Statement by H.E. Ambassador A.I. Antonov,
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Representative of the Russian Federation in the First Committee
of the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly

New York, October 10, 2007
Mr. Chairman,

Strengthening multi-polarity, deepening interdependency of all the countries of the world, increasing number and scale of global challenges and threats of a new generation require elaborating collective approaches and responses. Today, security is becoming the essential condition and the fundamental basis for successful socio-economic development of states, as well as the formation of world’s stable and sustainable development. At the same time, the aggravation of regional crises, the risk of WMD proliferation stir up the arms race, and divert the resources from the purposes of development. In this connection, the role of UN as a forum for adopting consensus-based and comprehensive decisions on the most important issues of international security, disarmament and nonproliferation is enhancing.

In his February 10, 2007, address at the Munich Conference on Security Policy the Russian President encouraged everyone to a serious and substantive discussion of the situation that is far from satisfactory in the field of international security. He noted: “The potential danger of the destabilization of international relations is connected… with the obvious stagnation in the field of disarmament”.

Nuclear disarmament is one of the core elements needed for strengthening international security and strategic stability. Recent years saw a drastic reduction of nuclear weapons. Thus, starting from 1991, the Russian nuclear arsenal has been reduced fivefold, while the total stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons – by three quarters. The Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction, and the START are being implemented. In view of the START expiration in 2009, we are maintaining a dialogue with the United States on a new arrangement to replace this Treaty. Our approach on this issue is to try to retain what is useful and effectively operating in the START regime.

Speaking of the process of nuclear disarmament it is necessary to take into account the inherent interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive missile armaments. The implementation of unilateral plans to build a global anti-missile defense ignoring the security interests of other states would upset the
balance of forces. The Russian Delegation made a statement on this matter several years ago in an effort to assert the need to sustain the ABM Treaty. We are forced to reiterate this today. We are convinced that the deployment of elements of a global US ABM system in the Czech Republic and Poland, as well as the appearance of ABM strike weapons in outer space, would adversely affect the disarmament process.

In order to avoid the well known Cold War "Action - Counteraction" scenario, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed an alternative solution that would provide for collective interaction and open the opportunity to find a way out of the current situation without undermining anyone's security interests. We are ready along with all interested countries to analyze potential missile threats up to the year 2020, and to consider the issue of establishing a regional system of objective monitoring of the strategic situation. However, I must underscore that our proposal is not meant to complement US plans to deploy a global ABM defense base in Europe, but rather it is an alternative to such plans.

We believe that the Treaty on the Elimination of Medium and Shorter-Range Missiles remains important for maintaining strategic security and stability. We are convinced that it will remain crucial for ensuring effective world nuclear disarmament. We call upon all countries, primarily those with missile capabilities, to jointly consider further strengthening of the Treaty's regime.

The NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a key element of international security and stability. Our priority is to ensure its effective strengthening and implementation, in particular, unconditional implementation of the Treaty provisions at the national level, closing the gaps, further promotion of its universality, strengthening its resilience, as well as the use of its provisions in order to promptly and effectively respond to existing challenges and threats. The importance and urgency of these tasks was confirmed at the recent first session of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee. We are satisfied that, despite all the difficulties and controversies, we succeeded in setting
a constructive tone for seeking joint decisions on strengthening the Treaty. This work must be carried on.

We believe that a ban on nuclear tests is a measure that is called upon to reinforce the nuclear nonproliferation regime. A unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests is insufficient to assure the world community that nuclear tests would not be resumed. We call on all the countries, on which depends the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, to ratify it as soon as possible.

Apparently, additional measures are required today to strengthen security assurances to the non-nuclear states. We do not object to elaboration of a global arrangement on providing such assurances to non-nuclear states, which would prohibit the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the exceptional cases stipulated for in the nuclear powers' military doctrines determining when such weapons could be used.

We consider strengthening of IAEA verification activities and the universalization of the Additional Protocol to Nuclear Safeguards Agreement with the Agency to be an important effort in strengthening the nonproliferation regime. We call upon all the states that have not yet put into effect the Additional Protocol, and primarily those who carry out significant nuclear activities or possess substantial supplies of nuclear materials, to do so without delay.

The growing significance and role of nuclear energy in the world naturally increase the risks of proliferation of such sensitive technologies as enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel. We propose to work collectively on such models of nuclear energy development that would provide for programs of reliable supply of nuclear fuel on the basis of international cooperation as an alternative to proliferation of sensitive technologies. One of such models is the establishment of international centers that would provide nuclear fuel cycle services.

As a first step, the International Center for Uranium Enrichment has been established in Angarsk, Russia. The Center will provide states with the opportunity
to have guaranteed access to the capacities for uranium enrichment to satisfy their needs in nuclear fuel without the need to have their own nuclear fuel cycle. The Center is open for the participation of third countries without any political preconditions. Russia and Kazakhstan are the founders of the Center. At present the procedure of putting the Center under the IAEA safeguards is about to be finalized.

Some interesting ideas in this field have been put forward by other countries recently. The July 3, 2007, "Joint Russian-US Statement on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation: Joint Actions" is called to merge these initiatives, create a new format that would contribute to the development of nuclear energy. All interested states, both those that possess the nuclear fuel cycle and are suppliers of nuclear equipment, and those that are only planning to use nuclear energy, can participate in this work.

We believe that it is an important and urgent task to prevent the falling of nuclear weapons and materials into the hands of terrorists. The 2006 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism put forward by the presidents of Russia and the United States is called upon to resolve this acute problem. Sixty states have already subscribed to the Initiative and reaffirmed their obligations under the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and under the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We expect all the countries that share the goals of the Global Initiative and are committed to the fight against nuclear terrorism to join the Initiative.

Complex problems call for comprehensive approaches. This fully refers to the situation around the Iranian nuclear program. It is necessary to continue the search for a comprehensive political and diplomatic solution as regards the nuclear program of Iran, as well as to promote the positive trends that have emerged on this track. We stand for intensifying contacts between the Six Parties and Iran in order to elaborate the models that would allow to launch such purpose-oriented full-scale negotiations process. We consider that there can be no alternative to the peaceful resolution of this problem.
A vivid example to that is the situation around the DPRK nuclear problem. Generally, we give positive assessment to the work conducted within the Six Party talks that aim at resolving the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula. The first stage of denuclearization has been completed successfully. Now we need to start looking vigorously for solutions at the second stage.

Mr. Chairman,

We are growing more and more concerned about the threat of placement of weapons in outer space, which might undermine global stability and international security, lead to a new round of the arms race in outer space as well as on Earth.

In his speech at the 2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy President Vladimir Putin stressed that the placement of weapons in outer space "can have unpredictable consequences for the international community of no less significance than the beginning of a nuclear era."

During the 2007 Session of the Conference on Disarmament we presented to our partners for their consideration the draft Treaty on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, Use or Threat of Use of Force Against Space Objects (PPWT). We intend to take into account the comments made by our partners. We believe that such an instrument might become a reliable guarantee that would prevent the appearance of a new destabilizing type of weapons - outer space weapons. It would also ensure the safe operation of spacecraft and safety of costly space property. We support the prompt reestablishment of the relevant ad hoc committee at the Conference on Disarmament that will be charged with drafting the PPWT.

Transparency and confidence building measures in outer space activities (TCBMs) might discourage those who intend to place weapons in outer space. During the current GA Session the Russian Delegation is planning to table the draft resolution on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures in Outer Space Activities that will comply with the corresponding Resolution of the previous GA Session. Its aim is to contribute to further analysis of such measures and to propose
to the Member States to continue submitting to the UN Secretary-General specific proposals on TCBMs that would promote peace and security and prevent the arms race in outer space. We are grateful to the delegations for their support of the TCBM resolution at the previous Session. We count on the consensus support of the draft resolution this year and call upon all Member States to co-sponsor.

As part of practical steps to build confidence in outer space, we suggest to follow the example of the CSTO Participating States and declare moratorium on being the first to place weapons of any kind in outer space.

Another priority for us at the present GA Session is the issue of international information security. In the context of global informatization and growing vulnerability of the information space, the possible use of information and telecommunications technologies for hostile purposes poses a growing threat to security at the national, regional and international levels. In this regard we will propose a draft resolution on the Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. The main goal of this document is to reaffirm the commitment to set up in 2009 a group of governmental experts to continue to study threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them. We count on the support of the Russian draft Resolution and call upon all Member States to co-sponsor.

We support the unconditional fulfillment by all Member States of their obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWC) especially those relating to the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles within the timelines established by the Convention and its national implementation. In 2007, Russia eliminated 20 percent of its chemical agents stockpiles ahead of schedule. We attach great importance to the success of the forthcoming Second CWC Review Conference and call to a thorough and balanced review of the implementation of the Convention, elaboration of realistic and balanced solutions to strengthen it.
The success of the 6th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) makes us cautiously optimistic about the increasing efficiency of the Convention regime. I refer in the first place to the resumption of elaboration of the legally binding mechanism of the compliance with the Convention. We note that a growing number of countries annually provide information as part of confidence building measures. We call upon all States Parties to exchange information in accordance with the above mentioned measures and believe that this would strengthen the BWC.

The missile nonproliferation issue calls for a solution. The main concern here is the lack of a legally binding international agreement limiting the proliferation of WMD missile means of delivery. In this regard I would like to remind you of the Russian proposal to establish a global missile nonproliferation regime.

We cannot but react to the critical situation with the CFE Treaty that has been existing for a number of years now and is only aggravating with time. The Treaty that was signed at the end of the Cold War is now desperately outdated, since it was based on the concept of limiting the armaments of the two opposing blocs, while the Agreement on the Adaptation of the CFE Treaty that would allow to restore its relevance till now has not come into force due to the position of the NATO countries. Further conservation of the situation when one group of states basically does whatever it wants while other countries are forced to comply with their obligations can hardly be perceived as normal and in line with the security interests of Russia. With this in mind, on July 13, 2007, the President of the Russian Federation decided to suspend the Russian Federation's Participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Related International Treaties. The suspension will enter into effect on December 12, 2007. This being said we are still open for continuation of a dialogue on restoring the viability of the Treaty's regime on the basis of our proposals that remain valid.

We share the concerns of the international community over the problem of illicit trade in SALW. We believe that the prompt implementation of the UN
Program of Action to fight the illicit trafficking in SALW, the potential of which is far from exhausted, would contribute to the efficient fight against that scourge.

The forthcoming 2008 Biennial Meeting of States Parties to review the implementation of the Program of Action is an important step along this way. The success of this forum will to a great extent depend on how well it is organized. Special attention should be focused on national efforts both through strengthening national legislations in this sphere and by improving law enforcement practices. On our part we are prepared to share our experience and expertise.

Mr. Chairman,

Today we acknowledge that disarmament is at crisis. The stability of its international legal basis is threatened. We have to state that some Treaties are not functioning properly, others are eroding and decaying - treaty vacuum is about to come to the area of strategic arms. It is also impossible to put into effect new Treaties that have already been agreed upon, while negotiation mechanisms are partially disabled.

New challenges emerge and the existing disarmament and non-proliferation mechanisms cannot always provide adequate responses. One of such challenges is the threat of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials falling into the hands of non-state actors.

The force factor is acquiring growing importance in international politics. The trend is becoming more pronounced to solve interstate problems by coercive measures to the prejudice of political and diplomatic means and UN mechanisms. This, in its turn, is pushing a growing number of States to increase their defense capabilities, even by choosing a military nuclear option.

Evidently, under these circumstances we need to join our efforts in order not to let the situation deteriorate further since that would have grave and irreversible consequences for the entire system of international security and stability. We believe that joint elaboration of a positive disarmament agenda would offer good prospects. This is a difficult and comprehensive task and all countries with no
exception must participate since disarmament is, above all, a process performed on a reciprocal basis. Creating favorable conditions for promoting disarmament, such as ensuring strategic and regional stability and equal security for all, must become a top priority.

Mr. Chairman,

Allow me on behalf of the Russian Delegation to assure you of our support and willingness to cooperate in order to achieve practical results in the work of the Committee.

Thank you.