STATEMENT

BY

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THE ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE
OF THE 65TH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

ON THE ISSUES OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
AND SUBMISSION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION
«BILATERAL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS AND THE
NEW STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK»

New York, 15 October 2010
Distinguished Mr. Chairman,

This forum meets today against the background of increasing positive trends progress in the area of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. These are, first of all, the signing in April this year of the new Russian–American Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, a successful Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and considerable multilateral efforts undertaken in order to launch substantive work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

The Russian Federation, being aware of its special responsibility as a nuclear power for fulfilling the obligations under Article VI of the NPT, continues in the spirit of good will the in-depth, irreversible and verifiable reductions of its nuclear potential.

An important step in this direction – the new the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms - replaces one of the most historically significant disarmament agreements, i.e. the US-Soviet Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) of 31 July 1991 that expired on 4 December 2009.

The provisions of the new Treaty stipulate that each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms so that seven years after its entry into force and thereafter the aggregate numbers do not exceed:

- 700 for deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers;
- 1,550 for warheads on them;
- 800 for deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs, and heavy bombers. This limit brings deployed and non-deployed launchers, as well as heavy bombers into the legal scope of the Treaty. It allows restraining the upload potential of the Parties (i.e. the capability of rapid increase in number of their
deployed warheads in crisis situations) and creates an additional impetus for elimination or conversion of strategic offensive arms subject to reductions.

Thereby, Russia and the US have clearly demonstrated once again their commitment to substantial reductions of strategic offensive arms. The Parties have agreed to cut down by one third the aggregate numbers of warheads (the 2,200 ceiling under the Moscow Treaty) and by more than a half the aggregate limit of strategic delivery vehicles (1,600 delivery vehicles under the START Treaty with no limits for delivery vehicles under the Moscow Treaty).

While negotiating the new START, we had in mind that nuclear disarmament was impossible without taking into account the developments in the field of strategic defensive arms, and that there was no existing limits on the deployment of strategic missile defense systems. The defensive systems, in particular, the missile defense, can play both stabilizing and destabilizing roles. The establishment of such systems on a block basis may lead to the emergence of new strategic dividing lines and increase tension in relations between the States.

With the entry into force of the new START, the Treaty between the US and Russia on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) of 24 May 2002 will be no longer effective.

The Treaty has been submitted for ratification. In Russia all necessary ratification procedures are being implemented in due course. We expect to maintain parallel consideration of the Treaty by Russian and American legislators.

During this session together with our negotiation partners from the United States we submit a draft resolution entitled "Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework". We hope that the draft resolution will be widely supported and adopted by consensus.

Mr. Chairman,

Deep reductions in strategic offensive arms undertaken by Russia and the USA lead to a qualitative change in the situation in the field of nuclear disarmament. The narrowing numeric gap between stockpiles of our countries and the other P-5
members creates a need for other states possessing nuclear weapons to gradually join the disarmament efforts of Russia and the United States.

At the same time, we believe that nuclear disarmament should not be limited exclusively to the efforts of the States Parties to the NPT. At a certain stage further progress in disarmament will simply not be possible without the engagement of other states.

Also, the signing of new START has brought us to a point where considerable lowering of nuclear capabilities makes deeper reductions impossible without due regard to all other processes in the area of international security. Further steps towards nuclear disarmament should be considered and implemented in strict compliance with the principle of equal and indivisible security and taking into account all factors capable of affecting strategic stability. In particular, such factors include the development of regional missile-defense systems without taking into consideration the security of neighboring states, possibility of placing weapons in outer space, development of strategic delivery vehicles in non-nuclear configuration, unilateral build-up in strategic missile-defense capabilities, growing imbalance of forces in the area of conventional arms, deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear states etc.

The interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms that is becoming more important as strategic offensive arms are reduced is vital for strengthening strategic stability. We call for a broad international dialogue on missile-defense issues. Our goal is to establish a collective system to respond to missile-related challenges by countering missile proliferation and preventing the existing missile-related challenges from turning into real missile-related threats, as well as eliminating these threats through, primarily, political, diplomatic and economic measures.

Mr. Chairman,

One of the determining issues in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament has become the successful outcome of the 2010 NPT Review
Conference. In the course of the Conference the most important thing was reiterated – the NPT remains the cornerstone of the international security system, constraining the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and facilitating progress in nuclear disarmament as well as the development of international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. All the challenges to the regime which appeared lately can and must be addressed on the basis of the NPT.

We consider it extremely important that for the first time in 10 years States-Parties to the Treaty sent a strong political signal on its unity in supporting the NPT norms and their readiness to undertake practical steps to strengthen it upon its all three fundamental pillars on the basis of the balanced Action Plan approved by the Conference.

It is imperative now as never before that nuclear disarmament initiatives would not be left on paper but translated into practical steps. For instance, the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) should become an essential step towards nuclear disarmament. All relevant conditions are in place taking into account positive signals coming from the US about the change in its attitude to this Treaty. We insistently call on all countries, and especially those whose accession to the CTBT is necessary for its entry into force, to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. The voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests, though significant as a measure, cannot substitute the relevant legal obligations.

We would also like to remind about our proposal for rendering the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) global.

We consider the task of global intensifying the multilateral disarmament process as the urgent one. In this connection we welcome considerable efforts being undertaken including under the auspices of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in order to launch substantive work of the Conference on Disarmament.

We are convinced that all relevant conditions are in place.
We are looking forward to the earliest launching of negotiations on banning the production of weapons-grade fissile material at the CD within a balanced program of work of the Conference.

Distinguished Mr. Chairman,

Russia actively contributes to the process of establishing in the world of Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones (NWFZ) as an important instrument for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as facilitating the process of nuclear disarmament and increasing the level of regional and international security. We note in this connection an important role of the Guidelines adopted in 1999 by the UN Disarmament Commission which provide, i.e., legal terms for such NWFZ.

We reiterate our support for the 2009 entry into force of the Semipalatinsk Treaty establishing a NWFZ in Central Asia and the Treaty of Pelindaba establishing a NWFZ in Africa. We would like to inform that Russia is now implementing internal legal procedures necessary for ratifying Protocols I and II to the Pelindaba Treaty.

I would also like to draw your attention specifically to the need to find ways to strengthen the nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) non-proliferation regime in the Middle East. The NPT Review Conference held in May has managed -for the first time since the adoption of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East - to agree on concrete steps that lay the foundation for a mechanism to start implementing in practice the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means in this region. Being a co-author of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East Russia is satisfied that these steps are based on the ideas and proposals that we had put forward earlier (convening a conference, appointment of a special coordinator, possible confidence-building measures in the region).

Mr. Chairman,
One should not forget about the indissoluble interrelation of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It is necessary that all the States strictly abide by their non-proliferation obligations under the NPT.

We attach great importance to increasing the efficiency of the IAEA verification activities. We consider the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement to be an efficient instrument aimed at increasing the Agency's capabilities in this field. In prospect the Additional Protocol together with the Safeguards Agreement should become a universally recognized norm of verification of compliance by the NPT State Parties with their non-proliferation obligations as well as an essential new standard in the field of nuclear export control.

We intend to further contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA Safeguards system, including through the national system of Safeguards support. Starting from July 1, 2010 the IAEA Safeguards have been applied to nuclear material of the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) in Angarsk. This is a milestone event as far as never before have the IAEA Safeguards been applied to any enrichment facility in our country.

Russia also stands for the universalization of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and involvement of new countries in the multilateral efforts implemented within the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The existing non-proliferation "safety net" that we have been creating for many years should be consistently strengthened.

We note the importance of the UN SC Resolution 1540 in the context of global non-proliferation efforts. We stand for the full implementation of its provisions by all countries while taking into account the comprehensive and long-term nature of the tasks set by it. In this regard, serious efforts should be made to determine the scope of a new resolution on the extension of mandate of the UN SC 1540 Committee (to expire in April 2011), as well as benchmarks for the further development of this process. The Russian side is prepared to do it.
It is important for us while moving along the non-proliferation track to create conditions to establish a proliferation-resistant architecture of international cooperation in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which would ensure the inalienable right of all interested States to develop nuclear energy. We are convinced that multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should become the basis for such an architecture. This is the aim of the 2006 Russian President’s global nuclear infrastructure initiative which includes the establishment of international centers providing nuclear fuel cycle services.

The first practical step towards its realization has become the establishment in 2007 by Russia together with Kazakhstan of the IUEC in Angarsk. Armenia and Ukraine have already been participating in the work of the Center. Our initiative is open for all other States developing nuclear energy and abiding by their non-proliferation obligations to accede. Participation in the IUEC does not require the States-Parties to refuse establishing «sensitive» elements of the nuclear fuel cycle but provides with the alternative to the development of such elements at the national level.

Moreover, in response to the IAEA Director General initiative Russia has proposed to establish at its expense at the IUEC a reserve of low-enriched uranium (LEU) under control of the IAEA. The aim of this reserve is to help countries that have faced fuel supply disruptions not related to the commercial reasons. Upon the IAEA Board of Governors resolution adopted in November 2009, on March 29, 2010 a respective Agreement was signed between Russia and the IAEA.

Distinguished Mr. Chairman,

The Russian Federation is disposed to constructive cooperation with all States in order to tackle the issues of disarmament, non-proliferation and ensuring international security, as well as consolidating the role of the UN in this field. We call upon all interested States sharing the noble goal of reaching the world free of nuclear weapons to join our efforts.

Thank you for your attention.