiate the removal of missile threats. (p. 146)

8. "Peaceful Nuclear Energy"

The Commission explores options for controlling uranium enrichment and plutonium separation activities in order to minimize the risks of proliferation associated with those activities. But they fail to even mention the possibility of phasing out nuclear energy. (pp. 73 - 77) The Commission is clear that nuclear fuel cycle technologies are inherently dual-use. It notes that non-nuclear weapons states including Brazil, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands have extensive civilian uranium enrichment capabilities, and that Japan has a massive reprocessing operation to produce plutonium, all operating successfully under IAEA safeguards. These countries are not currently viewed as threats by the United States or its allies. Nonetheless, as the report notes elsewhere, a "threat" is a combination of capability and intent, which may change over time. (p. 35) The report also notes, in reference to Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy production, that "a right to do something does not necessarily mean that this right must be exercised." (p. 71) In the view of the Civil Society Review, in order to truly address the inherent potential for diversion of nuclear materials for weapons, as well as the environmental risks and unresolved disposition issues associated with "peaceful" nuclear activities, nuclear power must be phased out. In addition, sustainable energy alternatives should be funded and promoted at both the national and international levels.

9. Redefining Security

The Commission calls on all states to start planning for security without nuclear weapons. (p. 109) Moreover, because the primary barrier to proliferation is political, the report recognizes that the regime will be strongest and most sustainable when nations make the decision not to acquire nuclear, biological or chemical weapons because they do not feel a need for them. "Promoting peace is the prime means of avoiding both the acquisition and the retention of WMD (as well as other weapons... progress is arms control and disarmament will often help to promote peaceful relations. Action against terrorism is similarly in vital need of a political, social dimension..." (p. 44) The Civil Society Review believes that this presents an opportunity to challenge the state-centric notion of national security based on the threat and use of force, and to call instead for an international system based on collective and human security, with resolution of international conflicts through multilateral institutions and nonviolent mechanisms, and the promise of adequate food, shelter, health care, education, clean water and air for all people everywhere.

10. The Role of NGOs and Gender

The report acknowledges the important role played by non-governmental organizations in "conveying views and proposals about WMD from the grassroots to governments and international institutions," and in influencing official decisions in the direction of eliminating WMD. The Commission gives special recognition to women's organizations. "Women have rightly observed that armament policies and the use of armed force have often been influenced by misguided ideas about masculinity and strength. An understanding of and emancipation from this traditional perspective might help to remove some of the hurdles on the road to disarmament and nonproliferation." (p. 160) The organizations forming The Civil Society Review heartily agree with the Commission's recommendation that "foundation's should substantially increase their support for [non-governmental] organizations that are working to eliminate global weapons of mass destruction threats." (p. 161)

11. Small Arms and Light Weapons Review Conference

From June 26 to July 7, governments will come to the UN to review work on regulating small arms and light weapons at the “World Gun Summit”, the Review Conference of 2001 Programme of Action. The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) will be following it closely. See their website for information and updates. WILPF members helped establish the IANSA Women's Network, which continues to do great work and make connections between gender, weapons and violence.

-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

May 18

Dear Reaching Critical Will Friends and Advisors,

Below is a Reaching Critical Will report on the Conference on Disarmament, the only multilateral disarmament treaty negotiating body. We are sending it to you because today the United States introduced a draft treaty on a Fissile Materials Cut-off. Fissile Materials are the main component of nuclear weapons, and a Fissile Materials Treaty is the third step of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's 13 step action plan for nuclear disarmament. We apologize if you are receiving this twice.

In this E-News:

1. The Text
2. Possibilities for Beginning Negotiations
3. The US and Iran
4. New US Ambassador to the CD
5. Back to Our Regularly Scheduled Speakers
   

Best Wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate

The United States introduced a draft Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty and a draft mandate for negotiating it in this morning's May 18th discussion on existing stocks during the week of the Conference on Disarmament's focused debate on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). US Acting Assistant Secretary of International Security and Nonproliferation Stephen Rademaker traveled to the Conference to present the draft treaty. Following the introduction, the CD paused its speaking list to give delegations an opportunity to react to what Ambassador Landman of the Netherlands called “possibly the most important statement in 3/4/5/6 years.” India, United Kingdom, Iran, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Italy, Japan, Spain, France, Pakistan, Germany, Venezuela, Chile, Belgium, China, Russia, Bulgaria, Algeria, and Canada reacted to the draft treaty, mandate and statement. All welcomed the statement and text as a sign of US engagement with the CD, even if many were not fully satisfied with its content.

1. The Text
The draft treaty does not include existing stocks or provisions for verification. The draft mandate is “to negotiate a non-discriminatory and multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devises,” leaving out “internationally and effectively verifiable” from the previously agreed-upon Shannon Mandate for an FMCT. The draft treaty requires the ratification of the five recognized Nuclear Weapon States (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) to enter into force and includes a withdrawal provision. Interestingly, Assistant Secretary Rademaker proposed either an ad hoc committee, or this plenary, begin negotiations. He also suggested they aim to approve a text by the end of this 2006 CD session.

As delegations only received the text this morning, most were not able to officially comment on specifics because they must send the draft to their capitols, but were interested in further discussions. Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Russia hoped the negotiating mandate and draft treaty were a flexible starting point for negotiations that “will help us to strike a balance” among differing positions, as Algeria said. Germany was “happy about some elements of flexibility in the mandate and draft proposal.” Pakistan hoped neither the text nor the US statement were “intended to support the notion that it is a take it or leave it document” and Russian said the draft treaty was “not the final word” on such a treaty, hoping it was open for comments and ideas.

Australia, Belgium, and the Netherlands were particularly concerned about the lack of verification in the draft treaty, although all agreed with the Netherlands who said “it seems we should, can and will discuss that” in negotiations. Even Pakistan, who has long held that “the agreed upon negotiating mandate [Shannon Mandate] cannot be called preconditions”, today said that “we believe all issues can be raised once negotiations start.” Although Australia holds that an effective FMCT should contain verification measures, it believes the treaty could contain states' commitments, followed by secondary agreements on verification, similar to the process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's initial commitments followed by secondary agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

2. Possibilities for Beginning Negotiations
As discussed yesterday, the CD must agree by consensus on a program of work to establish the Ad Hoc Committees that negotiate treaties, and has been unable to agree for ten years. Many delegations expressed hope today that the draft text and mandate would provide momentum and/or the opportunity to “bring the Conference back to negotiating mode” in the words of Italy. Some, like Spain and the UK, recommended dropping the links among the CD's four core issues in order to begin work, while others, like China, suggested the CD “speedily begin work on an FMCT, the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), nuclear disarmament, and Negative Security Assurances.” Belgium, Bulgaria and France were ready to begin negotiations “immediately”, “right away”, and “today”, respectively. Russia said the introduction of a draft FMCT text “cannot serve as an obstacle to our work on other issues”, and Venezuela said that if a program of work is to be adopted it “must address the concerns of all States Parties.”

The compromise Five Ambassadors' proposal for a program of work with Ad Hoc Committees on each of the four core CD issues has been rejected by the US, who only wants to work on a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty. Although all the other CD members agreed to the Five Ambassadors' compromise, Rademaker said, “a package approach will never work.” He called the linkage among the issues “unconscionable hostage-taking... by proponents of less worthy ideas”. The US saw no need for new agreements on outer space, nuclear disarmament, or security assurances.

Canada and the Netherlands both suggested a more compromising attitude. The Netherlands, reacting to the US characterization of linking issues as hostage-taking, advised that “in practice... insisting on not talking about anything but an FMCT is exactly the same approach as insisting on multiple subjects.” Canada reminded the Conference that the Five Ambassadors' proposal contains a negotiating mandate for an FMCT, but only discussion mandates for the other three subjects. “Americans do not usually shy away from a good debate,” said Canadian Ambassador Meyer. “If the US would signal a willingness to engage, secure in the knowledge they would not advance to negotiations without explicit US approval, it would make an important contribution to bringing this body back to productive channels.”

The text is indeed an opportunity. Although the Conference may not be able to agree by the end of the session, it should be able to use this text, in combination with the timetable of scheduled discussions on all the issues, to find a way to begin working.

3. The US and Iran
Rademaker's speech also accused Iran of having less than peaceful intentions with its nuclear program, and said “the US expects Security Council to live up to its responsibility to address the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program. It will be a defeat for effective multilateralism should the Council fail to live up to this responsibility.” Iran responded to Rademaker's list of reasons why Iran's nuclear program is not logically about energy independence by recalling the timeline of US accusations about weapons of mass destruction leading up to its invasion of Iraq, telling the Conference “not to take [the US's] words as real facts, and recalling that the International Atomic Energy Agency had found no diversion of nuclear materials to weapons purposes in Iran.

4. New US Ambassador to the CD
Assistant Secretary Rademaker announced the new US Ambassador to the CD as a sign of the US intention to begin negotiations, and followed it with the veiled threat that hopefully the former Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs Christina Rocca would not “be the last US Ambassador to the CD.”

5. Back to Our Regularly Scheduled Speakers
Following the discussion of the draft treaty and negotiating mandate, South Africa, Brazil and Nigeria spoke. Egypt addressed the Conference at its afternoon session devoted to “any other FMCT matters”.

South Africa offered that its experience destroying its nuclear program and the following International Atomic Energy Agency investigations would give some insights for FMCT verification. Egypt said compliance must be strict and with guarantees, requiring a complete inventory of stockpiles in all states, including Nuclear Weapon States and states that are not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nigeria pointed out that “In other disarmament instruments stockpiles, verification and compliance mechanisms have been incorporated because of their importance in achieving the set of objectives of such instruments. Why should these elements not be considered in our work on fissile material?”

All four supported including existing stockpiles in an FMCT as a step towards nuclear disarmament. South Africa said because stockpiled material could be used for the production of future nuclear weapons, in order for an FMT to be truly credible, in should include stockpiles in its scope: “It is clear that a complete halt in the production of fissile material would leave enough of the material available to further increase – and not decrease – the number of nuclear weapons.” Egypt said not including existing stocks in an FMCT would not reflect the majority of states' wish to reach complete nuclear disarmament. “The fact that certain countries insist on excluding stockpiles from the scope of the treaty is not in conformity with the spirit of the NPT,” they added.

Brazil stated that the scope of an FMCT must clearly be defined in order to preserve the inalienable right of States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Next Meeting
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held tomorrow morning, with a focused debate on compliance. The afternoon session will address verification.

-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will and
Beatrice Fihn, Disarmament and Economic Justice Intern
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

May 15

Dear Reaching Critical Will Friends and Advisors,

This is the second E-news devoted to the Disarmament Commission, which finished its 2006 session at the end of April. In this E-news:

1. Disarmament Commission Concludes

2. Nuclear Disarmament Working Group I

3. Confidence Building Measures Working Group II

4. Methods of Work

As always, this and all other General E-News Advisories are archived on our website. We welcome any feedback, questions, comments and concerns.

Best Wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate

1. Disarmament Commission Concludes

The 2006 UN Disarmament Commission (DC) concluded on April 28, 2006, having produced a number of discussion papers but with no consensus on anything but procedural reports. The DC remained saturated with tension between the United States and Iran, and the two engaged in a verbal duel at the final session of the Commission. Working Group I on Nuclear Disarmament forwarded 13 undifferentiated papers to the 2007 session, while Working Group II on Confidence Building Measures also forwarded a paper for possible consideration next year. The Commission was only able to agree on recommendations for improving the effectiveness of its Methods of Work, though reaching that agreement was also fairly contentious.

Although the former Chair of the Commission, Ambassador Rowe of Sierra Leone, was impressed by the quality of the texts, and considered the Commission's ability to meet at all a success, he also acknowledged that it was not enough. Ambassador Rowe noted that the people of the world are not impressed by diplomats “fiddling with linguistics while nuclear weapons continue to threaten humanity.”

Other states questioned whether the Commission lived up to its mandate this year; the Netherlands even characterized States' posturing taking precedence over progress as “coming close to being an insult to our taxpayers.” However, the Republic of Korea thought that efforts and discussions aimed at narrowing the gap[s] among positions were invaluable. The question now is whether delegations are effectively using this opportunity for dialogue, or if they will in the future. Certain states have a vested interest in avoiding compromise. Will they be allowed to hijack our international institutions?

Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Tanaka characterized the Commission's 2006 session as “a very difficult one”, but advised the group that nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation are long term goals. The Republic of Korea, Chair of the Commission, reminded the delegations that all the money governments spend on weapons could be better spent on the countless starving people in the world.

The Security Council was considering International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports on Iran's nuclear programme while the Commission met, and the confrontation between the US and Iran was the sub-script during the Commission. The US’s final speech was clearly prepared with a national audience in mind, criticizing Iran's election as Vice Chair of the Commission given its status with the IAEA, which had been recently noticed and criticized in US media and Congress. Iran prepared a speech defending its Vice-Chairmanship and its status with the IAEA, and accusing the US of being the real problem in disarmament.

The speeches and their retorts included such diplomatic parlance as “this Kafkaesque absurdity”, “the US, the self-proclaimed arbitor of compliance”, “you are either ignorant of the facts or liars”, and “you are just going to look like a fool”. Finally, it deteriorated to, “You started it.” If the US and Iran do finally decide to negotiate directly with each other, we hope the diplomacy improves at the negotiating table.

Significantly, US Representative Robert Luaces also questioned whether “the Disarmament Commission has finally outlived its usefulness” in his final speech. Consistent with its practice of undermining institutions it does not like, the current US administration has been blocking progress in other pieces of the disarmament machinery as well. In its final statement to the Commission, Cuba implied the US has proposed eliminating the Disarmament Commission as part the mandate review process currently taking place as part of UN Reform.

2. Nuclear Disarmament Working Group I
Predictably, the Commission's Nuclear Disarmament Working Group struggled to find agreement on anything. It eventually submitted a procedural draft report and forwarded all 13 of the 2006 documents to the 2007 Nuclear Disarmament Working Group with no preference indicated among them. Next year the delegations will likely face another lengthy struggle to decide on which draft to begin their work.

During this session, the Chairman introduced three papers: a Working Paper entitled “Recommendations for Achieving the Objective of Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;” a Conference Room Paper based on Member States' comments on the first Working Paper and summarizing discussion; and a final Conference Room Paper called “Draft Outline.” Some delegations were highly critical of the first two papers, from the titles to the details, so the Chairman revised them both based on their comments and amendments, and developed the final Draft Outline.

The Chair intended the Draft Outline to serve as a list of topics for further discussion and consideration, to be annexed to the report of the Working Group “without prejudice to the position of any delegation and on the understanding that it is non-binding.” Although there were suggestions in the last session of how to change the draft outline to make it acceptable as a reference for next year, in the end Member States could not agree and sent on a procedural report with all documents listed and undifferentiated. The current draft report says the Chair's papers are “his sole responsibility and do not represent a negotiated position nor command consensus.”

3. Confidence Building MeasuresWorking Group II
Working Group II discussed confidence building measures based on the Brazilian Chair's update of the 2003 Disarmament Commission working paper on the same subject. At the second to last meeting of the Working Group, the group decided not to attach the paper to its report, but rather use it as a “possible basis” for their work next year. The US accused Pakistan of breaking the delicate compromises from 2003, while Pakistan asserted that the US was responsible for not allowing the paper to be annexed to the report.

4. Methods of Work
Despite being a “deceptively thorny issue” and “very politically sensitive” in the words of the biggest proponent of UN Reform, the United States, the Disarmament Commission was able to agree on recommendations for improving the effectiveness of its methods of work. This agreement did not come without contentious negotiations, including a tit for tat editing spat between the United States and Iran.

Eventually, the Commission decided on six bullet point recommendations (in summary form):

1. Early election of Chairs and Vice-chairs, if possible three months prior to substantive meetings.

2. Early adoption of the agenda.

3. Early distribution of national working documents.

4. Strengthen dialogue with the General Assembly First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament.

5. Invite experts on disarmament, including UNIDIR, to discussions at plenary meetings.

6. Request the UN Secretariat to improve the Disarmament Commission website.

Delegations mainly disagreed over the format of the recommendations and an European Union (EU) proposal suggesting agenda items be relevant to the international security environment. Delegations also discussed inviting experts to participate in the Commission's discussions.

Some Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members, including Egypt, Indonesia and Iran, did not want the recommendations to take the form of a separate decision, as they were opposed to the discussion in the first place and did not want it to have any additional weight. The Commission then spent some time discussing its own ability to take decisions about its methods of work, and eventually settled that it would put the text in the recommendations section of the report.

The contentious and eventually discarded EU suggestion about “relevancy” of agenda items recalls language that has previously been used to imply that disarmament is no longer relevant in a post-September 11th world, and that terrorism is the number one concern. The United States supported the proposal and the “need for more narrow focus of agenda items”. The Commission currently only considers two agenda items, one on nuclear disarmament and one on another topic. Several NAM members objected to this language. Jordan clarified the underlying concern about restricting the agenda or using the term relevant when it defended the current two item set up: “discussing new security issues should not negate or take precedence over old security issues.” This struggle between “old” and “new” security issues is taking place in all the disarmament machinery as Member States try to negotiate a cooperative course in the new geopolitics.

The United States, India and France objected to inviting Non-Governmental Organizations and external experts to participate in the Commission's discussions, while Indonesia and Egypt supported it. Russia and Uruguay were concerned about possible financial implications of such invitations, even though there have not been any financial implications for any of the other disarmament bodies that have already invited such experts to participate in their discussions, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Process, the Small Arms and Light Weapons Programme of Action Review Process, the First Committee of the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmamen.

France incorrectly said the First Committee was “not in a position to invite external experts” to its discussions, even though it already did this without difficulty in its 2005 thematic discussion on disarmament education. Sierra Leone appropriately suggested the bullet point begin “Consistent with the practices of the First Committee.” Although this was not added to the bullet point, “experts ”were not defined, leaving room for the Disarmament Commission to mature and begin to formally engage with civil society.

In a similar conversation about civil society participation in the Conference on Disarmament on March 9, Syria noticed that "the states that objected to such participation [in the CD] are the same states that daily call on us to step up participation of NGOs in matters related to democracy, human rights, peace and security. These states seem to wish NGOs to be tools of their own policy.” If States are truly impartially supporting or objecting to NGO access, their positions should be consistent across issues, from human rights to disarmament.

May 4

Dear Reaching Critical Will friends and advisors,

Yesterday a draft resolution on Iran put forward by France and Britain and discussed in Security Council consultations was informally circulated at the UN. It is posted at
http://lcnp.org/disarmament/iran/draftresUNSC03may.pdf

The current version of the resolution is "Acting under Chapter VII", which includes the possibility of sanctions and the use of force. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom believes further coercive measures, particularly any military action, will be disastrous and counterproductive. A Chapter VII resolution leads in this direction. Talking points on military action and Chapter VII are here: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/iranactionpack.html#talkingpoints

Confrontation is not working, and continuing down this road is only going to make things worse. More productive solutions are here: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/iranactionpack.html#solutions More in-depth discussion of alternatives is available here: http://lcnp.org/disarmament/iran/remarks-may2.htm

Now is the time to act. If the Security Council adopts a resolution, it will set the precedent for further action. Send a letter to the Security Council (names and addresses of current Security Council members attached to this email, and online here: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/govcontacts/SCcontact.html

Form letters to the editor and to parliamentarians are available here: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/iranactionpack.html#parliamentarians

Form letters to the United States Congress and the Security Council are available here: http://www.unitedforpeace.org/article.php?id=3241

An initial reaction to the draft resolution by John Burroughs of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy: http://disarmamentactivist.org/2006/05/03/britishfrench-draft-security-council-resolution-on-iran/

Best Wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate

April 24

Dear Reaching Critical Will Friends and Advisors,

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is kicking off its three year cycle of deliberations with an agreed agenda for the first time in two years. Now in the middle of its three week 2006 session the UNDC is discussing:

1. Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons; and
2. Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons.

The UN Disarmament Commission is a deliberative body that considers and makes recommendations on various problems in disarmament. Reaching Critical Will is monitoring and reporting on the process, with the only website posting all governmental statements and papers.

The Commission has the most time allocated to multilateral substantive consideration of nuclear disarmament in any of the disarmament fora in years. The Commission can only make recommendations, like the 1999 guidelines for Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, but this opportunity should be seized to find common ground and compromise on nuclear disarmament at a time when international disarmament negotiations (and even deliberations) are at an impasse. New Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs Nobuaki Tanaka told the Commission they had a responsibility to provide fresh momentum by using new and creative thinking instead of allowing posturing to get in the way of results.

The Commission is also considering how to improve the effectiveness of its work. While this may not sound political, some states have used procedures to block substantive work on disarmament in various disarmament fora, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission. In this environment, procedure IS substance and is absolutely political. Governments are choosing to fight over procedure because it attracts less NGO attention, outrage and action, and makes it more difficult to pinpoint blame.

This E-news covers the Disarmament Commission, including:

1. Nuclear Disarmament Working Group I
2. Confidence-Building Measures in Conventional Weapons Working Group II
3. Working Methods of the Commission

Best Wishes,
Jennifer Nordstrom
Project Associate

1. Nuclear Disarmament Working Group I

Member States do most of their work on substance in the Working Groups, where they debate proposals, present and discuss papers and formulate recommendations. Although NGOs are not allowed to monitor the Working Groups of the Disarmament Commission, delegations elaborated specific positions during their general debate statements, and a few distributed the statements they delivered in the Working Group. Recommendations are the final, official product to come out of the Disarmament Commission, and positions in statements can turn into and/or affect papers, which the group can then edit and revise to come up with recommendations. The United States has already submitted a Working Paper, and the Nuclear Disarmament Working Group is debating whether the Chair will also develop a Working Paper. The Non-Aligned Movement and the EU have not yet submitted any papers.

In their statements, Member States generally reiterated their support for the 1995 and 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty outcomes, particularly the 13 practical steps toward nuclear disarmament. They underscored the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its full implementation. The European Union, in a statement delivered by Austria, recommended the 2007 Preparatory Committee for the NPT be held in Vienna.

They also expressed a great deal of support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and many states encouraged those whose ratification is still required for the CTBT's entry-into-force to ratify it without delay.