Statement

by

Ambassador Masood Khan
Permanent Representative of Pakistan
to the United Nations, Geneva

in the First Committee

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Madam Chairperson,

I congratulate you on your election as Chairperson of the First Committee. We are confident that this Committee will achieve optimum results, under your able guidance. You can count on our cooperation.

2. We also convey our sincere appreciation for Ambassador Choi Young-jin's leadership of the First Committee last year.

3. We welcome the appointment of Mr. Nabuaki Tanaka as the Undersecretary General for Disarmament and assure him of our full cooperation in promoting the agreed goals of disarmament.

4. We associate ourselves with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

5. In my statement, I would like to touch on five themes: (a) global security; (b) regional security (c) Pakistan's strategic posture (d) South Asia, and (e) and institutional challenges.

Global Security

Madam Chairperson,

6. The Charter recognizes “security” as the right of every state. The Declaration of SSOD-I adopted the principle of “equal security” for all states. A cooperative approach to collective security and a rule-based international order is the best guarantee for viable security. Norms for security, disarmament and non-proliferation should thus need to be developed, applied and implemented through multilateral institutions. National means or restrictive groups, however powerful they may be, cannot assure international security.

7. In order to make such norms relevant, we must address the motives that drive states to acquire armaments, specially WMD. These motives include disputes and conflicts with powerful states; perceived threats from superior conventional and non-conventional forces; and discrimination in the application of international laws.

8. Advocacy of concepts of “nuclear primacy” in the current era could set off a destabilizing chain reaction and accelerate a new strategic and conventional arms race at the global and regional level. Such concepts and their actualisation could increase the risks of accidental, unauthorised or deliberate use of nuclear weapons. We must devalue the currency of nuclear weapons if we are to prevent nuclear war and promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
9. Recent developments have revealed that the old consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation has broken down. Pakistan has proposed convening a Special Conference to evolve a new consensus which responds to the current and emerging realities. Such a conference will help promote universal nuclear disarmament under verified international controls. This new consensus should eliminate the discrimination and double standards that characterize the present non-proliferation arrangements. It should revive the commitment of all states to complete nuclear disarmament; establish non-discriminatory standards for peaceful nuclear cooperation; and normalize the relationship between the NPT regime and the three non-NPT nuclear weapon states.

10. Such a new consensus would help address such threats as WMD proliferation by terrorists, vertical nuclear proliferation, the development and accumulation of advanced conventional weapons, development and deployment of ABM systems, the absence of an international agreement on missiles and the militarization of the outer space.

11. It would also evolve an agreed basis for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under appropriate international safeguards in accordance with the international obligations of States and on a non-discriminatory basis.

Madam Chairperson,

12. An indispensable first step is a commitment by all nuclear weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament within a reasonable time frame to revalidate the “bargain” on disarmament and non-proliferation and restore a genuine balance between them.

13. We support negotiations on a fissile material treaty (FMT) in accordance with the Shannon Mandate and the A-5 proposal for a universal, non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty. The report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) clearly identifies the key issues which include a) scope of the treaty, b) past and future production of fissile material and c) management of such material. The previously agreed basis for negotiating the Treaty cannot now be called “pre conditions”.

14. Until nuclear disarmament is achieved, non-nuclear weapon states should have the assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. The security assurances offered by nuclear weapons states should be translated into a universal, unconditional and legally binding treaty.

15. We share the majority view that the existing international legal instruments are inadequate to prevent the weaponization of outer space. We should consolidate and reinforce this regime and enhance its effectiveness.

16. Proliferation of the ballistic missiles is without doubt a cause for concern. We call for enhanced efforts to conclude a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and universally negotiated treaty within the United Nations system on missiles covering all aspects of the missiles issue.
17. The chemical weapons prohibition regime, overseen by OPCW, is a manifestation of the success of multilateralism. However, for the credibility of the regime, the pace for the destruction of declared chemical weapons must be accelerated and environmental and safety concerns addressed.

18. We look forward to 2006 Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention as a means to reinforce the Convention and pave the ways for cooperation and exchanges in the field of biosciences.

Regional Security

Madam Chairperson,

19. Efforts should be stepped up to defuse regional tensions and resolve conflicts in the Middle East. Pakistan supports the fulfillment of international obligations by all states and the objective of creating a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East.

20. The confrontation over Iran's nuclear programme threatens further instability in an already inflamed region. We are encouraged by the Iran and 5+1 negotiations and believe that this issue can be resolved peacefully in a manner that accommodates the legitimate rights and interests of all parties. Resort to coercion and, worse, the use of force, could lead to grave consequences, regional and global.

21. The announcement by the DPRK regarding its intention to conduct a nuclear weapons test is a matter of deep concern. We urge the DPRK to desist from introducing nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula which would be highly destabilizing for the region. This announcement adds urgency to the resumption of the Six-Party talks.

Pakistan's strategic posture

Madam Chairperson,

22. The sole purpose of Pakistan's nuclear capability is to deter external aggression. Our strategic posture reflects restraint and responsibility. We maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent capability. Pakistan will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. We are against a nuclear or conventional arms race in South Asia.

23. Pakistan has taken a series of measures to ensure responsible stewardship of our nuclear programme. In 2000, we established our National Command Authority (NCA), which since then has created a strong military-civilian interface for the management and oversight of our strategic assets and our nuclear programme. A reliable command and control system and effective custodial controls underpin the system. In 2004, we enacted a comprehensive Export Control Act to deal with sensitive nuclear goods, technologies and equipment as well as biological agents. We are now working on a separate new law to implement the BTWC. Pakistan's
Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) ensures safe operation of civilian nuclear plants.

**South Asia**

24. A stable security environment is important for peace in our region. Pakistan has proposed a Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia, which has three elements: (a) conflict resolution; (b) nuclear and missile restraint; and (c) a balance of conventional forces.

25. Since early 2004, we have pursued a multi-pronged engagement with India on the basis of confidence building measures and a composite dialogue. President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in their meeting on the sidelines of the NAM Summit in Havana on 16 September, agreed that the peace process must be maintained as its success was important for both countries and the future of the entire region. The two leaders decided to continue the joint search for mutually acceptable options for a peaceful negotiated settlement of all issues between India and Pakistan, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, in a meaningful and purposeful manner.

26. Pakistan does not want to enter into a strategic and conventional arms race. But we will do whatever is necessary to preserve the credibility of our minimum defensive deterrence level.

27. Since June 2004, we have held four rounds of consultations with India to develop measures for confidence building, real time communication, risk reduction, and strategic stability. The two sides have already signed an agreement on pre-notification of flight-testing of ballistic missiles and operationalized a hotline link between the Foreign Secretaries. They have also held discussions on a draft text of an agreement on reducing the risk from accidents relating to nuclear weapons.

28. The international community has an abiding interest in ensuring strategic stability in South Asia at the lowest possible. Discriminatory approaches in the nuclear or conventional fields will not advance stability in South Asia. We cannot accept discrimination in the nuclear field. In the strategic and defense areas, Pakistan always demands and deserves parity of treatment with our neighbor.

29. Pakistan has a legitimate requirement for nuclear power generation to meet the energy needs of our expanding economy. We will continue to develop nuclear technology for power generation under strict IAEA safeguards. We will not accept discrimination.

30. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is considering new demands for exceptionalism. We trust the NSG will adopt a non-discriminatory, criteria-based approach that will offer equal opportunities for access to civilian nuclear technology.

31. The preponderant focus on the WMD threat should not divert attention from the need for the regulation and reduction of conventional arms and armed forces. World military expenditure in 2005 is estimated to have reached U.S.$ 1.1 trillion.
Recent studies have shown that asymmetry in conventional armaments in conflict areas propel military spending and promote insecurity.

32. We need to prevent the build up of conventional weapons and forces particularly in regions of tension. In South Asia, we need a stable balance of conventional forces to ensure strategic stability between Pakistan and India. There must be restraint both in the demand and the supply on conventional weapons. Massive induction of sophisticated weaponry will accentuate conventional asymmetries and compel greater reliance on nuclear and missile deterrence. SIPRI reports that there has been a sharp increase in defense spending in our own region, in one case surpassing 82% since 1996. In the past several years, Pakistan’s defense expenditure in real terms has remained static.

**Institutional Challenges**

**Madam Chairperson,**

33. We started this year with a sobering assessment by the UN Secretary General pointing to a weakened global disarmament machinery as a result of a series of setbacks in 2005. The trend has continued. The Secretary General, in his report to the UN General Assembly, has concluded that the time to break the deadlock and bring disarmament back in the limelight on the international agenda is now.

34. This year the Conference on Disarmament saw heightened activity. The focused and structured debates held by the six CD Presidents resulted in enhanced exchange of views on the four core issues. We commend the six CD Presidents for their efforts. The US also tabled draft texts for the mandate of an Ad Hoc Committee and a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT). Despite these developments, the fact is that the CD has not been able to start negotiations. We must bear in mind that the CD is a negotiating, not a deliberative, forum.

35. Pakistan supports the A-5 proposal as it presents a package solution to address the four core issues in a comprehensive and balanced manner. It is also supported by a majority of delegations. The CD agenda, stemming from the Decalogue and comprising nuclear disarmament, FMT, PAROS and NSAs constitutes a delicate equilibrium. Attempts to tinker with this balance have resulted in an impasse.

36. These linkages are intrinsic, not extrinsic, as they reflect collectively agreed bargains. Two assumptions must be addressed in this context. The four issues are post-Cold War, 21st century, contemporary issues. It is not correct to say that the time is ripe for a FMT, but not for other issues. There is sufficient legal, technical and political basis for movement on all the four issues. They will all qualify on grounds of contemporaneity and ripeness. Of course, when negotiations start, one can imagine a varying degree of progression and a different trajectory for each issue.
Madam Chairperson,

37. Multilateralism is not a simple aggregation of national interests. No such aggregation is possible given the varied interests of states. Multilateralism is the sum of "enlightened self-interest". It entails cooperation and agreement for monitoring, verification, and compliance. Let us resolve to pursue genuine multilateralism through this session and beyond.

   For the official record, the statement may be considered to have been read in full.

I thank you.