12 June 2007
Observers anxiously awaited the commencement of this morning’s Conference on Disarmament (CD) plenary to hear the results of CD President Ambassador Bonnier’s consultations on her complementary presidential statement to the L1 (P6) proposal for work, which were inconclusive.
Ambassador Bonnier said the CD had not yet exhausted consultations on whether the complementary presidential statement could help find a way out of the current decade of deadlock. She plans to hold another round of open-ended informal presidential consultations immediately following today’s plenary. A Thursday, June 14 formal plenary will hear the results, if any are reached.
The US and Germany were the only two speakers in today’s plenary. The US expressed its support for the L1 proposal and the CD President’s efforts to move the Conference forward. “Movement over recent months left the United States hopeful that the conference was on the brink of starting substantive work, including the drafting of an FMCT. As we have stated before, we understand that L1 is the best possible compromise and as such leaves many delegations, including ours, wishing for more. But we recognize it as the best chance to move this body forward,” Ambassador Rocca stated.
The US also reiterated the steps it is taking towards nuclear disarmament. Last week, Washington announced various US achievements in nuclear weapons dismantlement. The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has increased the rate of nuclear dismantlement by 50% over last year’s level, and increased the dismantlement rate of retired nuclear weapons by 50%. The plutonium removed from these weapons will be placed in storage, “until a facility is constructed and operating to turn the material into fuel to be burned.” In their 2000 non-proliferation agreement, the US and Russia each aimed to eliminate 68 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium by 2007.
While the US should be commended for making quantitative reductions in its nuclear weapons stocks, the significance of its reductions must be considered in relation to the qualitative improvements the US continues to make to its nuclear arsenal. Effective and meaningful nuclear disarmament depends on making quantitative reductions while stopping qualitative improvements. Current US plans for a Reliable Replacement Warhead contravene disarmament interests.
Germany discussed the non-proliferation statement adopted by the G8 last Friday, summarizing the paragraphs in the document that specifically referred to the work before the CD. The G8 supported the efforts to move the CD forward and begin negotiations on an FMCT.
The G8 also reaffirmed their commitment to the multilateral treaty system which forms the basis for all non-proliferation efforts, and encouraged strengthening and universalizing the NPT, CWC, and BTWC, along with implementing obligations at national levels.
It is encouraging to see that the G8 is again specifically addressing the issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Of the members of the G8, four are nuclear weapons states (US, France, Russia, and the UK), one has used nuclear weapons (US), and one has had nuclear weapons used against them (Japan).
Because we believe the CD and it work are important, we are sending out an civil society action alert about the CD. You can find it below.
-Katherine Harrison, Disarmament Intern, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
Action Alert: Last Chance for a New Disarmament Treaty
Dear Colleagues,
As you know, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been deadlocked for over a decade.
A burst of activity on the part of NGOs right now could make a difference by:
a) alerting the press in your country to the crisis in Geneva.
b) encouraging your Head of State to invest time, energy and political capital in making the CD work by contacting the Ambassadors and Heads of State in key countries.
PLEASE read, adapt and use the draft letter and press statement text below in communicating with your government and the parliamentarians and bureaucrats who have influence in your country.
We have provided some background information for those of you who haven’t been following the CD. As you know, you can read our short weekly summaries as well as the statements made by your government on our website here:http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/cdindex.html
Background
The Conference on Disarmament negotiates treaties, most recently the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996), and prior to that the Chemical Weapons Convention (1992). Even though it has a huge agenda, and the urgent need for disarmament is more apparent than ever, this body has been blocked for over 10 years.
States have not been able to agree on how to proceed on four main issues: a) nuclear disarmament b) prevention of an arms race in outer space c) security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states and d) a treaty on fissile materials.
Confidence in the CD has suffered as a result, and so too has the perception of the usefulness or urgency of disarmament diplomacy.
During each calendar year there are 6 Presidents of the CD in total, and in recent years the P6 have come together to outline and pursue a unified strategy, as opposed to each starting a different approach to try to achieve consensus on a programme of work.
In 2006, the P6 held a series of ‘structured focused debates’. This year, the P6 have proposed a Programme of Work that would begin negotiations on a new treaty on fissile materials while discussing the other three issues.
A core group of bridge-building states have succeeded in pushing the US, UK and France to compromise to the reasonable and strongly argued positions of other states, such as China, who are very concerned about the militarisation of space, nuclear disarmament, and negative security assurances. For many years, the US has been the major impediment to consensus on a compromise programme of work.
On May 22, China blocked movement forward, followed by a number of states who also joined China in asking for clarifications. Ambassador Bonnier of Sweden, the current President of the CD, on Tuesday 5 June announced a “last ditch” proposal to get the CD to start work. After consulting with all, she will produce a presidential statement that will clarify the outstanding issues, which she will put forward on Thursday 14 June. A similar presidential statement was useful in 1995 to clarify that existing stocks could be discussed in negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Hopefully this statement will also be able to bridge gaps and garner consensus on the programme of work.
Civil society does not believe this programme of work is perfect. WILPF's ideal would be to begin negotiating a nuclear weapons convention in the CD. However, this proposal is the closest thing governments can come to agree on now, and WILPF joins many NGOs in believing we should push for it because it has significant advantages for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT
Ambassador Bonnier of Sweden, the current President of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, announced a “last ditch” proposal to get the CD to start work after 10 years of blockage. After consulting with all, she will produce a presidential statement that will clarify the outstanding issues, with the hope that it will garner consensus on beginning negotiations. A similar presidential statement was useful in 1995 to clarify that existing stocks could be discussed in negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
China, with support from Pakistan and Iran, is blocking the negotiation of a treaty that would ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
China says it cannot agree to a proposal that would begin such negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament because: 1) the negotiating mandate does not explicitly call for the treaty to be verifiable; and 2) China wants more assurance that discussions on preventing the weaponization of outer space could lead to negotiations. Pakistan and Iran also say they want to ensure a treaty on fissile materials is verifiable.
The Conference on Disarmament, the world’s sole multilateral disarmament treaty negotiating body, has not produced a new disarmament treaty since the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. States have not been able to agree on how to proceed on four main issues: a) nuclear disarmament b) prevention of an arms race in outer space c) security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states and d) a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
If China, Pakistan and Iran join the rest of the 65-member Conference and agree on the current proposal, states would begin negotiations on a treaty on fissile materials and continue discussions on the other three issues.
Because the fissile material treaty would ban the production of materials for nuclear weapons, it would constrain those states that are producing or may wish to produce more fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Thus, such a proposal would put particular constraints on India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan, all of whom are continuing to produce plutonium for military purposes.
Although China stopped producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons by 1991, it has not declared a moratorium on fissile materials production like the other nuclear weapon states. China owns significantly less plutonium than the other nuclear weapon states, while the United States and Russia own the most by a factor of ten. Some states are suspicious of negotiating a treaty that could solidify the status quo by freezing stocks of fissile materials where they are. Moreover, China and Russia are particularly concerned that US development of missile defenses could create theoretical strategic superiority, and therefore are emphasizing working on preventing the weaponization of space in the CD. China may link freezing its current stocks of fissile materials with preventing missile defenses.
However, the current P6 proposal offers great possibilities. A verifiable FMCT that includes existing stocks would be an important disarmament measure, and the proposal as it now stands leaves the open possibility for creating such a treaty. Also, the US has been staunchly opposed to even discussing preventing an arms race in outer space, negative security assurances, and nuclear disarmament, and has changed its position, agreeing to discuss these other items. France and the UK have also reluctantly agreed. It is a win to begin formal work on these three issues in the CD; work that will hopefully move into negotiations.
Jennifer Nordstrom, who has followed the negotiations in the CD for years as manager of the Reaching Critical Will project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, said, “Civil society does not believe this programme of work is perfect. WILPF's ideal would be to begin negotiating a nuclear weapons convention in the CD. However, this proposal is the closest thing governments can come to agree on now, and WILPF joins many NGOs in believing we should push for it because it has significant advantages for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.”
DRAFT LETTER TO HEAD OF STATE
Dear ,
Due to inactivity for over 10 years, confidence in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has eroded.
I am writing to you to ask you to take an active role at a critical juncture in the work of the CD, when consensus on moving forward with negotiations requires China, Pakistan, and Iran to accept the current proposal for a programme of work, called the Six Presidents, or P6 proposal. This has been circulated as a draft decision of the Conference (CD/2007/L.1).
The proposal would initiate negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and continue discussions on preventing an arms race in outer space, security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states, and nuclear disarmament.
It is important to begin work on the basis of this proposal. Nuclear weapon states are modernizing their arsenals, some non-nuclear states are considering proliferating, and non-state actors are trying to acquire nuclear materials. More than ever, the world needs a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. This treaty should cover existing stocks and have a verification mechanism, which can and should be agreed to during negotiations.
It is also necessary to continue discussions on preventing an arms race in outer space, security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states, and nuclear disarmament in the CD, where they can and should lead to negotiations.
China, Pakistan, and Iran still have concerns about the current proposal for work, and are blocking consensus on the basis of those concerns. If our government is serious about nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and preventing non-state access to nuclear materials, we need to put high-level pressure on these three countries to join the consensus.
[insert what your government has said in support of the P6 proposal here. Find your government's statements online here:http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches07/index.html] Our government should visit the Chinese, Pakistani, and Iranian embassies here in [CAPITAL], and we call on you to make contact the capitals of these countries to underscore the importance of commencing work in the Conference on Disarmament.
Sincerely,
Your Name