Mr Chairman,

1. The dismantling of the Cold War security architecture has led to new challenges and uncertainties. Our concern with Weapons of Mass Destruction used to be focused on the possession by states of such weapons. Today, the situation is more complex—we also have to contend with non-state actors acquiring and possibly using WMDs. The threat of WMD proliferation has therefore become linked to terrorism. It is the possible use by such non-state actors of WMDs that poses one of the most serious threats to international security today.

2. As the complexity of the security environment has increased, so has the need for multilateral cooperation. One area where we need to work together is in advancing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Gains on one front need not be seen as a loss for the other. These are mutually-reinforcing concepts.

3. Another area is support for multilateral non-proliferation regimes like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. Universal adherence to these regimes is a goal that we should strive for. National efforts by individual states are also crucial for countering proliferation. One example is adherence to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which calls on all UN member states to implement effective domestic controls against the trafficking of WMD items.

Mr Chairman,

4. Singapore is an aviation hub and port located along one of the world’s most important shipping lanes. We do not wish to be used by proliferators in their illicit activities. We rely on robust export control systems and active counter-proliferation efforts. While there may be some impact in terms of additional procedures, these measures enhance our physical security and therefore strengthen our long-term economic
vitality. Allow me to elaborate on our export control system and our participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative.

**Export Control System**

5 In January 2003, Singapore enacted a Strategic Goods (Control) Act to strengthen our control of the export, transhipment and transit of strategic goods and technology. The Act includes brokering controls, controls on Intangible Transfers of Technology (ITT), and a "catch-all" provision that allows us to control items that are intended for WMD end-use but are not included on our list of controlled items. We will also expand our strategic goods export control lists with effect from January 2008 to include all items controlled by the four multilateral non-proliferation regimes—the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. This will help ensure that Singapore continues to keep pace with international efforts to limit the proliferation of WMDs.

**Proliferation Security Initiative**

6 Singapore is also an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI aims to deepen international cooperation to stop the movement of WMD and related items from flowing to state and non-state actors. PSI members are committed to the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, which ensures that all actions taken under the PSI are consistent with relevant international law and national legislation. The PSI is not a stand-alone initiative. Instead, it complements international efforts like UN Security Council resolutions, existing treaties and control lists.

7 Singapore hosted a PSI maritime interdiction exercise in August 2005—the first PSI exercise held in Southeast Asia. We also hosted a two-day Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting in July 2006, which involved over 200 operational experts from the defence, foreign affairs, law enforcement, transport and other agencies of the OEG countries. Most recently, the Singapore Armed Forces participated in a Japan-hosted PSI counter-proliferation maritime interdiction exercise from 13-15 October 2007. We congratulate Japan for organising a successful exercise.

8 In the final analysis, multilateral non-proliferation regimes are empty constructs if they are not accompanied by effective national implementation. In tandem, national efforts cannot succeed without comprehensive implementation and cooperation from other states. Effective counter-proliferation can only succeed if we can work together.

Thank you.