ADDRESS
BY AMBASSADOR ANDREY GRANOVSKY,
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
TO THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 57TH SESSION
OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

October 9, 2002
Mr. Chairman,

The past year showed that the world had not become more secure and safer after the end of the Cold War. The US tragic events of September 11, 2001 have demonstrated real threats and challenges to the mankind. That year also proved that facing such threats the world community should and could join its efforts and proceed with determination and deliberation.

Our first successful efforts in jointly opposing international terrorism have proved that the multilateralism principle has no alternative when it comes to assuring international security. Better than ever, we know that it is not isolation but integration and equal security for everyone that are the clue to the problems confronting us in this area.

The principal task we face now is to transform the antiterrorist coalition into a solid basis for building an efficient system of security and cooperation. The United Nations - which is to assure that the world community is guided in its efforts to meet new threats and challenges by the international law - should be placed in the center of this system.

We would like to underline that diminishing the role of the international law, withdrawing from the key agreements assuring strategic stability, international security and the rule of law in the world are only likely to feed terrorism, exacerbate threats to international security and weaken safety of the world community.

Mr. Chairman,

Russia is committed to strict implementation of our obligations in the field of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, and we second our words with deeds.

The period of strategic offensive weapons reduction provided for in START I was concluded last December. Under this Treaty, each Party was to reduce the number of its strategic delivery means and warheads attributed to them to 1600 and 6000 respectively within seven years after the entry into force of this Treaty. Russia
has fully implemented its obligations under these provisions before the end of that period and by the check date, December 5, 2001, had reduced the number of its deployed strategic delivery means (the ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) and warheads attributed to them to 1136 and 5518 respectively.

We destroyed the last nuclear warhead removed from the territory of Ukraine to Russia in October 2001.

Russia consistently and successfully carries out the measures that were announced within its 1991-1992 unilateral disarmament initiatives with regard to nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Through our strenuous and continuous efforts, all the weapons of the former Soviet Union have been withdrawn to the territory of Russia and brought under steady control. We would like to draw your attention once again to the Russian proposal to withdraw all the nuclear weapons to the territory of the nuclear states, which they belong to. So we will be more confident of its safety and security.

The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty concluded by Russia and the United States at the Moscow Summit last May is another major step towards nuclear disarmament. This Treaty legally binds each Party to reduce, on the basis of reciprocity, its aggregate number of strategic nuclear warheads to the agreed level of 1700-2200 by December 31, 2012, i.e. provides for threefold reduction if compared with the level established under START I. And according to its terms, START I will remain in force till December 5, 2009, and may be extended by mutual consent of the Parties – thus, the strategic offensive weapons of Russia and the United States will be subject to double complementary limitations of both Treaties at least till the end of this period. The new Treaty provides for its further improvement, strengthening and updating. To this end, a special Bilateral Commission on Implementation is to be created. Russia is going to ratify the new Treaty by the end of the year.

Like any other agreements, the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty has been made possible by the willingness of Russia and the United States to make mutual
concessions and build new strategic relations in facing new threats, which they formalized in the Joint Declaration adopted at the same Summit, as well as to reaffirm close interrelation between strategic offensive and defensive weapons.

According to the decisions taken at the Moscow Summit held in May, working out of a system of predictability and confidence-building measures in the anti-missile defense sphere is underway. That will help redress the situation after the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. To discuss strategic security issues on a regular basis, a special mechanism was established – the Consultative Group composed of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers of Russia and the United States, who held their first meeting in Washington on September 20. The similar mechanism is also to be created with France.

Russia attaches great importance to political and diplomatic efforts to resolve the problem of missile nonproliferation. We positively evaluate the work done by the group of governmental experts within the United Nations on the missile nonproliferation issues. We believe that such work should be continued. When preparing the expert report, Russia introduced a draft Memorandum of Intent in the missile non-proliferation area, which was to define further steps in that area. The document reflects the Russia’s concept of the Global Control System for Nonproliferation of Missiles and Missile Technologies, which assures wide and nondiscriminatory participation of all concerned states in developing such measures under the UN auspices.

We think it is of crucial importance to take into account opinions and proposals of all the concerned states when drafting the International code of conduct on the prevention of ballistic missiles proliferation which is under discussion now. An important aspect of the missile nonproliferation issue is to guarantee the legal right of each and every state to peaceful development of outer space.

The issue of preventing the militarization of outer space is acquiring more and more topicality. At the 56th UNGA session Russia put forward a proposal on a
possible basis for the comprehensive arrangement on non-deployment of weapons in space. Before such an arrangement is reached, the Russian side proposed to declare a moratorium on weapon deployment in outer space.

These proposals were further elaborated in the Conference on Disarmament working paper "Possible elements for a future international legal arrangement on the prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects" introduced by Russia and China along with Belarus, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Indonesia and Syria. It has received the initial approval by a number of states participating in the Conference and in our opinion could be discussed within the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. In order to make the document widely known, Russia and China have distributed it as a document of the current UNGA session.

The fact that during several previous sessions the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution on preventing an arms race in outer space by overwhelming majority serves as the evidence of the wide international support for this idea.

When interviewed by the Russian mass media on October 2, 2002, Igor S. Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, declared Russia's willingness to take another measure of transparency and confidence-building in outer space, which is to provide early notification of the forthcoming space launches.

We would like to reaffirm the importance of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a key tool to prevent such weapons from spreading, as a factor contributing to regional and global stability. We support the decision taken at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. We encourage fruitful work of the NPT Review Conference to be held in 2005. One of the most significant events that we would like to underscore in the context of the NPT universalization is Cuba's intention to accede to the Treaty and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We hope that this decision will influence the attitude of other states, still abstaining from acceding to this fundamental document.
The recent G-8 Summit decision on the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction deserves special attention in the light of the necessity to coordinate the international efforts to eliminate the risks of nuclear terrorism. It is also of great importance to enhance international legal documents on physical protection of nuclear materials and handling of radioactive materials and spent fuel. Russia urges the world community to promptly draft and conclude an international convention on combating nuclear terrorism.

We would like to express our satisfaction with the IAEA efforts, in particular in strengthening of the IAEA Safeguards system. We support the IAEA project on innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles, which is in line with the initiative launched by Vladimir V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation, to develop proliferation-proof nuclear technologies.

Russia regards the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as one of the basic instruments in the sphere of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, safeguarding strategic stability and security. The importance of this Treaty is confirmed by the Joint Statement of the foreign ministers of 18 states in support of the CTBT, which was made at the General Assembly session on September 14, 2002. We appeal to all countries that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible and especially to those countries whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force. It is also important to adhere to the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests and whatsoever nuclear explosions until the CTBT enter into force.

We consider the Chemical Weapons Convention to be an effective tool to consolidate international peace and security and we find it necessary to assure its universal character. We applaud the important decisions taken at the September session of the OPCW Executive Council 2002, which allow the Russian Federation to implement its commitments under the Convention in a systematic and consistent manner. We attribute the decisions taken by this authoritative international organization, to no small extent, to Russia’s continuous adherence to its international
commitments in the area of chemical disarmament as well as to the specific steps to implement this complex and expensive program.

Favoring the continuation of the multilateral efforts to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), we are willing to discuss also the proposals that supplement the verification mechanisms, on enhancing the Convention during the second stage of the 5th BWC Review Conference in November.

We would like to stress the necessity of a comprehensive approach, under the United Nations leadership, to the small arms and light weapons proliferation problem. We welcome the efforts undertaken by the United Nations to coordinate the actions of states to fight illegal traffic of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). We attach importance to effective measures to be urgently taken by all states to strengthen their national export control as well as to promote regional and international cooperation in keeping with the “Program of Actions” on illegal traffic of SALW, adopted at the UN Conference last year.

We welcome the successful work done by the group of governmental experts which discuss, within the framework of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) review process, proposals on further strengthening CCW and its Protocols.

Also we would like to mention the new initiatives on the program of work of the Conference on Disarmament, which were proposed in the end of its 2002 session aimed at releasing its work. Russia thinks that this unique forum has a great, though underused at present, potential. Russia has already submitted its proposals on this matter. We are ready to work further with a view to reach a mutually acceptable compromise.

Emerging threats and challenges to international security, the topicality and versatility of modern issues of disarmament, arms reduction and limitation and nonproliferation are compelling arguments in favor of convening a special UNGA session on disarmament. Russia supports it.
The issue of international information security is also among Russia’s priorities for the current UNGA session. Russia has put forward an updated draft resolution on “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”. We hope that the document will be adopted by the consensus as was the case in the previous years.

In conclusion, let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, and all distinguished colleagues of the readiness of the Russian Delegation to work constructively in the First Committee, of the determination of the Russian Federation to further prove by practical steps its commitment to the goals and tasks of promoting the international security.

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