Fifty-eighth session
First Committee
Agenda item 73 (d)
General and complete disarmament: towards a
nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda

Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden:
revised draft resolution

Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 53/77 Y of 4 December 1998, 54/54 G of 1 December
1999, 55/33 C of 20 November 2000 and 57/59 of 22 November 2002,

Convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons is a threat to the survival of
humanity and that the only real guarantee against the use or threat of use of these
weapons is their complete elimination and the assurance that they will never be used
or produced again,

Convinced also that the retention of nuclear weapons carries the inherent risk
of proliferation and falling into the hands of non-State actors,

Reaffirming that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are equally
important and mutually reinforcing processes requiring continuous irreversible
progress on both fronts,

Declaring that the participation of the international community as a whole is
central to the maintenance and enhancement of international peace and stability and
that international security is a collective concern requiring collective engagement,

Declaring also that internationally negotiated treaties in the field of
disarmament have made a fundamental contribution to international peace and
security and that unilateral and bilateral nuclear disarmament measures complement
the treaty-based multilateral approach towards nuclear disarmament,

Noting the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued at The Hague on 8 July
1996,1

* Reissued for technical reasons.
1 A/51/218, annex; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
Declaring that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security,

Declaring that each article of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons\(^2\) is binding on the States parties at all times and in all circumstances and that it is imperative that all States parties be held fully accountable with respect to the strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty, and that the undertakings therein on nuclear disarmament have been given and implementation of them remains imperative,

Expressing its deep concern at the limited progress made to date in implementing the thirteen steps on nuclear disarmament, and determined to implement these thirteen practical steps, to which all States parties agreed at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,\(^3\)

Expressing its deep concern at the continued failure of the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament and to resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other devices, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives,

Expressing grave concern that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty\(^4\) has not yet entered into force,

Stressing the importance of regular reporting in promoting confidence in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Noting the successful completion in September 2002 of the first phase of the Tripartite Initiative, involving the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, which aims to enable the placement of excess nuclear materials from dismantled weapons under international safeguards,

Convinced that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons constitutes an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process,

Noting that, despite bilateral agreements, there is no sign of engagement of all of the five nuclear-weapon States in the multilateral process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

Declaring that it is essential that the fundamental principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility apply to all nuclear disarmament measures,

Expressing its deep concern at the continued retention of the nuclear-weapon option by those three States, India, Israel and Pakistan, that have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, in particular given the effects of regional volatility


\(^4\) See resolution 50/245.
on international security, and, in this context, the continued regional tensions and deteriorating security situation in South Asia and the Middle East,

Expressing also its deep concern at the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and at its decision to restart the Yongbyon nuclear reactor without International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Expressing concern that the development of missile defences could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms race on earth and in outer space,

Stressing that no actions be taken that would lead to the weaponization of outer space,

Expressing its deep concern about emerging approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies, including rationalizations for the use, and the possible development, of new types of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming further the progress in the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones,

Recalling the United Nations Millennium Declaration, in which the heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,

Taking into consideration the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all the States parties to the Treaty are committed under article VI of the Treaty,  

1. Reaffirms that any possibility that nuclear weapons could be used represents a continued risk for humanity;

2. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action that could lead to a new nuclear-arms race or that could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

3. Calls upon all States to fulfil all their obligations under international treaties and international law in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

4. Calls upon all States parties to pursue, with determination, the full and effective implementation of the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the outcome of which provides the requisite plan to achieve nuclear disarmament;

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5 See resolution 55/2.
5. **Agrees** on the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications required to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;⁶

6. **Calls** for the upholding and maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

7. **Underlines** the urgency of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in the context of the progress achieved in implementing the international monitoring system;

8. **Calls upon** the nuclear-weapon States to implement the commitments made in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,² as well as in other nuclear disarmament or reductions agreements or initiatives, and to apply the principle of irreversibility by destroying their nuclear warheads and avoid keeping them in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment;

9. **Acknowledges** that the reductions in the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads envisaged by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty")⁹ represent a positive first step, and calls on the United States of America and the Russian Federation to make the Treaty verifiable, irreversible and transparent and to address non-operational warheads, thus making it an effective nuclear disarmament measure;

10. **Agrees** that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be accorded a higher priority as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons and be carried out in a comprehensive manner, including:

   (a) Further reductions in and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear-arms reduction and disarmament process;

   (b) The implementation of reductions in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner;

   (c) The preservation, reaffirmation and implementation of the 1991 and 1992 presidential nuclear initiatives of the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics/Russian Federation on non-strategic nuclear weapons;

   (d) The formalization by the Russian Federation and the United States of America of their presidential nuclear initiatives into legal instruments and the initiation of negotiations on further reductions of such weapons;

   (e) The enhancement of special security and physical protection measures for the transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, their components and related materials through, inter alia, the placing of such weapons in physically secure central storage sites with a view to their removal and subsequent elimination by the nuclear-weapon States as a part of the nuclear disarmament process to which they are committed under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the necessary steps to be taken by all nuclear-weapon States in possession of such weapons in this regard;

⁶ See CD/1674.
(f) The achievement of further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons;

(g) The achievement of concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of non-strategic nuclear weapons systems so as to reduce the risk of use of non-strategic nuclear weapons;

(h) The undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States that possess these weapons not to increase the number or types of weapons deployed and not to develop new types of these weapons or rationalizations for their use;

(i) The prohibition of those types of non-strategic nuclear weapons that have already been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear-weapon States and the development of transparency mechanisms for the verification of the elimination of these weapons;

11. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States to increase their transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapon arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures;

12. *Agrees* that the Conference on Disarmament should establish, without delay, an appropriate ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament;

13. *Agrees* that the Conference on Disarmament should resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives;

14. *Agrees* that the Conference on Disarmament should complete the examination and updating of the mandate on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, as contained in its decision of 13 February 1992,⁹ and re-establish an ad hoc committee as early as possible;

15. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States to undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear-weapon States into a process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons;

16. *Notes* that the third and, as appropriate, fourth meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, taking into account the deliberations and results of the previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a report containing recommendations to the Review Conference;

17. *Stresses* the importance of regular reporting in promoting confidence in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

18. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States parties;

19. *Notes* the proposals on security assurances that have been submitted to the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and

⁹ CD/V1125.
calls upon the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference to allow time to thoroughly consider the matter of security assurances at its third meeting so as to make recommendations to the Review Conference on how to take the matter forward;

20. Calls upon those three States, India, Israel and Pakistan, which are not yet parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and which operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without condition, to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols, consistent with the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 15 May 1997, for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation;

21. Reaffirms the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament;

22. Expresses concern at tensions in the Middle East and South Asia and renews support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

23. Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol;

24. Calls upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reconsider its recent announcements, with a view to being in full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in this connection supports all diplomatic efforts for an early, peaceful resolution of the situation and for the establishment of an area free of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula;

25. Stresses that the International Atomic Energy Agency must be able to verify and ensure that nuclear facilities of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are being used for peaceful purposes only, and calls on States to cooperate fully and immediately with the Agency in resolving issues arising from the implementation of their respective obligations towards it;

26. Calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to approach the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out the verification requirements set forth in the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement signed by the two States on the basis of the model legal framework that has been

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10 International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).
agreed on and that is now available to be used in new verification agreements between the Agency and each of the two States;

27. **Calls upon** all nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements for the placing, as soon as practicable, of their fissile material no longer required for military purposes under International Atomic Energy Agency or other relevant international verification and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes;

28. **Affirms** that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments;

29. **Acknowledges** the reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 57/59,\(^\text{11}\) and requests him to prepare a report, within existing resources, on the implementation of the present resolution;

30. **Decides** to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session an item entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda”, and to review the implementation of the present resolution at that session.

\(^\text{11}\) A/58/162 and Add.1.