Statement by Mr. Reza Najafi  
Director for Disarmament and International Security  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
On “Nuclear Weapons”  
At the Thematic Discussion of the 66th Session of the First Committee  
New York, 13 October 2011  

In The Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful  

Mr. Chairman,  
The continued existence of thousands of deployed and non-deployed strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons around the world continues to seriously threaten the international peace and security and the very survival of human civilization. While there is no pretext to justify the possession of nuclear weapons in the hands of any country, it is a source of grave concern that certain Nuclear-Weapon-States still continue to allocate billions of dollars to develop new types of nuclear weapons, build new nuclear weapons production facilities and modernize and replace such weapons. Equally, those countries, in contravention of their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, continue to resort to obsolete nuclear deterrence policy and promote the role and status of nuclear weapons in their defense and security doctrines. It is ironic that instead of committing their unconditional security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon-States parties to the NPT given at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, certain Nuclear-Weapon-States like France motivated by cold war thinking has made irrational statements of threatening against non-nuclear weapon States.  

Furthermore, NATO, in an unwelcome action, by adopting its new “Strategic Concept” in its Lisbon Summit in 2010, explicitly stating that “NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance” recognized that “The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.” By doing so, NATO Member States maintained the rational for the use of nuclear weapons which is a clear setback to nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons and a violation of their legal obligations under the NPT and the commitments agreed by its Nuclear-Weapon-States at the successive Review Conferences of the Treaty since 1995.

*Mr. Chairman,*

While in accordance with Article I of the NPT, "each Nuclear-Weapon-State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient, whatsoever, nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly", contrary to this obligation, hundreds of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery have been and are still being deployed in other countries in Europe and air forces of Non-Nuclear-Weapon-States have been trained to deliver these weapons under the cover of military alliances. The 2010 "Nuclear Posture Review" of the USA which has clearly confessed the deployment of US nuclear weapons in the territories of the European Union is tantamount to a serious case of non-compliance under the NPT.

The other area of concern is the growing trend of nuclear sharing by Nuclear-Weapon-States. Sharing nuclear weapons information among Nuclear-Weapon-States, particularly between UK and France, as well as transferring nuclear weapons information and materials to non-parties to the NPT is clear case of non-compliance with the NPT. Nuclear-Weapon-States, especially US, UK and France, instead of threatening others and crying wolf at other countries' behavior, shall fully comply with their obligations under Article I of the Treaty by refraining from nuclear-sharing, under any pretext, including security arrangements or military alliance. Additionally, by maintaining their nuclear arsenals and their horizontal proliferation through the transfer of nuclear technologies and weapons-grade materials to non-parties to the Treaty, these Nuclear-Weapon-States have also contributed to the emergence of new nuclear weapons possessors. Such measures are in clear violation of their obligations under the NPT and their unequivocal commitments agreed upon at its Review Conferences in 1995, 2000 and 2010.

Certain western countries in particular the United States and France are non-compliant parties with their obligations under the NPT by continuing nuclear-sharing with the Zionist regime, which constitute an act of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. France covertly has also provided that regime with all kinds of missile technology and materials to promote its capacity in delivering weapons of mass destruction. According to international experts, Jericho-1 Ballistic missile of the Zionist regime is based on the French missile MD-600. Now it is ironic that France cried wolf in this Committee about the proliferation of missiles in the region.

*Mr. Chairman,*

We stress that the NPT is the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, and the full implementation of the Treaty in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner would safeguard the world from the potential devastation of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, as a result
of the blatant violations, by certain Nuclear-Weapon-States, of their obligations under the Treaty, its integrity has been endangered, and the confidence of Non-Nuclear-Weapon-States in its credibility has been eroded. With no doubt, the world will not wait indefinitely for Nuclear-Weapon-States to live up to their international legal obligations in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As a fundamental part of the package agreed within the framework of the NPT in 1968, nuclear disarmament is the highest priority on the disarmament agenda, and the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons. In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to fully support the NAM position on the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeline, including for the start of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, based on a balanced and comprehensive program of work, for the conclusion of a nuclear weapon instrument. Such negotiations must lead to legally prohibit, once and for all, the possession, development, stockpiling and use or threat to use of nuclear weapons by any country and provide for the total destruction of such inhumane weapons by 2025, as well as a universal and unconditional legally-binding instrument on Negative Security Assurances as intermediary step.

In our view, any attempt to undermine the Conference on Disarmament by hijacking its established mandate or pushing it towards a one-sided program of work is doomed to fail. In this context, the recent proposal for negotiations on one of the four core issues outside the CD is in clear contravention with the agreements reached at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Pending the conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention, the Nuclear-Weapon-States must honor their obligations under the NPT and immediately cease any kind of development and research on nuclear weapons and any modernization of nuclear weapons and their facilities, refrain from making any threat of use of nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear-Weapon-States, withdraw and destroy their nuclear weapons in the territories of other countries, and stop maintaining their nuclear weapons in the trigger-alert situation.

Although the international community has noted the New START, but as this treaty does not go beyond mere decommissioning of nuclear weapons, lacks any international verification mechanism, and its parties did not commit themselves to destroy their nuclear weapons, it can never be a substitute for the explicit legal obligations of Nuclear-Weapon-States for the complete elimination of all their nuclear weapons, by full observance of the principles of irreversibility, transparency and international verifiability.

Mr. Chairman,
It should be recalled that the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 does not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the Nuclear-Weapon-States. It should neither be interpreted as,
nor result in, an indefinite extension of the lack of implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations. It also does not foresee the indefinite preservation of the status of non-members to remain outside the Treaty and defeat the potential for realizing its universality in particular in the Middle East region.

Mr. Chairman,
In the past few years, certain Nuclear-Weapon-States, by overemphasizing the obligations of Non-Nuclear-Weapon-States on non-proliferation, have attempted not only to overlook their own nuclear disarmament obligations, but also to infer that as if Nuclear-Weapon-States have no obligations related to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, through false and misleading propaganda, they similarly have tried to equate nuclear energy with nuclear weapons. This false misinformation has been highlighted, while all the nuclear activities of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon-States parties to the NPT are under the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and they have already foregone the nuclear option, therefore pose no threat to others.

In this context, I would like to draw the attention of delegations to some misinformation contained in the written statement of the UK which was distributed yesterday. It makes a reference to “the development of nuclear weapons” in Iran. This absolutely incorrect information reminds me of a wise proverb that “Every mad man thinks all other men mad.” We should also recall the deadly silence of UK delegation regarding Zionist regime’s secret nuclear weapons program, which is the most serious threat to the regional and international peace and security.

All nuclear activities in Iran are exclusively for peaceful purposes and the IAEA has never found any diversion in those activities. As regards to the reference to Iran’s 20% enrichment activity I would like to clarify that it is aimed at providing needed fuel for Tehran Research Reactor to enable it to continue producing medical isotopes for more than one million patients with hard diseases like cancer. Therefore this activity is purely for humanitarian purposes and plausible. Iran had requested the suppliers, through the IAEA, to provide new fuel for this reactor which regrettably has been rejected. Consequently, Iran had no choice but to produce fuel itself. The other misleading information in the UK statement is the reference to concealment of Iran’s nuclear facilities. According to the Safeguards Agreement, Iran should only inform the Agency 180 days before the introduction of nuclear materials into the facility which in all cases Iran declared the facilities to the IAEA even before the due date.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me reiterate once again that the Islamic Republic of Iran as a victim of the weapons of mass destruction, would pursue vigorously the goal of a world free from weapons of mass destruction, but will never submit to the intimidation and pressure.

I thank you Mr. Chairman.