The Monitor is a weekly report produced by the NGO Working Group on the First Committee, a collaborative effort undertaken by 9 non-governmental organizations to make the work of the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security more transparent and useful for those not based in New York. The Monitor is compiled, edited and coordinated by Reaching Critical Will, a disarmament project of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. RCW, supported by the NGO Working Group on the First Committee, provides several services to activists, diplomats, UN staffers, academicians and others, including:

* Posting statements, draft resolutions, and First Committee information online at www.reachingcriticalwill.org;
* Coordinating an array of briefings, workshops and panels designed to educate diplomats and activists on issues of disarmament, peace and security;
* Serving as an information resource by email or phone;
* Providing a link between the First Committee and NGOs who are not in New York.

Contributing groups to THE FIRST COMMITTEE MONITOR include:
Global Action to Prevent War;
Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy;
NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security;
The Undiplomatic Times
United Methodist United Nations Office;
Unitarian Universalist UN Office;
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom;
World Council of Churches;
and others.

The First Committee Monitor is made possible through the generous support of the Canadian Government and other Reaching Critical Will donors.
Introduction

The nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime has suffered a series of destabilizing ordeals in the past year and continues to struggle to find its equilibrium. Attempts to strengthen it and help it find a positive balance are coming from many directions, each with its own strengths and weaknesses, motives and audience. Many believe the situation is dire, and governments and civil society are both responding with urgency and innovation. During this 60th session of the UN General Assembly, it is imperative that civil society and governments build on our most productive collaborations to help this vulnerable regime find its center. According to San Marino, ‘a country’s own citizens can be the most effective negotiators with their governments.’

A great deal of the General Debate has highlighted the past year’s failures in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Member States have often not even been able to work to find common ground on substantive issues because a few States are using the rules of procedure to block the initiation of substantive work. In the first week of the First Committee, a group of cross-regional states presented a clever new idea for initiating substantive work on disarmament and non-proliferation within the existing multilateral machinery. This simple proposal to adapt the near-consensus A5 proposal for work in the CD to the non-consensus bound General Assembly just may be what gets the governments working again. (See the Disarmament Machinery Report)

Governments have been working together and making progress in controlling conventional weapons, and many of the statements during the General Debate reflected optimism in the area of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Chemical and Biological Weapons, and Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS). The Open-Ended Working Group on marking and tracing SALW concluded their negotiations on an international instrument to mark and trace small arms and light weapons (A/60/88), and many Member States hope it will be adopted during this session of the General Assembly. (See the SALW report)

Even arms control agreements in conventional weapons are often still weak in their accountability and verification mechanisms. Although the Chemical Weapons Convention has a Technical Secretariat and a verification mechanism, the Biological Weapons Convention does not. (See the Biological and Chemical Weapons report) The newly drafted international instrument on marking and tracing of SALW is not legally binding, and the UN Conventional Arms Register is still voluntary. In the nuclear arena, the United States is opposing the verifiability of a Fissile Materials Treaty. (See Fissile Materials report) Many States lamented that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has a nearly complete International Monitoring System (IMS) to verify compliance with the treaty, would stem vertical and horizontal proliferation, and is the first of the 13 steps toward nuclear disarmament, has not yet entered into force. (See the CTBT report)

The International Parliamentary Union concluded its statement to the First Committee with some advice for working through these problems. ‘Women can bring a unique perspective on all these issues and can make a decisive difference to their overall outcome,’ said Ambassador Anda Filip. ‘[I]t is now more urgent than ever to ensure that more women be included in all organizations and forums promoting disarmament and arms control.’ Women can help bring the perspective and balance these negotiations need.

Last Friday, several Member States congratulated Mohammed ElBaradei on winning the Nobel Peace Prize, with the International Atomic Energy Agency. ElBaradei and his agency are simultaneously tasked with preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and with promoting the process that has historically been the first step in nuclear proliferation*, causing peace groups to try to balance or choose between applauding non-proliferation work and the diplomatic resolution to non-proliferation concerns, and condemning the process that allows proliferation. This catch-22 is a direct reflection of the loss of balance between disarmament and nonproliferation in multilateral fora. States cannot simultaneously try to prevent proliferation while not making progress in disarmament and conferring status on Nuclear Weapon States.

Governments and civil society will stabilize and balance the disarmament and non-proliferation regime by recognizing what is in our best interest, and working together to achieve it. Time and again it has been demonstrated that it is not possible to have absolute control of every aspect of proliferation through inspections, controls, coercion and force. Even with extraordinary resource expenditures, there will still be loopholes, and states, or individuals, will choose and find a way to proliferate. Complete, irreversible, internationally verifiable disarmament is the only way to guarantee these weapons do not spread and are never used again.

True security will never be achieved through absolute domination; it must be achieved through cooperation and mutual trust. Multilateralism is required for our survival. We must, in our enlightened self-interest, choose cooperation and the total elimination of nuclear weapons rather than competition and a new arms race. Increasing arms expenditures at the expense of development, increasing terrorism bred out of poverty and resentment, and the possibility of total annihilation is losing situation for everyone. We must be able to see the scientific certainty of this prisoner’s dilemma.

-Jennifer Nordstrom
Reaching Critical Will, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
jennifer@reachingcriticalwill.org

*See the IAEA founding statute: http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html
Article 2: "The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world."
The General Debate of the First Committee concluded amid a chorus of ‘frustration,’ ‘disappointment,’ ‘concern,’ ‘regret,’ and ‘pity’ over the failure of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2005 Review Conference and the World Summit to achieve consensus on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament measures. Egypt described the 60th session of the General Assembly as ‘taking place in an atmosphere that can best be described as overcast, especially with regard to the issues of disarmament and international security.’

The vast majority of states continue to uphold the imperative of the practical disarmament steps agreed by the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Nearly all states continue to call for the early entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (See the CTBT report), and the commencement of negotiations without preconditions on an effectively verifiable Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (See the FMCT report). In an apparent reference to the U.S. reversal of position on these and other measures, Japan stated that in ‘order not to undermine the credibility of regimes, consistency in mid to long term policies is of particular importance.’ Most states recognize the inseparable link between progress in disarmament and the prevention of proliferation. Here, Israel struck a dissonant note, stating that ‘the conceptual and traditional association between progress in the fields of disarmament and nonproliferation has become irrelevant.’

Despite the call of last year’s GA Resolution 59/95 ‘to find commonalities in the language and purpose of ...’ complementary resolutions and to ‘to consider pursuing mergers of such texts through consultations with all sponsors,’ states plan to introduce updated versions of past resolutions. Japan announced a ‘concise and strong’ resolution that will mark the 60th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden) will introduce a resolution focused not on specific measures but rather a general call for accelerated implementation of disarmament steps agreed in the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Other group resolutions, as in the past, will come from Myanmar on behalf of a majority of members of the Non-Aligned Movement and from Malaysia and the ASEAN group on follow-up to the 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion.

Taking into account also the resolutions likely to be introduced with a few co-sponsors on various topics (CTBT, de-alerting nuclear weapons, U.S.-Russian reductions), anyone paying attention will again be bewildered by a plethora of apparently authoritative statements from the General Assembly, the sole universal deliberative body on disarmament and security. However, judging by GA Resolution 59/95 and informal remarks of states, there are many who agree with Iceland’s statement of support this week for ‘few and more focused resolutions which have a better chance of being followed up.’

Indications are that the Seven Nation Initiative will not introduce a resolution. In the run-up to the World Summit, that group (Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa and the United Kingdom) sought valiantly under the leadership of Norway to achieve agreed outcome language on non-proliferation and disarmament. (See Seven Nation documents at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1comindex1.html#M3) Like the New Agenda group, the Seven Nation Initiative crosses North-South boundaries and goes beyond to include a nuclear weapon state, the UK, and a close ally of a nuclear weapon state, Australia. This week, other states, echoing Kofi Annan’s remarks at the close of the Summit, praised Norway and the group for their efforts. The Philippines stated its support for this ‘new course in multilateral arms control diplomacy.’ Although Norway declared its intention ‘to continue to seek consensus’, both at the World Summit and this week, it remains to be seen how, or if, the initiative will be sustained.

See all governmental disarmament and security comments during the Summit and the High Level General Debate on the Reaching Critical Will website: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1comindex1.html#2005

-Michael Spies and John Burroughs, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy
johnburroughs@lcnp.org
mjspies@gmail.com
Proliferation

During the General Debate, nearly all speakers recognized weapons proliferation as dangerous, but there were significant differences in perspective and focus. While most Non-Nuclear Weapon States linked the failure of efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the failure of disarmament, Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) tended to ignore or fudge that linkage. NWS and their allies were also less gloomy than most other Member States at the failure to achieve consensus at the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference and the General Assembly Summit’s inability to agree on any wording on proliferation issues. China, Russia, the United Kingdom on behalf of the European Union, and the United States all balanced comments on those failures by noting what they saw as positive elements on the international scene. The United States ‘does not…share the oft-expressed view that those meetings were failures.’

Many States commented on the lack of consensus on the link between disarmament and non-proliferation issues that has stalemated multilateral arms control processes. This lack of consensus was seen as endangering the continued viability of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and creating conditions of growing threat to international peace and security. However, most States insisted on the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and that compliance with the NPT was the best avenue for dealing with proliferation. ‘[W]e have to re-invigorate our efforts and those of like-minded states world-wide’ stated Canada, ‘to salvage the NPT as the core legal commitment to eliminating all nuclear arsenals and preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by new possessors.’

Of the three non-NPT member States, Israel did not participate in the debate on its own weapons, although it did express concern about the proliferation of WMD and nuclear weapons to other States. India reported on the steps it had taken to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials. Pakistan declared that calls for it to join the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State were unrealistic. It said the ‘nuclear reality’ within global non-proliferation regimes had to be reconciled. There was an institutional deficit in dealing with disarmament and non-proliferation, and unless that was redressed, there was growing risk of a ‘cascade of proliferation.’

There were also important differences on how to deal with proliferation threats. Speaking for the NAM, Indonesia said the most effective course of action against proliferation would be within the UN framework, and consistent with the aims and purposes of the UN Charter. It called for constructive engagement of all delegations in the effort to convene a fourth Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD IV). India said that the growing threat of proliferation had to be dealt with in a manner that would facilitate and reinforce the process towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Egypt decried the ‘desperate efforts’ of NWS and their allies to ‘expand the obligations’ of Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) by applying ‘political and multiple standards’ while they themselves ignored the multilateral frameworks within which issues could be best addressed.

In contrast, the United States and the European Union underlined the importance of efforts to close proliferation ‘loopholes.’ The United States argued that the Cold War strategies of deterrence and a web of bilateral strategic arms control treaties were of little value against the threat that ‘rogue states’ might help non-State actors get and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially when some countries did not honor treaty commitments. Flexible, non-treaty-based efforts were therefore necessary to strengthen collective capacity to act rapidly. It was working to strengthen export controls through the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and to build cooperative capacity to interdict supplies through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). These arrangements were without a formal treaty or organizational structure, but had in a number of cases, stopped the shipment of missile-related material and equipment bound for ‘countries of concern, including Iran.’

China took a more holistic approach, noting that security is best maintained through dialogue and calling for ‘an integrated approach … to address both the symptoms and the root causes’ of WMD proliferation.

The two discussions on specific proliferation situations revolved around North Korea and Iran. With regard to North Korea, several speakers hailed as a breakthrough the joint statement issued after the latest round of 6-Party talks in Beijing, and stated their hopes that it would lead to the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of nuclear weapons and programs in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The DPRK, for its part, contended at length that its nuclear weapons program had been entirely in response to the threat posed by the United States. According to the DPRK, the joint statement ‘clearly specifies the obligations of the United States and South Korea, the responsible parties for the denuclearization of the whole Korean peninsula.’ These obligations include providing the DPRK with a light-water reactor as evidence of removing nuclear threats and ‘hostile policies’ against the DPRK, and ‘recognizing [its] rights to peaceful nuclear activities.’

continued on page 6
Disarmament Machinery

Nearly all the statements during the General Debate opened with paragraphs of disappointment over the past year's disarmament and non-proliferation failures. These generally identified the Non-Proliferation Treaty's failure to achieve any substantive outcome, the Conference on Disarmament's repeated failure to agree on a program of work, the World Summit's failure to include a section on disarmament and non-proliferation, and often included the Disarmament Commission's inability to agree on an agenda. International disarmament machinery is clearly clogged. Last year, efforts to increase the functionality of multilateral disarmament fora centered around the United States' resolution on revitalizing the working methods of the First Committee (A/RES/59/95). This year, there is a new and exciting attempt to unclog the wheels of this machinery and jump start disarmament.

Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden have introduced a non-paper, with an explanatory note, "Draft Elements of an UNGA60 First Committee Resolution: Initiating work on priority disarmament and non-proliferation issues." The non-paper outlines elements of a draft resolution that would establish four open-ended Ad Hoc Committees on the four priority issues of the Five Ambassadors (A5) proposal for a program of work in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). These Ad Hoc Committees would meet in Geneva with resources from within the regular CD budget, and be open to the 66 CD Member States as well as any interested UN Member State.

The language in the draft mirrors the A5 proposal, which has near-consensus agreement in the CD, but has still not resulted in a programme of work. As Deborah Panchhurst of New Zealand noted, the "willingness of some states to use rules of procedure as a means to prevent progress going forward continues to be of concern." This year, some states who see the status quo as unacceptable are trying to use the international disarmament institutions available to make progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

The co-sponsors of this resolution have made it very clear that they see this effort as a way to begin substantive work that will complement and catalyze the CD. In fact, the possible elements of the draft resolution stipulate that as soon as the CD adopts a programme of work, the Committees will stop meeting and report their results to the CD. By bringing this resolution to the First Committee for a vote, those who have been blocking consensus in the CD will either have to act for collective security, or risk global recognition of their unwillingness to get down to work.

Interest in this proposal is high. In his opening speech, the Department for Disarmament Affairs' Under-Secretary...

Fissile Materials

Ten years after the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference committed States to commence negotiations on a fissile materials treaty (FMT), no such negotiations are underway in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Last year's General Assembly resolution (A/RES/59/81) calling for the CD to adopt a program of working including negotiations on an 'effectively verifiable' FMT has been ignored. In the First Committee this week, two years after China's change of position, the world finally received an answer to the A5 (Five Ambassadors') proposal for a CD program of work from the state most often identified as blocking consensus on that proposal. The United States stated its support for a fissile materials cut-off negotiating mandate which is 'unencumbered by linkages to unrelated proposals' - as it is under the A5 approach, where it is linked to discussions on PAROS, security assurances, and nuclear disarmament.

As this is a stance very unlikely to garner acceptance from key states (China came a long way just to back the A5 proposal), it appears that prospects for FMT negotiations are dependent on the new initiative to have the General Assembly establish Geneva-based working groups mirroring those in the A5 proposal. (See the Disarmament Machinery report) The United States additionally reiterated that the mandate should not 'refer to verification measures.' Many other states have made concessions to this position, suggesting that verification issues can be addressed during negotiations.

While fissile materials issues sometimes seem to induce a certain lethargy among NGOs and governments alike, in fact they go to the heart of disarmament and non-proliferation. Most obviously, a cut-off halts growth in arsenals. This point was illustrated sharply by Pakistan's rebuff this week of the U.S.-backed proposal for a formal moratorium pending agreement on an FMT, stating that it will only 'halt fissile material production consistent with the requirements of its nuclear posture.'

A verified FMT would also bring international monitoring of facilities in nuclear-armed states, generally advancing the framework for abolition and, not insignificantly, contributing to the capability to prevent diversion to terrorists and other non-state actors, notably in Russia and Pakistan. Finally, depending on its provisions, an FMT could contribute directly to disarmament. For example, as South Africa has proposed, it could provide that materials declared surplus to military requirements would be subject to international monitoring. Indonesia's remarks this week illustrated that many states want a disarmament-oriented treaty, calling for 'negotiations without conditions on a verifiable fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT), focusing attention...
During the first week of the 60th Session of the First Committee, the Russian Federation was the most vocal advocate for Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). In general, however, discussions of the weaponization of outer space during the General Debate of the First Committee were not numerous, with less than one-fifth of the States commenting, and China, usually the other leading advocate, only advising that ‘[p]recautionary measures should be taken to earnestly prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space.’

In its opening statement to the First Committee, Russia discussed PAROS at length, once again noting the need to elaborate a UN Convention on international outer space law. Kazakhstan and Pakistan expressed strong support for such an arrangement in their statements.

The European Union in the statement delivered by the United Kingdom stressed that space should be used for peaceful purposes only, stating that PAROS ‘is an essential condition for strategic stability, and for the promotion of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.’ In the Conference on Disarmament this year, the UK advised the international community adopt ‘rules of the road’ on PAROS, rather than additional international legal instruments.

Pakistan, commending the important work done by China and Russia to enhance the current regime for PAROS, expressed ‘support for the A-5 proposal to commence work on PAROS in a CD Ad Hoc Committee,’ a measure which Sri Lanka happily noted is gaining support. The A-5 (Five Ambassadors) proposal is the near-consensus proposal for a programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which has been unable to agree on a programme of work for nine years. The proposal establishes four ad-hoc committees in the CD, one of which is on PAROS. China has changed its position in the last two years to support this aspect of the A5 proposal, having previously disagreed to move forward because it calls on the Committee ‘to identify and examine’ PAROS, rather than to negotiate a treaty, the United States announced this week that it will not support the A-5. (Learn about the new initiative to circumvent this road block in the Disarmament Machinery report.)

Sri Lanka noted increased support for the recurring First Committee resolution on PAROS, which Sri Lanka led in 2003 and co-sponsored in 2004. It also commended the initiatives of Canada, Russia and China to examine issues of space security on the sidelines of the CD, stating that these initiatives had ‘resulted in closer examination of the international legal regime to protect the sanctity of space as a common heritage of mankind.’

Russia discussed the need for transparency and confidence building measures in this area, recalling its own voluntary declaration to not be the first country to put weapons in outer space, and a similar one made in June, 2005 by member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Russia announced its intention to submit a new draft resolution on the topic, entitled ‘Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space activities’, because it ‘believe[s] that the time has come for us to take a comprehensive view of the possible range of potential confidence-building measures in outer space, and to update the proposals prepared in the United Nations back in the early 1990s.’


-Natalie Mendelsohn and Jennifer Nordstrom
Reaching Critical Will
jennifer@reachingcriticalwill.org

Disarmament Machinery Continued

General Abe quoted Jan Eliasson’s September 30 letter to all delegates in which he advised, "One…area [the Outcome Document does not address in detail] is disarmament and non-proliferation, on which I would encourage new and creative thinking in all appropriate fora."

H.E. Prof. Judith Mbula Bahemuka of Kenya, in her statement to the General Debate, "welcomes the initiative… to re-energize disarmament diplomacy", and suggested that this might be the "silver bullet that turns the tide." Many in civil society hope that this will be what turns the tide, and that states will, as Ambassador Yoshiko Mine (Japan) stated "heed the will of the international community and the voice of the public rather than solely pursuing their own national interests."

To read the A5 proposal, see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/A5.pdf
For more information on the CD, see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/cdindex.html

-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will
jennifer@reachingcriticalwill.org
Biological and Chemical Weapons

In comparison to the impasse in nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, agreements on Biological and Chemical Weapons have made fairly steady progress. Many Member States praised the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention’s (CWC) progress in their statements. ‘In the over-all bleak disarmament picture of the past year that I will describe in more details, we do see some bright spots,’ Vietnam stated. ‘We are pleased to note the adoption of specific measures to promote implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, namely those aimed at developing national capacity to mitigate infectious and deliberate diseases and avoiding misuse.’

Numerous delegations voiced their continued support for and adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention, while at the same time addressing the need for strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention. Ambassador Deborah Panckhurst from New Zealand stated on October 5, ‘New Zealand has already contributed US $1.2 million toward the destruction of chemical weapons. This is a tangible demonstration of our support for the Chemical Weapons Convention, a multilateral treaty that applies equally to all parties and is verifiably and irreversibly eliminating weapons of mass destruction.’ She went on to note, however, that ‘the Biological Weapons Convention still lacks any verification mechanism. This remains a major hole in multilateral defenses at a time when biological weapons have been identified as a growing threat. We hope that the BWC Review Conference next year will provide an opportunity to consider how to address this issue.’

Many delegations indicated their support of both the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). However, in contrast to the CWC, which has the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as its Technical Secretariat, the BWC has no Secretariat and no verification provisions. Beginning 16 October 2005, there will be 174 States party to the CWC, with Vanuatu as its newest signatory. The BWC has 153 States Parties and 169 signatories. Ambassador Mehdi Danesh-Yazdi of the Islamic Republic of Iran also highlighted the successes and progress in the areas of the CWC and BWC. He said ‘The destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles is continuing under international inspection and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is functioning professionally while negotiations on issues such as the implementation of Article XI of the Convention need to be pursued more seriously. Discussion among the States Parties to the BWC is also going on and the ways and means for strengthening the BWC, including legally binding protocol is still on the table.’

Canada, China, Iran, Israel, Malaysia, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom on behalf of the European Union all voiced concerns over the need to strengthen the European Union all voiced concerns over the need to strengthen the BWC and revise the treaty to create verification provisions such as those in the CWC.

-Jenna Crouch, Reaching Critical Will
jenna@reachingcriticalwill.org
and
David Sklar, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security,
disarmtimes@igc.org

Proliferation Continued

Both the United States and the European Union called on Iran to live up to its obligations under the 2004 Paris Agreement to stop enrichment of nuclear fuel and give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Failure to do that had led the IAEA Board of Governors to find Iran in non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards agreement, and note that this situation has given rise to questions within the competence of the United Nations Security Council. Iran said it was in full compliance with its NPT obligations, and rejected demands that it give up any aspect of its peaceful nuclear program. It charged that the United States was in non-compliance with the NPT because it had concluded agreements to ‘transfer all kinds of nuclear technology’ to NPT non-States Parties, especially Israel.

Some states also addressed vertical proliferation, where the policies and practices of particular States came under criticism. Among prominent issues were the weaponization of space, the continued qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons technology, and the nuclear technology cooperation of Nuclear Weapon States with non-States Parties to the NPT. The New Agenda Coalition in the statement delivered by South Africa stated that it is ‘disconcerting that another State Party has entered into a nuclear cooperation agreement with a State not Party to the NPT.’ Bangladesh noted that ‘[p]roviding more precision capability to the nuclear weapons would only make these weapons more attractive to the terrorists’ and that ‘the best guarantee against nuclear weapons proliferation continues to lay in their total elimination.’

-Bhasker Menon, UNdiplomatic Times
papamenon@mac.com
Disarmament and Development

Many member nations pointed out during the plenary sessions of the First Committee that the estimated US$ 1 trillion in global military expenditures is predicted to grow even higher in the coming years. Developing nations such as Bangladesh, Thailand and the Philippines have urged major military powers to reallocate the resources of military spending to development projects in order to reach the consensual Millennium Development Goals. Many nations commented on the disappointment of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, but the inextricable link between disarmament and development has been thoroughly solidified. Statements during the General Debate of the First Committee this past week strongly reflected the recognition of that link. Ambassador John Freeman of the United Kingdom said in his address on October 3rd on behalf of the European Union, "Development, security and human rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing."

The inter-relationship and inter-reliance of development and security have led many nations, both developing and developed, to call on the First Committee to work to ensure development by promoting security. The Holy See, as an observer of the First Committee, urged the Committee to fulfill its duty to disarmament and enhance the process of development throughout the world.

Disarmament and arms control of small arms and light weapons and the elimination of land mines have been specifically related to development. Burkina Faso discussed how the illicit trafficking of small arms increases insecurity in many regions and threatens all development measures. Mozambique declared that landmines still threaten human life as well as the progress in social and economic development throughout the country.

Many nations have highlighted the skyrocketing level of military spending and not only call for a reduction in that spending, but a reallocation of those resources to global development projects. Bangladesh urged "all countries, particularly the major military powers to curb their military expenditures and devote part of the resources made available thereby to economic and social development of the developing countries." The Philippines said, "Financing for development can also be sourced from cuts in military expenditures. This cutback can facilitate the efforts of developed countries reaching the target of 0.7 percent of GNP for ODA[Official Development Assistance] purposes."

Not only would resource reallocation benefit the Millennium Development Goals, but furthering development goals would facilitate many of the major issues of security. Ghana said, "It is morally wrong and an indictment on the community of nations that while over 1 trillion dollars is spent annually on weapons of death, half the world continues to suffer from acute poverty and deprivation, the fundamental factors that promote and foster terrorism, the bane of the 21st century. The development goals enshrined in the Outcome Document could be attained with only a minimum fraction of global military expenditure."

While the argument for resource allocation is logical and commendable, governmental budgets do not always link development and security with the same vigor as the dialogue in the international community. Resource allocation is, however, one of the goals outlined in Article 26 of the UN Charter: "to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources." As this has been a year of recognition of the interconnectedness between development and security, perhaps it is time to readjust how the ODA is measured, and instead of a flat percentage based on Gross Domestic Product, the calculation can instead reflect the percentage of GDP spent on military expenditures and be adjusted accordingly.

-Karen Tilli, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security disarmtimes@igc.org
and
Susi Snyder, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom susi.snyder@wilpf.ch

Fissile Materials Continued

both on existing stocks and future production of weapons-usable material - whether civil or military."

For a comprehensive inventory of all nuclear materials, see Reaching Critical Will’s Model Nuclear Inventory: Accountability is Democracy, Transparency is Security:
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/about/pubs/Inventory.html

John Burroughs and Michael Spies,
Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy johnburroughs@lcnp.org
mjspies@gmail.com
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) were one of the most frequently mentioned topics during the General Debate of the First Committee. States from areas where NWFZ treaties have entered into force spoke positively about Nuclear Weapons Free Zones. For instance, the Rio Group in the statement delivered by Argentina "congratulate[d] itself for the leadership of States Parties to the Treaty [of Tlatelolco, establishing the NWFZ in Latin America] for the convening of the First Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties Establishing NWFZs." The conference, hosted by Mexico, took place in April 2005.

Other members of the Tlatelolco Treaty shared this view, and other States party to NWFZs also expressed their satisfaction and enhanced confidence in regional security, including States party to the South Pacific NWFZ, the Southeast Asian NWFZ, and those making progress in the eventual entry into force of an African NWFZ. Nigeria announced that it intends to reintroduce its resolution on an African NWFZ. On behalf of ASEAN, Myanmar stated that in order for the Southeast Asian NWFZ treaty to be "fully operational and effective, it is essential that nuclear-weapon States sign the Protocol at an early date" and noted that States Parties to the Southeast Asian NWFZ treaty are holding consultations with the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) towards this end. Through protocols annexed to this and other NWFZ treaties, to which the Nuclear Weapon States are requested to accede, they would pledge to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the States in the region. Nuclear Weapon States often refuse to sign such protocols because of their interest in maintaining options regarding deployment and transit of nuclear weapons, as well as concern over strengthening the precedent of legally-binding negative security assurances.

In addition to support for existing NWFZs, many States expressed concern regarding certain regions that have not adopted such a zone. The two zones of primary interest were the Middle East and Central Asia. The proposed Central Asian NWFZ would consist of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. However, France, the United Kingdom and the United States are opposed to the treaty, contending, in an October 3 letter sent to the UN ambassadors of the five Central Asian nations, that some of the language is too vague, thus possibly allowing previous agreements to supercede the NWFZ. Russia and China support the proposed treaty, but the support of all Nuclear Weapon States, including signing a protocol, are necessary for the treaty to be fully effective.

As in the past, several Middle East states called on Israel to accede to the NPT and submit to IAEA safeguards, which Israel refuses to do. Although the delegates generally refrain from directly naming other states, those from the Middle East were quite direct in their criticism of Israel's nuclear policy and capability. Each delegation from the Middle East expressed a similar desire to establish a Middle East NWFZ.

Kuwait observed: "The Middle East region will not achieve security and stability as long as Israel, the only state in the region which has not yet acceded to the NPT and the sole country with nuclear weapons, has not been requested to accede immediately to the treaty, to dismantle its nuclear arsenal and submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA's safeguards regime...Kuwait calls on the international community to refrain from providing Israel with the scientific and technological know-how which contributes to the reinforcement of the Israeli nuclear arsenal." It is noteworthy that Kuwait also "welcomed the readiness of the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate and coordinate with the international community...."

Egypt discussed the significance of a Middle East NWFZ in the context of the NPT, including the commitments of 1995 and 2000, as well as Security Council Resolution 687 "which stated that the elimination of WMD in Iraq is a step towards the establishment of a zone free from all such weapons in the Middle East." According to Egypt, "in view of all such considerations, we have witnessed the regrettable failure of the 2005 NPT review conference in reaching an agreement aimed at renewing the international commitment we undertook in 1995 and 2000 respectively."

Israel stated that "The Middle East needs a restructured security architecture laying on the foundation of cooperation in the field of security." Israel further explained its position on a NWFZ in the Middle East: "[It is well known that Israel supports the eventual establishment of a mutually and effectively verifiable zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery. The establishment of such a zone should be based on arrangements freely arrived at by all the States of the region... Israel believes that the political realities in the Middle East mandate a practical step-by-step approach." In Israel's view such a process could eventually lead to the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

NWFZs, while not a complete guarantor of regional security, do provide for regional stability and are a component of a nuclear weapons free world. They are largely non-proliferation measures, and the negative security assurances such as those provided by the additional protocols are an immediate and obligatory step towards complete nuclear disarmament. While there are some weaknesses, such as the possibility of nuclear armed ships and submarines patrolling the seas within NWFZs, these zones contribute significantly to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

-David Sklar, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
disasntimes@igc.org
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

This week in the First Committee, many states expressed their disappointment with the lack of progress on the entry into force of the CTBT. While it is establishing a legal norm, with 176 signatures and 125 ratifications, it is not yet international law. The United States under the Bush Administration has rejected the Treaty, is actively opposing its entry-into-force, and is rumored to be considering a return to testing.

On Monday, Indonesia lamented that "the CTBT has continued to languish due to the refusal of some of the nuclear weapon states to adhere to the Treaty." Kuwait, Mongolia, Bangladesh, and Oman echoed this disappointment. Iran specifically highlighted the United States' non-ratification of the Treaty, although Iran itself has not ratified.

Many of the other Annex II states that have not yet ratified the Treaty also spoke this week, including India, Pakistan, China, Egypt, the United States, Colombia, Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Vietnam. While most of them did not mention the CTBT in their statements, Colombia expressed its intent to ratify the Treaty, and Egypt lamented the lack of political will of the nuclear weapon states. Colombia is the only remaining Latin American Annex II State that has not ratified (although it has been the recipient of legal assistance from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization for several years in order to overcome internal constitutional questions to ratify).

China stated "the prospect for entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is still blurry." At the CTBT Entry Into Force Conference held last month, Chinese delegate Zhang Yishan implied that Beijing would soon ratify the Treaty, saying "it is of urgent and practical significance for the international community to consolidate its basic consensus on banning international tests and to speed up the treaty ratification process with a view to bring about early entry into force."! Although China regularly reiterates its support for the treaty, it has told the international community that its ratification is coming for years, but has yet to fulfill the promise.

The General Debate statements to the First Committee contained vast support for the early entry into force of the CTBT, across regions and alliances. As Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg of Brazil pointed out this week, "the CTBT is intended to be a bulwark against both vertical and horizontal proliferation, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. It constitutes a crucial step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons."

Malaysia, Norway, Columbia, Republic of Korea, Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Thailand, and Jordan, as well as the African Group, the EU, ASEAN, and the Inter-Parliamentary Union declared their commitment to and support of the Treaty as a key instrument in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Malaysia also declared its intention to ratify the CTBT "in the immediate future." Many states and groups also called for all those states that have not yet signed and/or ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible, especially the Annex II states. Among those encouraging further ratification were Switzerland, Canada, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Columbia, Russia, Mongolia, Brazil, Mozambique, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Japan, Turkey, the African Group, New Agenda Coalition, and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

Meanwhile, Pakistan declared it is "observing a unilateral moratorium on further nuclear tests," and seeks to continue to do so bilaterally with India as part of its proposed Strategic Restraint Regime. There has been an acknowledged international voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests since the Indian and Pakistani nuclear test explosions in 1998. Other states expressed their support for the moratorium on nuclear testing, including Kuwait, Republic of Korea, Columbia, Russia, Mongolia, Mozambique, Japan, and the African Group. However, as Mongolia points out, "continuing moratoriums on tests, though welcome, can never substitute for the legally binding prohibition enshrined in the Treaty."

A few states expressed interest in the CTBT for the "side benefits" of its verification regime - in particular the International Monitoring System (IMS). Mongolia, Thailand, and ASEAN are interested in the scientific and civilian uses of the data collected with the IMS, which has potential to assist in the development of tsunami warning systems.

Kazakhstan, the site of the former Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground "urge[d] the international community to support a General Assembly resolution on the rehabilitation of the Semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan." The first anti-nuclear testing NGO in the former USSR, the Nevada-Semipalatinsk International Anti-Nuclear Movement, forced the closure and eventual decommissioning of the test site.

Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will
ray@reachingcriticalwill.org
Landmines

Despite many failures in the disarmament field in the past few years, the First Committee's General Debate this week consistently noted the progress on landmines as a successful example of what can be accomplished when the international community cooperates. Norway called it "strong evidence of constructive multilateralism and that it is possible to work in innovative ways."

Last November, 110 States Parties and 25 non-States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction (also referred to as the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines or the Mine Ban Treaty) gathered in Nairobi for the first review conference since the Treaty entered into force in 1999. Many States noted this successful "Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World". Kenya hailed the Summit and participants' commitments as "a major success for disarmament diplomacy," and called for "the full implementation of the Plan of Action to yield a mine free world ... [and] end the plight of the victims of these weapons of small destruction."

States Parties will gather again next month to review the Nairobi Action Plan. According to Canada, "[a]nother chapter in the human security success story, the Ottawa Convention, will be reached next month in Zagreb, when states and civil society partners will review progress in implementing the far-reaching Action Plan adopted at last year's mine ban summit in Nairobi." Civil society was an instrumental partner in this success.

As the Ottawa Convention is increasingly recognized as an international norm against anti-personnel mines, disarmament goals are now to ensure that the ban becomes universal, that stockpile destruction and mine clearance deadlines are met, and that mine survivors and affected communities receive adequate assistance. Thus, many of the governmental statements to the First Committee urged accession to the treaty, reported on mine destruction and clearance, and reminded delegates of the need for continued financial assistance.

Cambodia reflected on its own experience with conflict, landmines, and their removal. "While Cambodia has enjoyed peace and a return to normalcy, people still have to deal with the existence of land mines and unexploded ordinance left over by wars and conflicts. The Royal Government aims to free all of Cambodia from land mines by year 2012, [and] has adopted land mine clearance as an additional Millennium Development Goal for Cambodia."

Venezuela reported that it destroyed 47,189 mines from its National Armed Forces' arsenals, keeping "only a few" for training purposes.

Argentina reported that the Rio Group will follow the lead of the Organization of American States to make the hemisphere an antipersonnel mine free zone. They will also be "providing assistance with mine removal and victim assistance."

The European Union, in the statement delivered by the United Kingdom, pledged to "continue to work to improve the effectiveness of the international mine action system and to promote the universalisation of the Mine Ban Treaty." The European Union has called the Ottawa Convention an established international norm in the previous statements.

The United States, a major producer of landmines that has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty and did not participate in the Nairobi Summit, proposed that an alternative treaty banning the sale or export of all persistent landmines be negotiated in the currently deadlocked CD. "This approach complements other international restrictions on landmines," said Assistant Secretary Stephen Rademaker, "and we urge the members of the CD to give it prompt and favorable consideration."

-Jean-Marie Goldstein, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
disarmtimes@igc.org
and
Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will
jennifer@reachingcriticalwill.org

Read Reaching Critical Will’s Disarmament Index and Summit Disarmament Index for a comprehensive listing of all governmental references to disarmament and security in the High Level General Debate and World Summit:
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com05/disarmindex/disarmindex05.htm and
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com05/disarmindex/disarmindexsummit.html
Small Arms and Light Weapons and Conventional Weapons

While a recurring theme among this week’s opening statements expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome of the 2005 NPT review conference and the absence of reference to disarmament in the World Summit’s outcome document, countries also regularly discussed the progress made in the eradication of illicit trade of small arms and light weapons (SALW).

Many countries spoke of the importance and urgency of curbing the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons. Bangladesh called small arms and light weapons "the real weapons of mass destruction, causing higher death toll than caused by the atomic bombs in Japan." The Republic of Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) stated, "NAM remains deeply concerned over the illicit transfer, manufacture, and circulation of SALW and their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread to many regions of the world." Ghana spoke persuasively about how "The illicit trade [of SALW], which generated over 1 billion dollars annually, poses a grave danger to peace and security, due to their easy availability to criminals, drug traffickers and terrorists." Israel and Georgia both regretted the connection between the illicit trade of SALW and regional conflicts.

Comments on SALW referred primarily to the Programme of Action as laid out in the 2001 "Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects" (A/CONF.192/15), and the subsequent work of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) to "Negotiate an international Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons" (A/60/88).

In the OEWG draft resolution (A/60/88), the international instrument created to mark and trace SALW was considered "politically binding." While Qatar commended this politically binding instrument, most other states (Bangladesh, Colombia, Kazakhstan, The Republic of Korea, Trinidad and Tobago, Nigeria, and Ghana) expressed their disappointment that the instrument was not legally binding. "It is regretful to note that after three sessions the Open-ended Working Group on Trading Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons has failed to conclude negotiations on a legally binding instrument," said Kazakhstan. The Republic of Korea, while regretting the omission of ammunitions from the proposed marking and tracing instrument (as did Norway, Colombia and Thailand), still noted that "Although the instrument is not legally binding, excludes ammunition and was watered down in certain other respects, the instrument, together with the UN Program of Action, will greatly facilitate efforts to control illicit trade in such weapons."

States interested in strengthening and moving forward with the Programme of Action focused on the issue of arms brokering. The Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Nigeria on behalf of the African Group all emphasized this issue as a priority. Nigeria stated that "Cognizant that arms brokering plays a significant role in illicit arms trade, the African Group calls for the establishment of an effective international regime on brokering." Colombia said there was a need for tougher controls and called for the creation of a group of experts to analyze the problem of illicit brokering.

Mozambique made a compelling statement regarding the need for its country to receive international aid and cooperation, which is in line with the report of the Secretary General on "Assistance to States for curbing illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them" (A/60/161). "Production of a National Action Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Manufacturing, Trade Trafficking and use of Small Arms and Light Weapons is among the ongoing actions that need technical and financial assistance," advised the report. Other countries like Fiji, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo noted the need for economic assistance to address the spread of SALW as well.


Noting positive progress on SALW and wishing to continue moving forward, Japan announced that, with Colombia and South Africa, it will submit its annual resolution on Small Arms and Light Weapons updated to reflects the following outcomes: The adoption of the Nairobi Action Plan at the first review conference of the Ottawa Convention, the conclusion to negotiations on an international instrument on the marking and tracing of SALW, and the success of the second UN biennial meeting of states regarding the Programme of Action.

Myanmar put the instrument for marking and tracing of SALW into greater perspective within the work of the First Committee by stating that "the adoption of such an instrument is closely related with other disarmament efforts, especially towards the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, which should be accorded adequate attention by the international community." Let us hope that both areas move forward decisively and successfully in the coming weeks.

Waverly de Bruijn, Global Action to Prevent War waverly@globaactionpw.org
Terrorism

Terrorism is being confronted through a variety of international measures and fora, including the First Committee. The First Committee's work on terrorism takes place in the context of this year's Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) on incitement of terrorism, adopted during the High Level Summit, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly (GA) in April, and the ongoing negotiations on a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. The Convention is being drafted in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, in accordance with the timeline outlined in the Outcome Document of the Summit and the September 30 letter of GA President Eliasson to all Member States.

Most Member States included terrorism in their statements during the General Debate, and many expressed their condolences to Indonesia, which suffered a terrorist attack in Bali the Saturday before the First Committee began. Several States saw this attack as evidence of the global and indiscriminate nature of the terrorist threat. For instance, in its condolences to Indonesia, Chile explained that this was an example of the way "international terrorism and the possibility of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction is an urgent and pressing problem that threatens the supreme interests of all States, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear."

Often, States were particularly concerned about the possibility of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) falling in to the hands of terrorists. States disagreed about the best avenue to prevent this from occurring. While many States took the floor to praise non-proliferation efforts for preventing WMD acquisition, many others made the point that the only sure way to prevent terrorists from acquiring these weapons is by eliminating them. Indonesia, speaking on behalf of NAM, advised that "[t]he most effective way of preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is through the total elimination of such weapons. In this context, we underline the need for the threat posed by terrorists acquiring weapon of mass destruction to be addressed within the framework of the United Nations and through international cooperation consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law."

Indonesia brought up a second point highlighted by several NAM countries in their statements. Currently, anti-terrorist measures are usually non-proliferation focused, and are increasingly being generated outside the traditional multilateral mechanisms for creating international law. In this sense, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly on April 13 and supported in the statements of many States, is proliferation focused, but was adopted by the General Assembly rather than the Security Council. Some Member States do not believe the Security Council should perform a legislative function. Pakistan stated, "An unequal and restricted Security Council cannot supplant or circumvent multilateral negotiating processes. Unilateral restrictions and selective regimes will not promote security; they will exacerbate insecurity."

The United States, an active proponent of anti-terrorism measures focusing on non-proliferation, is a supporter of various methods of impeding terrorist acquisition of WMD, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, Security Council Resolution 1540, and others. "We have begun applying existing laws and legal principles in innovative ways..." said Assistant Secretary Stephen Rademaker of the United States.

Member States also noted threats posed by easy terrorist access to conventional weapons, particularly Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) and small arms and light weapons. They recommended various export control systems to address this, including international instruments on SALW marking, tracing and brokering, provisions on ammunitions, and a comprehensive instrument on arms trade. Turkey announced that it will again table the resolution on "improv[ing] stockpile security and strengthen[ing] export controls in countries that import and manufacture MANPADS."

The European Union urged commitment to conclude and agree on the draft of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism including a legal definition of terrorist acts. The Sixth Committee drafters of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism are still struggling to arrive at the long-contested definition of terrorism. In the First Committee this week, although most states agreed about the threat posed by terrorism, a few States noted the need to still define terrorism, and it was clear that States had different understandings of the definition. While some states referred to terrorism and the possible acquisition of WMD by non-state actors only, other states noted their opposition to terrorism "in all its manifestations," and Venezuela "raise[d] its voice to confirm, one more time, the sure and daily menace against international security that constitute State terrorism."

Jean-Marie Goldstein, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security

disarmtimes@igc.org

and

Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will

jennifer@reachingcriticalwill.org