Sixty-fifth session
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General and complete disarmament

Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 64/38, entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, the General Assembly urged all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures, including national measures, for tackling the global threat posed by the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction, and to report to the Assembly at its sixty-fifth session. The present report is submitted in response to that request.

2. By a note verbale dated 19 February 2010, Member States were invited to inform the Secretary-General of the measures taken and to communicate their views on the issue. On 17 and 18 February 2010, letters were also dispatched to relevant international organizations, including relevant bodies and agencies of the United Nations, inviting them to provide executive summaries of their contributions for inclusion in the report of the Secretary-General, while their submissions are posted in extenso on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs if so requested by the invited organization prior to the issuance of the report as a document of the United Nations. Organizations that had reported their relevant activities in 2009 were invited to submit only new information in relation to what they had previously submitted.

3. As at 23 June 2010, replies had been received from Australia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Thailand, Turkmenistan and Ukraine, which are reproduced or summarized in section II of the present report. Replies were also received from 14 international organizations; they are summarized in section III of the present report.

II. Replies received from Member States

Australia*

[Original: English]
[1 June 2010]

Preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is an international security priority of the Australian Government. In addition to maintaining a high standard of security over its own chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) material, Australia actively promotes the enhancement of CBRN security standards throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Australia is the permanent Chair of the Australia Group, which works to strengthen national export controls over material and technologies which could be used for the production of chemical and biological weapons. As a strong supporter of national

* The full text of the information provided by the Government of Australia is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (http://www.un.org/disarmament). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.
export controls, Australia is committed to expanding international trade in chemical and biological goods for peaceful purposes and maintaining active chemical and biotechnological industries within a secure regulatory framework. In this context, Australia encourages Member States to implement CBRN export controls, drawing on Australia Group and Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. Working in close consultation with international counterparts and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Australia’s nuclear agencies and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade conduct numerous capacity-building and outreach activities on nuclear security. Australia strongly supports the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. Australia encourages Member States to avail themselves of IAEA assistance to assess and improve, where necessary, national levels of nuclear security.

Finland

[Original: English]
[4 May 2010]

Finland has a comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework, including a comprehensive export control system, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Finland is a party to all relevant international treaties relating to the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention). Finland has also acceded to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, has signed the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, has completed the required revisions to its legislation and is ready to ratify the Amendment, jointly with the other European Union member States. Finland is a member of all international export control regimes and has joined other relevant international arrangements, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Finland is committed to the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and has fulfilled its national reporting obligations in this regard.

Recently, special attention has been paid to, for instance, issues relating to export control, such as intangible transfers of technology. Finland continues to maintain and improve its border control infrastructure. Furthermore, Finland has created a special website (http://www.helsinki.fi/verifin/UN1540) in order to raise awareness of the main problems linked with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to make people familiar with the principal treaties in the field. The information package is a part of an awareness-raising project launched by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland and the relevant public authorities. Moreover, the recently approved national counter-terrorism strategy includes a goal to strengthen national cooperation and coordination on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive weapons issues.

Finland also continues to provide assistance to other States, for instance through contributions to the G-8 Global Partnership Programme, through voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency and by training experts from developing countries in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In recent years, Finland has supported the work of the Stimson Center
to promote the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), based on a new security and development model.

**Georgia**

[Original: English]  
[4 June 2010]

In order to comply with General Assembly resolutions on the control and limitation of documentation prepared by the Secretariat and the guidelines of the Secretary-General for reports drafted and/or compiled by the Secretariat, the reply received from the Government of Georgia has not been reproduced, since it exceeded the acceptable page limit. The full text of the reply is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (http://www.un.org/disarmament).

**Hungary**

[Original: English]  
[7 June 2010]

Hungary would like to underline the importance of effective national legislation to combat international terrorism and to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. Pursuant to the Hungarian Criminal Code (HCC), any person who — with a purpose related to terrorism — commits a violent crime or a crime that poses a threat to the public or involves the use of a weapon is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 10 to 20 years or life imprisonment. Furthermore, in respect of the use of weapons of mass destruction, the HCC prohibits the following acts:

- Misuse of military items and services, and dual-use items and technology (subsections (1) to (3) of section 263/B)
- Misuse of radioactive materials (subsections (1) to (3) of section 264)
- Misuse of weapons prohibited by international conventions (subsections (1) to (3) of section 264/C)

**Views of Hungary on additional relevant measures, including national measures, for tackling the global threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists**

National measures should focus on:

1. Increasing the effectiveness of the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

   Non-proliferation is a system of cooperation between States to hinder the horizontal spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, comprising prevention and detection of and response (deterrence and interdiction) to:

   (a) Open and covert diversion of items (components/materials), including software and technology used in weapons of mass destruction;
(b) Covert operation of the facility or its technological processes and equipment, if there is a threat of illicit diversion of weapons of mass destruction;

(c) Covert processes aiming to produce components/materials used in weapons of mass destruction, and the non-licensed operation of equipment on the site of the facility, and during the application, storage and transport of components/materials used in weapons of mass destruction, if there is a risk of illicit diversion.

International verification regimes aim to detect and respond to the objectives of non-proliferation efforts; thus, national measures should focus more on prevention, deterrence and interdiction of illicit activities by strengthening:

- Accountability for and control of components/materials of weapons of mass destruction (safeguards) and of nuclear items
- Export and, in the case of very sensitive items, import controls
- Intelligence and international information exchange
- Licensing (possession, applications, packages-containers, transport, transport across borders, safeguards licensing) of nuclear items
- Enforcement
- Technical measures (intrinsic)
- Physical protection of very sensitive (e.g., nuclear) items
- Awareness-raising and outreach to stakeholders aimed at achieving partnership and compliance
- Inter-agency cooperation and training of government administration.

2. Promotion of the importance of and conducting national threat assessment and evaluation of the national design basis threat for physical protection purposes (of nuclear plants).

3. Implementation of a strong State-level safeguards system in the transfer of nuclear items in order to:

- Ratify and implement the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol (to achieve universal accession to those agreements internationally)
- Promote new facilities with “safeguards by design” in the nuclear renaissance.

4. Transparency towards international organizations (to provide relevant information voluntarily where a legal basis does not exist or is under preparation), especially in the field of activities related to nuclear items.
Mexico*

[Original: Spanish]
[24 May 2010]

Mexico believes that progress in the implementation of measures that prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is essential to the preservation of international peace and security.

In 2009, the General Customs Administration of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, in collaboration with the Civil Protection office of the Tax Administration Service and the National Nuclear Safety and Safeguards Commission, gave a course entitled “Immediate response to bomb threats” and three courses entitled “Training in radiological materials” for the country’s customs personnel. A further 10 courses are planned for 2010.

Mexico has regulations in place to ensure high safety standards in the transport of dangerous materials and waste. Accordingly, in 2009, efforts were focused on improving and updating safety standards in line with international guidelines.

The transport industry has been encouraged to adhere strictly to three relevant acts: the Federal Firearms and Explosives Act; the Federal Act to Control Chemical Substances Capable of Being Diverted to the Fabrication of Chemical Weapons; and the Federal Act on Chemical Precursors, Essential Chemicals and Machines for the Manufacture of Capsules, Tablets and/or Pills. Anybody contracting services for the transport of goods characterized as dangerous in the aforementioned legislation, or that can be converted into potential components for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, must provide the carrier with full documentation — including the data sheet and operating manual for the container in question — and must prove beyond any doubt that the source and the destination of the goods to be transported is legitimate.

Finally, work has continued on the “Megaports Initiative”, which is designed to provide equipment, training and technical support for the General Customs Administration so as to build its capacity to deter, detect and intercept at ports and border crossing points, using non-invasive inspection technology, the illegal traffic in nuclear and radioactive materials.

Morocco

[Original: French]
[2 June 2010]

The Kingdom of Morocco continues to be fully engaged in efforts to combat terrorism in all its forms, including nuclear terrorism, and is taking the relevant actions in the context of multilateral efforts to combat international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

* The full text of the information provided by the Government of Mexico is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (http://www.un.org/disarmament). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.
1. Support for international efforts:
   • Morocco is a party to all the conventions concerning weapons of mass
destruction and contributes to international counter-terrorism initiatives,
including those aimed at tackling the threat posed by the acquisition by
terrorist groups and networks of weapons of mass destruction;

   • Morocco voted in favour of resolution 64/38 and all the relevant resolutions
adopted under the auspices of the United Nations, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW);

   • In this connection, Morocco voted in favour of resolution GC(53)/RES/11 on
nuclear security, including measures to protect against nuclear and radiological
terrorism, adopted on 18 September 2009 at the fifty-third session of the IAEA
General Conference;

   • Morocco is also a partner in the following initiatives:
     – The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism;
     – The Proliferation Security Initiative, which it joined in May 2008;
     – The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, whose statement of principles it
signed on 1 October 2008;

   • In addition, Morocco contributed to the Nuclear Security Summit held in
Washington, D.C., on 12 and 13 April 2010, which concerned the
non-proliferation and securing of nuclear weapons and materials and resulted
in the adoption of a communiqué and a workplan.

2. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism:
   • The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
was adopted by the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee under the
chairmanship of Morocco. The Convention was signed on 19 April 2006 and
ratified on 13 February 2010.

3. National measures:
   • Weapons of mass destruction are not being produced or acquired by the Royal
Armed Forces;

   • Morocco has adopted a strategy for preventing and combating the threat posed
by the acquisition by terrorists of nuclear materials, based on the following
three pillars:
     – Strengthening the security and physical protection of nuclear materials
and facilities;
     – Preventing illicit trafficking;
     – Dismantling terrorist groups and networks;

   • The chief legal instrument for this purpose is Act No. 03-03 of 28 May 2003
concerning counter-terrorism;
Morocco is currently upgrading its nuclear security infrastructure in cooperation with IAEA, among others, and with international partners such as the United States, France and the European Union;

- The security and physical protection measures at the Maamora research reactor, Morocco’s only nuclear materials site, are consistent with international standards and have been welcomed by all international partners;
- A national nuclear materials accounting and control system (one of the most important international standards) has been set up.

4. Cooperation for strengthening national capacities:

- Each year Morocco organizes, in cooperation with IAEA, a high-level course for African countries on the safety and security of nuclear and radioactive materials. The next such postgraduate training course will be offered in Rabat from 11 October 2010 to 4 March 2011;
- Morocco participates in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database programme;
- In the context of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Morocco:
  - Hosted an initial seminar on rapid response to malicious acts involving radioactive materials (Rabat, 5-7 February 2008), as part of the implementation of the Initiative’s plan of activities;
  - Organized a second seminar focusing on the prevention of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials (3-5 June 2009);
  - Will organize, in 2011, an international exercise on the response to malicious acts involving radioactive materials, as well as a regional awareness-raising event for the West African countries.

Netherlands

[Original: English]

[23 June 2010]

In order to comply with General Assembly resolutions on the control and limitation of documentation prepared by the Secretariat and the guidelines of the Secretary-General for reports drafted and/or compiled by the Secretariat, the reply received from the Government of the Netherlands has not been reproduced, since it exceeded the acceptable page limit. The full text of the reply is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD).

Norway

[Original: English]

[3 June 2010]

1. Norway considers weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists an extremely frightening prospect. If a terrorist group were ever to acquire weapons of mass destruction, it would be not for deterrence but for actual use. The international community must never allow this to happen.
2. Norway co-sponsored the resolution on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction which was put forward by India at the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly in 2009. We welcomed its adoption by consensus as sending a strong message of the world’s commitment to stop terrorists from acquiring the world’s most deadly weapons. In accordance with the resolution, Norway is pleased to give this report on its efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

3. Norway participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The initiative is an important framework for projects aimed at preventing the smuggling of nuclear material, which can be used by terrorists. Norway has supported a project in Kazakhstan aimed at preventing such smuggling with $840,000. A further $500,000 will be provided for a continuation of the project in Kazakhstan. Norway also participates in exercises under the initiative to improve our ability to intercept nuclear smuggling.

4. Norway welcomed the decision of the United States of America to host an international summit on nuclear security in April 2010. Norway was pleased to attend the Summit, which developed a strong action plan on measures to secure nuclear materials from terrorists or other unauthorized persons. At the Summit, Norway presented a comprehensive list of measures which have been undertaken to strengthen nuclear security. Norway underlined that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be at the core of international efforts to strengthen nuclear security and therefore be fully equipped to meet the challenges in the coming years. Norway therefore pledged $3 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. Norway also underscored that the best way to prevent nuclear terrorism would be to abolish nuclear weapons forever.

5. Norway welcomes the positive and forward-looking outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which will accelerate efforts to reach a world free of nuclear weapons, as well as further strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

6. Although both biological and chemical weapons have been banned under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, the risk of terrorists acquiring biological or chemical agents for malicious uses cannot be ruled out. Again, one must assume that a terrorist’s purpose would be not to deter, but to actually use the weapons to inflict terror and chaos. Norway has been working closely with other States parties in strengthening implementation of the two Conventions. Norway also enjoys excellent cooperation with international organizations such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations Implementation Support Unit for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

7. Norway has consistently argued that a comprehensive approach is needed to prevent terrorism. In addition to strengthening national and international defences, the root causes of terrorism must be addressed, such as lack of freedom, democracy and human rights. This is the fundamental challenge. Curing the symptoms will not solve the problems.
Thailand*

[Original: English]
[21 May 2010]

Thailand has continuously undertaken and strengthened national measures, through the work of designated national focal points as well as various legal instruments, to support the international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies.

At the national level, Thai agencies concerned are in the process of developing an integrated export control system, incorporating licensing and enforcement, to enhance Thailand’s capability in controlling weapons of mass destruction-related materials, in particular sensitive dual-use items. Technical cooperation from more advanced countries would be very helpful in this regard.

Intelligence cooperation and regional/international mechanisms for information-sharing between exporting and importing countries should be developed so as to monitor and strictly control weapons of mass destruction and related materials, as well as to alert concerned authorities on suspicious cases. In this regard, points of contact in each country for information-sharing should be designated.

As a capacity-building measure, training courses and workshops should be arranged for concerned Thai authorities to exchange views and experience on how to effectively detect, deter, prevent and combat the transport of illicit weapons of mass destruction and related materials, as well as trafficking and brokering, consistent with international law. Support from more advanced countries in this regard is welcomed.

Turkmenistan

[Original: Russian]
[7 June 2010]

In order to comply with General Assembly resolutions on the control and limitation of documentation prepared by the Secretariat and the guidelines of the Secretary-General for reports drafted and/or compiled by the Secretariat, the reply received from the Government of Turkmenistan has not been reproduced, since it exceeded the acceptable page limit. The full text of the reply is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (http://www.un.org/disarmament).

* The full text of the information provided by the Government of Thailand is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (http://www.un.org/disarmament). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.
Ukraine

[Original: Russian]
[12 May 2010]

In order to comply with General Assembly resolutions on the control and limitation of documentation prepared by the Secretariat and the guidelines of the Secretary-General for reports drafted and/or compiled by the Secretariat, the reply received from the Government of Ukraine has not been reproduced, since it exceeded the acceptable page limit. The full text of the reply is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (http://www.un.org/disarmament).

III. Information received from international organizations

A. United Nations system

International Atomic Energy Agency

[Original: English]
[1 June 2010]

1. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a comprehensive plan for strengthening nuclear security, including preventing acquisition by non-State actors of nuclear material that can be used to develop nuclear explosive devices. For effective assistance and coordination, the Agency has expanded the use of Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans, which serve as a reference and framework for implementing nuclear security activities in States.

2. With the aim of assessing the status of States’ technical and administrative arrangements for nuclear security, the Agency continued to offer advisory service missions, fact-finding missions and technical visits. Fourteen advisory service missions were carried out in 2009.

3. The Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) is the Agency’s information system on incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and other radioactive material. It continued to expand in terms of the membership, now numbering 110. As at 31 December 2009, States had reported and otherwise confirmed 1,801 incidents to ITDB.

4. Support for the development of nuclear security education and training continued to be a priority. The Agency continued to provide nuclear security training to improve and expand the practical nuclear security skills of technical and non-technical personnel in States. In all, 1,275 trainees from 120 countries participated in the 51 training events held during 2009.

5. The Agency also continued its involvement in projects to secure, through repatriation, highly enriched uranium (HEU) research reactor fuel. In 2009, it assisted in the shipment of more than 225 kg of spent HEU fuel as well as 18.9 kg of fresh HEU fuel to the Russian Federation.

6. Publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) are designed to help States establish a coherent nuclear security infrastructure in line with the international legal framework for nuclear security, and to identify best practices for
nuclear security. In 2009, the Agency published two NSS implementing guides: *Development, Use and Maintenance of the Design Basis Threat* and *Security of Radioactive Sources*.

7. During 2009, the Agency’s Nuclear Security Equipment Laboratory continued to provide technical support to States in their national efforts to establish effective border controls. It provided 471 pieces of equipment to States to improve detection and response capabilities.

8. Following the successful implementation of previous projects to assist States in ensuring the nuclear security of major public events, the Agency continued discussions on nuclear security for future major public events to take place in China (2010 Shanghai EXPO), South Africa (2010 World Cup), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (2012 Olympics) and Poland and Ukraine (2012 Eurocup).


**International Civil Aviation Organization**

[Original: English]

[22 June 2010]

1. A number of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) provisions are intended to prevent aircraft hijackings, and hence events in which aircraft could be used as weapons of destruction. Provisions in Annex 17, Security, to the Convention on International Civil Aviation were updated and strengthened in March 2010. Amendment 12 to Annex 17 is expected to become applicable in 2011. ICAO has also adopted a comprehensive strategy for enhancing aviation security that recognizes the need to proactively address potential threats to civil aviation. It continues to promote travel document security through implementation of its Machine Readable Travel Documents Programme, to conduct mandatory security audits of ICAO member States, and to provide States with assistance in developing and maintaining a viable and sustainable aviation security system under its Implementation Support and Development Programme.

2. The ICAO Aviation Security Point of Contact Network, established as a secure means of exchanging sensitive security information, had the participation of nearly 100 States as at 20 May 2010.

3. A diplomatic conference will be held in China in 2010 to finalize and adopt two draft legal instruments, which will criminalize, inter alia, the act of using civil aircraft in service as a weapon, the act of using biological, chemical and nuclear weapons (BCN weapons) from civil aircraft to attack such aircraft or other targets on the ground, and the act of the unlawful transport by air of any BCN weapon.

* The full text of the information provided by the International Aviation Organization is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (http://www.un.org/disarmament). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.
International Maritime Organization*

[Original: English]
[18 March 2010]

International Maritime Organization (IMO) measures do not explicitly focus on “preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction” but on maintaining the security of the ship at all times to prevent its use for a terrorist purpose.

Maritime security is an integral part of the responsibilities of IMO. A comprehensive security regime for international shipping entered into force on 1 July 2004. The mandatory security measures, adopted in December 2002, include amendments to the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, the most far-reaching of which (chapter XI-2) incorporates by reference the new International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code), which contains detailed security-related requirements for Governments, port authorities and shipping companies in a mandatory section (part A), together with a series of guidelines about how to meet these requirements in a non-mandatory section (part B).

The purpose of the Code is to provide a standardized, consistent framework for evaluating risk, enabling Governments to offset changes in threat level with changes in vulnerability level for ships and port facilities.

The Maritime Safety Committee is continuously working on additional elements of and guidance for the mandatory requirements, that is, ship security alert systems, long-range identification and tracking of ships, control and compliance measures, training and certification of security officers, and so on.

Among the unlawful acts covered by the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation are the seizure of ships by force; acts of violence against persons on board ships; and the placing of devices on board a ship that are likely to destroy or damage it.

The 2005 Protocol to the 1998 Convention adds a new article which significantly expands the list of offences and includes those involving use of a ship for transport of a weapon of mass destruction (and certain dual-use materials) and those committed with what is generally understood to be a “terrorist motive”.


United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

[Original: English]
[20 May 2010]

Pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolution 2005/19 and recent General Assembly resolutions, in particular resolutions 64/118 and 64/177, the

* The full text of the information provided by the International Maritime Organization is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (http://www.un.org/disarmament). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.
Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is giving focused attention to nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological terrorism, as part of its ongoing technical assistance delivery on the criminal justice aspects of countering terrorism. The Branch is working in close cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and with other specialized bodies such as the expert staff of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

In 2009, several specialized regional activities were undertaken, including a workshop on nuclear terrorism for the States members of GUAM, held in Kyiv on 22 and 23 July and attended by participants from Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, and a workshop on the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, held in Buenos Aires on 2 and 4 June and attended by participants from Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). The Branch also organized, together with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, a workshop for Central Asian countries on non-proliferation and international legal cooperation against biological, chemical and nuclear terrorism, held in Ashgabat on 2 and 3 December, attended by participants from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

The Branch also continued in 2009 to undertake national-level activities, including a legislative drafting workshop on the criminal law aspects of the universal legal framework against nuclear terrorism, held in Armenia (16 to 20 February), and national training workshops on the 2005 international instruments, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, in the Sudan (14 to 16 April) and Tunisia (2 and 3 December).

The Branch is also in the process of preparing a comprehensive legal training curriculum for criminal justice practitioners, of which one module is devoted to nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological terrorism.

UNODC received observer status with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in August 2009 and was asked by the co-chairs to contribute to the work of the Global Initiative on legal issues.

UNODC also co-organized, together with IAEA, the International Symposium on Nuclear Security, from 30 March to 3 April 2009, and co-chaired the meeting on the elaboration of nuclear security recommendations related to the detection of and response to criminal and unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control (23 to 27 March).

The Branch also enhanced its cooperation with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, including through participation in the International Seminar on National Implementation of Non-proliferation Obligations, held in Jahorina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, on 22 and 23 June 2009.

As in previous years, the Branch also worked closely together with the International School of Nuclear Law, in Montpellier, France.
B. Other international organizations

Caribbean Community*

[Original: English]
[18 June 2010]

1. Caribbean Community (CARICOM) members have been parties to and have consistently urged compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

2. The long-standing commitment of CARICOM to the principle of multilateralism in facing the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction has been underscored by the ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by all CARICOM members and, more recently, the undertaking of a regional initiative aimed at fully implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The CARICOM-Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) implementation initiative, which is the first such effort in any region to collectively implement a non-proliferation mandate, demonstrates CARICOM’s understanding of the urgency of the threat of the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and the need to pool resources in facing this present challenge.

3. In the past year, the CARICOM secretariat has co-sponsored a maritime security and export controls workshop in support of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in Jamaica, and CARICOM members have hosted several forums aimed at advancing the global non-proliferation agenda. These include a counter-terrorism committees subregional meeting in Saint Kitts and Nevis sponsored by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), a bioterrorism assessment and training seminar in Trinidad and Tobago with the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), a Caribbean subregional workshop on best practices in port security in the Bahamas as well as in Trinidad and Tobago, and a specialized legal workshop on the prevention of and fight against terrorism and its financing for the Caribbean subregion, in Saint Kitts and Nevis.

4. The CARICOM secretariat has also been engaged in other counter-terrorism/combating the financing of terrorism capacity-building for CARICOM members in collaboration with UNODC/Organization of American States-CICTE at workshops in Saint Kitts and Nevis and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

5. The CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), the CARICOM institution at the centre of the regional security framework, has also engaged in programmes related to counter-terrorism. This includes the operation of the Advance Passenger Information System, the provision of regional intelligence capabilities and the conduct of training courses relevant to counter-terrorism capacity.

* The full text of the information provided by the Caribbean Community is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (http://www.un.org/disarmament). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.
6. With respect to future non-proliferation measures, it is recommended that more emphasis be placed on programmes such as the CARICOM-Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) initiative, which focus on dual-use interventions to ensure that the measures taken to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction also address the perennial security challenges of illegal drugs and arms trafficking faced by CARICOM members.

**Collective Security Treaty Organization**

[Original: Russian]  
[28 April 2010]

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) attaches the highest priority to urgent issues relating to coordinating and integrating the efforts of CSTO member States to counter international terrorism and extremism and is a principled and consistent advocate of adopting effective international measures to vigorously oppose the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their components and means of delivery.

The statement on policy matters in the area of non-proliferation made by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the CSTO member States on 12 November 2004 welcomes the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and expresses the hope that it will help to strengthen existing international mechanisms and regimes for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

CSTO expressed its concern at attempts to weaken the regime for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the statement made on 18 June 2004 by the Heads of CSTO member States, the declaration made on 6 October 2007 by the Heads of CSTO member States in connection with the fifteenth anniversary of the Collective Security Treaty, and the declaration made on 5 September 2008 by the Moscow session of the CSTO Collective Security Council.

On 14 June 2009, the Heads of CSTO member States signed a statement in which they called on all countries to contribute to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free world and emphasized that they supported the universalization and comprehensive strengthening of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which should be the basis for addressing challenges to international security posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the possibility of non-State entities gaining access to nuclear materials.

The CSTO Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in a statement adopted on 25 March 2010 in connection with the holding of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, noted the need to develop an agreed package of measures to enhance the effectiveness of the Treaty.

In a decision of 22 June 2006, the CSTO Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs adopted a document on the main areas for cooperation between CSTO member States in detecting and preventing illicit trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials.

The Plan includes measures to enhance coordination and planning for the response to terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, or nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological or other potentially deadly materials.

Cooperation between CSTO member States for detecting and preventing illicit trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials has been discussed on a regular basis at consultative meetings of experts. The most recent of these meetings took place in April 2009, when experts from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and other interested ministries and departments of CSTO member States discussed the possibility of establishing a mechanism for operational cooperation between CSTO member States for the detection and prevention of illegal movements of weapons of mass destruction.

Steps are also being taken to ensure practical cooperation among member States of the Organization in that area. In September 2006, an exercise entitled “Atom-Antiterror 2006” was held in the Republic of Armenia in partnership with the Counter-Terrorism Centre of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In the course of the exercise, a number of issues were resolved in connection with joint actions to free hostages and neutralize terrorists at a nuclear power facility.

The decision to create a CSTO collective operational response force (CORF) was a major step towards establishing a comprehensive collective security system that can respond to the challenges of the times. This decision was taken on 4 February 2009 at a special session of the Collective Security Council. In addition to providing military security, it is planned that the response force will participate in actions to combat international terrorism and illicit trafficking in narcotics, psychotropic substances and their precursors, weapons and ammunition, in addition to other forms of cross-border crime. It will also take part in activities to protect the public from danger arising during or as a result of military operations, and provide emergency response and emergency humanitarian assistance.

Practical testing of the response force took place in the course of the exercises conducted in Kazakhstan in September 2009 and the effectiveness of the regulatory and legal framework governing its activities was also verified.

**Commission of the African Union**

[Original: English]

[6 April 2010]

The threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the possibility of terrorists acquiring access to such weapons is a major concern for the African Union. This is demonstrated in the preamble of the Protocol to the Organization of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2004), in which the Heads of State and Government of the member States of the African Union expressed their grave concern at the increasing incidence of terrorist acts worldwide, including in Africa, and the growing risks of linkages between terrorism and mercenarism, weapons of mass destruction, and so on, thus recognizing the increasing risk associated with access by terrorists to weapons of mass destruction. It further calls, in its article 3 (f), on States parties to commit themselves and to undertake, among other things, to strengthen national and regional measures in conformity with relevant continental and international
conventions and treaties, to prevent the perpetrators of terrorist acts from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

The African Union promotes positive developments and trends so as to create a positive climate to pursue further the goals of General Assembly resolution 64/38, on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and to achieve a world free from nuclear weapons and terrorism.

The determination of Africa to renounce weapons of mass destruction is constant. One recent illustration of this, without any doubt, is the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), which entered into force in July 2009. The Treaty shows the determination of African States to denuclearize the continent and establish a zone free of nuclear weapons through a series of commitments and measures.

It is also important to mention that Africa is very much active in banning chemical weapons. This is evident in view of the dynamism of the 50 African members of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and their participation in the various programmes initiated by the organization, particularly those relating to the peaceful use of chemistry. The African Union has been exploring closer cooperation with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, with which the African Union has a memorandum of understanding.

The African Union is sparing no effort to encourage those of its members that have not yet ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction to do so, as the spread of biological weapons would affect Africa.

It is also important to mention that the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established to assist the African Union member States in the implementation of the Organization of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, the counter-terrorism universal instruments and to strengthen the capacity of Member States to deal with issues relating to the prevention and combating of terrorism, including denying terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction. Its most notable activities include:

(a) Within its programme of development of technical expertise for the detection and neutralization of explosives, ACSRT is developing a set of modules that will focus on weapon of mass destruction attacks, incident management and pre- and post-incident interdepartmental coordination;

(b) ACSRT is developing a programme for enhancing the border control capacity of African Union member States, in particular their capacity to detect nuclear, chemical and biological weapons;

(c) ACSRT will also pursue the contacts made with the International Criminal Police Organization-INTERPOL, particularly in the context of its bioterrorism prevention programme, for the establishment of an awareness programme for African States on the prevention of the bioterrorism threat.
Commonwealth of Independent States*

[Original: Russian]
[25 May 2010]

Given the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction for terrorist purposes, the member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are taking measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring such weapons.

The database of the specialized units of CIS member States contains information on persons and organizations who intend to commit or have committed crimes involving nuclear, chemical and biological weapons or their components. This information is subjected to analysis.

Under the CIS programme of cooperation in combating terrorism and other violent manifestations of extremism for 2008-2010, coordinated and/or joint activities are being carried out which are designed to suppress the illegal manufacture of and trafficking in highly dangerous chemical, biological and radioactive substances.

Within the CIS, cooperation among States to prevent radiation and nuclear terrorism primarily involves harmonization of their legal frameworks.

Accordingly, the Joint Commission for Harmonizing Legislation to Combat Terrorism, Crime and Drug Trafficking of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly is considering draft recommendations to harmonize and unify the legislation of CIS member States to combat manifestations of terrorism in the field of chemical and biological safety and security.

Issues relating to further development of cooperation between the special services of CIS countries for combating nuclear, radiological and biological terrorism are regularly considered at meetings of the CIS Council of Heads of Security Bodies and Special Services.

In September 2009, in Aktau, Republic of Kazakhstan, regulations were adopted on the organization of inter-agency cooperation to ensure security and safety for the transport of nuclear material along international routes. In Ekaterinburg, Russian Federation, on 1 and 2 June 2010, consideration was given to ways of improving cooperation between the agencies and special services of CIS member States in combating nuclear terrorism.

CIS is focusing on the scientific development of measures to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction for terrorist purposes.

In October 2009, an international scientific conference on the prevention of radiological terrorism was held in Moscow. The security bodies and special services of all CIS member States were represented, as were the CIS charter and other bodies and international organizations. At the conference, the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation demonstrated a training operation involving release of “hostages” and neutralization of “terrorists” who had seized special vehicles containing radioactive waste.

* The full text of the information provided by the Commonwealth of Independent States is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (http://www.un.org/disarmament). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.
The charter and sectoral bodies of CIS member States are making ongoing efforts to enhance their cooperation in the primary areas of international cooperation to ensure counter-terrorist security and anti-diversionary protection of high-priority, sensitive and military infrastructure facilities.

There is no evidence indicating widespread production or use by terrorists of the substances and materials referred to or of access to technologies for their manufacture in CIS member States.

INTERPOL

[Original: English]
[22 April 2010]

INTERPOL is the world’s largest international police organization which facilitates police cooperation even where diplomatic relations do not exist between particular countries.

Exploitation by terrorists of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials to maximize their criminal actions are of great concern. International terrorists are known to be pursuing such materials. The proliferation of such weapons further increases the risk of their becoming accessible to criminals. All current INTERPOL services can be used by the Government of member countries to assist in defeating illegal proliferation, to include projects strengthening border security, countering smuggling and combating terrorism.

CBRN terrorism poses a challenge that few agencies can prepare for alone. It is widely recognized that there are four key goals to an effective programme designed to counter the CBRN threat: prevention of an initial CBRN attack; the addressing of an attack that might occur; the prevention of follow-on attacks; and the bringing of such perpetrators to justice. To facilitate these goals, INTERPOL both follows and recommends the division of police counter-CBRN-threat programmes into four interrelated centres of excellence: intelligence, prevention programmes, response and operations, and training and exercises. Within this framework, INTERPOL currently offers many important services.

Prior to the dissemination of CBRN materials, INTERPOL supports services with available expertise in environmental crime, organized crime, countering fraudulent documents, suspect identification and terrorism, all areas in which a catastrophic CBRN plot may be uncovered and prevented. Upon discovery of an active CBRN threat, INTERPOL currently maintains the capability to deploy a rapid investigation team with CBRN expertise to the victim country. Post-dissemination, INTERPOL personnel have the knowledge to assist in substantive CBRN police response and investigative management and the facilitation of the movement of the necessary resources from member country to member country. Current INTERPOL assets include a seconded police executive with experience in CBRN operations, programme development and policy. INTERPOL maintains a dedicated radiological/nuclear analytical capability available to members through regular publication under the auspices of Project Geiger and the ability to devote further analytical assets to chemical and biological issues as needed. Prevention programming includes an aggressive bioterrorism train-the-trainer programme and participation in international efforts across the CBRN spectrum.
Future INTERPOL CBRN programme developments include the planned creation of a radiological and nuclear terrorism unit before the end of 2010 and a chemical terrorism unit before the end of 2012.

**League of Arab States**

[Original: Arabic]
[31 May 2010]

In order to comply with General Assembly resolutions on the control and limitation of documentation prepared by the Secretariat and the guidelines of the Secretary-General for reports drafted and/or compiled by the Secretariat, the reply received from the League of Arab States has not been reproduced, since it exceeded the acceptable page limit. The full text of the reply is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (http://www.un.org/disarmament).

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization***

[Original: English]
[1 June 2010]

The policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are rooted in the 1999 Strategic Concept and were reaffirmed in the Comprehensive Political Guidance of 2006. In this Political Guidance, allies expressed their concern that terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years, most seriously in the event of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction.

NATO calls for universal compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, universal adherence to the Additional Protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement and full compliance by all parties with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

Heads of State and Government also declared at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit that the Alliance remained deeply concerned about the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and related proliferation risks and called on the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions. It is also deeply concerned by the programmes and proliferation activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and calls on it to fully comply with relevant Security Council resolutions.

NATO has developed a multinational CBRN Defence Task Force. This high-readiness force serves to protect against, and respond to, any events involving CBRN materials.

NATO is finalizing a disease surveillance system which will enhance Alliance efforts to prevent and respond to any outbreaks of biological agents.

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* The full text of the information provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (http://www.un.org/disarmament). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.
To complement the disease surveillance system and operational capabilities, Centres of Excellence and training centres for Partnership for Peace nations exist. NATO has also recently developed a weapon of mass destruction Maritime Interdiction Operations course that takes place at the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations Training Centre in Souda Bay, Greece.

Through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and with other partners around the globe, NATO has deepened cooperation and information-sharing on threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and strengthened non-proliferation initiatives.

This provides an operational dimension to cooperation between Allies and partners in interdicting the illicit trafficking of weapon of mass destruction materials.

Defence against terrorism is one of three key priority areas under the NATO Science for Peace and Security programme, which supports security-related civil science and technology collaboration between NATO and partner countries. Between 2006 and 2009, 50 activities (workshops, team collaborations, training courses) have been completed under the programme in a range of CBRN-related areas.

**Oceania Customs Organization**

[Original: English]  
[23 May 2010]

The Oceania Customs Organization (OCO) recognizes the seriousness of the threat to our communities and peoples in the region posed by weapons of mass destruction and takes into account the efforts being made at the highest political and diplomatic levels to counter the threat.

The Oceania region, idyllic and peaceful, may seem not prone to these threats. However, we have witnessed recently island countries being used as transit points for drugs and dirty money. These developments raise security concerns to a new level, one that requires the cooperative effort of every law-enforcement agency in the region.

General Assembly resolution 64/38, on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, adds a new dimension to the work of OCO at the regional and national levels.

OCO has since 2004 been engaged in assisting member customs administrations undertake legislative reforms based on the regional customs model law that was developed in collaboration with the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat on the basis of concerns by Pacific leaders that some legislations were outdated and lacked a mandate for customs authorities to enforce border and security responsibilities. This is currently ongoing and provides powers to customs officers to detain, investigate and prosecute persons who may be engaged in transnational criminal activities.

Through the existing cooperation arrangement of OCO with the World Customs Organization (WCO) through the WCO Regional Office for Capacity-Building for the Asia-Pacific Region, the organization has been able to provide
training in specific areas, such as the WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade and developing integrity frameworks for a majority of the non-WCO members in the region, which would otherwise have been disadvantaged by their non-membership.

OCO has been fortunate enough this year to coordinate a training workshop and a national implementation training with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the region for States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, for which we are grateful, and we believe that such cooperation should continue, given the current constraints on financial and technical resources faced by OCO with respect to the delivery of such training to other administrations in the region.

OCO will continue to play its role in working closely with other law enforcement agencies in the region in combating transnational organized crime.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons*

[Original: English]
[31 May 2010]

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), within the clear boundaries of its mandate, continues to contribute to the international community’s efforts in the area of counter-terrorism. This has been undertaken both through the promotion of the full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, as agreed by the OPCW Executive Council in 2001 (EC-XXVII/DEC5, dated 7 December 2001), and in the context of cooperation with the United Nations.

The Technical Secretariat has continued to offer its support to the Council’s Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism, which serves as a forum for sharing information and best practices among member States, as well as for substantive discussions on the issue of the OPCW contribution to the global efforts in this field. The Open-Ended Working Group provides valuable guidance to the secretariat in its activities and contacts on these issues.

On 8 February 2010, the secretariat issued a note by the Director-General on the Status of the OPCW contribution to global anti-terrorism efforts (EC-59/DG.11). The note includes information on relevant decisions by the OPCW policymaking organs and activities of the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism. It also includes the activities undertaken by the secretariat pursuant to the aforementioned decisions and in collaboration both with States parties and with relevant international organizations. Furthermore, the note outlines cooperation with the United Nations, and presents contacts and cooperation the secretariat has had with international bodies in the field of counter-terrorism.

On 22 April 2010, at its sixtieth session, the Council considered and noted the note by the Director-General on the status of the OPCW contribution to global anti-terrorism efforts. The Council welcomed the various efforts made to date.

* The full text of the information provided by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (http://www.un.org/disarmament). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.
OPCW is encouraged by the explicit recognition of its role in the global anti-terrorism efforts being undertaken by the United Nations, as defined in the yearly General Assembly resolution entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”. The resolution states that “the full and effective implementation of all provisions of the Convention, including those on national implementation (article VII) and assistance and protection [against chemical weapons] (article X), constitutes an important contribution to the efforts of the United Nations in the global fight against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations” (General Assembly resolution 64/46).

Following concerns expressed at both the First and Second Review Conferences that chemical facilities may become subject to attacks or other incidents that could lead to the release or theft of toxic chemicals, the secretariat encourages States parties to exchange experiences and discuss related issues. OPCW also contributes to enhancing the security of chemical facilities by developing the role of the organization as a platform of support for global cooperation in lessening the chemical threat by promoting awareness of chemical security best practices and by fostering cooperation between chemical professionals.

**World Customs Organization**

[Original: English]  
[3 May 2010]

The secretariat of the World Customs Organization (WCO) focuses its activities in the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on three main areas:

- The provision of information to customs services via the Customs Enforcement Network (CEN), a platform giving access to seizure information, alert messages, national reports, and specifically on the latest development in non-intrusive inspection and detection technology via the WCO databank on advanced technology, accessible via the WCO members’ website. Both the contents of CEN and the databank on advanced technology are updated on an ongoing basis.

- The provision of a secure/encrypted communication platform for participants (not restricted to customs only) for the exchange of sensitive information in bilateral and multilateral control operations (CENcomm), supported by preformatted and tailor-made messages. In 2009, CENcomm was used to implement Operation Early Bird, an export-control operation in Europe on dual-use goods. The CENcomm platform is available for future operations of this nature.

- The implementation of the WCO SAFE Framework of Standards, a comprehensive strategy building on a set of customs-to-customs and customs-to-business standards to enhance security in the international trade supply chain. Its key elements cover, inter alia, a consistent risk-management approach to address security threats, the advance electronic transfer of cargo information, risk-targeting methodologies, use of non-intrusive inspection/detection technology, and the promotion of strong customs-business
partnership cooperation. As the implementation of the SAFE Framework of Standards is an ambitions and complex task, the WCO secretariat is continually promoting and monitoring the progress made by its members in implementing the Framework and its related measures through regular meetings, workshops and seminar and by means of implementation surveys.

As a general principle, the WCO secretariat is striving to cooperate with all competent institutions of the public sector and partners in the business community to make optimum use of the competencies and facilities available in implementing its programmes, projects and other operational activities.