Mr Chairman,

1 While a globalised and interconnected world today has brought about tremendous benefits, the very same conditions that have enhanced trade and interaction since the end of the Cold War have also created new and complex security challenges for our governments. This can be seen in the shifting focus of security agencies when it comes to the securitisation of nuclear weapons. Previously, attention was focused on the possession of such weapons by state actors. However, with the increasingly fluid trade and security architecture of today, the concern has now been expanded to include possession of such weapons and related technologies by non-state actors. It has become almost impossible for any government to individually address the proliferation of nuclear weapons related technologies.

2 At the same time, cross-border non-proliferation efforts still rely on the bedrock of robust implementation at the national level. In this regard, Singapore plays its role by participating in relevant multilateral initiatives to advance both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. We take our obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 seriously. We also support the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. Singapore believes that while universal adherence to these regimes is a goal to strive for, multilateral non-proliferation regimes are empty constructs if they are not accompanied by effective implementation. National efforts by individual states, as well as practical cooperation between states, are therefore crucial for countering proliferation.

Mr Chairman,

3 Singapore is a major aviation and port hub. As one of the busiest transhipment ports in the world, Singapore attracts more than 140,000 vessels and processes about 29 million containers (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit) annually. We are very much part of the global supply chain. In this regard, Singapore relies on a robust export control system and participates actively in non-proliferation efforts. The security procedures we have put in place ultimately enhance our physical security and therefore strengthen our long-term economic vitality. In addition, this also highlights our commitment to help prevent WMD-related technologies from falling into the wrong hands.
Mr Chairman,

4. I will elaborate on our non-proliferation efforts in terms of our export control systems and our participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

5. As a major transhipment hub and a responsible member of the international community, Singapore has enacted strong national legislation that allows for an enhanced export control system to govern the export and transshipment of strategic goods and technology with potential WMD application. From the Strategic Goods (Control) Act in 2003 - which adopted a partial control list - we now include the monitoring of all four major multilateral export control regimes\(^1\) controlled items with effect from January 2008. In addition, our system includes a catch-all provision\(^2\), brokering controls, and controls on the Intangible Transfer of Technology (ITT), which is a unique feature yet to be implemented in many export control systems in the world. The ITT refers to the electronic transmission via fax, e-mail, or the Internet, of strategic goods technology controlled under our strategic goods control, including technology relating to any such relevant activity.

6. Singapore takes the proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery and related items very seriously. We are an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which was formed in 2003 to encourage international cooperation in the interdiction of shipments of WMDs, their delivery systems, and related materials and technology. To date, more than 90 countries around the world have endorsed the PSI and are working together to counter the global threat of WMD proliferation. PSI members are committed to the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, which ensures that all actions taken under the PSI are consistent with relevant international law and national legislation. The PSI is not a stand-alone initiative. Instead, it builds on existing mechanisms such as international treaty regimes and domestic export control systems to create an effective framework for states to work together to prevent the flow of WMD and related materials to and from entities of proliferation concern. Later this month, from 27-30 October 2009, Singapore will be hosting a PSI exercise, “Deep Sabre II”. This Exercise, which involves participants from twenty countries\(^3\), will allow PSI participants to enhance their interoperability and build capacity for the conduct of maritime and port counter-proliferation actions.

Mr Chairman,

7. In conclusion, national implementation of measures in support of multilateral non-proliferation regimes remains critical. Nonetheless, national efforts alone cannot succeed without comprehensive implementation by and cooperation from other states to make non-proliferation efforts succeed. Thank you.

\(^1\) Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group and Wassenaar Arrangement.
\(^2\) The catch-all clause allows us to enforce the export control laws on items which are intended for WMD-end use but are not included in our list of controlled items.
\(^3\) The Exercise comprises participants from Australia, Brunei, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia, USA and Singapore. There are also observers from Argentina, Germany, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Poland, Spain and Turkey who will be observing the exercise proceedings.