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- Action on Armed Violence
- Global Action to Prevent War
- Global Security Institute
- Hibakusha Stories
- International Action Network on Small Arms
- Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy
- NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
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A delegation pointed out last week. Yet many non-nuclear weapon possessors, including Algeria, continue to argue that the consensus rule is a way of protecting national security interests of all states at the same level and not simply the most powerful among them. But the nuclear weapon possessors are the only states using this rule as a veto. Thus it protects those that possess nuclear weapons, which they use as an instrument of power in their relations with other states.

The nuclear weapon possessors, a tiny minority of countries, benefit from the stalemate in the CD. The decision of certain non-nuclear weapon states to block proposals for beginning substantive work on the issues they purportedly care most about would only seem to harm their own interests. Nuclear disarmament, prevention of new nuclear arms races and a huge amount of money (hundreds of billions of US$) being spent” on nuclear weapons.

“One of the main reasons the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has failed is the non-nuclear weapon states have not been willing to begin substantive work on disarmament treaties.”

Some questions thus arising from this year’s First Committee are: Why is the CD, an institution whose rules of procedure and limited membership undermine collective security, so revered by some of the non-nuclear weapon states? What benefit do they derive from the continued stalemate? They may be concerned about losing an institution historically identified with nuclear disarmament, without having anything solid to replace it. However, such worries should be outweighed by the costs of continuing indefinitely with the status quo.

The ever present question that plagues any attempt to move forward, given the lack of political will to a) negotiate on any of the four core issues; b) establish an alternative process or structure for such negotiations; and/or c) abandon the four core issue approach and focus on one encompassing treaty such as a nuclear weapons convention: If there is no will, where is the way?
Throughout this year’s First Committee session, many delegates’ statements indicated that despite the innovative solutions to the impasse at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on offer this year, national positions remain entrenched. While most states indicated their frustration with the deadlock and their flexibility on how to move forward, in the end, only minimal steps were taken toward revitalizing multilateral disarmament negotiations.

**The political vs. procedural argument continues**

During the thematic debate on disarmament machinery, some states, such as Cuba, continued to argue that the problem is not with the CD and thus it does not need reforming, nor should the issues on the CD’s agenda be taken up elsewhere. Instead, political will of the nuclear weapon possessors is the key problem and it is this that must somehow be overcome in order to forge ahead. However, the nuclear weapon possessors also seek to preserve the consensus rule, which they have been using as an instrument of veto for the last fifteen years. France’s delegation asserted, “The procedural rules and in particular the consensus rule are guarantees to safeguard all countries’ defence and security interests,” agreeing that the problem is political, not procedural.

Pakistan’s delegation seems to agree, though it places the blame of lack of political will with other nuclear weapon possessors. Ambassador Akram described his country’s position as taking a “stand against nuclear selectivity, discrimination and exceptionalism.” Yet Pakistan speaks as a nuclear weapon possessor itself. It argues that the “leading critics of the CD” are those who have prevented action on the three other core issues on the Conference’s agenda, but in reality, these countries are among those refusing to “revitalize” the machinery. The CD’s “critics” are actually those states most concerned with lack of progress on the very issues Pakistan highlights. And they are not critics of the CD as much as they are proponents of engaging in substantive work on nuclear disarmament.

Those who are most actively and creatively seeking revitalization of work on the CD’s agenda are non-nuclear weapon possessors, who see the lack of progress on work in the CD as being selective, discriminatory, and exceptional against their interests. The lack of progress in the CD perpetuates the double standard of the nuclear regime, wherein many states increasingly feel that a system of haves and have-nots is undermining collective security. As Mr. Langeland of Norway said, by continuing on this same path year after year, “we are now allowing those who do not seek progress to set the pace.”

**Resolutions on taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations**

The level of frustration with the CD ran high throughout First Committee and this was reflected in the number of draft resolution dealing with the subject this year. However, the most promising attempt since 2005 to unblock the stalemate at the CD was unfortunately withdrawn on the final day of First Committee. The Austria-Mexico-Norway draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.21/Rev.1, “Taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations,” did not go for a vote after it became clear that it would not garner enough support at this time to make it truly viable. It received criticism from the nuclear weapon possessors and some key non-nuclear weapon states, which argued that it would undermine the CD.

For example, Ambassador Danon of France argued that exporting the CD’s work into another forum such as the General Assembly “will not help resolve the political problems that underlie the deadlock of the CD,” but rather, “will enable them to persist, while diluting the pressure to overcome them.” However, it is unclear how the CD’s blockage would persist in a General Assembly working group, which would allow for increased participation of UN member states, more scrutiny from the international community, greater flexibility in the rules of procedure to initiate substantive work.

Furthermore, the Egyptian delegate argued that some of the resolutions would create duplicative structures that would discuss agenda items while the CD might be addressing it at the same time. However, as Austria’s Ambassador Strohal made clear, the opened-ended working groups proposed in L.21/Rev.1 would only start operating if the CD remained paralyzed.

L.21/Rev.1 contained only minor revisions to its original. The preamble no longer includes a specific reference to the efforts of the P5 to facilitate progress on a fissile material treaty or UN Security Council resolution 1887 (2009). Furthermore, paragraph (a) of OP2 is slightly rearranged to list “priority issues of nuclear disarmament” in one paragraph rather than segmenting them into separate paragraphs. It also specifies negotiations on fissile materials. Paragraphs (b) and (c) are now combined and rearranged so that the working groups would develop recommendations and report to the General Assembly in 2013, “which would assess their progress and decide on extending their mandates, not excluding the possibility of negotiations on legally binding instruments.” In L.21, it seemed that the working groups themselves could decide to negotiate, whereas in Rev.1 the instruction would seem to have to come from the General Assembly.

While L.21/Rev.1 was apparently a bridge too far, A/C.1/66/L.39, “Revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations,” put forward by the Netherlands, South Africa, and Switzerland, was adopted by consensus. This resolution offers space for continuing the dialogue on breaking the impasse at the CD, though

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it unfortunately does not contain any mechanisms itself for breaking that impasse.

Cuba’s resolution A/C.1/66/L.13/Rev.1, “Report of the Conference on Disarmament,” was also adopted without a vote. The draft simply calls on the CD to “further intensify consultations and explore possibilities with a view to adopting a balanced and comprehensive programme of work at the earliest possible date during its 2012 session.” In an explanation of vote, Pakistan’s delegation expressed “special appreciation for the professional manner in which the work on this resolution was carried out” and for the “constructive spirit in which delegations participated in informal consultations.” It went along with consensus because of this although it expressed disappointment that the resolution mentioned the programme of work adopted but not implemented in 2009. Meanwhile other delegations that joined consensus, such as Japan, were disappointed that the resolution did not make a stronger reference to CD/1864.

Canada’s draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.40/Rev.1**, “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,” which focuses exclusively on one issue on the CD’s agenda, did not fare quite as well. It was adopted with a vote of 151-2-23. Pakistan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea voted against the text, while the Arab Group, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, and Israel abstained. Based on explanations of vote, the abstentions derive from the resolution’s unitary focus on a fissile materials treaty and because of its suggestion that options outside the CD could be considered next year.

Separate votes were held on OP2 (adopted 149-3-16), which calls on the General Assembly to consider options for negotiating an FMCT next if the CD should fail to implement a programme of work by then, and OP3 (adopted 148-2-19), which encourages all member states (instead of just interested states as in the original version), “without prejudice to their national positions during future negotiations,” to continue efforts, “including with and on the margins” of the CD, in support of commencement of negotiations.

The adopted text contains a few changes from its original. The most notable change is that it withdraws the mechanism for establishing a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). Some delegations, such as Lichtenstein and Slovenia, complained about the removal of the GGE in their explanations of vote. Other changes include the addition of a new preambular paragraph recalling CD/1299, the Shannon mandate for an FMCT. Meanwhile, PP5 in the new version recognizes the importance of advancing “all issues” identified in CD/1864, as opposed to “other relevant issues” in the original.

Finally, during First Committee the Russian Federation unofficially distributed a proposal that it felt could have served as a basis for beginning substantive negotiations at CD. The proposal suggested beginning work elaborating the main elements of an FMCT and continuing substantive discussions on three other key issues. However, agreement was not reached even on this simple proposal, which more or less carries forward the traditional programme of work formula that has been attempted in the CD over the past several years.

Disarmament Commission

With everyone’s attention devoted to the proposals for overcoming the stalemate in the CD, the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) received scant notice this year, aside from expressions of extreme frustration uttered during the general and disarmament machinery debates. Several delegations criticized the UNDC’s failure to adopt any non-binding political recommendations since 1999. Mexico’s delegation described the UNDC’s “failure to comply with its mandate” as “intolerable”. It argued that the Commission was established in a context responding to Cold War “necessities” and that under those dynamics, it was able to reach agreements, but that a multi-polar world order inhibits its work. That said, Mexico’s delegation argued, the body is not a “victim of circumstance”—the same states that are represented in the UNDC manage to take care of their national interests in other multilateral fora that are not stalemated.

A few delegations made suggestions for revitalizing the UNDC’s work. The Chair of the last UNDC session, Ambassador Hamid Al-Bayati of Iraq, suggested that the next cycle focus only on two agenda items—nuclear and conventional weapons. However, one of the UNDC’s main problems is arguably its vague and all-encompassing agenda items. In this vein, Norway’s delegation reiterated its proposal that First Committee ask the UNDC to look into certain well-defined topics each year. Mr. Langeland of Norway suggested that the outcome of each session “could be a Chair’s summary presenting the different, and eventually converging, views on any given topic.” The following First Committee session would then “decide on possible courses of action, drawing on the UNDC report.” Mr. Langeland also suggested that the UNDC sessions be shortened and invite more expert participation from capital.

Only one resolution addressed the UNDC. A/C.1/66/L.20, “Report of the Disarmament Commission,” simply recommends that the UNDC “intensify consultations with a view to reaching agreement on the items on its agenda” before the start of its substantive session of 2012; and sets the dates for that session as 2–20 April 2012. It was adopted without a vote and without comment.
As can be seen from the debates at this year’s First Committee, nuclear disarmament continues to be a top priority of most UN member states, which see the lack of progress on the issue since 1945 becoming increasingly untenable since the end of the Cold War. Many expected that as a more interdependent and complex world order developed, nuclear weapons would become ancient relics of a violent and dangerous past. While the nuclear weapon states addressing First Committee insisted that they are in full compliance with their article VI obligations to disarm, the vast majority of states are not convinced. Indeed, as many others before him, Ambassador Kwon of the Republic of Korea called on the nuclear weapon states to demonstrate a “higher standard of compliance” with their disarmament obligations.

Virtually every delegation addressing First Committee welcomed the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty as well as the outcome document of the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, but most were firm in their conviction that neither went far enough and that they expect more. Ambassador Viotti of Brazil also pointed out that “other developments, in particular the modernization of weapons systems, and the reiteration of outdated concepts and doctrines of nuclear deterrence, continue to be a cause of concern.” The New Agenda Coalition reiterated its concern with the “development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons” and Swiss Ambassador Fasel pointed out that “the unilateral and bilateral steps taken fail to address adequately the fissile material issue, the continuing deployment of thousands of weapons or their modernization programmes.”

Noting the difference between rhetoric and reality on nuclear disarmament, several states emphasized the importance of moving from discussion to action. In this vein, Serbia’s Ambassador Starcevic called for “intensified joint efforts” to translate the 2010 NPT outcome document into concrete results and the International Committee of the Red Cross called on states to fulfill the commitments undertaken at the NPT Review Conference as a “humanitarian, moral and political imperative.”

The New Agenda Coalition (NAC)’s resolution A/C.1/66/L.31/Rev.1, “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments,” is intended to facilitate the implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligations contained in the 2010 document. L.13/Rev.1 includes only one slight change from the original L.31. Operative paragraph (OP) 8 was rearranged to welcome the appointment of a facilitator and host country for the 2012 conference on the creation of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East.

It was adopted with a vote of 160-6-4, with only nuclear weapon possessors opposed. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), France, India, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States voted no, while China, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, and US-associated state Micronesia abstained.

In a separate vote, OP1 was adopted by a vote of 162-1-7. The paragraph reiterates that all of the NPT’s articles are binding on all states parties at all times and in all circumstances and calls on all states to “comply fully with all decisions, resolutions and other commitments made at Review Conferences.” The DPRK voted no, while China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States abstained. (Georgia, an eighth abstention, intended to vote yes.) Meanwhile, OP9, which calls for states to “spare no effort to achieve the universality” of the NPT and urges India, Israel, and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states, was adopted with a vote of 160-5-3. DPRK, Israel, India, Pakistan, and the United States voted no while Bhutan, France, and the UK abstained.

While it is alarming to see NPT states parties voting anything other than yes on a paragraph calling for universality of the Treaty, it is even more alarming to hear from certain nuclear weapon states that they rejected the resolution because it does not “accurately” reflect the 2010 NPT outcome document. In their explanations of vote both China and the United States echoed the French delegations’ earlier comment that L.31/Rev.1 “reinterprets” the outcome. In fact, the resolution in no way reinterprets the outcome document. Instead, as the NAC explained fully in its general statement before the vote, it reflects the Coalition’s “specific focus on ensuring that the nuclear disarmament commitments contained in the Conference’s action plan are implemented in full.” While the nuclear weapon states expressed concern that the resolution is “unbalanced” between disarmament and non-proliferation, the NAC argued, “this does not mean that we are less committed to the plan’s other elements, but there are other resolutions that deal with those elements.”

A slew of other resolutions directly and indirectly addressed nuclear disarmament. Iran’s draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.3, “Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” was adopted with a vote of 105-52-10. As in previous years, most Western delegations voted against the resolution because of their conviction that Iran is in non-compliance with its “non-proliferation obligations”. Ambassador Kennedy of the US delegation said she finds it “cynical for the primary sponsor, a state in noncompliance with its NPT
Nuclear disarmament (cont.)

obligations, to try to dictate follow up with disarmament obligations.” India and Pakistan abstained because they are non-NPT state parties.

However, whereas in previous years the European Union voted no on preambular paragraph 6, this year it abstained. The paragraph reaffirms the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East. “Circumstances have changed since 2009, when this resolution was last adopted,” explained Dr. Cezary Lusiński of Poland on behalf of the EU. “Through the change in our voting pattern, we want to send a signal to Iran, the sponsor of this resolution, and, certainly also to all other countries in the region, to fully and constructively engage in the process leading to the 2012 Conference, and at the Conference itself.”

Canada, Israel, Panama, the United States, and US associates Marshall Islands and Micronesia continued to vote no. A separate vote was also called on preambular paragraph 9, which welcomes the adoption of the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Most of the EU also abstained on this paragraph, though France and the United Kingdom joined Canada, Israel, Japan, Panama, and the United States in voting no.

The Philippines resolution, A/C.1/66/L.15, “2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee,” was adopted with a vote of 169-0-3. Only non-NPT states parties India, Israel, and Pakistan abstained on the resolution as a whole and on PP7, adopted 169-0-3, which reaffirms the necessity of implementing the 2010 Review Conference’s follow-on actions.

Japan’s draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.41*, “United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,” was adopted with a vote of 156-1-15. The DPRK voted against the resolution because it believes that the Japanese delegation “has no moral ground” to table a resolution on the elimination of nuclear weapons since it, inter alia, shelters under the US nuclear umbrella. The DPRK further rejected the resolution because it calls on the DPRK to abandon its nuclear programme, which it sees as a violation of the UN Charter’s self-defence provisions. In a right of reply, the Japanese delegation asserted that the DPRK’s claims against it are groundless.

As for the other nuclear weapon possessors, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and United States voted in favour of the resolution, while China, India, Israel, and Pakistan abstained. Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Iran, Mauritius, Myanmar, South Africa, Syria, and Zimbabwe also abstained. Brazil’s delegation argued that the resolution uses ambiguous framing for nuclear disarmament, which was clarified by the unequivocal undertaking in 2000. It also argued that the resolution inappropriately hints that nuclear terrorism and nuclear war are risks of the same status.

Separate votes were held on preambular paragraph (PP) 9 and OP2, OP8, OP9, and OP15. DPRK voted no on all these paragraphs. In addition, Pakistan, India, and Israel abstained on PP9, which welcomes the outcome of the 2010 NPT review Conference, as none are NPT state parties. Pakistan and Bhutan abstained on OP2, while India and Israel voted no. The paragraph calls on states not party to the NPT to accede as non-nuclear weapon states, which none of the three are willing to do. India, Mauritius, Pakistan, and Syria abstained on OP8, which calls on all states to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India’s delegation explained its abstention is consistent with its position on the CTBT.

China and Pakistan voted no on OP9, while Brazil, Ecuador, India, Israel, Russia, South Africa, and Venezuela abstained. The paragraph calls for immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT) and for all relevant states to declare and uphold moratoria on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. Brazil and Russia’s delegations explained that they abstained because it did not specify that negotiations of an FMCT should take place in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). India’s delegation said it likewise supports negotiations of an FMCT in the CD and that the question of a moratorium “does not arise”.

Finally, Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, and Pakistan abstained on OP15, which calls for the universalization of IAEA safeguards and encourages states to conclude additional protocols. Brazil’s delegation argued that the additional protocol is voluntary and thus the resolution would have benefited from the language used in the 2010

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Editorial (cont.)

Civil society and many non-nuclear weapon states grow weary of calls for political will. The mantra has been repeated for fifteen years and we are no closer to nuclear disarmament. In fact, that goal becomes more elusive as modernization programmes are put into place, as billions of dollars are sunk into the weapons laboratories, and as states around the world continue to shelter under nuclear umbrellas and include the potential use of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines. The continued economic, political, and security investments in nuclear weapons undermines the development of collective security. The failure of the General Assembly to accept responsibility for and initiate substantive work on nuclear disarmament doesn’t just mean that international agreements prohibiting such weapons do not exist but that sustainable security itself becomes increasingly unobtainable. “It is not just the disarmament process that is put into question,” argued Mr. Hermoso of the Philippines, “but the multilateral process as a whole is at stake.”

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In what has continued to be a growing practice at First Committee, some delegations insisted on singling out others for alleged non-compliance with “non-proliferation obligations” throughout the month. The varying opinions on obligations and compliance resulted in a continuous flow of allegations and rights of reply between accusers and accused, detracting from the work of the Committee to build consensus on vital issues of disarmament and international security.

In order to mitigate the rising tensions, especially from those emanating from calls for “strong responses” to “non-compliance” as issued by the Canadian delegation or “concerted action” as in the US draft resolution on compliance (see below), Ms. Elsa Haile of Eritrea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged that dialogue, rather than sanctions or threat or use of force, should be the central instrument for pursuing non-proliferation. Similarly, Swiss Ambassador Fasel said diplomacy is the only way to resolve issues of concern and appealed to all states “to comply with the applicable norms and decisions.”

Furthermore, many delegations noted that nuclear disarmament is the only way to guarantee against proliferation, while Ambassador Kwon of the Republic of Korea called for deeper voluntary arsenal cuts as a way to increase the “moral authority and political legitimacy” of nuclear weapon possessors to call on non-nuclear weapon states to participate actively in strengthening non-proliferation mechanisms. The New Agenda Coalition, Mexico, Venezuela, and many others emphasized that non-proliferation and disarmament are intrinsically linked and mutually reinforcing. Yet despite the widespread recognition that disarmament will help facilitate non-proliferation, the nuclear weapon possessors are implementing or planning for modernization of their arsenals, which is attracting increasing amounts of attention from the international community. Switzerland’s Ambassador Fasel criticized both the quantitative arsenal increases and the fact that “all nuclear powers are strengthening their arsenals at the qualitative level through modernization programmes.” Mr. Reza Najafi of Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs lamented that some nuclear weapon states “continue to allocate billions of dollars to develop new types of nuclear weapons, build new nuclear weapons production facilities and modernize and replace such weapons.”

At the same time, many delegations emphasized that non-proliferation measures should be strengthened. Several states highlighted the importance of implementing safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and ratifying the additional protocol, which they want to see become the standard non-proliferation toolkit. Several delegations expressed support for the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in Seoul in 2012. As a representative of the host country, Ambassador Kim of the Republic of Korea said the summit will be an opportunity to “address the synergy between nuclear security and nuclear safety, review the implementation of the commitments made at the Washington Summit, and explore new and creative ways to further enhance nuclear security.”

Three resolutions dealt with proliferation issues. Egypt’s draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.2, “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East,” was adopted by a vote of 157-5-6. Before the vote, Israel’s delegation urged others to vote no on this “ill motivated and unbalanced resolution,” which they see as unfairly singling out Israel. Ms. Tamar Rahamimoff-Honig also argued that the resolution’s inclusion of language referring to the 2012 conference on establishing a weapons of mass destruction free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East “proves above all the ill intent of the Arab states with regard to this proposed conference.” Ambassador Laura Kennedy of the United States also lamented the resolution’s inclusion of the 2012 conference, arguing that this “hurts prospects” for the conference’s outcome. Indicating that her resolution would be voting no, she however expressed the US delegation’s support for a WMDFZ in the Middle East and universal adherence to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The European Union, New Zealand, and Switzerland indicated that they voted in favour of the resolution because they support the establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle East, but that they remain concerned with the resolution’s lack of “balance” concerning the proliferation risks in the region.

Separate votes were held on preambular paragraphs (PP) 5, 6, and 7. PP5, which calls for universal adherence to the NPT, was adopted 155-2-2, with India and Israel voting no and Bhutan and Pakistan abstaining. PP6, which also calls for universal adherence to the Treaty and to IAEA safeguards, was adopted 160-2-2, with India and Israel voting no and Bhutan and Pakistan abstaining. PP7, which calls specifically on countries in the Middle East to adhere to the NPT and IAEA safeguards, was adopted 163-1-2, with Israel voting no and India and Pakistan abstaining. India’s delegation abstained on the resolution, arguing that the focus of the resolution should remain limited to the region that it intends to address. Its abstentions and no votes on the resolution were based on its position against acceding to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.

The US draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.47/Rev.1, “Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments,” adds two new paragraphs to its original. A new operative paragraph (OP) 5 calls on member states to “support...”
Nuclear disarmament (cont.)

NPT final document. Cuba’s delegation argued that the references in OP15 to UN Security Council resolutions are inappropriate because of its limited and politicized nature.

Malaysia’s resolution A/C.1/66/L.42, “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” was adopted with a vote of 127-25-22, which is similar to previous years. Only Japan and Sweden explained their votes. Japan said it abstained because step by step progress is needed before embarking on negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. Sweden voted in favour of the resolution but emphasized that the reference to the model nuclear weapons convention in PP15 should not prejudice any future negotiations.

Myanmar’s resolution A/C.1/66/L.49, “Nuclear disarmament,” was adopted with a vote of 113-44-18. Separate votes were held on paragraphs OP14, which calls for implementation of the 2010 NPT action plan, and OP16, which calls for negotiation of a fissile materials treaty on the basis of the Shannon mandate in the Conference on Disarmament. Pakistan explained that it abstained on the resolution and OP14 and voted against OP16 because of its positions on the NPT and negotiation of a fissile materials treaty. India similarly abstained because its position on the NPT.

On behalf of France and the United Kingdom, the UK delegation explained that they voted no on the resolution as a whole and thus had to abstain on OP16, even though they support the paragraph. The Netherlands, which voted no as a whole and abstained on OP14, argued that non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually reinforcing and therefore it is important to work for the full implementation of the 2010 NPT action plan, not just the actions on disarmament. Similarly, Germany, which voted no on the resolution but yes on OP14, said it did so with a view to balanced implementation of the action plan. Meanwhile, Japan abstained because the resolution takes a different approach than it feels is appropriate.

India’s resolution A/C.1/66/L.45, “Reducing nuclear danger,” was adopted with a vote of 110-46-12. France, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States voted no, while China and Russia abstained. Pakistan voted in favour. Only Brazil offered an explanation of vote, saying it voted in favour but that it is concerned that the text doesn’t address the primary danger of nuclear weapons, which comes from their possession. It emphasized that de-alerting cannot replace elimination. In previous years, pro-de-alerting states such as Switzerland and New Zealand have explained their votes by critiquing the resolution’s lack of reference to the NPT and recognize that all nuclear weapon possessors, not just the P5, will need to take relevant actions to reduce nuclear dangers.

India’s other resolution, A/C.1/66/L.46, “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons,” was adopted with a vote of 113-48-10. Australia explained that it voted no because the resolution does not make reference to relevant non-proliferation norms. Brazil indicated that it voted in favour despite its priority of eliminating nuclear weapons, not just prohibiting their use.

Nuclear proliferation (cont.)

efforts aimed at the resolution of compliance questions by means consistent with such agreements and with international law,” while a new OP6 welcomes the role of the UN “in restoring the integrity of, and fostering negotiations on, certain arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and in the removal of threats to peace.”

In introducing the revised resolution, Ambassador Kennedy of the US delegation explained that the paragraphs were taken from the 2002 consensus resolution. However, L.47/Rev.1 also retains the changes made in 2005 that calls for concerted action to hold states accountable for non-compliance and to “prevent serious damage to international security and stability arising from non-compliance”. Because these controversial paragraphs were retained, a vote was again called on the draft this year. It was adopted with a vote of 157-0-18. Iran’s delegation gave a similar explanation of vote as it did in 2008 when the resolution was last adopted, describing the resolution as subjective and politically motivated. The Iranian delegation argued that the text fails to afford priority to compliance with disarmament obligations while the nuclear weapon possessors are engaged in modernization programmes and nuclear sharing arrangements. It also criticized the lack of legal clarity and precision in the draft and its national approach to assessments of non-compliance.

A/C.1/66/L.48, “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction,” was adopted without a vote. Iran and Pakistan delivered explanations of vote. Pakistan’s delegation said it supports the resolution but the language should have been refined, arguing that terrorism should be viewed in perspective. It also called for increased international cooperation to develop a radiological weapons convention, for the strengthening of multilateral regimes, and for states to address the root causes of terrorism such as injustice and deprivation. Iran’s delegation argued that the draft text suffers from a selective approach to nuclear security that does not mention nuclear disarmament.
Only one draft resolution this year dealt with an element of the nuclear fuel chain. The African Group tabled its biennial A/C.1/66/L.53, “Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes,” was adopted without a vote. It contains only technical updates from the 2009 version. The text expresses grave concern about the dumping of radioactive waste or the use of such waste in radiological warfare; calls upon states to prevent any dumping of radioactive waste that would infringe on another state’s sovereignty; and requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify efforts to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons and to include radioactive waste in the scope of such a convention. A new preambular paragraph welcomes the convening of the recent meetings on nuclear safety and security by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Secretary-General while a new operative paragraph takes note of their outcomes. Before action was taken in First Committee, the African Group introduced an oral amendment to the text, wherein a new preambular paragraph 10 “Notes the convening by the Secretary General of the high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security in New York on 22 September 2011.”

Overall, this year’s First Committee continued the largely stagnant debate between states that want to restrict the further spread of so-called “proliferation sensitive” nuclear fuel chain capabilities and those who demand access to technology and know-how for the development of nuclear power. Many countries, including those of the Non-Aligned Movement, reiterated the “inalienable right” of states to develop nuclear energy for “peaceful uses” under article IV of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Others, such as the Republic of Korea and the United States, emphasized that with this right comes the responsibility of non-proliferation.

A few delegations discussed the link between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Brazil’s Ambassador Viotti, for example, emphasized the importance of a “global endeavor to promote [nuclear] safety and security, which, in its broadest sense, comprises a renewed commitment to nuclear disarmament.”

Moreover, several delegations highlighted the importance of developing a more robust nuclear safety and security regime, especially in the wake of the disaster at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Brazil, Egypt, Holy See, Israel, Jamaica, Mongolia, Netherlands, and Thailand noted that the disaster at the Fukushima brought questions of nuclear safety into sharp focus. Some of these delegations, along with others such as Liberia, Oman, and Singapore highlighted the Secretary-General’s high-level meeting and/or the ministerial meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its action plan adopted on 22 September 2011.

A few states mentioned regional initiatives on nuclear safety and security. Singapore’s delegation announced that it would be holding an Asia-Europe nuclear safety seminar in 2012 to address regional cooperation on emergency preparedness and response capabilities, while Thailand’s delegation announced that it has proposed to its ASEAN colleagues the establishment of “an informal network among nuclear regulatory bodies or relevant authorities in the region to enhance regularly capacity to ensure safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the region.” The Republic of Korea discussed the nuclear security summit it will hold in 2012.

Finally, a few delegations highlighted the dangers of various aspects of the nuclear fuel chain. The delegations of CARICOM and Jamaica highlighted the dangers of the transshipment of nuclear waste through their region. Kyrgyzstan’s delegation urged assistance from the international community in cleaning up the 36 uranium tailing ponds in its country, left over from uranium mining and the process of nuclear fuel production. Mongolia’s delegation refuted media reports that the Mongolian government is negotiating the establishment of an international spent fuel storage facility on its territory, pointing out that “importing foreign nuclear waste would be in gross violation of Mongolia’s domestic laws and regulations.” •
First Committee Monitor

Nuclear testing
Daria Medvedeva | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) continued to receive attention during this year’s First Committee. Many delegations called for its entry into force and welcomed ratifications by Ghana and Guinea. Mexico and Sweden have jointly taken on the role as coordinating states during the next two years for the facilitation of the entry into force of the Treaty and chaired the Article XIV Conference on 23 September 2011, which several delegations welcomed. However, key annex II states continue to prevent the Treaty’s entry into force, fifteen years after it was negotiated.

The annual draft resolution on the CTBT, A/C.1/66/L.37, was adopted with a vote of 170-1-3. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) voted no, while Syria, India, and Mauritius abstained.

The Syrian delegation explained that it abstained because the CTBT does not require negative security assurances or nuclear disarmament, nor does it explicitly stress the illegitimacy of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Cuba and Iran explained that they voted in favour of the resolution but that operational paragraph (OP) 5 detracts from the resolution’s technical nature. The paragraph recalls UN Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), which condemn the DPRK’s nuclear tests, and reaffirms its support for the Six-Party Talks.

Pakistan’s delegation explained that it voted in favour though noted that it is not bound by the conclusions and recommendations of the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference referred to in the resolution. Finally, Israel’s delegation explained that it voted in favour but emphasized that it does not support some of the language in preamble paragraph (PP) 6 and OP1. PP6 notes that the 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the vital importance of the CTBT’s entry into force. Israel’s delegation argued that the CTBT and NPT are not linked and that an attempt to “force” such a linkage will damage security prospects in the Middle East. Meanwhile, OP1 stresses the urgency of ratification of the CTBT without conditions. However, Israel maintains that it wants to ensure that there is adequate coverage of the Middle East by the International Monitoring System before ratifying the Treaty. The delegation also reiterated that Israel’s participation in the CTBTO’s executive council must be addressed and sovereign equality ensured.

Negative security assurances
Tayyaba Khokhar | NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security

Throughout this year’s session, many states reaffirmed the importance of negative security assurances (NSAs). The Non-Aligned Movement stressed that “efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to all non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” should be pursued as an urgent priority. Among others, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the African Group, and the New Agenda Coalition, as well as individual states such as Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Lao PDR, Mongolia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Tajikistan, Uruguay, and Venezuela also voiced support for NSAs.

Many of these states emphasized that NSA arrangements would constitute major confidence-building measures between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states and would ease the threats rising from the positional use of nuclear weapons.

In the final week of First Committee, Cuba reiterated that existing NSAs have not been effective and that there is an urgent need for such assurances pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Cuba also argued that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the only appropriate forum in which to negotiate a legally-binding agreement on NSAs.

First Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.25, “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,” with a vote of 119-0-56. China, India, and Pakistan were the only nuclear weapon possessors that voted for the resolution. The France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States abstained.

While introducing the resolution, Pakistan’s delegation stated that it thought the end of the Cold War would make it easier for nuclear weapon states to extend NSAs but noted this has not happened. Like Cuba, Pakistan agrees that the CD would be an appropriate forum for this. As a Pakistan is a nuclear weapon possessor and not a party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, approaching the issue through the CD would help legitimize it as a nuclear weapon state capable of granting NSAs.
In the final week of the First Committee, the two draft resolutions on the biological and chemical weapons conventions were adopted without a vote.

The draft resolution entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction” (A/C.1/66/L.32), introduced by Hungary, urges all states parties to work together to achieve a consensus outcome of the Seventh Review Conference, to be held in December of this year. The resolution includes several updates from last year’s resolution (A/65/92), which was adopted without a vote. L.32 welcomes measures to update the mechanism for transmission of information, recalls the decisions reached at the Sixth Review Conference, and notes with appreciation the work of the Implementation Support Unit from 2007–2010.

The draft resolution entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction” (A/C.1/66/L.19), introduced by Poland, states “that implementation of the Convention makes a major contribution to international peace and security.” It does not include any changes from last year’s version, adopted without a vote as resolution 65/57.

Regarding the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), this year’s First Committee focused on the upcoming Review Conference. Paul van den IJssel, President-designate of the conference and the Dutch Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, outlined areas in which a result will be necessary for the conference to be considered a success: a new work programme; annual exchanges of information; a way to monitor advances in science and technology; evolution of the Implementation Support Unit; cooperation and assistance; compliance and verification; and universalization of treaty membership.

A key and divisive area referred to by Ambassador van den IJssel is that of verification and compliance. In 2001, the United States scuttled negotiations on a verification protocol. José Moraes Cabrai, Permanent Representative for Portugal, noted that the BTWC “remains the only convention on weapons of mass destruction that still lacks a verification mechanism” and added that “we hope this situation can be changed.”

On cooperation and assistance, Ambassador van den IJssel said the question for the Review Conference is “how can we improve the way States Parties work together and with their international partners in building capacity and promoting the peaceful uses of biological science and technology?” Article X of the Convention promises facilitation of access to non-military biological technology and products as well as cooperation in prevention of disease and other peaceful endeavors. Pakistan’s Deputy Permanent Representative Raza Bashir Tarar stated that his country “attaches priority to developing an effective mechanism on implementation of Article X.”

Brazil’s Permanent Representative, Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, linked implementation of Article X and progress on verification, stating “discussions held so far have fallen short of expectations to reconcile verification and enhanced cooperation.” Her comment indicates that there continues to be resistance to easing restrictions on biology-related trade and assistance as the price for the agreement of countries of the South on a verification regime, which was an issue back in 2001.

Some delegations, such as those of Australia and Switzerland, highlighted the need for the Review Conference to create mechanisms for responding to developments in the life sciences.

Canada linked the potential for bioterrorism with advances in science. Hussein Hirji of Canada stated that “the risk of biological weapons proliferation, either by rogue states or non-state actors, remains as real today as it was when the [BTWC] was adopted in 1972. Since then, the rapidly advancing pace of science and technology and dual-use risks associated with biological science has increased the danger of such weapons.”

The United States, France, and India also spoke of the need for the Review Conference to address bioterrorism.

Comments by states indicated that the Review Conference will agree to continue the Implementation Support Unit (ISU), which provides administrative support for the BTWC and facilitates confidence-building measures.

Looking back, delegations such as Switzerland, Spain, India, the United States, and Australia praised BTWC intersessional work from 2007 to 2010. US Ambassador Laura Kennedy observed that “over the last several years, the States Parties to the [BTWC] have come together to share information and foster progress in important areas such as biosafety and pathogen security, professional responsibility in the life sciences and codes of conduct surrounding dual-use issues, assistance with disease surveillance capacity building and national implementation measures.”

Regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), many states commented on its success, including Viet Nam, Myanmar, Russia, and the United States. Ahmet Üzümcü, Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, addressed the agency’s future role, stating that the focus will need to change from elimination of existing arsenals to prevention of the reemergence of such weapons and of the misuse of toxic chemicals. By 2016, only one percent
Nuclear weapon free zones

Thomas Garafalo | NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security

The three resolutions concerning nuclear weapon free zones were all adopted by First Committee without a vote. The only source of contention was on draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.1, which calls for a Middle East NWFZ. This resolution is almost a mirror image of all the resolutions going back to 1974, but does include important clauses concerning the upcoming conference on establishing a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East.

In an explanation of vote, Ms. Tamar Rahamimoff-Honig of Israel stated that her delegation “remains committed to a vision of the Middle East developing eventually into a zone free of Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear weapons as well as ballistic missiles.” She suggested that the process should begin with “modest” confidence-building measures and be followed by “the establishment of peaceful relations, reconciliation, mutual recognition and good neighborliness, and complemented by conventional and non-conventional arms control measures.” A “mutually verifiable” NWFZ could follow “in due course”.

Draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.38, “Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty),” was adopted without a vote. The Indian delegation reiterated its support for the Southeast Asian countries rights to form this zone. The ascension of the five recognized nuclear weapon states to the relevant protocol in the Bangkok Treaty is still the subject of much debate amongst member states, but recent talks have lent optimism for its resolution.

Meanwhile, the resolution on the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, A/C.1/66/L.51, was adopted without a vote. The Indian delegation issued an explanation of support similar to that for L.38. Spain’s delegation reiterated that it supports the Pelindaba Treaty, but will not sign it, since the Treaty does not contain any provisions that Spain has not already implemented on its whole territory.

First Committee saw some compelling advancements toward establishment of more NWFZs this session, especially with the appointment of Jaakko Laajava, Under Secretary of State of Finland as the facilitator for the conference on a WMDFZ in the Middle East, to take place in Finland in 2012. This news was welcomed in First Committee by the Arab Group, the European Union, the United States, United Kingdom, Russian Federation, and Ireland. The Israeli delegation did not comment. The Iranian delegation took note of the appointments, saying it “is merely step at the beginning of an extremely tortuous path.” Mr. Reza Najafi of Iran’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs articulated the Iranian delegation’s vision for the 2012 conference, arguing that “an agreed plan of action and timetable for universality of the NPT in the Middle East should be the only top priority” at the conference. He insisted that all NPT states parties, especially the nuclear weapon states, should use the conference to pressure Israel to join the Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state and place all of its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Finally, since the convening of this conference was decided upon at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, he argued that the 2012 conference “should be considered as a subsidiary forum of the NPT Review Conference” and consequently, it should be subjected to the rules of NPT Review Conferences “and the basis of any decision must be the decisions already taken consensually by the States Parties at its Review Conferences.”

Meanwhile, the renewed talks between SEANWFZ members and some members of the P5 this year revitalized hope that the nuclear weapon states will sign the protocol to the Bangkok Treaty. This would assure non-interference by nuclear weapons states, as well as negative security assurances. ASEAN member states as well as some P5 states have indicated they look forward to continued talks in 2012.

Biological and chemical weapons (cont.)

of the global chemical weapons stockpile will remain.

As Mr. Üzümcü noted, however, the United States and Russia will not meet the April 2012 CWC deadline for the complete destruction of stockpiles, with 10% still remaining for the US and 40% for Russia. On behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, Ambassador Kleib of Indonesia expressed “serious concern” at the prospective non-compliance. Ambassador Viotti of Brazil stated: “As we near the deadlines for the final destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles, States Parties will have important decisions to make, in order to ensure the credibility of the CWC regime and to avoid precedents that could have a negative impact on the efforts in other areas.”

States including Switzerland and Australia stressed the need to keep abreast of scientific developments related to the CWC. Paul Wilson, Australia’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the CD, noted that “globalisation, rapid scientific developments, the availability of increasingly sophisticated production techniques, and new procurement channels mean that we need to be constantly vigilant and proactive.”
Draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.10, “Missiles,” was adopted without a vote during the plenary on 26 October 2011 as in accordance with last year’s First Committee. Previous iterations of the missiles resolution have been met with some controversy (see third edition of the 2011 First Committee Monitor).

While many states are concerned with the threats that missile and anti-missile systems pose, statements addressed to First Committee have not adequately addressed these issues. Only a few delegations have expressed comprehensive concerns.

The Iranian delegation, which is also the main sponsor of resolution L.10, expressed concern regarding France and the United States providing Israel with missiles and missile technology. Iran also expressed concerns regarding the US expansion of its ballistic missile defence system.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s delegation, which co-sponsored resolution L.10, expressed concern regarding the US system, especially in the context of northeast Asia. It accused Japan of actively collaborating with the US missile defence programme, which it sees as a threat to the DPRK’s national security.

Meanwhile, the United Kingdom emphasized threats it sees from Iranian and DPRK missile tests. “Tests of ballistic missiles of increasing range and sophistication have been conducted over recent years outside all existing transparency and pre-notification schemes, especially by the DPRK and Iran,” argued Ambassador Adamson. France’s delegation also expressed concern with Iran and DPRK’s missile programmes.

The Russian Federation highlighted the lack of progress of Russia-US/NATO collaboration and interaction on missile defence, putting this lack of progress in the context of potentially interfering with further progress on nuclear disarmament. The United States’ main concern related to missiles, however, is its fear of missiles reaching terrorists or non-state actors, and the proliferation of Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS). Israel’s delegation also stated concerns on similar topics as the United States, emphasizing the terrorist and MANPADS issue.

Various aspects of the missile and missile defence issues continue to be of concern to the international community. To keep postponing real negotiation or even discussions on the issue will not lead to enhanced international security and will not fulfill the Secretary General’s call to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and limiting missiles, which would help, among other things, to alleviate international tensions.

As in previous years, First Committee’s discussion of the peaceful use of outer space this month centered not around the merits of preventing an arms race in outer space (PAROS), which nearly all states seem to support in principle, but rather around the best way of accomplishing this task. The annual resolution on PAROS, A/C.1/66/L.14, was adopted with vote of 171-0-2, with only the United States and Israel abstaining.

This resolution, unchanged from last year’s version, reaffirms the General Assembly’s commitment to ensuring the peaceful use of outer space and calls on all states to act in ways that support this objective. The resolution further affirms that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is to be the primary forum for any multilateral treaty on PAROS and calls for the CD to create a working group dedicated to the subject.

The Cuban delegation spoke in support of the resolution, which it co-sponsored, emphasizing that the continued development of international measures to promote transparency and confidence are vital to international security. Cuba also expressed support for the idea that a treaty on PAROS should negotiated in parallel with a fissile materials treaty and other disarmament issues.

In addition, First Committee adopted A/C.1/66/L.11 without a vote. This draft decision, introduced by Russia and China, calls for the item “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities” to be included on the agenda of the 68th session. The group of governmental experts on this subject, established by last year’s resolution of the same title, will begin convening in July 2012.

While some states, including Russia and China, emphasized non-binding transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs), others such as India asserted that TCBMs would only be useful in combination with a legally-binding treaty on PAROS. This sentiment was shared by many other delegations speaking on outer space issues throughout First Committee. In particular, during the thematic debate on outer space in week three, many countries explicitly emphasized the need to prevent the weaponization of space, noting that it is easier to prevent the weaponization of space than to disarm it post facto.
Dis
cussion of the arms trade treaty (ATT) was limited during the final week of First Committee. A/C.1/66/L.50, the draft decision on the ATT was adopted with a vote of 155-0-13. The decision calls for a final preparatory committee (PrepCom) from 13–17 February 2012 that will conclude all substantive discussion and decide on all relevant procedural matters. The UK and Uruguayan delegations regretted that a vote had to be taken at all and expressed disappointed that it could not be adopted by consensus, especially given its procedural nature.

Egypt’s delegation was one of those that abstained. It explained that its abstention had nothing to do with any substantive consideration, but because the decision, in Egypt’s view, conveyed a lack of respect for previous UN General Assembly resolutions—resolution 64/48 (2009) that established a final PrepCom of up to three days. Similarly, the Pakistani delegation abstained because the draft decision refers to concluding substantive work, while resolution 64/48 indicates the final PrepCom would only deal with procedural issues for the negotiating conference.

Meanwhile, the Iranian delegation argued that while the major problem of developing countries is the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, some countries “try to imply” that the main problem comes from the seven categories of the UN Register on Conventional Arms, such as jet fighters and missiles. Mr. Najafi argued that states should focus on the problem of SALW and work constructively within the UN Programme of Action on small arms. It abstained because, in its view, the proposed ATT is not the “real solution” to the problems of developing countries.

Mr. Najafi also reiterated his delegation’s concern that exchanging diverse views, as states have done at the PrepComs, is different from negotiations, which must be conducted in accordance with international law. The UK delegation interjected to clarify that “the negotiating conference IS the negotiating conference, and the PrepCom IS the PrepCom.”

Morocco and India, which voted in favour of the resolution, also offered comments. Morocco’s delegation welcomed progress made in the PrepComs and underscored the importance of taking into consideration the legitimate concerns of all states and to ensure transparency of the process. India’s delegation emphasized that any work undertaken in the PrepComs, including the Chair’s papers, must not pre-judge the negotiations. It also reiterated that the negotiations must address the interests of all stakeholders “in a consensus based process and outcome, without artificial deadlines.”

As demonstrated throughout statements to this year’s First Committee, delegations appear eager to move towards the final negotiations. Regardless of whether or not negotiations will be based on the most recent Chair’s paper from Ambassador Moritán, it seems that member states are ready for the transition from discussions to negotiations. The ambitious Chair’s paper from 14 July 2011 surely lays forth existing proposals that will require honest and practical vetting during the negotiation conference. Ambassador Moritán’s presence at First Committee enabled member states to hear, once more, the various proposals and divisions that still exist around the ATT, underscoring the vast challenges that lie ahead. Ambassador Moritán is under no illusions regarding the complexity of the process, as he noted the levels of ambition regarding the ATT are vastly different.

Keeping a strong emphasis on diversion risks remains one of the core tasks of curbing the illicit arms trade. Addressing this issue will require special attention to be paid to the practice of diverting arms from authorized end-users to non-state and unauthorized parties who may use such weapons for criminal, corrupt, and abusive purposes. It is often in this indirect, and sometimes unintentional, manner that the arms trade becomes even more harmful. The strength of the language on this issue in the treaty text remains to be seen. The Chair’s paper from July 2011 notes, “A State Party shall not authorize a transfer of conventional arms if there is a substantial risk that those conventional arms would” undermine peace and security in various forms such as to commit violations of international human rights law. One major question for advocates of a strong humanitarian instrument in the ATT is whether the words “shall not” will be changed to “should not,” which inherently alters this responsibility from obligation to suggestion.

This issue of diversion language is but one example of difficult work ahead. Implementation of ATT language in national practice will be just as important as the text itself, for without implementation the language is empty wording. Therefore, sufficient discussion next year must be focused on implementation support and corresponding structure. We also encourage delegations to put in place a sound review process that will allow for the ATT to be strengthened in response to changing international security risks as time goes on. Furthermore, regardless of negotiation outcomes, it is the responsibility of all states to treat the ATT as a floor and not a ceiling for improving state arms transfer controls.

The overwhelming trend in conversation in this year’s First Committee has been support for both the preparatory process and the leadership of Ambassador Moritán as well as the inarguable need for better regulation of the arms trade. Building on these consensus points, we are hopeful that next year’s conference will, in fact, yield a strong and robust ATT.
Cluster munitions and landmines
Katherine Harrison | Action on Armed Violence

Over the course of the 2011 UNGA First Committee, over 20 states affirmed their support for the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), specifically calling attention to its momentous entry into force, its highly successful First and Second Meetings of States Parties in Lao PDR and Lebanon, and the significant and measurable progress made in the first year of its implementation. Encouragingly, strong political will to maintain this momentum was evident in the numerous appeals for states which have not yet done so to join the Convention and for continued and renewed support to its universalization.

A number of states noted the condemnation of the use of cluster munitions by Libya and Thailand in 2011 as concrete evidence of the growing stigma and political backlash against cluster munitions. One highlight of the meeting was a statement by Thailand that it was continuing its “serious engagement” on the issue of acceding to the Convention out of recognition of the humanitarian concerns caused by cluster munitions. Positively, there was also engagement from Mongolia and Qatar, two other non-signatories.

Despite the many positive statements in support of the CCM, however, a frustrating and troubling distraction was the polemic around the upcoming 4th Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the future of negotiations on a sixth CCW protocol on cluster munitions. Statements during First Committee indicated a vastly polarized spectrum of views, ranging from those expressed strongly by Austria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, and Switzerland—condemning the serious humanitarian harm risked by fundamental loopholes in the weak provisions of the current Chair’s draft text—to those staunchly maintained by China, Cuba, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, Russia, and the United States in support of the Chair’s protocol text on the basis of perceived “real and immediate humanitarian benefits,” to quote the US delegation. Disappointingly, a number of CCM states aligned themselves with the latter group, including Australia, France, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, which gave vocal support for the adoption of a CCW protocol on the basis of the Chair’s text, at odds with the repeated statements from other CCM states detailing the dangerous precedent the protocol would set in the regressive development of international humanitarian law (IHL) and the damage it could do to the protection of civilians on the ground.

There was no resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions during the 2011 session of the First Committee. Bulgaria, incoming President of the 4th CCW Review Conference, and Sweden co-sponsored resolution A/C.1/66/L.17 on the CCW and its universalization. Operational paragraph 10 of the resolution welcomes the preparatory work of the GGE on cluster munitions and notes the issue will be further addressed at the Review Conference. The resolution was adopted without a vote. Libya gave an explanation of its decision, saying that while it joined consensus on resolution L.17, this did not reflect Libya’s acceptance in full of the CCW’s provisions as Libya is not party to the convention.

Dedicated commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty was also evident during First Committee, with over 30 states speaking out in support of the treaty and reaffirming their commitment to realizing its full implementation. A number of affected states gave updates on progress made in their national implementation efforts, while Libya appealed for assistance for demining and comprehensive victim assistance, as the delegation said recent use of “thousands” of mines by the previous regime has exacerbated the continued impact of WWII-era mines still on its territory.

Cambodia received resolute support for its offer to host the upcoming 11th Meeting of States Parties in Phnom Penh from 28 November to 2 December 2011. During the session, the recent accession of Tuvalu to become the 157th state party to the Treaty was highlighted as evidence of continuing progress. Non-state party Finland gave a positive update that it is still on track to join the treaty in 2012. The US delegation stated that its landmine policy review is still on-going. Other non-states parties Cuba, India, Israel, Azerbaijan, and Mongolia also made statements on their positions on the Treaty.

Resolution A/C.1/66/L.4, co-sponsored by Albania, Cambodia, and Norway on the implementation and universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, passed by a vote of 155 states, including many non-signatories. No state voted against the resolution, although 17 abstained. A surprise came from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which voted in favour of the resolution for the first time. The DPRK did not however give an explanation of its vote or any indication of recent policy change. The resolution was largely unchanged to that of last year, with minor technical adjustments such as including an updated invitation for all states to attend the upcoming 11th MSP in November–December 2011. The explanations of votes by those abstaining were largely predictable, coming from non-states parties who either support the aims of the Treaty but claim that due to particular security situations they are unable to give up the use of landmines or do not support the treaty because of purported views that it was negotiated outside of the UN framework.

As 2011 draws to a close, much work is still to be done on the issues of both cluster munitions and antiperson-
Small arms and light weapons
Dr. Mirjana Dokmanovic | International Action Network on Small Arms

Last week, First Committee took action on two draft resolutions pertaining to small arms and light weapons (SALW). A/C.1/66/L.18, “Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small and light weapons and collecting them,” and A/C1/66/L.43, “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,” were both adopted without a vote on 27 October 2011.

While the debates on SALW issues concluded during the third week of First Committee, the final week saw a reaffirmation of some of the issues that were raised at earlier points in the First Committee’s meetings. Morocco’s delegation, in announcing its co-sponsorship of draft resolution L.18, stated that uncurbed proliferation is caused by the absence of regulation and control. As delegation after delegation this month has concluded, SALW proliferation negatively impacts stability, security, and social and economic development. For these reasons, Morocco once again reiterated its support for the UN Programme of Action on SALW (UNPoA), the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), and the successful conclusion of Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) negotiations. For Morocco, the ATT should have a broad scope and include SALW. The delegation further noted that Africa is particularly harmed by the illicit SALW trade, itself suffering from proliferation from conflict in the Sahel.

These ongoing challenges require regional and sub-regional cooperation in response.

NGO presentations were also made during the final week of First Committee, with Michele Poliacof of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) delivering an eloquent statement that reflected civil society concerns and aims for the Review Conference of the UNPoA in 2012. The Conference will provide the international community with an opportunity to evaluate efforts and renew its commitment to strong measures designed to limit the illicit SALW trade. Ms. Poliacof urged member states to participate in the ITI and offered a reminder that civil society is well-positioned and willing to assist states in this endeavour.

While the UNPoA requires continued attention and improvement, there are important successes to report. Regional and sub-regional agreements and collaboration have made real progress in combating SALW proliferation. Efficient marking and tracing mechanisms have been employed. Strong national legislative measures have been instituted, which assist countries in controlling SALW within its border. Such successes should rightfully be lauded by the international community and every member state.

The UNPoA has become a more structured process within the United Nations and has raised awareness of the proliferation of SALW and its nefarious humanitarian effects. Still, there is a lot to reconsider and strengthen for the UNPoA to fulfill its potential. So far, the UNPoA process has failed to comprehensively evaluate how it has contributed, and can contribute more effectively, to a reduction in SALW-related violence, and concerted efforts in this regard are required for improvement in implementation.

Civil society will continue to raise awareness and understanding that violence perpetrated with small arms is no longer concentrated in conflict zones. It occurs mainly in non-conflict situations through common and organised armed crime, interpersonal and armed domestic violence. Such an increase in gun violence challenges our concept of safety and threatens our communities. Therefore, the response of the international community and states must be adequate.

Rather than a process debated every two years or reported upon annually by a minority of states, the UNPoA must be implemented on a daily basis in every country. Civil society will continue to remind and support policy makers to respond to this need. From the North America to Africa, and from Western Europe to Southeast Asia and everywhere in between, it is clear that the negative effects of illicit SALW are pervasive and highly detrimental. This requires the urgent and continued attention of the international community and every member state.

Cluster munitions and landmines (cont.)

nel mines. The upcoming 4th Review Conference to the CCW from 14–25 November in Geneva will be a critical time for Convention on Cluster Munitions states to stand firm and ensure that states not party do not succeed in creating regressive international law which would be a step backwards for the framework of international humanitarian law and for the protection of civilians on the ground. Then, on a much more positive note, from 28 November to 2 December, states and civil society will gather again, this time in Phnom Penh, to carry on the work of implementing the Mine Ban Treaty, fittingly in one of the world’s most affected countries.
Conventional weapons were directly addressed in several resolutions at this year’s First Committee session.

A/C.1/66/L.36, “Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus,” was adopted without a vote, as was A/C.1/66/L.17, “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects”. Libya’s delegation, which is not a party to the CCW, offered an explanation of vote (EOV) noting that the resolution does not adequately address the issue of self-defence or the concerns of developing countries, although it expressed assurance that its delegation is in general consensus with the resolution.

The biannual resolution proposed by the Netherlands, “National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology” (A/C.1/66/L.33), was adopted without a vote, as was the case in 2009. The biannual resolution “Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures,” (A/C.1/66/L.35), presented by Germany and Romania, was also adopted by consensus. Cuba’s delegation reiterated in its EOV, however, that the standardized reporting instrument is voluntary and recommendations from the group of governmental experts on the development of the instrument should in no way alter the instrument’s voluntary nature.

Other conventional weapons-related resolutions were subject to a vote. These included the resolution presented by Pakistan entitled, “Conventional arm control at the regional and subregional levels” (A/C.1/66/L.27). The resolution was adopted as a whole with 165 in favor, 1 against, and 3 abstentions. As was the case during last year’s session, India voted against the resolution offering an EOV stating that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) should not be responsible for formulating principles on regional instruments, but is mandated to deal with international agreements. As was the practice last year, a separate vote was conducted on operational paragraph (OP) 2, which requests the CD to consider formulation of such principles. The paragraph received 133 in favor, 31 abstentions, and India’s vote against. The Mexican delegation noted its abstention on OP2, as has been the practice in preview sessions, explaining that given the CD paralysis, this body is not capable of taking on a new mandates such as conventional arms control, and that instead, this issue falls under the purview of the Disarmament Commission.

Resolutions pertaining to arms transparency also received general approval by the majority of member states. “Transparency in armaments” (A/C.1/66/L.29), co-sponsored by more than 70 states, was adopted as a whole with a vote of 149-0-25, similar to the last vote on this resolution in 2009 of 150-0-22. This resolution was subject to separate votes on many of its individual paragraphs, during which the majority of abstentions came from states of the Middle East and North Africa. The main issues of contention included the particular calls within the resolution for reporting through the UN Register on Conventional Arms, such as the invitation to include small arms and light weapons (SALW) in reports on the ‘optional standardized form’ of the Register in OP4 (151-0-23). Tanzania’s delegation explained its abstention on the resolution and called for the full inclusion of SALWs in the Register. The Arab Group, represented by Qatar, explained its abstention noting that any transparency instrument must be balanced and non-discriminatory, conditions which the current Register does not satisfy to the Group’s specifications. The Qatari delegation argued that this imbalance is caused by the Register’s limited scope of only the seven categories of conventional weapons and its non-inclusion of WMDs, which is unacceptable for the Arab Group due to the special regional circumstances in the Middle East.

On the whole, there was little surprise in the voting on resolutions pertaining to conventional weapons. No new resolutions were presented. Nonetheless, the issues addressed are critical points for improving international peace and security and although issues directly related to conventional weapons, as distinct from SALWs and the arms trade, were somewhat limited this session, the cross-cutting concerns of transparency and regional cooperation are applicable to all disarmament issues. These resolutions serve, at the very least, a reminder of these important themes to which most delegations have assigned much concern.
Regional disarmament
Daria Medvedeva | Reaching Critical Will

Regional disarmament and security continue receiving support in First Committee amidst instability in a variety of regions across the world. Many states believe that global security and peace are most likely achieved through cooperation and incremental steps in confidence-building on the regional level. As in previous years, delegations extended support for regional security initiatives within and outside of the United Nations, particularly those implementing confidence-building measures (CBMs) and training and dissemination programs.

This year, First Committee adopted eight out of ten regionally-focused items without a vote.

L.9 on the UN regional centres; L.16 on the Centre in Latin America and the Caribbean; L.23 on the UN Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa; L.26 on regional disarmament; L.28 on regional and sub-regional CBMs; L.34 on the Centre in Asia and the Pacific; and L.52 on the Centre in Africa were all adopted without a vote or comment.

L.22, “Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region,” was also adopted without a vote, though Iran’s delegation explained in advance that it would not participate in the consensus because of the resolution’s silence on the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and thus its failure to reflect the reality in the Mediterranean region.

L.5, “Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace” tabled by Indonesia, was adopted as 123-4-45 with France, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States voting no.

L.27, “Conventional arms control at the regional and sub-regional levels” was adopted with a vote of 165-1-3. Bhutan and the Russian Federation abstained and India cast a negative vote. (Poland, the third abstention, intended to vote in favour of the resolution.) A separate vote was held on operative paragraph 2, which requests the Conference on Disarmament to “consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control.” The paragraph was retained with a vote of 133-1-31. Only India voted against the paragraph, while many European countries and Mexico abstained. The latter explained that this issue does not belong in the Conference on Disarmament. India’s delegation voted against the resolution for the same reason. The Indian delegation also finds it unrealistic and unacceptable to preserve a “balance in defence capabilities in the regional or sub-regional context.” In its explanation of vote, the Russian delegation cited discontent with the resolution’s treatment of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. While the resolution describes the Treaty as “a cornerstone of security in Europe,” the Russian delegation described it as “obsolete”.

Information security
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One resolution dealt with information technology and international security at this year’s First Committee. A/C.1/66/L.30, “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security” was adopted without a vote. The resolution establishes a group of governmental experts in 2012 to “continue to study existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them, including norms, rules or principles of responsible behaviour of States and confidence-building measures with regard to information space.”

In an explanation of vote on L.30, Sweden on behalf of Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Switzerland emphasized the importance of maintaining an open and free internet. They argued, “The same universal rights that individuals enjoy “offline”—such as freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek information, freedom of assembly and association—must also be upheld and protected online.” Pointing out that many human rights violations would have never been reported without the internet, this group of states also argued that a human rights perspective “should permeate all issues of internet governance”. They criticized L.30 for its lack of reference to a human rights based approach to the issues of cyber security. Furthermore, the group suggested that internet governance should be based on a multi-stakeholder approach that includes private sector and civil society actors.

Meanwhile, the Cuban delegation indicated its support for L.30 because of its “appropriate emphasis” on the need to prevent the use of resources, information, and telecommunications for terrorist and criminal purposes. Cuba highlighted how information technology can become a weapon when it is designed or used to damage state infrastructure or when it is used with the aim “of subverting domestic or political order within states”. In this context, it described illegal broadcasting conveyed to Cuba by terrorist groups dwelling in the United States.
On 27 October, First Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.6, “Relationship between disarmament and development,” without a vote. Following the same pattern of previous years, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States gave explanations of vote. The US delegation reiterated its position that disarmament and development are two distinct issues and thus disassociated itself from the consensus on the resolution. France and the United Kingdom stated that they joined the consensus but argued that the “symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development appears questionable to us as the conditions conducive to disarmament are not necessarily dependent on development only, as seen with the growing military expenditure of the fastest developing countries.” While the two countries issued support for mainstreaming disarmament issues in development policies, they did not mention the contribution that development could have on concrete and sustainable disarmament, such as the support that socioeconomic stability can lend to preserving security through means other than military might.

The main issue in disarmament and development highlighted during this session of First Committee was the concern that amidst increasing scarcity of resources and the global financial crisis, exaggerated sums of money are put into militarism instead of development. In a world where the poor are getting poorer, human-made and natural crises are increasing, states need to rethink their expenditure priorities. Many delegations, including Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, and Switzerland, discussed the need for doctrine and policy changes in this area and of their responsibility to adapt to new threats to humanity. In short, this means that increased efforts need to be put on human security instead of clinging onto military doctrines in the name of right of self-defense or deterrence.

Some states are slowly starting to incorporate disarmament into their wider concerns and are looking at the world’s problems in a more holistic way, instead of isolating every issue and losing the complexity of the world and humanity. Indeed, numerous states highlighted the impact that arms have on development, armed violence, and conflict.

Furthermore, a concern expressed this year by a few was the connection between nuclear weapons and development. South Africa, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Cuba explicitly outlined the need to reallocate money from nuclear weapons and their modernization programmes to development. During NGO presentations, Ms. Alicia Godsberg from Peace Action New York State delivered a statement on military expenditure, human security, and nuclear power, in which Ms. Godsberg stated that “[t]he World Bank estimates an annual investment of $40 to $60 billion, approximately half the amount currently spent globally on nuclear weapons, would enable the Millennium Development Goals on poverty alleviation to be achieved by the targeted year of 2015.” She furthermore referred to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s five-point plan on nuclear disarmament. Mr. Ban has argued, “The obstacles to disarmament are formidable. But the costs and risks of its alternatives never get the attention they deserve. But consider the tremendous opportunity cost of huge military budgets. Consider the vast resources that are consumed by the endless pursuit of military superiority.”

As Ambassador Cyan Chandra Acharya, from Nepal emphasized during the first week of general debate, military expenditure continues to rise and the international community continually fails to keep its commitment to the draft resolution on disarmament and development, even though it is adopted every year by consensus. If there is to be serious progress in implementing this resolution, it is vital that states start thinking outside the box and start connecting the world’s issues to illuminate the bigger picture. They must constantly make the link between disarmament and development, even more so today when a lack of development can be a potential source of conflict. •
During the final week of First Committee, Japan hosted a side event where Special Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons spoke for the first time in their new role. The Special Communicators status has been thus far given to hibakusha (atomic bomb survivors) in recognition of their work for nuclear disarmament. Recognizing the importance of the atomic bomb survivors in educating the public about the realities of nuclear war, that same day Japan passed a resolution on Disarmament Education.

Japan has been very active historically in its disarmament advocacy, particularly its support for implementing the recommendations of the UN Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education. In 2002, the 34 recommendations of the Study were unanimously adopted by member states at the General Assembly. Sadly, we are no closer to disarmament 10 years later, despite the good intentions of some member states to participate in the laudable goal of public education, specifically the education of young people, about the unique dangers of nuclear weapons.

As acknowledged in the UN Study, the community of nations needs to regard with urgency and dedication the education of the future leaders and citizens who will be responsible for nuclear disarmament. Educators should seek creative means to engage young people in disarmament issues, and this requires a thoughtful approach—not only about disarmament, but education for disarmament.

Over the past three years, Hibakusha Stories, an NGO operating in the New York Metro Area, has created opportunities for students to hear the first hand testimony of the hibakusha. Through this living witness in the classroom, students can begin to understand what nuclear weapons mean, what radiation means, and begin to comprehend the daily realities of the nuclear age.

Here is some of what the students are saying:

It made me realize how fast and instantly the world as we know it could turn literally to nothing but dust and ashes. — a student from East Side Community High School, Manhattan

I never really thought about how badly people were hurt from this one atomic bomb. After their visit I now have a more sensitive feeling towards others’ emotions and stories. It really opened my eyes to what can happen if history repeats itself. — a student from John Bowne High School, Queens

I met people who lost a war; who survived an atom bomb, and yet still said sorry. — a student from Bushwick School for Social Justice, Brooklyn

I want to spread the knowledge of nuclear weapons to other people. The more people who know about the dangers of these weapons, the more people will detest them. — a student from St. Francis Preparatory High School, Queens

It helped me understand that even through war, there are just some boundaries that people shouldn’t cross. — a student from High School for Arts, Imagination, and Inquiry, Manhattan

Since 11 March 2011, when the terrible earthquake and tsunami took the lives of over 20,000 people in the Tohoku region of Northeastern Japan, the on-going nuclear tragedy of Fukushima still continues. And the situation is yet to be brought under control.

When we talk about disarmament education and nuclear disarmament we must understand the process by which nuclear weapons are made. Nuclear weapons are connected to nuclear power. Put simply, without nuclear reactors there would be no raw material for nuclear bombs. For example, the first industrial nuclear power reactor at the US Atomic Energy Commissions’ Hanford site in Richland, Washington was constructed to create plutonium for the bomb dropped on Nagasaki. It was only after the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that US President Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace became the rallying cry that brought forth nuclear power to now 31 countries across the globe.

Only the hibakusha can speak to the hell on earth that results from nuclear weaponry and exposure to radiation through the radioactive catastrophe at Fukushima. At the side event last week, Kazue Sueishi said, “one second can change from heaven to hell.” Setsuko Thurlow commented, “radiation is still killing survivors, 66 years later.”

Japan is the only nation to receive radiation by force through the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 and is now receiving radiation through the force of nature combined with the fallibility of human ingenuity. Perhaps it is from this place that we can exit the nuclear age.

Education for disarmament is at its core value meant to prepare future leaders and citizens for the inevitability of the total abolition of nuclear weapons. We must either strive for that goal, or face the total elimination of life on earth.

Dr. Kathleen Sullivan is the Program Director for Hibakusha Stories, www.hibakushastories.org.
Costs, risks, and myths of nuclear power

NGO world-wide study on the implications of the catastrophe at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station

coordinated by

Reaching Critical Will

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Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

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Costs, risks, and myths of nuclear power: NGO world-wide study on the implications of the catastrophe at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station is a collaborative work of non-governmental researchers, scientists, and activists. It was released on 11 September 2011, six months after the disaster at Fukushima and in advance of the high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon convened at the United Nations on 22 September. The report provide non-government perspectives of the range of issues related to nuclear power. This report includes civil society analysis of nuclear power infrastructure and government policies from around the world. It also articulates arguments against the common myths of nuclear power in its relationship to safety, the environment, renewable energy, climate change, economics, and more.