THE FIRST COMMITTEE MONITOR

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The First Committee Monitor

CONTENTS

PAGE 1  |  INTRODUCTION
PAGE 2  |  NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
PAGE 3  |  GRAPE AND CUCUMBERS: PANEL DISCUSSION ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
PAGE 4  |  OPERATIONAL STATUS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PAGE 5  |  NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
PAGE 6  |  THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
PAGE 7  |  DISARMAMENT MACHINERY
PAGE 8  |  FISSILE MATERIALS
PAGE 9  |  NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES
PAGE 10  |  NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME
PAGE 11  |  COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY
PAGE 12  |  MISSILES
PAGE 13  |  CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
PAGE 14  |  ARMS TRADE TREATY
PAGE 15  |  DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
PAGE 16  |  LANDMINES
PAGE 17  |  BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PAGE 18  |  NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES

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The Monitor is a weekly report produced by the NGO Working Group on the First Committee, a collaborative effort undertaken by non-governmental organizations to make the work of the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security more transparent. The Monitor is compiled, edited, and coordinated by Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.

RCW provides services to activists, diplomats, UN staffers, academics, and others, including:
- Posting statements, draft resolutions, and First Committee information online at www.reachingcriticalwill.org;
- Coordinating an array of briefings, workshops and panels designed to educate diplomats and activists on issues of disarmament, peace, and security;
- Serving as an information resource by email or phone; and
- Providing a link between the First Committee and NGOs who are not in New York.
Last week’s Thematic Debate on nuclear weapons offered a glimpse at one of the roots of the current impasse in the disarmament and non-proliferation regime: a discord of perception of what states perceive constitutes collective security—and how to attain it. Most delegations agree that multilateralism is essential, arguing, “equal’ security can only be achieved collectively, mainly through the United Nations,” (Ambassador Khan of Pakistan), and “our common disarmament efforts should not overlook the principles of multilateralism, non-discrimination, and supremacy of international laws” (Ambassador Punkrasin of Thailand).

However, stark divergences in opinion, reminiscent of the infamous dichotomy between disarmament-first and non-proliferation-first, became apparent during a panel discussion on nuclear disarmament. Jeffrey Eberhardt, US State Department, asked how the international community can achieve a global security environment that allows for nuclear disarmament, an environment that does not “require” reliance on nuclear weapons. In contrast, many delegations have asserted in their statements over the past two weeks that the first step to increasing international security is abolishing nuclear weapons. (See the report on this panel for further analysis.) These debates, while valuable in their demonstration of the difficulties delegations face when trying to reach consensus on programmes of work, are ultimately unhelpful, as they rest exclusively on narrowly defined national security priorities that are largely inflexible at the diplomatic level, with few new ideas presented to overcome the impasse.

The question of what a collective security environment constitutes, and how to build it, is extensively addressed in Nuclear Disorder or Cooperative Security, a civil society response to the WMD Commission Report. The authors assert that the concept of security needs to be reframed, “with a premium on universal human and ecological security, a return to multilateralism, and a commitment to cooperative, nonviolent means of conflict resolution.” They further argue that nuclear weapon states, particularly the US, “should make nuclear disarmament the leading edge of a global trend towards demilitarization and redirection of military expenditures to meet human and environmental needs.”

Demilitarization is the quest of most delegates and civil society representatives that attend these debates. At the end of his remarks, Ambassador Landman of the Netherlands paraphrased Victor Hugo, announcing that one day the time will come when the instruments of war, and in particular weapons of mass destruction, “will be on show in museums in the same way as today one can visit and inspect instruments of torture, fashionable in the Middle Ages and thereafter. And we would all be wondering that such weapons have existed and their use ever contemplated.”

It is this world that we “disarmament sophisticated” strive for in our work and lives, with reason, wisdom, and passion. One of the leaders on this path was Dr. Randall Caroline Forsberg, Executive Director of the Institute of Defense and Disarmament Studies and instrumental figure in the Nuclear Freeze movement, who consistently argued for the complete abolition of war as an aberration of humankind, and worked for a world in which weapons and war would no longer be socially-sanctioned, where they would be as obsolete and morally reprehensible as slavery.

We note with great sorrow that Dr. Forsberg passed away on 19 October after a long struggle with cancer, but we are confident that her vision and work will be carried on by those who share her belief that our better nature will prevail, and that the abolition of nuclear and conventional weapons is possible—and inevitable.

-Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will (www.reachingcriticalwill.org)

Dr. Randall Caroline Forsberg, 1945-2007
Nuclear Disarmament

The General Debate concluded at the beginning of last week with statements by nations in the tensest regions of the world: Israel, Iran, Pakistan, India, and North Korea.

Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan said there has been “a progressive erosion” of disarmament and non-proliferation structures, adding there is “the need to construct a new consensus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.” He repeated his government’s earlier proposal for a six pillar “disarmament architecture,” including a commitment by the major powers “to address the underlying motives and compulsions which drive states to acquire weapons of mass destruction and larger conventional arsenals and forces,” and a commitment by the nuclear weapon states “to complete nuclear disarmament within a reasonable timeframe.”

India promoted its own comprehensive plan, based on the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi plan. Ms. Sushma Swaraj, MP, said the plan “provided a holistic framework for disarmament with those with the biggest arsenals having the greater responsibility for nuclear disarmament.” She added, “Once the international community agrees on the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, all states could work together to elaborate incremental and progressive steps for realizing that goal.” While Pakistan framed many of its concerns in terms of India, India never mentioned Pakistan.

Israel and Iran were central to each other’s statements. Ambassador Mohammad Khazaee of Iran cited Israel as “the only impediment” to disarmament in the Middle East and said, “The lack of progress towards the realization of nuclear disarmament and the failure of certain nuclear weapon states to fulfill their obligations in this regard are frustrating.” Deputy Director General Miriam Ziv of Israel focused on strengthening non-proliferation and export controls regimes to counter “the danger arising from the existence of such weapons and systems in the hands of reckless and irresponsible actors, such as rogue states and terrorist groups.”

Meanwhile, Ambassador Pak Gil Yon of North Korea said, “It is alleged that there will no longer nuclear threats once proliferation is held in check. This is no more than a pretext for monopolizing nuclear weapons by evading nuclear disarmament.”

The Thematic Debate on nuclear disarmament began on Wednesday, with delegates focusing on specific strategies. Most of those strategies are detailed in other sections of The First Committee Monitor. Major non-nuclear weapon states took the opportunity to reinforce their beliefs in advancing a few core initiatives. Ambassador Sumio Tarui of Japan said his government “strongly believes that nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states based on the [NPT] regime is a necessary condition for achieving international peace and security... The nuclear weapon states must therefore completely implement their obligations under Article VI and make further nuclear disarmament efforts with ‘renewed determination.’”

Counsellor Craig Maclachlan of Australia said nuclear disarmament should be advanced “though balanced, progressive and reinforcing steps,” including permanent reductions in forces and increased transparency. “We also look to all states possessing nuclear weapons to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, thereby lowering the risk that these weapons might ever be used, and advancing their eventual elimination.” David Da Silva of Canada also focused on doctrines, saying, “There continue to be worrying signs as states demonstrate increased reluctance to consider further reductions, new doctrines are mooted which would assert a role for nuclear weapons as war-fighting – as opposed to strategic – tools, and plans for new weapons are discussed. These developments directly challenge our nuclear disarmament efforts.”

Norwegian Ambassador Knut Langeland said the seven nation initiative “has demonstrated that countries with different perspectives can develop a common understanding on how to move the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda forward.” He called for “an incremental disarmament agenda” including further cuts in strategic forces, moving forward on sub-strategic nuclear weapons, and greater transparency on disarmament efforts.

The draft resolutions also began to be
Grapes and Cucumbers: Panel Discussion on Nuclear Disarmament

The Thematic Debate on nuclear weapons in First Committee last week included a panel discussion with representatives of the US and Indonesian governments and the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The 17 October meeting highlighted the contrasting views of the world’s major nuclear weapon power and a leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement, specifically the balance between the non-proliferation and disarmament commitments of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Ambassador Sudjadnan Parnohadingrat, Indonesia’s ambassador to the United States, said proliferation “has been effectively contained,” therefore it was “unfair and untenable to demand the [non-nuclear weapon states] NNWS to comply with their obligations, while the [nuclear weapon states] NWS have failed to live up to their obligations and commitments.” If the NWS obligations were not “backed by stringent enforcement and verification measures” as are the obligations of NNWS, the NPT regime runs the risk of “becoming irrelevant and ultimately leading to its collapse.” He said, “The consensus political agreements of 1995 and 2000 [NPT review conferences] must be implemented in an incremental, transparent and non-discriminatory manner.” Sudjadnan also called on the US and Russia “to exercise leadership and commit to further negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons,” as well as negotiations on sub-strategic weapons.

Mr. Jeffrey Eberhardt, representative from the US State Department, repeated the argument the US has been making since the start of First Committee, specifically that the US is fulfilling its disarmament obligations by reducing its stockpile of nuclear weapons and fissile material “at an accelerated rate,” and has reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in its strategic doctrines. The bulk of his remarks focused on how to “achieve a global security environment that will allow for disarmament.” Referring to the January 2007 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal by Kissinger/Shultz/Perry/Nunn and by Mikhail Gorbachev, Eberhardt said the US strategy was not to focus on “laundry lists” but rather “how to create circumstances under which such an elimination process would be the most stable and realistic policy choice.” He said the “greatest challenge” is how to implement nuclear disarmament without creating new insecurities. It is only the unrealistic “disarmament sophists” who dislike struggling with those questions, he concluded.

Dr. Patricia Lewis, the Director of UNIDIR, said the current situation was “unstable” because of the “concept of security with nuclear weapons” and “unsustainable” due to the unresolved tension of the “haves versus the have-nots.” Referencing an experiment by primatologist Frans de Waal, wherein monkeys were given cucumbers for completing simple tasks, Dr. Lewis explained the powerful effects that inequity can have on behaviour. When one monkey began receiving grapes instead of cucumbers, the cucumber-receiving monkey became increasingly upset, and eventually rejected the cucumber in protest.

She further argued that the policies that have made nuclear weapons “a sought after goal” have led to a “domination fetish”. The challenge of how to avoid nuclear proliferation is to create the conditions that would lead to nuclear disarmament. The best route to that goal was to pursue disarmament as agreed to in the NPT, with “assessments of the security aspects” at each step. Lewis outlined a number of interim steps and confidence-building measures necessary since the large number of nuclear weapons means, even with reductions, that cuts “won’t affect security immediately.” The key first steps would be entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a moratorium on fissile materials. She also suggested outlawing nuclear weapons as a normative framework for disarmament, similar to the bans on chemical and biological weapons.

-Jim Wurst, Middle Powers Initiative (www.middlepowers.org)
On 10 October, New Zealand Ambassador Don Mackay reported to the First Committee that New Zealand would introduce a draft resolution—co-sponsored by Chile, Nigeria, Sweden, and Switzerland—calling for a stand-down of nuclear forces.

The initiative had been previously announced in Wellington by the New Zealand Minister for Disarmament Hon. Phil Goff on 30 August at a press conference with Dr. Hans Blix, Chair of the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Goff noted that “Thousands of nuclear weapons currently are on high-alert status, ready for instant launch. This presents a major threat to global security. Nuclear weapon systems at a high level of readiness increase the risk of these weapons being used, including unintentionally or by accident. Such an eventuality would have catastrophic consequences.”

The draft resolution, entitled “Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems” (A/C.1/62/L.29), welcomes steps already taken by some countries to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons, and calls for further practical steps with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high alert status.

The initiative caught the attention of the United States, leading to a statement by Christina Rocca, the US Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, that “the US forces are not, and never have been, on hair-trigger alert… In order to comply with this request we would have to first put our forces on hair-trigger alert so that we could then de-alert them.”

However, Dr. Bruce Blair, former Minuteman ICBM launch control officer and Director of the Centre for Defense Information, replied that “Both the United States and Russia today maintain about one-third of their total strategic arsenals on launch-ready alert. Hundreds of missiles armed with thousands of nuclear warheads—the equivalent of about 100,000 Hiroshima bombs—can be launched within a very few minutes.”

He further argued, “Their command and early warning systems are geared to launch on warning—firing friendly forces en masse before the anticipated arrival of incoming enemy missiles with flight times of 12-30 minutes. The Presidents of both countries would come under enormous pressure to make quick launch decisions in the event of an apparent missile strike by the other side. Much of this decision process has been designed to be quasi-automatic. It can reasonably be described as going to war by checklist, enacting a prepared script, with little margin for human error or technical malfunction.” See Rebuttal of the U.S. Statement on the Alert Status of U.S. Nuclear Forces for further details.

The US claims were also challenged in a paper circulated on 19 October by nuclear stockpiles expert Hans Christensen (Federation of Atomic Scientists). Christensen reports that new US military doctrine, especially the new Global Strike mission, “has deepened the requirement for quick-reaction strikes with forces on high alert… First articulated in January 2003 and assigned to U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Global Strike is defined as ‘a capability to deliver rapid, extended range, precision kinetic (nuclear and conventional) and non-kinetic (elements of space and information operations) effects in support of theater and national objectives.’” See A Rebuttal of the U.S. Statement on Nuclear Weapons Alert, Dismantlements and Reductions.

Interest in the draft UN resolution was clear from the high turn-out to a panel on operational status of nuclear weapons held on 17 October, which featured New Zealand Ambassador Don Mackay, Swedish counselor Magnus Hellgren, nuclear scientist Steven Starr, and de-alerting advocate John Hallam, coordinator of the international appeal on operational status of nuclear weapons. Of particular interest and concern to the audience of diplomats, UN officials, and civil society were the reports of incidents where high alert status could have resulted in a nuclear exchange by accident or miscalculation, the information on possibilities for infiltration of nuclear command systems by terrorists, and the new models of severe climatic change from the use of even a small number of nuclear weapons.

It is understood that key capitals are coming under pressure from some nuclear weapon states...
The dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme was again the near-exclusive focus of discussion over matters concerning nuclear proliferation in the second week of First Committee. Despite the large amount of floor time devoted to the issue, delegations generally failed to add any points of substance to the discussion beyond those covered already in the General Debate (see Nuclear Proliferation week one). In the Thematic Debate, the European Union statement did little more than expand on its position on Iran incorporated in its general statement. Japan and Australia both expressed approval of the work plan between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve outstanding issues, but also called on Iran to fully comply with relevant IAEA Board and UN Security Council resolutions without delay, including the suspension of uranium enrichment.

Given the active engagement and ownership of this issue by some major powers, who are also permanent members of the Security Council, the role of the General Assembly on this matter is certain to remain limited to repeated reassertion of national positions in prepared remarks during the general and themed discussions. The only, very minor, exception to this might be if some states continue to raise objections to the annual resolution sponsored by the League of Arab States, A/C.1/62/L.2, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.” Despite its title the resolution exclusively singles out Israel without reference to other concerns relevant to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (i.e. Iran), which has led some delegations to question its balance.

First Committee also heard both the Iranian and Israeli viewpoints on this issue in their general remarks. Reiterating familiar rhetorical points, Iranian Ambassador Khazaee defended Iran’s nuclear programme as peaceful, touted the 21 August work plan to resolve all outstanding issues with the IAEA, which the ambassador noted had been well received by the international community, and denounced UN Security Council resolutions adopted on the nuclear issue as “unwarranted … unlawful, unnecessary and unjustifiable.”

Israeli Ambassador Ziv, also delivering general remarks from the viewpoint of her country’s unique perspective on matters of global security, urged states to regard Iran “as a threat well beyond the geographical limits of the Middle East” and also as “a threat not just to the regional stability but also to the global strategic situation.” Ambassador Ziv’s statements were in part based on her argument that weapons of mass destruction “in the hands of reckless and irresponsible actors” is singularly the problem. These hyperbolic statements are particularly notable because Israel possesses the only nuclear arsenal in the region. Such positions were flatly rejected by the Hans Blix-led Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, which pointedly discarded the notion that nuclear weapons in the hands of some are safe, but in the hands of others place the world in mortal jeopardy.

Taking a large step back from the narrow and overtly self-interested views expressed by the regional antagonists, Ambassador Khan of Pakistan observed that in the context of Iran’s nuclear programme, “resort[ing] to further coercion or worse, the use of force, will be counter-productive and lead to further and grave instability and insecurity in the Middle East and beyond. It could also jeopardize the bright economic prospects of the entire region.” He emphasized the need to “safeguard the security and independence” of all states in the region, noting that “[a]symmetry, imbalance and discrimination will ultimately propel proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this region,” rather than facilitating the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

-Michael Spies, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy (www.lcnp.org)
Discussion of the nuclear fuel cycle continued both inside and out of the First Committee. The 2007 report of the International Panel of Fissile Materials, presented at an event in the UN on 19 October (see Fissile Materials), addresses issues related to the management of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle in light of projections anticipating global expansion of nuclear power. Even if the 1500 MWe growth scenario, used in a key report by MIT on the future of nuclear power, proves to be too optimistic, the report notes that even a modest expansion of nuclear power would result in power reactors coming online in a number of developing countries that have no or negligible operating nuclear power plants today. These states include Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Indonesia, Iran, North Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Viet Nam.

Important to determining how to best approach issues related to the nuclear fuel cycle, the report observes that economics is unlikely to be a barrier to states seeking to develop indigenous uranium enrichment capabilities, either to avoid fuel disruption issues or for other non-economic reasons, as “the cost of nuclear power is relatively insensitive to the cost of enrichment.” The report concludes that more countries will acquire national enrichment capabilities as nuclear power expands, unless some non-discriminatory framework is established for the supply of nuclear fuel. A forthcoming stand-alone report from the panel will examine the issue of nuclear fuel assurances as an alternative to national-based uranium enrichment.

Noting that without concerted action the nuclear fuel cycle could be the Achilles heel of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Gustavo Zlauvinen from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), addressing the First Committee, called for a new multilateral framework on both the front and back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Mr. Zlauvinen, who listed various existing proposals put forward by several countries, stated that the best way forward would be an incremental approach, which he described as a three step process to achieve a such a framework.

The first step would be to establish an adequate and reliable mechanism for supply. The next step would be to place any new uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities under multinational control. The last step would be to extend multinational control to existing nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

The European Union welcomed the report of the IAEA Director General entitled “Possible New Framework for the Utilisation of Nuclear Energy: Options for Assurance of Supply of Nuclear Fuel,” and stated it believes that it is time for a new approach to the nuclear fuel cycle, noting a “balanced multilateral mechanism” would reduce proliferation concerns.

-Michael Spies, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy (www.lcnp.org)

Nuclear Disarmament (cont.)

introduced and issued on Friday, including the New Agenda Coalition’s annual resolution (A/C.1/62/L.9); India introduced two nuclear disarmament resolutions, “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons” (A/C.1/62/L.23) and “Reducing Nuclear Danger” (A/C.1/62/L.21); and Iran’s draft resolution on the NPT nuclear disarmament obligations (A/C.1/62/L.8). Details on the drafts will be in next week’s report.

-Jim Wurst, Middle Powers Initiative (www.middlepowers.org)

Operational Status (cont.)

not support the resolution. In order to help balance this, Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament Co-Presidents Marian Hobbs and Alexa McDonough are circulating a letter to parliamentarians around the world urging them to contact their foreign ministers and United Nations ambassadors to support the draft resolution when it comes to a vote.

-Alyn Ware, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (www.ialana.net)
Disarmament Machinery

While disarmament machinery is scheduled to be discussed on 25 October, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) was highlighted during the Thematic Debate on nuclear weapons, with the presentation by Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Secretary General of the CD. Last year, Mr. Ordzhonikidze doubted that the CD could survive another year without substantive work, and whether the Five Ambassador’s proposal, although widely supported, would ever accrue consensus. This year, he reported that the potential of the CD as a negotiating body is alive, and that the P6 package proposal on a programme of work, L.1, intensified the CD’s work and participation of capitals, and managed to sustain continuity from the 2006 session.

With these positives in mind, Mr. Ordzhonikidze examined the reasons for continuing deadlock in the CD. He indicated that changing (and then hardening) perceptions of security by states is largely responsible for the impasse. He sees the CD as trying to force consensus on disparate priorities, when governments need to establish a clear and convincing understanding of security based on common desires. He suggested states look beyond narrowly defined national security interests to determine their policies, but also that the CD review its working methods to become more responsive to contemporary security challenges. He questioned the efficacy of a package approach, pointing out that it has not yet produced a breakthrough—that, ironically, while trying to adopt a comprehensive work programme, the CD has ended up with no work programme.

Sri Lanka’s Ambassador Kariyawasam expressed a similar sentiment in his statement earlier in the week, when emphasizing “the importance of the Conference to agree on a practical, less ambitious programme of work, which could direct the Conference towards the goals for which it was established.”

Most delegations, however, consistently express support for the comprehensive package. Iran’s Ambassador Khazaei advocated a “balanced programme of work,” and during the General Debate most delegates called on CD member states to adopt the L.1 proposal at the start of the 2008 session. During the CD’s 2007 session, the overwhelming majority of delegations argued that the package proposal is the best way to proceed in the CD. A balanced programme is a non-discriminatory approach that would allow for the interests and concerns of more than a few select states to be acknowledged and accommodated.

During his statement on 15 October, Ambassador Khan of Pakistan, like Mr. Ordzhonikidze, recognized the “need to construct a new consensus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.” He argued, “Such a new consensus will require a revival of commitment to collective security architecture based on equity, balance, restraint and cooperation among States.” However, in response to Mr. Ordzhonikidze’s presentation, Ambassador Khan expressed doubt that political will is all that is lacking to reach such a consensus. He asked where political will should be exerted in the CD, arguing that at one point, all member states agreed to a certain structure for the negotiation of a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)—the Shannon Mandate—but that understanding was reneged upon.

During his presentation, Mr. Ordzhonikidze also argued the need for civil society and the media to reach out to people that will give the CD the support it needs, indicating that the CD is suffering from a lack of civil society involvement. In the informal question period, New Zealand’s Ambassador Mackay agreed the CD would benefit from further civil society involvement and greater transparency. However, challenging Mr. Ordzhonikidze to consider how civil society involvement could be enhanced, he pointed out that non-government organization (NGO) access to the CD is severely restricted, especially in comparison to the level of participation in which NGOs are allowed to engage at the First Committee and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle. Despite restricted access to the CD, the Reaching Critical Will project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom monitors and reports on all formal plenary meetings and posts governmental statements and papers from the CD.

During the concluding statements from the General Debate last week, Mrs. Sushma Swaray of continued on page 14
For the second year in a row, the Canadian delegation found itself unable to move forward with a draft text on a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), due to lack of consensus. In the 2006 session of the First Committee, the Canadian delegation withdrew its draft resolution, A/C.1/61/L.23, in the belief that a resolution passed without consensus would not send the right message to the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The draft resolution took a minimalist approach, simply calling on the CD “to commence immediately negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons,” without reference to verification or existing stocks, which the Canadians maintained could be brought up during negotiations. This year, Canadian Ambassador Marius Grinius stated his delegation would seek a decision from the First Committee on an FMCT. Despite choosing not to proceed with a draft decision, Canadian representative David Da Silva called on all states to support the presidential draft decision, L.1, tabled at the CD this year.

At an event entitled, “Toward a Global Cleanout of Nuclear Weapon Materials,” the Princeton University-based International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) presented its 2007 Global Fissile Material Report, and highlighted technical issues faced by the international community in securing and irreversibly reducing fissile material stocks. IPFM co-chair Frank von Hippel gave an overview of the 2007 report which, inter alia, examines possible mechanisms for detection of clandestine fissile material production, key for effective verification of a FMCT. As a long-term problem for efficacy of a fissile materials production ban regime, Alexander Glaser emphasized the complications posed by continued production and stockpiling of highly-enriched uranium fuel for naval reactors and civilian stocks of fissile materials, which will be vastly larger than military stocks once nuclear arsenals in Russia and the United States drop below 1000 warheads each. Harold Feiveson emphasized the panel’s concern that the lack of a permanent repository for nuclear waste was driving renewed global interest in spent fuel reprocessing, which is not only problematic from a proliferation standpoint, but is also extremely expensive and does not necessarily save repository space. Forthcoming stand-alone reports of the IPFM will explore verification of an FMCT, including recommendations on possible treaty text, a verification protocol, and mechanism for international monitoring. All reports of the IPFM are accessible on their website, www.fissilematerials.org.

In the Thematic Debate on nuclear weapons, delegations discussed their differences over the scope of an FMCT and preconditions for negotiation. Many delegations that spoke on the subject expressed support for the package deal tabled by the six presidents of the CD, including those of Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia. The Chinese and Indian delegations reiterated their support for a multilateral, non-discriminatory, and effectively verifiable FMCT. The Netherlands and the European Union called for commencement of negotiations without preconditions. Ambassador Khan of Pakistan elaborated on his government’s continuing objections to proceeding with negotiations on any basis but the 1995 Shannon Mandate. While he agreed that any issue may of course be raised in negotiations, he stated that specific reference to such matters as verification in the negotiation mandate is crucial, as when entering negotiations “one has to be sure what is sacrosanct and what is not.”

The necessity of a fissile material production ban, ideally in conjunction with a commitment to deep reductions in the US and Russian nuclear arsenals, is made more urgent by the prospects of a nuclear arms race in South Asia. At its event, members of the IPFM noted that construction was continuing on a breeder reactor in India, exempt from safeguards under the US-India deal for nuclear cooperation, which would greatly increase its plutonium production capacity. In addition, within the past year it had been revealed that Pakistan began construction of two additional plutonium production reactors.

-Michael Spies, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy (www.lcnp.org)
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) continued to feature prominently in this week’s deliberations of First Committee, with states reaffirming their support for existing zones, proposing measures to strengthen their objectives, and encouraging the creation of new NWFZs.

China’s delegation reaffirmed its support for “the efforts made by relevant states and regions in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones,” as demonstrated by China’s signing of the relevant protocols of NWFZ Treaties. Norway, Indonesia, and Laos joined China in calling on nuclear weapon states (NWS) to ratify supporting protocols of existing NWFZ Treaties.

Unlike regional NWFZs, single state zones lack the formal agreements from NWS respecting their nuclear weapon free status (NWFS). Mongolia is setting the precedent in seeking a legally-binding NWFS and negative security assurances from NWS. In this week’s statement, Mongolia recalled the recognition by NWS in a 2000 joint statement of Mongolia’s NWFS and negative security assurances. Mongolia welcomed progress on a draft trilateral treaty between Mongolia and its nuclear neighbors, China and the Russian Federation.

Indonesia and New Zealand introduced resolutions to strengthen existing NWFZs and to enhance the means of cooperation and communication between the zones. Indonesia, on behalf of the States Parties to the Southeast Asia NWFZ introduced the draft resolution (A/C.1/62/L.19) entitled “Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)”. The objectives of the resolution are “to seek universal support for the SEANWFZ Treaty; to encourage ongoing consultation with NWS with a view to early accession by NWS; to enhance and explore further ways and means of cooperation between SEANWFZ with other nuclear-weapon-free-zones; and to further contribute to global efforts in achieving a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas.” New Zealand and Brazil introduced the annual resolution (A/C.1/62/L.27) affirming the creation of a nuclear weapon free Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas that would unite the existing NWFZs covering virtually the entire Southern Hemisphere, while assuring that the freedom continued on page 10
North Korea’s Nuclear Programme

During the second week of First Committee meetings in 2006, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced it had conducted a nuclear weapon test. This announcement was met with widespread condemnation, as well as renewed focus on the First Committee and its role in forging normative consensus among states regarding proliferation, disarmament, and nuclear testing, and in creating the necessary legal instruments to facilitate practical steps towards a less armed, more secure world.

A majority of delegations articulated their concerns about the DPRK’s nuclear programme. Many also recognized the progress that has been made this past year in the Six-Party Talks. They lauded the agreement reached in September between the DPRK and the other Six-Party members, which is leading to the full de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, beginning with the closure of plutonium-producing reactor at Yongbyon.

Thailand and Gabon’s representatives, among others, lauded the progress made thus far, and expressed their desire to see the full de-nuclearization of the Peninsula in the near future. The peaceful resolution of the DPRK situation has been cited as a significant step towards a more secure world through multilateral diplomacy, and within the non-proliferation regime as a whole. Japan’s Ambassador Tarui noted the success of the Six-Party talks and urged further progress towards full transparency and compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The DPRK did not offer a governmental statement during the sessions this week.

Though the Six-Party talks have been the primary nexus of negotiating the settlement of the issue, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been present at each step. The IAEA, with its international team of nuclear experts and inspectors, has taken a lead role in facilitating the de-nuclearization of the DPRK. Additionally, the success of the negotiations have offered an example of the potential for negotiated de-nuclearization of states that have violated, withdrawn from, or are not party to the NPT.

-Nanna Walther, Reaching Critical Will
(www.reachingcriticalwill.org)

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (cont.)

of navigation on the high seas would not be undermined. Support for this initiative has been strong in the past among the UN General Assembly and the regional NWFZs.

A number of governments, including Bangladesh, Jordan, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan, and Palestine called for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East as a means of restoring the non-proliferation regime and contributing to regional and global peace and security. In this regard, Jordan, Iran, Lebanon, and Palestine called for Israel to accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its provisions. Jordan argued that “this would not only defuse existing tensions, bring about tangible progress on other bilateral tracks of the peace process, enhance confidence-building measures between all parties, and have an overall positive impact on regional peace and security, but would also prevent the occurrence of potential nuclear accidents and radiological contamination.” Last week, Egypt tabled its annual resolution (A/C.1/62/L.1) on “Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East” and, along with the League of Arab States, a resolution (A/C.1/62/L.2) on “The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East”.

In addition to the proposed NWFZ in the Middle East, discussions are currently underway at the UN and in respective regions about the creation of NWFZs in South Asia, Northeast Asia, Central Europe, Arctic/Nordic region, and in the Mediterranean. As stated by Ambassador Don Mackay of New Zealand, “[a] powerful symbol for demonstrating the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction is the reach, and potential reach, of nuclear weapon free zones over the landmasses of the globe.” The establishment of the Central Asian NWFZ in 2006, the first NWFZ in the Northern Hemisphere, serves as an important reminder and encouragement for the emergence of additional zones leading the way to nuclear disarmament and the fulfillment of NPT promises.

-Monika Szymurska, Atomic Mirror
(www.atomicmirror.org)
The First Committee Monitor

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Tibor Tóth, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) delivered a presentation to the First Committee last week during Thematic Debate on nuclear weapons.

Tóth commented on the successful outcome of the Fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry Into Force of the CTBT in Vienna, where 100 of the 140 states that have ratified the Treaty and state signatories were present. This conference’s Final Declaration, which reflected the consensus of the participants, calls on those states that have not ratified the CTBT to do so without delay.

The issue of the CTBT’s entry into force was a recurring theme during the second week of First Committee. Nineteen delegations, in addition to the European Union (EU), which was represented by Portugal, spoke on this topic. Most delegates expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that the CTBT has not entered into force despite it reaching the eleventh anniversary of adoption this year. They urged all states, especially the Annex II group whose ratification is needed for the Treaty’s entry into force, to sign and ratify as soon as possible.

Bangladesh’s representative mentioned it was the first Annex II nation in South Asia to have signed and ratified the CTBT, and urged the remaining eleven Annex II States to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. Sergio Duarte, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, emphasized the contribution of the Fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT. He added that the Office of Disarmament Affairs and its regional centres for peace and disarmament in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in the Asia/Pacific, have worked actively with the CTBTO Preparatory Commission to promote the entry into force of the Treaty.

According to Tóth, the Conference and its Final Declaration are evidence of the international community’s desire to have a universal and internationally effective and verifiable tool in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Seven delegations and the EU stressed the importance of the CTBT vis-à-vis nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Bangladesh stated that the CTBT and the NPT are “the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.” Dr. Patricia Lewis, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), emphasized nuclear disarmament when talking about the importance of the entry into force of the CTBT. Gustavo Zlauvimen, Representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the United Nations, talked about the CTBT’s contribution to halting the development of nuclear weapons by both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states.

Tóth reported that since September 2005, 20 or more states have signed or ratified the treaty, bringing the total numbers to 177 signatories and 140 ratifications, and bringing its universality closer to reality.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear test, according to Tóth, was a performance challenge for the CTBTO, its fledgling verification regime, its technical capabilities, and its procedures. Although the yield of the explosion was low, and at the time the CTBTO had only less than 180 of the International Monitoring System’s 321 stations in operation, the nuclear test was well recorded by the Organization’s system. This successful outcome in nuclear test detection added value to the CTBT verification system.

Despite the CTBTO’s accomplishments, Tóth revealed that the organization has important challenges ahead of it. There are considerable technical, financial and political challenges in the process of the installation and certification of many remaining stations.

-Edgar Socarras, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security (www.disarmtimes.org)
A few delegations addressed the issue of missiles in their statements to the General Debate in the First Committee (see Missiles week one). The delegation of Iran expressed pleasure that the third Panel of Government Experts on missiles seemed to have a “very constructive and serious discussion” during its first substantive session. In light of the fact that the panel will have two additional sessions in 2008, the Iranians announced they would introduce a draft decision on the issue of missiles instead of a substantive resolution “as suggested by the 2005 recommendations of the Committee on ‘methods of work.’”

In his general statement to the First Committee, Ambassador Khan of Pakistan described the proliferation and development of missiles and anti-ballistic missile systems as an emerging threat to international stability, and stated it should be dealt with in an international agreement as part of what he described as a proposed “new disarmament architecture”. Referring to existing export regimes as discriminatory, Ambassador Khan stated they would never work because they would not constrain states determined to develop a ballistic missile capability. He also called for a multilateral treaty to prohibit deployment of ballistic missile defense systems, which he described as “inherently destabilizing both at the strategic and the regional levels,” and for an accompanying agreement for limitations on other kinds of missile systems. Ambassador Khan further advocated for the Conference on Disarmament to take up the issue of anti-ballistic missiles as a priority item and to consider discussions of missiles.

Also chiming in on the subject of ballistic missile defense, Ambassador Pak Gil Yon of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea took the floor during the General Debate to denounce the deployment of US missile defense systems. US State Department representative Jeffrey Eberhardt, in a panel discussion on nuclear disarmament, took a contrary approach, suggesting that the deployment of ballistic missile defenses could actually facilitate nuclear disarmament by assisting in creation of a “new security environment”.

-Michael Spies, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy (www.lcnp.org)
On behalf of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA), High Representative H.E. Sergio Duarte shared the levels of submissions generated by the request of resolutions introduced last year. Resolution 61/72, “Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus” (A/62/166 and Add 1), received 18 submission this year, an increase of 10. 61/82, “Conventional arms control at regional and subregional levels” (A/62/93), experienced an increase of 5 submissions to reach a total of 12 this year. 61/89, “Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms” (A/62/278/Parts I and II and Add.1), received an unprecedented 97 submissions. Unfortunately, reporting on the UN Register of Conventional Arms (A/62/170 and Add.1 and Add.2) dropped from 116 submissions to 107. Overall, Duarte noted, submissions to conventional weapons-related resolutions are faring better than others.

In his statement, Serbia’s Ambassador Kruljevic announced that Serbia has taken necessary measures to ratify the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)’s Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and to accede to Amended Protocol II. India reported that it was among the first 23 states to ratify Protocol V and “one of 25 states to have signed and ratified the CCW and all its five protocols.” Belarus is working to accede to Protocol V and hopes to accomplish this in the near future. A representative from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted that the First Meeting of States party to the Protocol on ERW will be held in Geneva in November 2007, and needs to “produce clear guidelines for how all States Parties should proceed with the recording, retention and transmission of information required by the Protocol, and for it to establish an operational framework for addressing the massive problem of existing ERW.”

Serbia’s delegation also noted its active involvement both within the CCW and the Oslo Process to ban the use of cluster munitions in highly populated civilian areas, and towards the destruction of munitions stockpiles. High Representative Duarte also stated the support of the ODA for the establishment of norms governing cluster munitions. “Now is the time to finally address this problem by adopting legally binding rules,” stated the ICRC. “Until such time as they enter into force, we urge States to refrain from using, producing or transferring inaccurate and unreliable cluster munitions.”

Georgia’s delegation noted with concern the challenges in implementing the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the intention of the Russian Federation to withdraw from it. Georgia continues to call for a national or international monitoring team to inspect the military base in Gudauta to verify its closure, as claimed by the Russian Federation.

Regarding the regulation of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), Belarus supports the “elaboration and adoption under the SALW Programme of Action of the measures to counter uncontrolled transfer of SALW, including MANPADS.” Israel’s Ambassador Ziv stated her support for the draft resolution advanced by Australia on the regulation and control of transfers of MANPADS.

On 19 October, the European Union and the ODA showcased its joint project on promoting the universality of the CCW and its Protocols. The joint action was established in November 2006, and plans have been made to hold 7 regional seminars to increase the number of signatories to the CCW while increasing support for its sponsorship program, which provides resources for the participation of mine-affected low income countries. Increased membership in the CCW will allow it to more fully respond to advancements in weapons technology and developments in the nature and conduct of armed conflict.

-Waverly de Bruijn, Global Action to Prevent War (www.globalactionpw.org)
The Holy See articulated its support for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), driven from the grave concern it shares with conflict-ridden countries “whose experience tells us that illicit trade in arms, their accumulation and illicit production are a hindrance to the peaceful settlement of disputes, drive tensions into armed conflicts and are a key factor in prolonging them, thus heavily compromising peace and development.”

As a co-sponsor of last year’s draft resolution, “Towards an arms trade treaty,” Ethiopia “vehemently supports” the ATT process, and “will continue to extend its unreserved support and cooperation to the successful conclusion of this important treaty.” Statements made by the delegations from Albania, Georgia, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) echoed support for the ATT initiative, with Jamaica, Montenegro, and Serbia also noting that they have submitted a report to the Secretary-General on this matter.

Sudan’s delegation is closely following the discussion on the proposed ATT, and will “continue to engage constructively in this process, to figure out its feasibility, how far it will serve the disarmament objectives within the multilateral context and in full transparency without prejudice to the legitimate rights of the member states.” Iran’s Ambassador Khazaee is of the opinion that efforts towards implementation of the UN Programme of Action should not be abandoned, and that “given the current positions and disagreements on the issue of Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), it is also premature to begin a new process.”

Thailand’s Ambassador Punkrasin noted his support for the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), the members of which were appointed on 28 September from the following 28 countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States.

On 17 October, the Non-Governmental Organizations ATT Steering Committee and the Control Arms campaign launched “A Global Arms Trade Treaty: What States Want,” an analysis of the 97 submissions made to the Secretary-General on the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for an ATT. The report concludes that “Some 86 of the 92 submissions analysed either explicitly reiterated their support or provided views as to how this initiative could move forward.” Regarding scope, 57 submissions expressed the view that an effective ATT should include “all” conventional arms, and that the range of activities (including a broad definition of transfers) that fall within the scope of an ATT must be clearly and precisely defined. The submissions of member states were compiled into a substantial list of recommendations to the GGE, with the understanding that “If the GGE report is sufficiently constructive it could lead to the establishment by the UN General Assembly of an Open Ended Working Group in 2009 to negotiate the terms of a global Arms Trade Treaty so that the international community can agree and benefit from such a Treaty as soon as possible, hopefully by the year 2010.”

- Waverly de Bruijn, Global Action to Prevent War (www.globalactionpw.org)

Disarmament Machinery (cont.)

the Indian delegation emphasized the importance of the First Committee’s contributions to CD. She explained, “The First Committee and the General Assembly have a special role in forging a better understanding on the entire range of issues on the global disarmament agenda. Through such an exercise, they can promote purposive actions internationally and provide useful direction to the [CD].” It is unfortunate that the Canadian delegation determined it would not be able to table a draft decision on the FMCT again this year because of lack of consensus—such a decision could have acted as just such a purposive action providing direction to the CD.

-Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will (www.reachingcriticalwill.org)
Disarmament and Development

Highlighting the link between vast governmental expenditures on military capability and armaments, the potential uses of those same resources for development purposes was a theme in this past week’s Thematic Debate on nuclear weapons. During the panel discussion and subsequent informal session on the morning of 17 October, High Representative Sergio Duarte articulated that disarmament and development is a wide and intricate subject. Compared to enormous arms expenditures, states spend tiny amounts on development projects—whether domestic development or foreign aid.

The delegations from Cuba and Nicaragua argued that investments in armaments could be redirected to overcome development challenges being faced in their own states and beyond. Likewise, Ambassador Chang of the Republic of Korea stressed the necessity of having a security environment conducive to disarmament in order to be afforded the option of apportioning funds freed up from military expenditures to development projects. Nicaragua’s Ambassador Duarte argued that the money nuclear weapon states spend on modernization programmes could eradicate communicable diseases and illiteracy in the developing world.

However, High Representative Duarte pointed out the difficulty in harnessing resources currently dedicated to the military for redirection towards civilian development goals. He referred to a proposal of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, which asked for a tax on military spending, known as the 1% tax for human folly. The Secretary General of the Conference on Disarmament agreed that even if military budgets were to shrink, such reductions would offer no guarantee that those funds would be redirected towards development. States have a myriad of competing interests and goals among which resources are divided, and thus military and development expenditures are not necessarily inversely proportional.

Furthermore, Duarte, as well as the representative from the International Atomic Energy Agency, noted that disarmament and non-proliferation goals also require significant investment. Some states must choose between allocating funds towards honouring their treaty commitments and those related to UNSCR 1540, and other worthy development projects or goals. Another concern in the disarmament and development debate was energy security. As economies expand and their demand for energy soars, states must take measures to secure access to sufficient energy resources. Spending in this arena, which could involve money from former military budgets, might also be seen as related to development.

During the formal governmental statements, developing nations took the lead in addressing the link between disarmament and development. Oman, Cuba, Pakistan, Thailand, Jamaica, Gabon, Nicaragua, and Morocco each made references to it. Jamaica’s Ambassador Brown purported that the crux of the disarmament debate lies firmly at the nexus between disarmament and development—that the “deteriorous effects” of weapons, particularly small arms, wreaks “havoc and harm in many parts of the world, daily.” She emphasized the “needless burden on the socio-economic structure of many governments” that results “in the diversion of scarce resources from our national budget to tackle its crippling effects and so, retard levels of growth and development.” Ambassador Moussotsi of Gabon argued that the continuing increase in global military expenditures is an ethical problem, especially as aid to Africa decreases.

-Anna Walther, Reaching Critical Will (www.reachingcriticalwill.org)
Landmines

The second week of debate on landmines continued to focus on the need for universal membership to the Ottawa Convention (also known as the Mine Ban Treaty), with delegates from Jordan, Ethiopia, Jamaica, Serbia, Belarus, and Thailand reiterating the importance of this goal. Delegates also called upon member states and donor nations to assist with landmine clearance operations and victim rehabilitation. Ambassador Kolsenik of Belarus stated, “the responsible attitude of donors in providing necessary assistance at the stage of implementation of the Convention is one of the factors that can promote its universality.”

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) pointed to the tenth anniversary of the Mine Ban Treaty as an important success story in creating international norms, and a positive trend in the field of international humanitarian law regulating weapons. The Representative for the ICRC, Ms. Pellandini, noted that commitment to the treaty and the “model of cooperation between states, international organizations and civil society” acted as an “inspiration” for action in

the area of cluster munitions and the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War. A side panel on the “EU Joint Action in support of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)” highlighted the success achieved through the Ottawa Convention and universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), noting the potential for further successes in dealing with cluster munitions, anti-vehicle mines, and Explosive Remnants of War.

Ethiopia, Jordan, Belarus, Albania, and Serbia’s delegations outlined their commitment to the destruction of anti-personnel landmines. Ethiopia, which ratified the Convention in 2004, confirmed the destruction of four thousand mines and close to forty thousand items of unexploded ordnance. Belarus, while reaffirming its commitment to the universality of the Convention, noted the difficulty it faced in destroying the seventh largest arsenal of anti-personnel mines in the world, due to the high estimated cost of destruction. Serbia’s Ambassador Kruljevic indicated more success with the destruction of anti-personnel mine stockpiles held by the Serbian Army in

continued on back page
Delegations spoke in broad agreement about the imperative of complete implementation and universalisation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), in order to preserve and develop the benefits from these two multilateral regimes.

Most States Parties consider the Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC in December 2006 a success. Ambassador Park from the Republic of Korea praised the Meeting of Experts, which was held in August, as “a good opportunity to share experiences and learn from others, especially on the national implementation of the Convention.” Ambassador Park further mentioned the importance of penal legislation as well as strict export controls on biological agents and associated dual-use technology and equipment. Ambassador Gomas from Portugal, on behalf of the European Union (EU), mentioned the adoption of an EU Action Plan to “revitalise interest in and use of BTWC Confidence Building Measures (CBM) ensuring the annual submissions of returns by all EU Member States.” The EU urged all State Parties to enhance transparency through the submission of CBM returns.

Santiago Oñate, the Legal Advisor of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPWC), elaborated on the status of national implementation of the CWC, which has risen from less than one third of States Parties in 2003 to 79%. However, there is still a large backlog in terms of comprehensive national legislation, which has only been introduced by 42% of the States Parties. Oñate added that an incomplete implementation of the CWC holds the risk of a “return to chemical weapons”.

Ambassador Park from the Republic of Korea highlighted “the importance of enhancing the effectiveness of chemical-industry verification.” Ralph Trapp from the OPCW pointed out challenges arising from the relocation of the chemical industry from traditional to new locations in eastern Europe and the southern hemisphere. This leads to expansion of chemical development in countries with little prior experience in national implementation of the Convention, and adds to the complexity in maintaining the quality of the verification regime.

Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General of the OPCW, pointed out that while 30% of the chemical weapons stockpile has been destroyed over the last 10 years, the remaining 70% have to be destroyed in just 5 years. Regarding the Russian Federation, Pfirter called for continued international funding, whereas in the case of the United States he focused on the complexity of safe practices.

Pfirter articulated his hopes that the second review conference to be held in Den Haag in 2008 will not focus on the issue of possible non-compliance with the 2012 deadline. Trapp emphasized that the conference should cater to the rapid changes in science and technology, and embrace these innovations as new opportunities. This view was shared by Ambassador Park, who called for “an opportunity to assess and address the current challenges, laying a solid foundation for ensuring full implementation and enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention.”

Projecting the future of the OPCW after 2012, Hans Reeps of the OPCW assured the need of maintaining the Organization, as chemical weapons will keep “popping up over the next 50 years.” Ralph Trapp added, if chemical weapons should ever be used in the future, the technical competence and capabilities of the OPWC will be indispensable. Pfirter mentioned the OPWC would benefit the international community as watchdog, deterrent, and through its activities in industry monitoring and verification.

Poland introduced the draft resolution entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction” (A/C.1/62/L.7). Similar resolutions have been introduced by Poland in preceding years. This draft resolution contains only cosmetic changes in comparison to last year’s.

-Philip Urech, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security (www.disarmtimes.org)
Negative Security Assurances

As the First Committee concluded its General Debate and began a Thematic Debate on nuclear weapons, negative security assurances (NSAs) remained an issue of concern for many countries.

Several states possessing nuclear weapons took stands in favor of legally-binding NSAs. India’s delegation emphasized its government’s policies of no-first-use and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states, and said it was willing to turn these policies into legally-binding treaties. Pakistan’s Ambassador Khan took the argument further, claiming that as a corollary to the idea of NSAs, the Security Council should come to the aid of non-nuclear weapon states who are threatened with nuclear weapons.

Several non-nuclear weapon states also voiced their support. During the General Debate, Kuwait’s delegation argued for “making effective international arrangements that gives [sic] non-nuclear states assurances against the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of their use.” This sentiment was echoed in statements by delegates from Belarus, Thailand, and several others.

During the Thematic Debate on nuclear weapons, the Republic of Korea cited NSAs as a means to alleviate the security concerns of non-nuclear weapon states. The United Arab Emirates delegation also stressed the importance of “[d]eveloping a universal, unconditional instrument that provides the necessary safeguards for non-nuclear states against any threats or risks that might result from the use of existing nuclear arsenals.”

Of the nuclear weapon states that spoke during the Thematic Debate, only China’s delegate brought up the topic of NSAs. He emphasized that “[b]efore the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear weapon states should commit themselves to no first use of nuclear weapons, undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear-weapon-free zones, and negotiate and conclude an international legal instrument on this matter.”

During Thematic Debate, Iran tabled draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.8, which, among other things, notes that “the 2000 review conference of parties to the treaty [on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons] agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear weapon states to the non-nuclear weapon states parties to the treaty strengthen the non-proliferation regime.”

-Nathan Band, Global Security Institute (www.gsinstitute.org)

Landmines (cont.)

May 2007, and that final mine field clearance is scheduled for the end of 2008.

In November 2007, Jordan will host the eighth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty at the Dead Sea. Ambassador Majali of Jordan stated that the conference will provide an opportunity for “mine affected countries to voice their concerns, needs and undertaking … and bring State Parties and their partners closer towards full implementation of the Convention.” Many delegations see the Dead Sea meeting as crucial in ensuring the 2009 mine clearance deadlines are met, and that any extensions are only for the shortest period possible. In line with last week’s statement from Australia, Jordan confirmed its intention to table a joint resolution on the Convention.

Jordan’s presidency of the meeting and its location at the Dead Sea provides a new regional venue for the Convention. Both Iraq and Kuwait (who recently acceded to the Convention) received special note from Jordan and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC also noted that it had held conferences for the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council and of the Magreb to address the problems of mines in the region.

-Kavitha Suthanthiraraj, Global Action to Prevent War (www.globalactionpw.org)