The First Committee Monitor is a collaborative NGO effort undertaken to make the work of the First Committee more transparent and accessible. The Monitor is compiled, edited, and coordinated by Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.

Contributing organizations and projects to this edition:
- Global Action to Prevent War
- International Action Network on Small Arms
- International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms
- Middle Powers Initiative
- NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
- Quaker United Nations Office
- Reaching Critical Will of WILPF
- Religions for Peace

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**First Committee Monitor**

2010 Number 4 | October–November 2010

Reaching Critical Will | A project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

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*The views in this publication are not necessarily those of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom or the Reaching Critical Will project.*

## About Reaching Critical Will

Reaching Critical Will is your primary source for information, documents, and analysis about the United Nations General Assembly First Committee and other multilateral disarmament conferences.

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- All statements, working papers, resolutions, and voting results from all First Committee meetings since 2001;
- All statements and documents from the Conference on Disarmament, and regular reports on the plenary meetings;
- All statements, documents, and reports from NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees, and archived editions of the *News in Review*;
- Research and analysis of critical issues related to disarmament and arms control; and
- News and information about civil society engagement for a nuclear weapon free world.
Editorial: A framework for what objectives?
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

During the thematic debate on disarmament machinery, Ambassador Skorpen of Norway noted, “The framework for deliberations and negotiations must be a function of the objectives we want to achieve.” While she was referring principally to the Conference on Disarmament and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, her comment is also broadly applicable to other ongoing and future processes for disarmament and arms control. If such negotiation processes severely limit possible outcomes, create an imbalance among key players, prevent negotiations from beginning, or even undermine the ability of some actors to participate, it is clearly not a function of the objective. However, an immediate question arises in the context of any negotiating process or forum: what happens when different players have different objectives?

When it comes to the arms trade treaty (ATT), objectives are still widely varied. The Swiss and Norwegian delegations, for example, outlined their comprehensive expectations for an ATT, which, when their positions are combined, would prevent violations of human rights and international humanitarian law; include as many weapon types, components, and technologies as possible; offer victim assistance and rehabilitation provisions; and take into account the sustainable economic and social development of the intended recipient state. At the same time, several other delegations limited their ATT-related comments exclusively to emphasizing that the treaty must uphold article 51 of the UN Charter, regarding a state’s right to self-defence against armed attacks. It is also unclear as of yet exactly where some of these states will draw red lines when it comes to the objectives of others, though their skepticism about some of the more robust objectives suggests that at least a few countries see the treaty as being potentially discriminatory, its application subject to political manipulation and double standards.

With this in mind, is the framework for negotiating an ATT—an open-ended process in the General Assembly conducted by consensus—sufficient to ensure that the objective of an effective and robust ATT is accomplished? Many countries have already expressed concern that the framework of the open-ended working group will result in a lowest-common denominator treaty; when the ATT negotiation process was established through General Assembly resolution 64/48 in 2009, delegation after delegation took the floor to outline their concerns with the consensus rule being included in the mandate.

And then there is the position of one of the ATT’s leading promoters, the United Kingdom. The UK delegation, largely credited with achieving agreement among states for the 2009 resolution, emphasized in its statement last week that it views the treaty as a means to “benefit the defence industry,” noting that establishing common agreed standards for arms transfers “will help pave the way for increased industry collaboration and joint ventures.” How does this objective accord with those of states who see the treaty’s primary goal as being to limit human suffering and promote sustainable development across the globe? Can we expect all of the major weapon manufacturing and exporting states to view the purpose and design of an ATT the same way as the UK? Traditionally, major weapons producers have viewed arms sales and transfers as “instruments of foreign policy,” to exert influence and to strengthen alliances, among other things. Will the major arms exporters seek to exert their influence over the outcome of the very treaty that could potentially limit their ability to exert such influence in the future?

These questions, of course, are also applicable to any potential process to negotiate a fissile material (cut-off) treaty. As tensions rise in conference room 4 over perceived objectives and positions of various states on a potential FM(C)T, the halls are abound with ideas for the negotiation of this treaty. Some have advocated that the treaty remain on the Conference on Disarmament (CD)’s agenda and that its members continue seeking consensus on a programme of work to commence substantive work. Others argue the treaty should be taken outside the CD framework and negotiated by the General Assembly, a group of like-minded states, or even just by the five recognized nuclear weapon states alone. However, the questions of “do any of these frameworks act as a function of the objectives for this treaty” and “whose objectives should be reflected in the framework” are as pertinent here as they are for the ATT. They will be equally relevant for any future negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, a legally-binding marking and tracing instrument for small arms and light weapons, or an agreement on the use of outer space and relevant security or arms control matters. Unfortunately, either minimal attention is paid to these foundational questions when governments and civil society approach negotiations, or, as in the case of the ATT, the most powerful determine the negotiating process by exerting their influence over the establishment of the framework.

What can be done? Perhaps a more rigorous process is required for the establishment of negotiating frameworks—though as can be seen in the case of the CD, this can also result in infinite stalemate. In the absence of established guidelines on this subject, it would be useful for a few core objectives to be held at the heart of an negotiating process, upon which decisions regarding the framework for negotiations can be based.

For the ATT, the framework has been established and now it will be up to the entire international community to ensure that the treaty achieves these most fundamental continued on page 5
Nuclear disarmament
Jim Wurst | Middle Powers Initiative

First Committee focused on conventional and other aspects of disarmament this week, so the deliberations on nuclear disarmament were minimal. Instead, the key draft resolutions on the subject were issued. The major differences between 2009 and 2010 were, not surprisingly, the incorporation of references to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and to the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) final document’s action plan. There were a few new references to the call for a nuclear weapons convention (NWC) or framework of agreements and for a greater focus on the need to respect international humanitarian law.

Reflecting the widely held belief that the events of 2010 have given nuclear disarmament new momentum, the Japanese-led draft on nuclear disarmament had a change in title as well as content. “United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (A/C.1/65/L.43) replaces the old “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”. Besides references to New START, “the necessity of fully implementing the action plan adopted at the [NPT] Conference,” and calling for respect for international humanitarian law, the co-sponsors have sharpened some of the nuclear disarmament language. While the 2009 resolution encouraged “further steps leading to nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article IV of the Treaty,” the new draft invokes the more explicit language of the 2000 Review Conference: “reaffirms the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.” The text also sharpens the co-sponsors’ vision of the next steps in that it “calls upon nuclear weapon states to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed.” This draft has in recent years drawn the most support of any of the omnibus disarmament resolutions.

The New Agenda Coalition’s annual draft resolution always refers to the “unequivocal undertaking” language of 2000 RevCon, and like “United Action,” this year’s text uses the results of the 2010 RevCon to push for further action. Since the 2010 RevCon (unlike the 2005 RevCon) acknowledged the continuing validity of the commitments made in 2000, the draft, “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” (A/C.1/65/L.25), often refers back to those commitments. The text reinforces “the continued validity of the practical steps” from 2000 “including the reaffirmation of the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals” and “stresses” the commitment by the nuclear weapons states at the 2010 RevCon “to accelerate concrete progress on the steps” from 2000 and “of their prompt engagement with a view to ensuring substantive progress” ahead of the 2014 NPT preparatory committee. Like “United action,” the NAC draft reflects the RevCon language on international humanitarian law.

The co-sponsors of the draft, “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons” (A/C.1/65/L.50), also incorporated language reflective of the RevCon in its text this year. While the draft has always called for negotiations for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the 2010 draft notes the Secretary-General’s five-point proposal, including “the consideration of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of … instruments.” It also expresses “deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons” and says states need to comply with international humanitarian law.

Since the Non-Aligned Movement’s “Nuclear disarmament” (A/C.1/65/L.22) draft resolution traditionally has such a broad sweep, there is little difference in this year’s draft other than to acknowledge New START and the final document of the 2010 RevCon. The draft recognizes “the important work” done at the RevCon and calls “its plan of action … an impetus to intensify work aimed at beginning negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention.” The draft lists NAM’s disarmament priorities including a halt to qualitative improvements in warheads and delivery systems, diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrine, establishment of nuclear weapon free zones, especially in the Middle East, deterring, a legally-binding instrument against the first use of nuclear weapons, a fissile materials cut-off treaty, and the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament “to commence negotiations on a phased program of nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time.”

The United States and Russia joint draft resolution, “Bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations” (A/C.1/65/L.28), which focused on New START, was reported on last week.

Britain’s Strategic Review

Ambassador John Duncan of the United Kingdom took the floor on 19 October to present the results of Britain’s Strategic Defence and Security Review. While acknowledging that “no state currently has both the intent and the capability to threaten” the UK, the review says the country “can not dismiss the possibility that a major nuclear threat to the UK might re-emerge.” Therefore, the government “reaffirms the UK’s commitment

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to a submarine-launched minimum continuous nuclear deterrent based on the Trident missile delivery system, whilst taking tangible steps towards the long-term goals of a world without nuclear weapons.” Maintaining that deterrent means proceeding with the Trident replacement program. The review states that a “credible level of deterrence” is possible “with a smaller nuclear weapons capability.” Specifically, the number of warheads on each submarine will decrease from 48 to 40 and reduce the operational missiles on the Vanguard submarines to “no more than eight,” meaning operational warheads will drop from 160 to no more that 120. “These changes will enable us to reduce our overall nuclear weapon stockpile to not more than 180 by the mid-2020s,” according to the review. “These are significant disarmament measures and indicate our level of commitment to the NPT, including a successful Review Conference in 2015.”

HUMANITARIAN LAW VERSUS NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Monday, October 25, 2010
1:15-2:45 pm
Conference Room A, North Lawn Building, United Nations

The 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed “the need for all states at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law”. This event will examine implications for nuclear weapons doctrines and deployments, and explore further steps.

Participants include:
John Burroughs, author of *The Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: A Guide to the Historic Opinion of the International Court of Justice*, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy
Jonathan Granoff, President, Global Security Institute
Charles Moxley, author of *Nuclear Weapons and International Law in the Post-Cold War Age*, Board of Directors, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy
Peter Weiss, President, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy


Sponsored by:
Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy
Global Security Institute
Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations

A UN pass is required to attend this event.
Momentum toward a nuclear weapons convention or framework of agreements

Alyn Ware | International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms

Momentum: “The quantity of motion in a moving body, now expressed as the product of its mass and velocity.”—UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Sergio Duarte (citing a dictionary)

On the opening day of the First Committee, UN High Representative Sergio Duarte reported that momentum for nuclear disarmament is now building. Evidence for this is indicated by the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference outcome, international support for the UN Secretary-General’s five-point proposal, and commentaries by high-level authorities in over a dozen countries. However, Mr. Duarte noted that such momentum would falter without determined efforts by nuclear weapon states (NWS), non-NWS (especially “middle power” countries) and civil society.

The momentum for nuclear abolition through a nuclear weapons convention (NWC) or framework of agreements was evident at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. A large number and range of states spoke about a NWC. Parliamentary resolutions were adopted leading up to the Review Conference. Civil society petitions and representations were submitted to the Review Conference. For the first time in an NPT Review Conference final document, reference was made to a NWC.

This momentum is being supported and maintained at the UN General Assembly, primarily through the draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.50, “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.” This resolution has been amended from previous years in order to reflect the key agreements in the 2010 NPT Review Conference final document relevant to the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world, in particular:

1. Recognition that any use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences, and the affirmation that international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to all States at all times.

This reinforces and strengthens the conclusion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that IHL should apply at all times, and that the application of IHL and other international law makes the threat or use of nuclear weapons generally illegal. In addition, as in the landmines and cluster munitions campaigns, the application of IHL opens up a process based on prohibition of the weapons rather than on relying only on small steps to control and reduce such weapons. A prohibition process is vital in order to move states away from reliance on nuclear deterrence and thus become willing to take significant disarmament steps and measures.

John Burroughs of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (“Humanitarian Law or Nuclear Weapons: Choose One,” First Committee Monitor, Preview Edition, 4 October 2010) has indicated that this development has opened up possibilities for initial measures to build part of the framework for a nuclear weapon free world. Such measures can be taken by NWS by, for example, affirming the practice of non-use through a UN Security Council resolution, and by non-NWS, through national legislation prohibiting nuclear weapons, criminalizing nuclear weapons use through the International Criminal Court, and/or negotiating a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons.

2. Agreement by the nuclear weapon states to undertake a number of concrete nuclear disarmament steps.

This indicates that a step-by-step process can advance concurrently with initiatives towards prohibition.

3. Agreement that all states need to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.

This affirms that, in addition to encouraging the NWS to take steps toward nuclear disarmament, the non-NWS can undertake steps and measures themselves to prohibit nuclear weapons and build the legal, technical, and political elements for a nuclear weapon free world. This could include, in addition to the measures listed in section 1 above, reducing the role of nuclear weapons through establishing nuclear weapon free zones, engaging with the NWS on building verification capacities, and/or undertaking a like-minded preparatory process for a nuclear-weapons convention.

4. Noting the UN Secretary-General’s five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament, which proposes negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments.

The UN Secretary-General’s five-point proposal has considerable momentum—it has found support from most of the world’s parliaments (being endorsed by both the 2009 General Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union Assembly and the 2010 Conference of Speakers of Parliaments) and includes both substance and process that has been picked up in a range of inter-governmental forums.

The ICJ resolution builds on the momentum of the 2010 NPT Review Conference by bringing these key agreements into the international arena on the basis of the nuclear disarmament obligation affirmed by the ICJ.

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Nuclear weapon free zones
Georgie Bright and Sean Kelly | NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security

Despite transitioning away from nuclear weapons-related topics at the First Committee, a limited number of delegations still discussed the issue of nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) during the debate on regional security. Cuba’s delegation highlighted the efficacy of NWFZs in strengthening regional and international peace and security. Iraq’s delegation supported this view and reaffirmed the need for a NWFZ in the Middle East, asserting that an arms race escalation would have a negative impact on security worldwide. Iraq’s representative argued that the ambiguity surrounding Israeli nuclear installations has stalled this process, and called for the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 487, urging Israel to place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Kuwait and Iran’s delegations endorsed this sentiment, arguing that Israel needs to adhere to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

In addition to the draft resolutions reported on last week pertaining to NWFZs in the Middle East and Central Asia, four further draft resolutions were introduced this week. Brazil and New Zealand sponsored A/C.1/65/L.24, “Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas,” Mongolia introduced A/C.1/65/L.41, “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status,” Nigeria, on behalf of the Group of Africa States, tabled draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.54, on the “African-Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty,” and several Latin American countries tabled A/C.1/65/L.52, “Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco”).

The resolution tabled by Brazil and New Zealand was last adopted by the General Assembly in 2009 as resolution 64/44 with a vote of 170-3-6. The United Kingdom, United States, and France voted against the text, citing concern over the resolution’s “ambiguity”. In a joint statement, they argued it is “contradictory to propose simultaneously the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone that would be composed largely of the high seas and yet to say that it would be fully consistent with applicable principles and rules of international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the right of passage through maritime space.”

L.24 welcomes “the progress made on increased collaboration within and between zones at the second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia,” at which states expressed their “intention to foster cooperation among the nuclear weapon-free zones to fully implement the principles and objectives of the treaties and to exchange relevant ideas and best practices in areas of mutual interest.” The co-sponsors also noted “the positive announcement of the United States of America of its intention to begin the process of ratification of the protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba and Rarotonga,” and reported “that the Russian Federation has initiated internal procedures to ratify the appropriate protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba.”

The updated draft again congratulates states party and signatory to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Pelindaba, and commends the countries of Central Asia on “their efforts to pursue the common goals envisaged in those treaties and to promote the nuclear-weapon-free status of the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.”

Momentum toward a NWC (cont.)

This obligation is unconditional (not dependent on general and complete disarmament), universal (i.e. applying not only to states party to the NPT) and comprehensive (i.e. nuclear disarmament in all its aspects).

In recognizing that some states are not yet ready to commence negotiations on a NWC, the ICJ resolution calls for negotiations leading to a NWC. Malaysia, in introducing the resolution, has noted that this supports work on initial measures and thus is not inconsistent with the step-by-step approach—except that it adds a comprehensive framework that would enable such steps and measures to be accomplished more quickly and be better focused toward the end goal of a universal, legally-binding, non-discriminatory, verifiable, and enforceable regime for a nuclear weapon free world.

In noting and reflecting the UN Secretary-General’s five-point proposal, the ICJ resolution takes a similar approach. It emphasizes the importance of the Conference on Disarmament, but also recognizes the need for action in other forums, whether bilateral, plurilateral, regional (such as through NWFZs), or multilateral (including the UN Security Council, UN General Assembly, and a World Summit on nuclear disarmament).

In previous years most NATO states opposed this resolution, while most former eastern-bloc member states opposed or abstained, on the grounds that it was too early to start considering a NWC. Now that the ICJ resolution has been amended to reflect the key agreements of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (as indicated above), such an argument is no longer valid. This should enable these states to shift to supporting this resolution. Indeed, some have already indicated such a shift in their vote. Civil society, which has indicated strong support for the UN Secretary-General’s five-point proposal and a NWC, could encourage all of these states to do so.
Nuclear weapon free zones (cont.)

Similar to the 2009 version of the resolution, the text calls upon “all States concerned to continue to work together in order to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties by all relevant States that have not yet done so.” The updated draft resolution, however, notes the “positive announcement of the United States of America to conduct consultations with the parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central and South-East Asia in an effort to sign and ratify the relevant protocols.”

L.41 is largely identical to resolution 63/56, “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status,” adopted by the General Assembly in 2008. The current draft resolution does, however, welcome “the declaration by Mongolia for its nuclear-weapon-free status, and supports the measures taken by Mongolia to consolidate and strengthen this status.”

The draft resolution also acknowledges the support for Mongolia’s nuclear weapon free status at the Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, held in New York on 30 April 2010. The conference, established by A/RES/64/52, aimed at enhancing cooperation between participating and interested states and agencies in order to improve and facilitate the implementation of the treaties and strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

A/C.1/65/L.52 on the consolidation of the NWFZ regime includes several changes from last year’s version. The text reflects technical updates and recent developments in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, namely the Treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Central Asia, as well as the Antarctic Treaty. It also welcomes relevant UN resolutions and the outcome documents of the second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia and the 2010 NPT Review Conference for their contribution towards achieving a nuclear weapon free world. It adds a preambular paragraph stressing the importance of establishing NWFZs and “commending the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean for its leadership in this area.” Finally, this year’s draft resolution adds an operative paragraph calling “upon the nuclear-weapon States that formulated unilateral interpretive declarations at the moment of signature or ratification of the relevant Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco to withdraw those declarations that affect the denuclearized status established by the Treaty.” The First Committee will next address this issue in its sixty-eighth session. Last year, the resolution was adopted without a vote, with India conveying “its unambiguous assurance that it will respect the status of the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.” France and the United Kingdom issued a similar joint explanation.

A/C.1/65/L.54, on the “African-Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty” remains unchanged from when it was adopted without a vote last year. The resolution calls on relevant states to sign, ratify, and fulfill commitments for sustaining a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the region.

Isabelle Cutting and Natalia Pombo of the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security contributed to this report.
This year, four resolutions relate to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Last week’s edition of the Monitor reported on one of these, A/C.1/64/L.3, “The threat of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.” The other three resolutions deal with the illicit transfer and acquisition of WMD.

A/C.1/65/L.29, “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction,” includes some updates to reflect new initiatives since 2009. The preamble now notes the launching of the US-Russian Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the convening of the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010. The operative portion of the text remains the same; it urges states to participate in international efforts to prevent WMD terrorism and calls for a report from the UN Secretary-General on measures undertaken by international organizations and the views of member states on the subject. Last year this resolution was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 64/38 without a vote.

A/C.1/65/L.46, “Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources,” was last introduced as a draft resolution in 2007. It was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 62/46 without a vote. In 2009, this item was presented only as a draft decision, putting it on the agenda for this year. The 2010 text includes a new preambular paragraph expressing concern about “the potential threat to human health and the environment that would result from the use of such devices by terrorists.” It also notes the entry into force in July 2010 the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, which addresses radioactive materials, and stresses the contribution of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s Illicit Trafficking Database and work in nuclear forensics. The preamble now also encourages states to contribute to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund and notes the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan for 2010–2013. It also recalls “that it is in the best interest of all States that the transportation of radioactive materials and sources continues to be conducted consistent with international safety, security and environmental protection standards and guidelines.” The operative portions of the resolution remain unchanged from 2007. The main thrust of these paragraphs is to encourage states to take national action and join international initiatives to prevent terrorists from acquiring radioactive materials.

A/C.1/64/L.49, “Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities,” applies both to conventional weapons and WMD. The draft resolution argues that illicit brokering of all types of arms will undermine international peace and security, prolong conflicts, impede sustainable development, and leak weapons to non-state actors. Its WMD-related provisions recall UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), particularly its implications for border controls and law enforcement, and recognize international efforts to prevent and combat illicit nuclear trafficking at the Security Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation in September 2009. The resolution was last tabled in 2008, when it was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 63/67 without a vote. Two new preambular paragraphs encourage states to share experiences and practices in controlling illicit brokering and note the UN Institute for Disarmament Research’s activities on this subject. The operative portion of the text remains unchanged.

The delegation of Singapore was the only state to address the topic of nuclear proliferation during the third week of First Committee. Ms. Ng called for international legal regimes aimed at preventing terrorist acquisition of WMD to be accompanied by effective national implementation. She reported on some of Singapore’s measures, emphasizing its export control regime, counter-proliferation efforts, and regional cooperation.

Draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.48, “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,” calls for an end to nuclear tests and universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as early as possible. The 2010 version of the draft resolution welcomes both the Joint Ministerial Statement, which was adopted at the Ministerial Meeting in New York on the 23 September 2010, and the steps taken by Trinidad and Tobago, Central African Republic, and the Marshall Islands to ratify the Treaty.
Fissile materials
Daniel Brunn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

During the thematic debate on disarmament machinery, Pakistani representative Raza Bashir Tarar continued to voice his government’s displeasure with the possible negotiation of a fissile materials cut-off treaty at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) because it would “permanently freeze a strategic handicap for Pakistan.”

Giving no indication that his government is willing to deviate from its position on a fissile materials treaty, Mr. Tarar further charged that the “nuclear powers” are attempting to shift the focus of the CD and the international community from the real priority of negotiating treaties regarding nuclear disarmament to strictly focusing on those consisting of non-proliferation measures.

Nevertheless, many delegations are refusing to let the negotiation of a fissile materials treaty fall from the agenda. As Ms. Julie Croteau of Canada announced last week, the Canadian delegation tabled A/C.1/65/L.33, an updated version of the resolution presented in 2009, which was adopted without a vote. Draft resolution L.33 once again urges the CD to establish “a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” However, after consultations on the annual CD resolution (A/C.1/65/L.57) last week, the lead sponsors issued a revised version, contained in A/C.1/65/L.57/Rev.1. This revised version no longer includes any reference to A/RES/64/29, last year’s consensus resolution on a fissile materials treaty, indicating that some delegations might be considering a change of position.

Outer space
Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Since the scheduled thematic debate on space was postponed until the final week of First Committee, no discussion on outer space or the draft resolutions on this topic took place. Many delegations raised the issue of space being dealt with through a programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) (see report on disarmament machinery), and Norway noted that an arms race in outer space must be avoided. Ambassador Hilde Skorpen highlighted that Norway has supported both resolutions in the UN General Assembly on space and work programme in the CD that would start consultations on preventing an arms race in outer space (PAROS).

The Russian draft resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) was tabled this year again (as A/C.1/65/L.38), but with significant updates. Operational paragraph 2 requests the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts (GGE) to conduct a study, commencing in 2012, on outer space transparency and confidence-building measures. The resolution notes that this study would be without prejudice to the substantive discussions on PAROS within the CD framework.

On 14 October, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and Secure World Foundation organized a side event called “Space Security: Next steps in TCBMs,” at which representatives from the United States, Russian Federation, and European Union discussed international cooperation and approaches to TCBMs in space. At this event, the updated EU proposal for an international code of conduct for space activities was presented.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose highlighted that the new US Space Policy calls for developing TCBMs in order to promote “responsible and peaceful behavior in space.” He noted that joint resolutions on space security, and the adoption of international norms or “codes of conduct” are also examples of TCBMs. Regarding the EU draft code of conduct specifically, Mr. Rose said that the United States had been working with the EU over the past 18 months and hoped to decide “in the coming months” whether to sign on to it.

The draft resolution on PAROS, A/C.1/65/L.2, remains unchanged from last year’s text, which was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 64/28 with a vote of 176 in favour and two abstaining (United States and Israel). Under the Bush administration, the US delegation voted against the annual PAROS resolution.
The thematic debate on other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) started on 22 October. The debate mainly focused on biological and chemical and the implementation of the Biological and Toxic Weapon Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC). Most states emphasized the importance of strengthening the two conventions, in particular the BTWC. Ambassador Soares of Brazil, speaking on behalf of MERCOSUR and Associated States, said, “it is necessary to develop and implement additional measures for assuring that the prohibition [on biological weapons] is effective, even though this may be a challenge considering the biological and weapons peculiarity.” He expressed MERCOSUR and Associated States’ concern with the current situation of the BTWC and declared their commitment to contributing substantially to the Review Conference of the BTWC in December 2011 to “restore the international security dimension of this important legal instrument.”

The representatives of the European Union, Norway, and Switzerland emphasized that the Review Conference of the BTWC should improve its confidence-building measures. They also addressed the important role of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU). Ambassador Jean Lint of Belgium on behalf of the European Union said the ISU is important as it maintains “the link between the state parties and the BTCW.” Ambassador Jürg Lauber of Switzerland expressed his delegation’s wish to broaden the mandate of the ISU to more effectively enable it to assist in the implementation of the BTWC.

MERCOSUR congratulated the progress of Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in implementing the CWC but reiterated its concern of the still-existing chemical weapon arsenals. Mr. Knut Lange-land of Norway reiterated his delegation’s call “for completing the process of stockpile destruction within agreed time limits,” arguing, “[w]hile the prime responsibility for destruction lies with the possessor states themselves, non-possessors can also contribute towards this end.” He explained that the Norwegian government has been engaged in a cooperation programme with the Russian Federation as a contribution to the G8 Global Partnership.

Many states expressed their fear of the spread of WMD into the hands of terrorists and highlighted the importance of UN Security Council resolution 1540 regarding non-proliferation of WMD. The European Union stressed that the proliferation of WMD is a major threat to international peace and security and emphasized that the CWC, BTWC, and the 1925 Geneva Protocol (the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed in on 17 June 1925) play a key role in reducing this threat.

Draft resolutions

Last week some countries tabled resolutions regarding biological and chemical weapons. Indonesia, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), introduced a draft resolution on “Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,” A/C.1/65/L.12. The resolution calls on the international community to achieve “effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons.” It further calls on those states that continue to maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to withdraw. A text by this title was last adopted by the General Assembly in 2008. This year’s version contains only technical updates.

As it did last year, Hungary tabled a draft resolution on the BTWC, A/C.1/65/L.20. The resolution was adopted without a vote in 2009. The changes made this year mainly refer to the preparations for the upcoming Seventh Review Conference of the BTWC, a conference which many states have expressed high expectations of during the thematic debates. This year’s draft “[n]otes the proposal to hold the meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Seventh Review Conference in April 2011 and to hold the Seventh Review Conference in Geneva in December 2011”.

The Polish delegation tabled a draft resolution on the CWC, A/C.1/65/L.23. This annual resolution was adopted without a vote in 2009. There are few changes to the text this year; since the adoption of the 2009 text, four states acceded to the Convention. Besides this technical update, a new paragraph is added to the resolution which “[w]elcomes decision C-14-DEC.6 of 2 December 2009 of the fourteenth session of the Conference of the States Parties on the appointment of Ahmet Üzümcü as the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.”
Conventional weapons
Global Action to Prevent War

Several concerns—and measures—related to conventional weapons were described during the First Committee’s thematic discussion on the subject this year. Japan was one of the many countries to recognize the capability of conventional weapons to “exacerbate armed conflicts around the world” and reinforced its strict policy prohibiting the export of any arms “in principle”. Papua New Guinea’s delegation likewise noted the suffering and “untold economic and social damage” that comes from the “misuse and abuse” of conventional weapons and highlighted the many measures that the government has taken—including formation of a Gun Control Committee—to address the illicit trade and proliferation of these weapons. Australia’s delegation joined with others in underscoring the “humanitarian costs” of conventional arms proliferation and expressed appreciation for the “balanced and detailed” contributions of civil society organizations to the work of states on conventional arms control.

Some delegations highlighted the importance of specific conventional weapon instruments. Switzerland’s ambassador, among others, expressed concern about the status of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, specifically the diminished value that states seem to place on reporting to the Register. Ambassador Lauber of Switzerland invited countries that have not done so yet to let the UN Secretary-General know if the Register’s continued exclusion of small arms and light weapons has limited the Register’s relevance and/or directly impacted the country’s decision on participation. He urges states to let their view be known ahead of the Group of Governmental Experts that will meet in 2012.

Canada’s delegation highlighted its support for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), saying it has ratified all of its protocols. Belgium’s ambassador, on behalf of the European Union, described the full adoption of the CCW and its protocols as one means of firmly preserving distinctions between “civilians and combatants,” as well as “prohibition of the use of weapons that inflict excessive injury or unnecessary suffering on combatants.”

Many of the resolutions offered by states in the areas of conventional weapons, arms trade, and small arms and light weapons were designed primarily to keep pressure on the UN and member states to prioritize these issues at future disarmament meetings. For instance, draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.31, “Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms,” encourages member states to “continue dialogue on confidence building measures in the field of conventional arms” and also encourages the organization of “seminars, courses and workshops” as well as an electronic database, to assist member states to keep abreast of new knowledge in the field. While highlighting positive regional developments on illicit arms through Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Nigerian delegation urged delegates to keep such work flexible in order to take into account “new developments in warfare technology.”

More pointedly, and following on the heels of some vigorous discussion on its viability, resolution A/C.1/65/L.6, “Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels,” requests the Conference on Disarmament (CD) “to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control.” Last year, the resolution was adopted by a vote of 173-1-2 in the First Committee, with Bhutan and Russia abstaining and India casting a negative vote. India argued that “security concerns of States extend beyond narrowly defined regions,” and that “the notion of preservation of a balance in defense capabilities in the regional or sub-regional context is both unrealistic and unacceptable to [India’s] delegation.”

For its part, resolution A/C.1/65/L.44 on the CCW “calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible,” to the CCW and its protocols, “with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to these instruments at an early date, and so as to ultimately achieve their universality.” The resolution also calls upon states that are party to the CCW “to be bound by the Protocols to the Convention and the amendment extending the scope of the Convention and the Protocols thereto to include armed conflicts of a non-international character.” The draft text has been updated from last year’s (which was adopted without a vote) to reflect the upcoming fourth review conference of the CCW and to express support for continued negotiations on a protocol on cluster munitions.

There was much discussion during the week regarding capacity needs for carrying out technical support and other measures to assist with implementation of the UN Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, the CCW, and other obligations in the conventional weapons area. Two particularly welcome resolutions called for more open-ended meetings of government experts on conventional weapons (A/C.1/65/L.32, on the illicit trade in small arms) and for leadership by the Group of Interested States on small arms and conventional weapons to “continue to promote, on the basis of lessons learned from previous disarmament and peacebuilding projects, new practical disarmament measures to consolidate peace, especially as undertaken or designed by affected States themselves, regional and subregional organizations as well as United Nations Agencies” (A/C.1/65/L.36, on the consolidation of peace). •
The topic of missiles and anti-missile systems did not receive any significant attention during the third week either, despite the tabling of one draft decision on “missiles” (A/C.1/65/L.18) and one draft resolution “The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation” (A/C.1/65/L.45).

However, a few delegations still raised the issue under different clusters. Iran, one of three lead sponsors of L.18, stated that due to “bitter experience of eight years of imposed war during which Iranians in defenceless cities even in the capital being under constant missile attacks, Iran was obliged for its self-defence to develop its indigenous missile technology.” However, Mr. Taghi Ferami noted that his country supported fully any comprehensive and non-discriminatory approach towards addressing the issue of missiles in all its aspects and argued that a discriminatory approach outside the UN “will not contribute to addressing comprehensively this important issue.”

Due to lack of time for proper analysis and consultation on the outcome of the Third Panel of Governmental Experts to assist the UN Secretary-General in the preparation of reports on the issue of missiles in all its aspects, the sponsors of L.18 decided to submit only a draft decision, rather than a resolution. The draft decision is to place the topic of missiles on the agenda for next year and the Iranian delegation hoped that “those who are in support of keeping the issue of missile within the framework of the UN will vote in favour of the draft as they did in previous years.”

The European Union argued that the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) and the Missile Technology Control Regime are the best existing tools to address the problem of missile proliferation and affirmed the clear multilateral and universal purpose of the HCOC. The EU called upon all states that have not already done so to adhere to the Code as soon as possible and noted that disregarding key provisions of the Code would undermine its viability and functioning. The EU also highlighted the need of examining further multilateral steps to prevent the threat of missile proliferation and reminded the First Committee of its proposal to start consultations on a treaty banning short and intermediate range ground-to-ground missiles. Norway stated that they are co-sponsors of the HCOC resolution and urged all UN member states to adhere to it in order to contribute to enhanced confidence and stability.

The draft biannual resolution L.45 on the Hague Code of Conduct is similar to previous years, but recalls that proliferation of ballistic missiles, as recognized by the UN Security Council in its resolutions 1540 and 1887, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. It also contains two new operational paragraphs, which encourages states already subscribed to the HCOC to make efforts to increase participation in the Code, and welcomes progress in implementation of the Code through the submission of pre-launch notifications and annual declarations on space and ballistic missile activity. In 2008, while 18 states abstained, only Iran voted against the resolution since it believed that the HCOC was “drafted and endorsed outside the United Nations in an opaque manner and without participation of all interested countries.” •
Small arms and light weapons

Jimmy Wall | IANSA and Nadira Khudayberdieva | Quaker United Nations Office

The thematic discussion at the First Committee of the General Assembly on conventional weapons included an abundance of references on the issue of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Both developed and developing countries see the problems of illicit trade and unlawful use of SALW as dangerous impediments to peace, national and human security, as well as development and achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

Virtually all delegates that gave speeches during the thematic debate on conventional weapons referred to the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA) and the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS4), which focused on the UNPoA’s implementation. The prevailing view among delegations was highly positive in regards to both the UNPoA and BMS4. The majority view the UNPoA as a key mechanism to address the issue of illicit trade of SALW.

Several delegations called for the marking of all arms manufactured and exported, including CARICOM, Togo, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Venezuela, Libya, and Uganda. CARICOM stated that the effectiveness of marking and tracing measures are currently ineffective because there is no legally-binding instrument. Venezuela’s delegation also recommended the establishment of an international database of manufactured and exported arms.

Last week’s edition of the First Committee Monitor reported on draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.11, “Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them”. This week, two additional resolutions related to SALW were released.

The omnibus resolution on “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects” (A/C.1/65/L.32) contains both technical and substantive updates from last year’s text. While last year’s version bears in mind the importance of national reporting, this year’s text stresses the importance of reporting “as a means of assessing overall implementation efforts, including implementation challenges and opportunities.” And while last year’s text notes UN Institute for Disarmament Research’s analysis of these reports, this year the draft notes that the tools developed by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), including the UNPoA Implementation Support System (ISS), “could be used to assess progress made in the implementation” of the UNPoA. The resolution also encourages states to submit on a voluntary basis their reports on the implementation of the UNPoA and notes that they will submit, to the extent possible, reports on the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument by the end of 2011, using UNODA’s new reporting template.

L.32 endorses the report of BMS4 and decides to hold an open-ended meeting of government experts “to address key implementation challenge and opportunities relating to particular issues and themes, including international cooperation and assistance” in New York from 9 to 13 May 2011. The draft also welcomes the designation of New Zealand as the chair of this meeting and encourages states to identify, in cooperation with the chair-designate, relevant issues to be covered and to develop “pragmatic, action-oriented draft agendas for this meeting”. It encourages states to contribute relevant national expertise to the meeting and stresses the importance of civil society contributions with regard to the preparations of the meeting. L.32 also recalls its decision of last year to convene a second review conference on the UNPoA, which was held in New York in 2012, and decides to convene a preparatory committee for one week before earlier that year. It recommends the designation of a chair by May 2011 and recognizes that the 2012 review conference may consider recommending convening a further open-ended meeting of government experts.

Last year, the General Assembly adopted the omnibus text as resolution 64/50 with a vote of 180-0-0, though the Iranian delegation abstained on the two operative paragraphs that welcomed the outcome of BMS3.

The draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.36 “Consolidation of peace through practice disarmament measures,” also deals with SALW issues. The resolution calls for a “comprehensive and integrated approach towards certain practical disarmament measures,” including collection and disposal; confidence-building measures; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; demining; and conversion.

The only updates are contained within the draft’s operative paragraphs, where it now encourages the Group of Interested States to “continue to function as an informal, open and transparent forum” supporting the implementation of the UNPoA and encourages the Group “to facilitate the exchange of views on issues related to the United Nations small arms process as well as to facilitate” matching needs and resources. It also requests the UN Secretary-General to provide UNODA “with resources adequate for maintaining” the UNPoA-ISS from 2012.

The last time this resolution was introduced was 2008, when it was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 63/62 with a vote of 182-0-0, though the Iranian delegation abstained on the last three words of the preambular paragraph that welcomed the outcome of BMS3.

Ray Acheson of Reaching Critical Will contributed with reporting to this article.
Cluster munitions
Allison Pytlak | Religions for Peace, a member of the Cluster Munition Coalition

The thematic debate on conventional weapons reinforced the widespread support for the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and highlighted expectations for its upcoming First Meeting of States Parties. Over sixty countries included reference to the Convention during this debate. After a dynamic year, the momentum around the CCM is now turning to the long-term work of universalization and implementation.

The European Union, Japan, South Africa, Philippines, Panama, CARICOM, New Zealand, Eritrea, Senegal, and Burkina Faso welcomed the Convention’s recent and rapid entry into force that took place on 1 August 2010. Given that this happened so recently, it was highly encouraging that some states are already providing updates on the Convention’s implementation. Montenegro announced, during its general debate statement, that it has completed its stockpile destruction well ahead of the treaty mandated deadline. Moldova referred to its stockpile destruction program that was launched prior to entry into force. Zambia has completed a baseline survey to map the extent of cluster munitions contamination and expects to begin clearance shortly. It is also continuing its activities on stockpile destruction. Bolivia, Canada, Guatemala, Kenya, South Africa, and the United Kingdom continue to be in the process of ratification.

A few delegations expressed strong sentiments in relation to on-going discussions about cluster munitions in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) by noting that these discussions are not leading to any conclusion and that the standards set by the CCM cannot be matched. South Africa noted that the present draft protocol in the CCW “continues to contain a number of elements that contradict the principles of international humanitarian law.” The representative of the Holy See argued, “the risk that the introduction of a double standard, which might render achievement on the humanitarian and military level ineffective must not be underestimated,” while Mexico’s delegation noted the “dearth of results” in the CCW negotiations on cluster munitions and pointed to the CCM as a positive example of pursuing humanitarian concerns in other fora.

The principle focus of states right now is on the upcoming Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) to the CCM, which will take place in less than three weeks in Vientiane, Lao People’s Democratic Republic from 9–12 November. Most statements that referred to cluster munitions also referenced 1MSP; Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Kenya, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Slovenia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom reinforced their intention to participate.

As such, the special event on 19 October that focused on 1MSP was extremely welcome. Hosted by the Permanent Missions of Lao PDR and Japan, the event was an opportunity to present the draft agenda for 1MSP and explain its goals in greater detail. Ambassador Asha Rose Migiro, Deputy-Secretary-General of the United Nations, delivered a special message at the opening. Other speakers included Ambassador Akio Suda, Permanent Representative of Japan to the CD; Ambassador Kanika Phommachanh, Permenant Representative of Lao to the UN; Mr. Walter Fuellmann, International Committee of the Red Cross, and Mr. Thomas Nash, Coordinator of the Cluster Munition Coalition. During the event, Cape Verde presented its instrument of ratification to the United Nations, making it the 43rd country to have ratified the Convention. Additionally, many states confirmed their intention to participate at 1MSP. The representative of Lebanon indicated that its government is considering hosting the second Meeting of States Parties.

Other nuclear weapon resolutions
Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

During the thematic debate on nuclear weapons, the Indian delegation introduced two annual resolutions, “Reducing nuclear danger” (A/C.1/65/L.26) and “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons” (A/C.1/65/L.27). The resolutions are co-sponsored by a number of countries from the Non-Aligned Movement.

Ambassador Halid Ali Rao argued that there is no justification for large numbers of nuclear weapons to be maintained in state of high-alert and that such weapons pose unacceptable risks. Draft resolution L.27 calls in its operative parts for review of nuclear doctrines and for urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution also requests the UN Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would implement the seven recommendations of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Draft resolution L.26 underlines that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to humankind’s survival and highlights the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice from 1996 on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. The draft reiterates the need for an international convention on the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons and requests the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations in order to reach such an agreement.

Both draft resolutions contain only technical updates from last year, when they were both adopted by a vote with about 50 countries, mostly western, voting against them.
Much discussion by delegations in this area focused on responses to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of this past summer. Switzerland’s delegation noted its satisfaction with the “intensity” of discussions at the PrepCom and complimented the PrepCom mandate that put more of a premium on “operational” matters rather than “mere discussions”. South Africa’s delegation likewise complimented the PrepCom process and encouraged delegations to continue vigorous engagement on the “scope, parameters and implementation” of the treaty. Finland, as one of the original initiators of the ATT process, also expressed appreciation for the PrepCom, but called for “strong engagement” moving forward in recognition of the illicit arms market’s impact on national stability, human rights, sustainable development, and efforts to address organized crime.

The illicit trade in weapons often has a “small arms and light weapons context” but is nevertheless connected to the work of the ATT. Japan has joined with South Africa and Colombia in calling on member states to do more to control illicit arms movements, both independently and as part of a commitment to international instruments. Belgium’s ambassador, speaking on behalf of the European Union, noted that stopping the illicit trade in such arms is important but is “not enough,” and urged attention to the large “challenges posed by the unregulated trade in conventional arms and their diversion to the illicit market.” The EU called for an ATT that includes “transparency, monitoring and assistance provisions” to address diversion of transfers and makes clear references to the human rights and international humanitarian law implications of such illicit transfers.

India’s delegation raised the need for an ATT process that can achieve “universal consensus,” the elements of which include “national responsibility” for establishing and exercising control over the trade in conventional arms as well as development of a “step by step, pragmatic, realistic and consensus-driven approach.” The Canadian delegation added to this the need for “clear, universal principles” to prevent the illicit diversion of arms transfers, recognizing that there is a legitimate, legal trade in such weapons and that there are both international law and sovereign right to self-defense issues that must be addressed together in order for an effective treaty to be concluded.

Some delegations were specific in their expectation for an ATT. The Norwegian delegation, along with others, emphasized that the goal of the ATT “should be the reduction and and prevention of violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law through the use of conventional arms.” Switzerland’s delegation went even further, saying the ATT should “also apply in cases bearing a substantial risk that exported arms are used against the civilian population or diverted to illicit recipients, taking into account the possible impact on sustainable economic and social development of the state of destination.” Ambassador Hauge of Norway also argued that the treaty should “address the rights of victims of armed violence, including their right to adequate care and rehabilitation, as well as their social and economic inclusion.”

While most delegations seem content to have the ATT cover the seven categories of conventional weapons contained in the UN Register on Conventional Arms as well as small arms and light weapons, several argued for the inclusion of ammunition, arms technology and components, manufacturing equipment and services, and more. New Zealand’s delegation endorsed Norway’s proposal made during the first PrepCom for a “yes, unless” approach to deciding what is included in the ATT’s jurisdiction. A few delegations also requested that the ATT increase marking, reporting, licensing, and tracing obligations on states. The Norwegian delegation called on the ATT to include a “responsibility on states to publicly report on all licensed international international arms transfers in order to ensure transparency and accountability.”

Argentina’s intervention on the ATT was provided by Ambassador Roberto Garcia Moritan, who is also Chair of the PrepCom. Ambassador Moritan reminded delegates that the ATT process emerged from the recognition that “the absence of common international standards for the import, export, and transfer of conventional weapons is a factor that contributes to conflict, the displacement of people, organized crime and terrorism, thereby undermining peace, reconciliation, security and stability, as well as sustainable social and economic development.” He reassured delegates that through multilateral negotiations, a treaty can be completed that is feasible, has clear parameters and definitions, is immune from political abuse, and is balanced and non-discriminatory.

Perhaps because arms trade issues are now being fully engaged in preparation for formal negotiations, ATT-specific resolutions were scarce. However, resolution A/ C.1/65/L.49, “Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities,” specifically encourages states “to fully implement relevant international treaties, instruments and resolutions to prevent and combat illicit brokering activities.” Moreover, the resolution requests states “to establish appropriate national laws and/or measures to prevent and combat the illicit brokering of conventional arms and materials, equipment and technology” and notes that national activities in this area can be reinforced by regional and sub-regional activities as well as international cooperation and assistance.
The issues of cyber security and information technology in international security were dealt with during thematic debate on other disarmament measures and international security. Ambassador Laura Kennedy from the United States argued that as the international community’s dependence on information technology has grown, “so too have the risks to our security associated with that dependency.” She further emphasized that threats towards the functioning of national and global networks are increasing in sophistication and noted that some threats are state-sponsored and “involve the extension of traditional forms of state-on-state activities and conflict into cyberspace.”

Ambassador Soares of Brazil noted that there are already “national armed forces with specialized military units trained and equipped to disable or even destroy critical infrastructure by means of intrusion and disruption of information networks” and highlighted that the same tactics may also be used by terrorists. The Brazilian ambassador further argued that the international community should strive to build appropriate tools for dealing with criminal and terrorist activities involving information technology, and that states should consider developing international instruments to cope with the emergence of cyber warfare.

The Russian delegation, represented by Mr. Victor Vasiliev, highlighted that international communication technology can be used not only by individual delinquents and criminal groupings, but also by terrorist and extremists organizations, as well as states for hostile political, military, economic, and other purposes. He further stated, “specific aspects of information and communication means being applied for destructive purposes are explained by their common availability and in many instances—by non-discriminative effect, a possibility of an anonymous application or under disguise of peaceful activities, potential of their wide trans-border applications, low cost and efficiency.”

US Ambassador Kennedy pointed out that each nation should pursue cyber security efforts on both national and international levels, and argued that states must “collaborate on common, or at least complementary, approaches to transnational cybersecurity issues.” She argued that international collaboration should focus on a variety of cooperative strategies to address the various transnational threats to information networks and believed that progress in establishing the foundation for better collaboration has been made. Ambassador Soares expressed belief that the UN should play a relevant role in order for member states to reach goals such as establishing networks to protect critical infrastructure, assessing national network structures, and enabling authorities to trace origins of cyber attacks.

The Russian delegation introduced draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.37, which is based on UNGA resolution 64/25. While most changes are only technical, L.37 proposes the convening in 2012 of a group of governmental experts (GGE) on information and international security “to conduct a study on existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them,” as well as relevant international concepts that would be aimed at strengthening the security of global information and communication system.

The US, Russian, and Brazilian delegations highlighted the GGE on information security and its final report that was released earlier this year. The GGE’s report acknowledged the existence of potential threats, risks, and vulnerabilities in the field of information security and presented a number of confidence-building and other measures to reduce the risk of misperception resulting from international communication technology disruptions.

While supporting the recommendations from the GGE, Ambassador Soares noted that they were mainly focused on confidence-building measures. He expressed hope that in the near future, discussions can be resumed in order to address additional measures, such as the need to develop international legal standards in the field of information and telecommunications security.

Other science and technology issues

India noted that science and technology is important in order to fulfill development aspirations, and technologies with military applications should therefore be regulated in order to enhance international security. India therefore introduced A/C.1/65/L.40, a draft decision to place “the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament” on the agenda for the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly.
Disarmament and development
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILF

As First Committee continued for a third week, delegations continued to highlight the connections among military spending, arms races, armed violence, and poverty on the one hand and disarmament, development, and security on the other.

Zambia’s representative noted that containing and dealing with the effects of the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons diverts resources from education and health that are crucial to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Mr. Tarar of Pakistan decried that the international community spends more on “breeding, exacerbating and maintaining conflict than preventing it,” while Cuba’s representative complained that the economies of developing countries “bleed to death” military spending continues to increase. The Cuban reiterated its proposal for a UN managed fund be established, where at least half of the world’s military expenditure would go to be redirected to meeting the development requirements for countries in need.

Ms. Chan of Costa Rica highlighted the “incipient arms race” building in Latin America, where there is no external security risk and yet countries continue to strengthen their troops, acquire large conventional weapon systems and arms on the pretext of “updating their arsenals,” while millions of inhabitants of these countries cannot meet even their most basic needs. “For my country, the enemies of our nations, far from being beyond our borders are within them. These are poverty, inequality, social exclusion, and wrong economic decisions.” Resources must be redirected to health, education, and housing in order to ensure development, peace, and security, she argued.

At a side event hosted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security on Wednesday, 20 October, SIPRI researcher Carolina Solmirano outlined recent patterns of military expenditure in Latin America. Among other things, she pointed out military expenditure in the region has been fairly steadily on the rise since the early 1990s, but that it has skyrocketed in recent years, creating concerns of an arms race. At the same time, Ms. Solmirano noted, fewer Latin American countries have been reporting to the UN Standardized Instrument on Reporting Military Expenditure and responding to SIPRI’s requests for data.

**Transparency in military spending**

MERCOSUR and Associated States reiterated “the importance of continuing to promote an enabling environment for arms control and limitation of conventional weapons, which allow each member to devote more resources to their economic and social development.” A few delegations pointed to the need for increased transparency as a way to foster confidence among states to promote the reduction of military expenditure.

“Transparency in the field of military expenditure is another key element in building trust between States and preventing conflict,” argued the European Union representative, Ambassador Lint of Belgium. “The increase in global military expenditure in the last decade emphasizes the need for an effective UN mechanism for reporting such expenditure. This why the EU looks forward to the work of the Group of Governmental Experts established by the General Assembly and mandated to review in November 2010 the continuing operation and further development of the standard instrument to account for military expenditure.” The delegation of Burkina Faso expressed its support for the standardized instrument and encouraged universal participation in this instrument. Mr. Junan of China note that his government supports the work of the group of governmental experts.

**Armed violence and development**

Kenya’s Ambassador Yattani highlighted “the nexus between armed violence and development,” explaining how armed violence negatively impacts human, social, and economic development, undermines efforts to the provision of basic social services, and “contributes to a vicious cycle of conflicts and under development.” Ambassador Hauge of Norway argued that reducing armed violence requires efforts that address both the demand and supply sides of the problem, and highlighted the future arms trade treaty as a potentially effective tool to prevent and reduce armed violence (see the Arms trade treaty report in this edition).

Ambassador Lauber of Switzerland expressed his government’s commitment to fostering, through the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, “further collaborative efforts among the communities and institutions involved in disarmament, peacebuilding, humanitarian affairs and development in order to reduce armed violence and to further increase human security worldwide.” The delegations of Guatemala, Kenya, and Norway also issued support for the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development and welcomed the adoption of the Oslo Commitments, which are aimed at achieving measurable reductions in armed violence. The Oslo Commitments were developed at a conference co-sponsored by Norway and the UN Development Programme in May 2010; they commit states to: include armed violence prevention in development strategies and plans; better monitor and report on the problem of armed violence; recognize the rights of victims; and strengthen international cooperation and assistance to reduce armed violence.
The discussion on the future of the disarmament machinery continued throughout the third week, with a thematic debate on the topic. Ms. Theresa Hitchens, Director of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) posited that the 24 September high-level meeting on revitalizing multilateral disarmament negotiations “has certainly brought disarmament machinery into the limelight. It has become a theme of this General Assembly. Whether or not the stagnation of parts of the multilateral disarmament machinery is viewed as a matter of universal concern, it is undeniable that it is receiving more attention than usual.” Over 30 speakers took the floor during this thematic debate, though the discussion largely focused on the same issues as previous weeks.

The delegations of Egypt, Cuba, Iran, Pakistan, and India highlighted that the current rules of procedure and the machinery itself are not the problem. Ambassador Maged Abdelaziz of Egypt argued that the agenda item entitled “High-level meeting on Revitalizing the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations” should not be used as a platform to criticize the CD or to take disarmament negotiations out of its context. The Egyptian ambassador also noted that efforts to revitalize the CD “should not be driven only by the desire to begin negotiations on the FMCT,” and argued that equal efforts are needed to revitalize the UN Disarmament Commission and to streamline the work of the First Committee. Ambassador Halid Ali Rao of India purported that since the CD’s decisions impact the national security of member states, it is logical that the CD remains a member state-driven forum and conduct its work and adopt its decision by consensus. “A bad workman often quarrels with his tools,” he noted. Liechtenstein’s delegation, however, argued that the maintenance of an effective disarmament machinery is a matter of national security and highlighted concerns that the CD’s last substantive negotiations have become a “subject contemplated by historians rather than diplomats.”

Iran’s delegation argued that the inability of the CD to undertake substantive work is not due to its structure or working methods, but rather to the unwillingness of the nuclear weapon states to agree on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work. Ambassador John Duncan of the United Kingdom disagreed and argued that evidence suggests the opposite. By highlighting the UK’s commitment to article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Ambassador Duncan stated that the problem lies not with those that are engaged in a path towards nuclear disarmament.

South Africa’s delegation cut to the chase, arguing that despite the wide-ranging views on what is causing the stalemate, “the central issue that we as Member States have to address is whether the CD is still able to fulfil its mandate” or if it is “a creation of a bygone era focused on maintaining the status quo that is out of step with today’s reality and in need of reform.”

The need for reform, especially regarding the consensus rule, was supported by many delegations. Ambassador Hilde Skorpen from Norway argued, “it is not acceptable that the consensus principle is applied in a manner which allow countries to single-handedly bring work to a standoff, which in turn has led to the marginalisation and irrelevance the CD is now facing.” Swiss Ambassador Jürg Lauber supported steps aiming to “re-interpret how the consensus rule is applied to procedural matters” and argued that Switzerland keep testing other avenues to achieve a breakthrough regarding the programme of work—for instance, by departing from the current practise and significantly reducing the level of details. Ambassador Hoffmann from Germany stated that his government does “not only have grave doubts about the wisdom of using—or should one perhaps better say: abusing?—the consensus rule in order to block purely procedural decisions like on the adoption of work programmes. In fact, if this kind of behaviour were to become the norm in the conduct of international relations, the international community would soon face total gridlock.”

Austria’s delegation introduced a draft resolution on the follow up of the high-level meeting, A/C.1/65/L.34, arguing that in order to take full advantage of the developments that have taken place during 2010, the international community must be ensured that the disarmament machinery is fit for purpose. Ambassador Strohal explained that the draft resolution seeks to encourage member states to revitalize the machinery and to inscribe the agenda item for next. He expressed hope that the time between this and next year’s First Committee would be productive and that concrete progress would have taken place by this time next year.

Many of the co-sponsors of L.34 argued that placing this topic on the agenda for next year is important. Norway’s delegation asserted, “if there has been no progress by then, it is time to switch off life support,” the Canadians expressed their willingness to see next year’s First Committee examine how the work of the CD should be pursued if the CD “does not commence substantive work on its agenda—including negotiations—before the end of its 2011 session.” New Zealand’s delegation agreed, hoping that by the time of the next First Committee, “progress on revitalizing the disarmament machinery will have been achieved and negotiations will be well underway. This would be a development on which we could indeed rejoice.” The German delegation also expressed its hope that when this agenda item would be

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**Disarmament machinery (cont.)**

dealt with next year, “all of us will be able to report with satisfaction that the Conference on Disarmament has actually begun doing its proper work.” While hoping for progress, Ambassador van der IJssel of the Netherlands called the current situation in the CD “unacceptable” and highlighted the scarce financial and human resources that are used to maintain this body. He also noted a more serious waste, that of “positive momentum,” and argued, “now is the time to act.”

US Ambassador Laura Kennedy, while not a co-sponsor of L.34, reiterated that patience is running out for many governments, including her own. She stated that if efforts to start negotiations in the CD continue to stall, then those governments that wish to negotiate an FMCT will have to consider other options for moving this process forward.

Pakistan’s delegation, on the other hand, argued that through “clever semantics, media hype and bureaucratic activism, the international community is being led to believe that the CD can only justify its existence by working according to a certain agenda which consists in making negotiations on a fissile material treaty the centre-piece of the disarmament agenda.” Pakistan’s representative further argued, “some among those who want to be the proverbial knights in shining armour for the CD allege that Pakistan is holding up consensus on FMCT and thereby flouting the international will.” This, according to Mr. Reza Bashir Tarar, “quite simply, is not true.” However, Ambassador Dell Higgee of New Zealand noted that her delegation’s frustration with the impasse was not new, and highlighted that her delegation is part of a group of countries that put together a proposal to progress disarmament negotiations in 2005 in response to the stalemate then in the CD.

The annual resolution on the report of the Conference on Disarmament was tabled last week as A/C.1/65/L.57. The resolution notes with concern that the CD has been able to commence substantive work, but notes with appreciation the initiative of the Secretary-General in convening the high-level meeting. However, after further consultations, a revised version was circulated, L.57/Rev.1. In this version, references to the resolution on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (A/RES/64/29) were deleted, despite the fact that 64/29 was adopted by consensus. In operational paragraph 2, the reference to the Brazilian proposal for a programme of work contained in CD/1889 has been removed.

Several countries welcomed the decision of the Secretary-General to have his Advisory Board carry out a thorough review of the disarmament machinery. However, questions about the Board’s transparency and work were raised after a panel on Friday afternoon, where its Chair, Ambassador Carlo Trezza, presented the Board’s 2010 report. The representative of Pakistan called the Advisory Board “a bit of a mystery” and wondered how the recommendations were formulated. He also asked if the Board had a system for interacting with member states, or if they think their “collective wisdom suffices”. The Egyptian and Indian delegations had similar comments, highlighting the issue of transparency. Ambassador Trezza emphasized the non-governmental nature of the Board and that therefore it doesn’t interact with states institutionally.

**UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and First Committee**

While many delegations, including Egypt, Cuba, and Iran, supported the UNDC, Norway questioned the need to preserve it at all. Ambassador Skorpen noted that “if we do, it has to be made more practical, more focused and more relevant. We continue to believe that regular UNDC sessions should be much shorter and focus on one or two topics, decided by the UN GA First Committee.”

The Norwegian ambassador also suggested some improvements for First Committee, proposing that states could limit the practice of seeking co-sponsorship to only newly introduced resolution. Switzerland’s delegation also expressed belief that First Committee could benefit from revitalization and suggested that the work in New York should become more focused and more dynamic. “Given its universal nature the First Committee has the authority to push forward concrete action,” argued Ambassador Lauber.

**Other resolutions**

A number of other resolutions that deal with different aspects of disarmament machinery have been tabled. Aside from the resolution on the report of the UNDC (see last week’s disarmament machinery report) and the two resolutions on the CD, the annual resolution on the Convening of a Fourth Special Session was tabled (A/C.1/65/L.35). The resolution is similar to previous ones, and convenes an open-ended working group to consider the objectives and agenda for an SSOD-IV. The working group shall hold its organizational session as soon as possible for setting dates for its substantive sessions in 2011 and 2012. Another draft resolution concerns the 30th anniversary of UNIDIR (A/C.1/65/L.47). It recognizes the importance, timeliness, and high quality work of the Institute, and underlines the contribution that UNIDIR makes to disarmament and non-proliferation education. The resolution takes note of the lack of implementation of the Advisory Board’s recommendation that the costs of the core staff should be funded from the regular budget and appeals to all member states to continue to make financial contributions to the Institute.
Structural adjustment
Dr. Robert Zuber | Global Action to Prevent War

Tuesday afternoon at 866 UN Plaza, a group of diplomats and civil society representatives met to do something that is all-too-rarely done in this community: discuss the elements of a sustainable disarmament structure. The immediate topic of a discussion led by Ambassador Skorpen of Norway and Beatrice Fihn of Reaching Critical Will was the future of the CD

The CD discussion comes out of longstanding frustration with the inability of all aspects of the UN’s disarmament machinery to reflect both the enormous opportunities that currently exist in the disarmament field and the sense of urgency of so many in the global public for concrete, trustworthy movement on some of the critical security issues facing their communities—everything from illicit arms transfers to nuclear terrorism.

Clearly, not every country that questions the mandate of a particular body or critiques the scope of a proposed treaty obligation is acting contrary to the interests of international peace and security. Likewise, not every country proposing robust disarmament measures has taken into account a full range of legitimate state and human security interests let alone raised important questions about whether the existing disarmament structure is sufficiently robust to manage the diverse negotiations and complex implementation strategies required at this present time in the UN’s history. As new technologies come online to challenge the existing security system, the need for dependable and sustainable disarmament architecture will only grow.

Inside the North Lawn Building, things are not always what they seem. Despite what at times seems like deeply entrenched stalemate, we all recognized that we need to keep probing, keep seeking clarity and areas of potential agreement. At the event on the CD, there was a clear message to both diplomats and especially to civil society representatives who are more likely to take strong stands on relatively narrow security interests. Structure matters. Insufficient organizational capacity and structural inflexibility rivals inadequate leadership and moral authority as impediments to sustainable movement on peace and security concerns.

Civil society groups working on issues from space weapons to cluster munitions have this in common—success is in part a function of ensuring that the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs and the various negotiating committees have the capacity they need to ensure disarmament engagements that can creatively balance state sovereignty and human security, and that have demonstrable impacts on communities. In this instance, the soil must be kept as rich as the seeds we seek to plant.

There are assuredly reasons for skepticism regarding the ability of the UN to meet its urgent obligations in the disarmament field. But that skepticism should not be allowed to obscure the Herculean efforts of diplomats, UN officials, and NGOs seeking to break deadlocks, clarify issues, and negotiate lasting, transparent, verifiable agreements. To those efforts, thankfully, now belong capacity and structural concerns.

Disarmament education
Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Ambassador Carlo Trezza, Chairman of the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board, presented the Board’s report of 2010 and emphasized the lack of knowledge of the complicated issues of disarmament. He noted that this might be one of the reasons it has been difficult to make progress on disarmament, explaining that it is often difficult for delegations, especially small ones, to follow these topics closely on a regular basis. Ambassador Trezza further shared that the Advisory Board in its annual report noted the weak implementation of the 2002 UN study on disarmament education and suggested that the Secretary-General should remind states to implement the recommendations from the study fully. The Board also recommended that the Secretary-General should encourage governments to establish robust infrastructures to handle disarmament and non-proliferation studies and to regularly submit reports in connection with disarmament education.

Ambassador Suda of Japan noted that only five countries submitted the relevant information to the UN Office on Disarmament Affairs on the steps they have taken to implement the recommendations from the UN study. Mr. Pablo Arrocha of Mexico highlighted the importance of the Secretary-General’s study as well and argued that disarmament education is important in order to inform citizens and providing them with the skills to work with their governments on such topics. The Mexican delegation also called upon all states to implement these 34 recommendations from the study and highlighted the need for coordination among competent bodies within the UN system, the international community, and civil society.

The Japanese delegation highlighted the fact that the outcome document of the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference for the first time included a reference to the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as a useful and effective means to advance the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. He also noted that the outcome document’s action plan encouraged all states to implement the recommendations contained in the UN study.

Ambassador Suda also notified the First Committee that it has started to appoint its atomic bomb survivors, the hibakusha, as “Special Communicators for a World
Representatives from the three UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament briefed the First Committee on 21 October, preceding the thematic discussion on regional disarmament and security. Expressing gratitude for increased financial and practical support, the chief of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs’ Regional Disarmament Branch, Agnès Marcaille, called for sustained support with the message, “help us help you”. Each of the directors of the three regional branches—Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, and Africa—gave updates on their work over the last year. Most projects focused on facilitating states’ implementation of international disarmament and arms control agreements, such as UN Security Council resolution 1540 and the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons.

In response to the presentations, the representative from Kazakhstan described the regional centres as “hearts of excellence” that have successfully bridged the gap between policy makers at the international level and practitioners on the ground. Referencing the Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-LiREC), Brazilian Ambassador Soares, speaking on behalf of MERCOSUR, cited the increased number of requests from member states and regional organizations for assistance as “demonstrating the increasing confidence in the Centre’s effectiveness and its recognized role in this area.”

Indonesia, on behalf of the Non-Aligned movement, once again tabled the draft resolution “United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament,” A/C.1/65/L.16. Aside from technical updates, the resolution remains unchanged from last year when it was adopted without a vote. The text reaffirms the positive impact of the three regional centres in carrying out “dissemination and education programmes that promote regional peace and security.” In keeping with this recognition, the representative from UN-LiREC updated the First Committee on this year’s regional disarmament measures, which focused on controlling the illicit trade and traffic of firearms through an award-winning training program and a joint comparative study on firearms legislation with Or SuR, cited the increased number of requests from member states and regional organizations for assistance as “demonstrating the increasing confidence in the Centre’s effectiveness and its recognized role in this area.”

As lead sponsor of A/C.1/65/L.56, “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific,” and host to the Centre, Nepal cited the
Regional disarmament (cont.)

Regional Centre as “nurturing regional understanding and cooperation in the field of peace, disarmament, and non-proliferation.” Whereas last year’s opening operative paragraph welcomed “the physical operation of the Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific from Kathmandu,” this year’s resolution expresses the General Assembly’s “satisfaction for the activities carried out in the past year by the Regional Centre,” and “invites all States of the region to contribute to support the Centre’s activities.”

Egypt, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and (for the first time) Malaysia sponsored the draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.4 on “Regional Disarmament.” Aside from technical updates, the resolution remains unchanged from last year when it was adopted without a vote. It “affirms that global and regional approaches to disarmament are complementary and should be pursued simultaneously.” It also “encourages the promotion of confidence-building measures to ease regional tensions.”

Pakistan also tabled A/C.1/65/L.7, “Confidence-building measures in the regional and sub-regional context,” which, aside from technical updates, remains unchanged from last year, when it was adopted without a vote. The same applies to the text of A/C.1/65/L.6, “Conventional arms control at the regional and sub-regional levels,” also sponsored by Pakistan in addition to Belarus, Egypt, Nepal, Peru, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Ukraine. Last year, the resolution was adopted by a vote of 173-1-2 in the First Committee, with Bhutan and Russia abstaining and India casting a negative vote. Citing the UN Disarmament Commission as the appropriate body to deal with regional disarmament, rather than the Conference on Disarmament (CD), India rejected the resolution’s request for assistance from the CD. Furthermore, India expressed that “security concerns of States extend beyond narrowly defined regions,” and that “the notion of preservation of a balance in defense capabilities in the regional or sub-regional context is both unrealistic and unacceptable to [India’s] delegation.”

Algeria tabled A/C.1/65/L.30, “Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region.” In his statement, Algerian representative Mr. Djamel Moktefi explained that “the challenges and perils, which menace the stability of the African Continent, reverberate in the Mediterranean region and weaken the capacity and potential for cooperation and assistance between the North and South borders of the Mediterranean.” Ambassador Saviour F. Borg of Malta echoed these statements in citing the resolution as “bringing together both sides of the Mediterranean” as well as the greater European and African regions in their collective and interlinked security. Aside from technical updates, the resolution remains unchanged from last year, when it was adopted without a vote.

Macedonia presented draft decision A/C.1/65/L.17, entitled “Maintenance of international security—good-neighborness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe.” The decision puts the item on the provisional agenda for 2012. Apart from technical updates, the draft decision remains unchanged from the sixty-third session in 2008, when it was adopted without a vote.

In addition to re-introducing these resolutions on regional security and disarmament, member states expressed further support for regional and sub-regional disarmament efforts by adding regional considerations to operative paragraphs in A/C.1/65/L.32, “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,” A/C.1/65/L.49 on “Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities,” and A/C.1/65/L.36 on “Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures”. L.36, for example, “welcomes the synergies within the multi-stakeholder process” including regional and sub-regional organization and institutions, and L.49 “acknowledges that national efforts to prevent and combat illicit brokering activities can be reinforced by [...] efforts at the regional and sub-regional level.”

Disarmament education (cont.)

without Nuclear Weapons,” asking them to pass on their first-hand experiences to younger generations. He also announced that together with the United Nations University, Japan will host a global forum on disarmament and non-proliferation education in March 2011, with the main purpose of facilitating further dialogue and cooperation among civil society and governments on the subject.

Two resolutions have been submitted on the topic of disarmament education: the biennial resolution on “United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education” A/C.1/65/L.53 and the biennial resolution on “United Nations Disarmament Information Programme” in A/C.1/65/L.52. Both resolutions contain only technical updates from previous years and are expected to be adopted by consensus once again.
Women and disarmament
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

During the UN General Assembly general debate in September, the prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, announced that in keeping with her country’s commitment to advancing peace and security and the promotion of women, the government would introduce in First Committee a resolution on “Women, disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation”. Over the past few weeks, the Trinidad and Tobago delegation has been holding consultations on this resolution, which resulted in the tabling of A/C.1/65/L.39.

This is the first time that First Committee has formally addressed this highly relevant issue; it is especially timely because this October marks the tenth anniversary of UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security. UNSCR 1325 is the first resolution UNGA has ever adopted on women, the promotion of women’s roles in conflict resolution and sustainable peace. UNSCR 1325 “through broadening the understanding of women’s roles in the attainment of sustainable peace and recognizing the value of their contributions in this important field.” However, he also emphasized that L.39 must be distinguished from UNSCR 1325, as L.39 does not “misappropriate, duplicate or replace” 1325 but aims “to develop a particular aspect of it”.

The draft resolution unfortunately does not mention UNSCR 1325, though an earlier version of the text, introduced by Trinidad and Tobago at a side event in week two, did contain a direct reference to that landmark resolution. The earlier draft also referenced other related initiatives, which provided a rich context for L.39’s introduction. These included the UN Conferences on Women, which recognized the leading role that women have played in working actively towards general and complete disarmament, and the need for the full participation of women in efforts to strengthen and maintain international peace, security, and disarmament. The original draft also mentioned the Economic and Social Council agreed conclusions on gender mainstreaming (1997/2), in which the United Nations was mandated to work systematically to incorporate gender perspectives into all areas of substantive work, and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs gender mainstreaming action plan, launched in 2003. Mr. Charles acknowledged that L.39 is a compromise text compared to the original draft, in pursuit of consensus.

Interestingly, a different resolution does reference UNSCR 1325; A/C.1/65/L.58, “Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa,” urges the member states of the Standing Advisory Committee, “in accordance with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), to include a gender equality dimension in the various meetings of the Committee relating to disarmament and international security.”

A few delegations have issued their support for L.39. Tanzania’s representative explained, “Women have to play a significant role in the disarmament debate and activities in the Great Lakes Region of Africa at all levels because they are major stakeholders in development activities, and because they bear the biggest brunt of war and armed conflict perpetrated using [small arms and light weapons].”

Ambassador Lauber of Switzerland argued that all efforts for disarmament must be comprehensive and should include a gender perspective. He noted that experiences of men and women tend to differ in armed violence and that if the international community wants to make progress, this difference has to be taken into account. He expressed hope that all delegations can subscribe to the basic principles underpinning L.39.