Mr. Chairman,

My delegation would like to join previous speakers in congratulating you on your election as the Chairman of this Committee. Our congratulations also go to the other members of the Bureau. We are confident that under your competent leadership we will be able to achieve significant results in our work. Let me assure my delegation's full cooperation with you during the work of the First Committee.

Mr. Chairman,

Georgia welcomes the positive developments of this year, including the outcome of the NPT Review Conference, the Washington Nuclear Security Summit and the signing of the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; as well as the Arms Trade Treaty process. We hope that by these events the momentum in global arms control and disarmament will re-gain its continuity and appropriately meet the needs for general disarmament. We hope that the major challenges still present in the fields of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control, will be dealt comprehensively through combined efforts by the international community.

The NPT represents the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, nuclear disarmament and the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Georgia welcomes the adoption by consensus of the final document of the 2010 Review Conference and reassures the international community of its full readiness to support the implementation of the Action Plan it contains.
Another vital instrument which contributes to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We believe that the treaty should enter into force in the nearest future. Renewed political commitments to pursue its ratification, in particular by CTBT Annex 2 States Indonesia and the USA, give us solid grounds for optimism. On its part Georgia continues to actively cooperate with the CTBTO Provisional Technical Secretariat to strengthen the monitoring and verification system.

The Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons is the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. Georgia stands ready to fully cooperate with member States in order to ensure successful outcome of the BTWC Review Conference in 2011.

The Chemical Weapons Convention, sui generis among disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, as it completely bans an entire category of weapons of mass destruction in a verifiable manner, has an essential role to play in preventing the risks posed by chemical weapons. Georgia supports the OPCW and is ready to actively contribute to the efforts aimed at meeting those goals.

Mr. Chairman,

Last year we commended the work of the Conference on Disarmament, which after a decade of stalemate, agreed on a Programme of Work. We considered it as a positive development. As it turned out in 2010, it was yet too early to celebrate revitalisation of the CD. Georgia like other delegations strongly believes that the CD, to regain its credibility, should resume its negotiating role as soon as possible. In this regard, we welcome the recent High-Level Meeting aimed at giving new momentum to the multilateral disarmament negotiations within the CD. Georgia supports the UN Secretary General in his call for action.

As many speakers in this hall emphasized, the illicit manufacture, accumulation, transfer and flow of small arms and light weapons remains to be one of the most challenging items on the international security agenda. Georgia reaffirms its commitment to play its role in the prevention and combating of illicit trade in and excessive accumulation of SALW, and strongly supports the full implementation of the UN Programme of Action. We are looking forward to actively contributing to the 2012 Review Conference.

We have had a chance on a number of occasions to express our full support to the International Arms Trade Treaty initiative. Indeed, this mechanism must be considered as an effective instrument in the field of non-proliferation of conventional arms. In this regard, we fully support the position expressed by many delegations that the measures to prevent the trafficking in conventional weapons can be effective if they are coupled with rigorous transfer controls on the legal arms trade. This is why Georgia is fully committed to the negotiation of an
Arms Trade Treaty. In that, the July session of the Preparatory Committee was an encouraging start for ATT negotiating process eventually leading to a legally binding international instrument.

Mr. Chairman,

Preventing the risk of nuclear terrorism, the need for compliance with obligations under United Nations Security council Resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2009) and improving security for high radioactive sources is one of the main priorities of Georgia. My country joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and continues to support consolidating efforts of the international community to combat illicit acquisition, use or transportation of nuclear materials and radioactive substances.

The fact that in recent years there were several attempts of nuclear smuggling via Georgian territories uncontrolled by the central authorities further amplify the sense of danger. These attempts were prevented by the Georgian law enforcement authorities. It should be noted though that these smuggling attempts occurred in the time when there were some international control mechanisms on those territories. In the absence of the international presence in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia, due to the foreign occupation it has become impossible to conduct any type of verification activities there and thus the risk of these regions of Georgia becoming smugglers paradise for nuclear materials has tremendously increased.

Existence of so called white spots and occupied territories, where international control mechanisms are either very weak or non-existent, creates fertile ground for illicit transfer and/or sale of conventional arms, their accumulation, as well as the illegal transit of weapons of mass destruction and its materials, including nuclear materials.

As I spoke about the failed attempts to use occupied territories of Georgia for smuggling of radioactive and nuclear materials, allow me few words on the risk of conventional arms proliferation through these territories. As you are aware, huge amount of armaments is being accumulated in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia. As long as international control mechanisms are totally absent in those territories due to the foreign occupation, there are no guaranties whatsoever that these arms, including most dangerous ones like MANPAD, for example, would not be transferred to various terrorists and criminal groups, which would pose serious threat not only to one particular region but to the whole international community.

At the beginning of this session of the First Committee we heard statements on comprehensive nature of modern security doctrines. We heard statements on its indivisibility and its universal application to all States irrespective of their size. These are encouraging statements.

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believe that this approach goes the right way since it corresponds to the future of mankind, its aspiration for peaceful and prosperous life within one's own recognized borders without fear of being the subject of threat of force and illegal occupation.

Within this context I would like to take this opportunity and draw your attention to the security situation in my country. Presently our northern neighbour continues its illegal military build-up in two occupied regions of my country. Instead of being closed down the illegal military bases are being reinforced by additional personnel and equipment, such as S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems, to cite just one example of many. Overall, there are up to 10,000 occupation troops located in these two regions and six military bases, including one naval base, are presently under construction. While we are talking of construction let me also inform the Committee that the occupying country just completed the concrete wall along the whole division line between the two occupied territories and the rest of Georgia.

At the same time we have heard about the need to establish new security architecture from the representatives of this occupying country; country which is still challenging existing universal security arrangements; country that fails to implement its obligations undertaken vis-à-vis the international community; country which continues to grossly violate the UN Charter, norms and principles of the international law, and the six point agreement, brokered by the European Union. We believe that the implementation of existing obligations must be a necessary precondition for proposing new European security architecture or any meaningful discussion thereof. That is unless under the "new security architecture" its authors mean building new dividing walls. But let me remind everybody that one wall in Europe was already rejected by the civilized world, rejected resolutely and unequivocally.

Mr. Chairman,

We are convinced that in these circumstances, it is an appropriate time for the international community to stand up for the principles enshrined in the UN charter. Georgia considers the First Committee a fundamental body to be seized not only with elaborating initiatives and ideas for addressing existing problems in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament but also with most critical issues related to international and national security.

Thank you.