Madam Chair,

1. Last year, the international community witnessed two significant failures in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation: neither the 7th NPT Review Conference nor the UN World Summit was able to produce any substantive outcome in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The long-anticipated Review Conference on the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms, held this July, also failed to produce a final document, putting the whole disarmament regime in disarray. As was rightly pointed out in the report of the WMD Commission, it is time for us to renew our cooperation and breathe new life into the international machinery for disarmament and non-proliferation.

Madam Chair,

2. Nuclear disarmament is vitally important to lasting international peace and security. Though we acknowledge the significance of the progress that has been made thus far in the reduction of nuclear arsenals by nuclear weapon states including the Moscow Treaty, the gap remains wide between what non-nuclear weapons states have hoped for and what nuclear weapons states have actually achieved. Closing this gap is crucial to restoring trust and a more cooperative spirit between nuclear haves and have-nots.
3. My delegation therefore calls upon all nuclear weapons states to implement their Article VI obligations in good faith by carrying out the 13 practical steps contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

4. In the meantime, to relieve the security concerns of non-nuclear weapons states, we believe that strong and credible security assurances should be granted by nuclear weapon states to NPT States Parties that are in full compliance with the Treaty and other safeguards obligations. It must be absolutely clear to all states that the path to security and stability is not nuclear weapons but disarmament and compliance with international obligations and norms.

Madam Chair,

5. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) are two essential means of complementing and strengthening the NPT regime. By placing qualitative and quantitative caps on the development of nuclear weapons, bringing these treaties into force would be a major step towards our ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear arms.

6. An early entry into force of the CTBT is paramount for the eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals. This year marks the 10th anniversary of the opening for signature of the CTBT, yet the prospect of the Treaty’s entry into force in the near future remains bleak. We have been sitting on this egg for a decade, and it is due time it hatched and took wing. My delegation strongly calls upon those states that have not yet ratified the Treaty, in particular those remaining 10 Annex states to do so without further delay.

7. As next logical step following the CTBT, we cannot overemphasize the importance of an early conclusion of an FMCT. In this regard, we highly appreciate the United States’ proposed draft mandate and treaty, which were tabled last May. We believe this proposal provides us with a solid basis for starting negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In the meantime, considering the urgency of the need to curb the production of fissile materials, we urge all states with nuclear capabilities to declare voluntary moratoria on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes without delay. This would certainly be conducive to enhancing transparency and building confidence among states.

Madame Chair,

8. Despite the setbacks and challenges that confront it, the NPT remains the cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. As such, it should be further strengthened. In addition to continuing to work to ensure universal adherence to the NPT, we should also strive towards
universal application of the IAEA Additional Protocol. Universal application of the Additional Protocol would undoubtedly enhance global confidence in the NPT regime by bolstering the NPT regime's monitoring and verification mechanisms.

9. As we embark on the preparatory process next year for the 8th Review Conference in 2010, we should strive to make the NPT function more effectively so that it can stand up to the challenges before us.

Madam Chair,

10. In spite of the efforts of the international community for the nuclear non-proliferation, Northeast Asia remains unfortunately the locus of a pressing nuclear issue. To our great dismay, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced on 8 October that it had conducted a test of a nuclear weapon. The Government of the Republic of Korea strongly condemns the DPRK's act as a serious threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and throughout Northeast Asia. The nuclear test also constitutes a flagrant violation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, UN Security Council Resolution 1695 of 15 July, and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of 1991. My delegation reminds the DPRK that such a provocative act will not be condoned or tolerated. We urge the DPRK once again to abandon immediately all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, to faithfully abide by the NPT regime, and to behave as a responsible member of the international community.

Thank you, Madam Chair.