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A another session of First Committee has ended. Another 53 resolutions have been adopted. Hundreds of statements have been delivered. Looking at the documents, the lists of speakers, the statistics, one could say it was another routine year for the committee on disarmament and international security. But delving into content reveals a different picture; a picture in which the majority of countries elevated their concerns with the humanitarian and environmental tragedies caused by weapons above the status quo thinking on security. These delegations did not let warnings from the nuclear-armed states or concerns from their nuclear-dependent allies deter them from demanding progress on disarmament. Hopefully this trend will continue, and move beyond words in First Committee to action in all relevant venues.

This is an unusually optimistic assessment of First Committee. But it is difficult to conceive of any other reading when one takes into account the overwhelming concern expressed by governments about the humanitarian harm of all weapons. The majority of delegations welcomed the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), praised the gains made by the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty, expressed dismay with the use of chemical weapons in Syria and demanded the universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and demanded progress on developing a multilateral treaty prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons. On the margins of First Committee, civil society groups working on a range of weapons issues convened their second conference on humanitarian disarmament.

Not everyone is pleased with the momentum of humanitarian disarmament and arms control. There are some governments that remain skeptical about the ATT—some because they fear it will prevent their acquisition of arms; others because the Treaty did not go far enough in affecting the volume of arms production, transfers, and war profiteering. There are those who still refuse to join the conventions banning cluster munitions and antipersonnel landmines, even though they admit that these weapons bring death to civilians and undermine development. Some have no interest in enhancing the provisions or legally-binding status of the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons.

And of course, most vocally of all, there are those who do not want any further progress on nuclear disarmament. These are a small minority of countries, but they made their views well known over the last month. During the action on resolutions, they took every opportunity to once again voice their disdain with the fact that the majority of countries, as well as civil society, are discussing the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The Russian delegation said it is “cynical” to discuss this topic. The UK delegation expressed its alarm with the idea that other governments might want to prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons. Most of the nuclear-armed states that are NPT state parties, and many of the countries that prop up the continued possession of nuclear weapons through nuclear sharing or security relationships, expressed concern that any action to pursue activities related to nuclear disarmament will undermine the NPT and the implementation of its 2010 action plan.

These arguments are absurd. They illuminate the tension between those who see the NPT as simply a non-proliferation instrument and those (the majority) who have always viewed it as a mechanism for achieving disarmament. Prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons would fulfill the NPT’s goals and objectives, not undermine them. As Reaching Critical Will argues in its paper Preventing collapse: the NPT and a ban on nuclear weapons, a process to ban nuclear weapons that arises from the discussion around the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons actually has the potential to prevent the NPT’s collapse.

Civil society groups are not alone in this understanding. In a joint explanation of vote to the draft resolution on the follow-up to the high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament (A/C.1/68/L.6/Rev.1), Austria, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, New Zealand, and San Marino argued that the resolution’s objectives are “entirely consistent” with the NPT and its action plan. Noting that action 1 of the 2010 plan obliges states parties to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the NPT and with the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons, these countries highlighted the relevance and appropriateness of all actions that promote nuclear disarmament. They also emphasized their interest in pursuing “any set of effective measures to achieve the objective of complete nuclear disarmament and the maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons, regardless of how such measures might be elaborated.”

The 125 countries that associated themselves with the joint statement condemning the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and calling for their elimination, and the countless countries who emphasized their humanitarian and environmental concerns continued on next page
with other weapon systems, truly made their mark at this session of First Committee. The majority opinion seemed to be that improved security—human and national—can be achieved with fewer weapons, less military expenditure, and more investment in peace and human development.

As Norway’s delegation said, “The humanitarian dimension in disarmament and arms control must be a key element in our discussions and efforts, because at the end of the day, it is the consequences for the people on the ground that our policies will be measured against.”

While not everyone may be on board with the advancements in humanitarian disarmament, this should not be a concern for those wanting to make progress. Moving beyond lowest common denominator agreements is vital for peace and security and for the vitality of the United Nations as a responsive body that can address today’s challenges.

### NUCLEAR WEAPONS

**Mia Gandenberger | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF**

As was the case in previous years, a great number of resolutions under cluster one were adopted by First Committee by vote. Many had been updated and modified compared to their previous versions and the Non-Aligned Movement introduced a new draft resolution contained in A/C.1/68/L.6/Rev.1, on follow-up measures to the high-level meeting (HLM) on nuclear disarmament.

The humanitarian concerns regarding nuclear weapons received more attention in this year’s nuclear-related resolutions. Some revised texts also took into account the developments in nuclear disarmament discussions of the past year, namely, the conference on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons in Oslo, the meetings of the open-ended working group (OEWG), and the HLM. This in turn, again much like during the debate, provoked criticism from the nuclear possessor states and those who rely on nuclear weapons in security policies. These states continued to praise the value of a step-by-step process toward a “safer and more stable world” in which nuclear weapons possessors feel “able” to relinquish them, as the ambassador of the United Kingdom explained, and cautioned against undermining the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Others, however, rightly pointed towards the obligation of nuclear disarmament in article VI of the NPT and the consistency of these new efforts and concerns with this commitment.

**Voting on draft resolutions**

The draft resolution entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament” as contained in A/C.1/68/L.6/Rev.1 was adopted by a vote of 129-28-19. This revised version includes two new PPs 10 and 11, one reflecting the deep concern with the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and the other recalling the obligations of states parties to the NPT as contained in article VI of the Treaty.

The French, UK, and US delegations in a joint statement regretted that their views expressed during the HLM had not been reflected in the resolutions and that the HLM had only focused on nuclear disarmament. In their view, the reference to the NPT in L.6/Rev.1 was insufficient, incidental, and unbalanced. They argued that planning another conference to discuss nuclear disarmament in 2018 is not consistent with the NPT agenda and “risks weakening commitment among states to securing a successful outcome” of the 2015 review conference. The Netherlands speaking on behalf of 21 member states, all of which voted against the resolution, raised similar concerns and continued to call for a comprehensive and balanced programme of work within the CD that would allow advancement on “all four core issues.” In the same vein, Spain speaking on behalf of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Moldova, Portugal, Romania, and Slovenia, which all abstained from the vote, stressed the need to recognize both the security and humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons to advance toward the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, Ireland speaking on behalf of Austria, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, New Zealand, and San Marino thought the resolution to be entirely consistent with the NPT as well as the 2010 action plan and the obligations laid out therein. Any initiative aimed at advancing nuclear disarmament should “give due prominence to the important ongoing discussion regarding the humanitarian consequences of any nuclear weapons detonation.” They would be favorably disposed towards “any set of effective measures to achieve the objective of complete nuclear disarmament and the maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons, regardless of how such measures might be elaborated.”

Iran’s draft resolution contained in A/C.1/68/L.11 entitled “Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations
agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” includes only technical changes in comparison to that of 2011. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 113-52-7.

A separate vote was requested on PP6 and PP9. PP6 refers to the decision on the Middle East of the 1995 NPT review and extension conference and the therein reaffirmed importance for the realization of universal adherence to the NPT and placement of nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. It was retained by vote of 116-5-49 with Canada, Israel, Micronesia, Palau, and the United States voting against the paragraph. PP9 refers to the 2010 NPT review conference outcome document and action plan. The paragraph was retained by a vote of 115-5-46 with Canada, France, Israel, UK, and US voting no. None of those voting against the paragraphs or the resolution explained their position.

The resolution introduced by the New-Agenda Coalition entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” as contained in A/C.1/68/L.18 was adopted by vote 164-3-5, with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), France, India, Israel, Russia, UK, and US voting against the resolution and Bhutan, China, Micronesia, Pakistan, and Palau abstaining. This year’s version of the resolution included many changes taking into consideration recent developments, which were discussed in detail in last week’s edition. Unlike last year a separate vote for OP 9 in addition to OP 11 was requested. OP 9 was not modified compared to last years version, but emphasises the importance of the NPT, calls for its universalization, and specifically urges India, Israel, and Pakistan to accede to the treaty as non-nuclear weapon states and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. It was retained by vote of 161-5-3, with the four states outside the Treaty and the US voting against and France, UK, and Russia abstaining.

OP 11 was extended to include a specific call on the CD to “commence without delay substantive work that advances the agenda of nuclear disarmament.” It was retained by vote 164-3-5 with Israel, US, and Russia voting against and DPRK, France, India, Pakistan, and UK abstaining from the vote. Pakistan and India both expressed concern with the references to the NPT and the call for them to join the Treaty. France, UK, and US thought the changes to the resolution would lead further away from the NPT action plan. The increased energy around the nuclear disarmament debate “would be better employed if channeled towards existing processes, helping to tackle blockages and making progress in the practical, step-by-step approach.” Also they regretted their latest P5 meeting was not recognized.

Resolution A/C.1/68/L.20 entitled “Reducing nuclear danger” contains no changes in substance and was adopted by the Committee by a vote of 117-49-11. The resolution on the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons” as contained in A/C.1/68/L.21 included only minor updates compared to last year’s resolution and was adopted by a vote of 119-49-9. Brazil stressed that though it voted in favour of L.20 and L.21, the very existence of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to humanity and thus there is urgent need to eliminate nuclear weapons and not only prohibit their use. Switzerland, which voted against both resolutions, reasserted that a resolution on the prohibition of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should include appropriate reference to the “pertinence and viability of the international non-proliferation regime.”

The resolution “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons” as contained in A/C.1/68/L.26 was adopted by a vote of 127-25-27. In the same manner as last year, Japan and Sweden, which both abstained from the vote, expressed support for the opinion of the ICJ but voiced their hesitation with regard to the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention as contained in PP 15.

Resolution A/C.1/68/L.29/Rev.1 on the “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty” was adopted as a whole by a vote of 175-1-3, with the DPRK voting against and India, Mauritius, and Syria abstaining from the vote. A separate vote on PP 6 was held with the result 170-1-4, with the DPRK voting against and India, Mauritius, Pakistan and Syria abstaining from the vote. Israel explained that while it voted in favour of L.29/Rev.1 it cannot support some of the language of PP6 and OP1 as the CTBT and the NPT are not linked. Rev.1 includes an additional PP taking note “of the establishment of a group of eminent persons to complement efforts to secure ratifications from the remaining Annex 2 countries and to support the article XIV process.”

The draft decision on a “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (draft decisions)” as contained in A/C.1/68/L.35 was adopted by a vote of 172-1-5. Pakistan reiterated its position on the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT and the GGE and voted against the resolution. The DPRK, Egypt, Israel, Syria, and Zimbabwe abstained.

The draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.36 entitled “Nuclear disarmament” was adopted as whole by a vote of

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117-44-18. In a separate vote on OP 16, which calls for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material within the framework of the CD, was retained by a vote of 168-1-5. Armenia, France, Israel, Russia, and the UK abstained and Pakistan voted against the resolution. Both India and Pakistan in their explanations after the vote explained that references to the NPT had caused them to abstain from the vote. Japan abstained as there is a difference between its view and the approach of this resolution to the shared goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.43 entitled “United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” had been updated to reflect the developments of last year. It was adopted as a whole by a vote of 164-1-14 with the DPRK voting against the resolution. Separate votes were held for OP 2, 8, 9, and 17. OP 2 reaffirms the vital importance if the universality of the NPT and calls on states to accede to the Treaty. It was retained by a vote of 168-3-3, with the DPRK, India, and Israel voting against and Bhutan, Mauritius, and Pakistan abstaining. OP 8 calls on states to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and supports measures to assure compliance with the Treaty. It was retained by a vote of 171-1-4, with the DPRK voting against and India, Syria, and Uganda abstaining. OP 9 reiterates the call for the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material and calls nuclear weapon states party and non-party the NPT to declare and maintain moratoriums on the production of fissile material that would be subject of such a treaty. It was retained by a vote of 166-3-8 with China, DPRK, and Pakistan voting against and Ecuador, India, Iran, Israel, Mauritius, Syria, Uganda, and Zimbabwe abstaining. OP 9 stresses the importance of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards and the Model Additional Protocol and calls on states to conclude and bring into force theses instruments. It was retained by a vote of 167-1-8 with DPRK voting against and Argentina, Brazil, India, Iran, Israel, Mauritius, Pakistan, and Uganda abstaining.

In their EOVs both France and Russia expressed their concern about the development of the text, especially the inclusion and emphasis of the humanitarian concerns about the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The DPRK voted against, as it did not see the situation on the Korean Peninsula correctly reflected in the resolution. Pakistan and India again rejected calls to accede to the NPT and other treaties and thus abstained. China had voted against OP 9 as it does not support the moratorium. Iran and Egypt called the resolution unbalanced and Brazil believed it could greatly benefit from adjustments “that would reflect a resolve to pursue such objective in more assertive and unequivocal terms, helping to overcome the current status quo in the field of nuclear disarmament.”

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.49 entitled “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” was adopted by a vote of 120-0-58. As during last year’s session, Japan in its explanation after the vote said that deepening discussions on such assurances is essential but cautioned that the discussions in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) should not be prejudged and expressed the hope the CD would resume work on this and other issues soon.

Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFS)
The annual draft resolution entitled “African Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone Treaty” as contained in A/C.1/68/L.46 was adopted without a vote. Compared to last year’s resolution, OP 3 includes a reference to the second conference of states parties, held in Addis Ababa on 12–13 November 2012. As in previous years, Spain explained that it decided not to ratify protocol III of the Treaty. It joined the consensus, but does not feel it can associate itself with OP 5 and hoped that in the future the sponsors of the resolution will find a better wording.

The draft resolution on the “Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)” as contained in A/C.1/68/L.42/Rev.1 was adopted without a vote. Compared to previous text some additions have been made to the text of the resolution. In OP 6 in addition to the other NWFS treaties, the declaration of Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status is recognized.

PPs 8, 10, 11, and 12 are new. PP 8 highlights the enhancing cooperation among NWFS treaty members including joint meetings with the relevant states. PP 10 takes note of the two preparatory meetings for the Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia. PP 11 welcomes the international seminar held on 14–15 February 2012. PP 12 welcomes the granting of the Gold Future Policy Award for sustainable disarmament to the Treaty of Tlatelolco on 23 October 2013. A reference commending the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean for its leadership in this endeavour was added to PP 13, formerly PP 9. Former PP 10 has been removed and PPs 8 and 11 are now PPs 9 and 14.

OP 3 has been revised to encourage those states that have ratified the relevant protocols to the Treaty to review reservations and interpretative declarations in accordance with action 9 of the 2010 NPT action plan.
The biannual draft resolution on the “Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)” as contained in A/C.1/68/L.39/Rev.1 was adopted without a vote. Some changes have been made. This year’s PP 11 recalling the statement of the chairman of the twenty-second ASEAN Summit and the joint communiqué of the forty-sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, is new. OP 1 has been updated to include a reference to implementing the Plan of Action for the period 2013–2017, adopted in Bandar Seri Begawan on 30 June 2013, with a renewed commitment and a stronger emphasis on concrete actions. Former OPs 2 and 3 have been replaced by OP 2 encourages states parties of the zone to “continue to engage nuclear-weapon states to resolve comprehensively, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Treaty, outstanding issues, with a view to signing the Protocol thereto and its related documents expeditiously.” Former OP 4, now OP 3, underlines the value of enhancing and implementing further ways and means of cooperation among the states parties of NWFZ and their protocols, “with a view to strengthening the non-proliferation regime and to contributing towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament.” OP 4, formerly OP 5 now refers to the seventieth session. The earlier draft did not include the reference to contributing to the objective of nuclear disarmament.

As in previous years the resolution on the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Reduction and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction” as contained in A/C.1/68/L.10 was introduced by Hungary and adopted by First Committee without a vote.

Likewise, Resolution A/C.1/68/L.32 entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction” was introduced by Poland and adopted by First Committee without a vote in the same manner as last year. In comparison to last year’s version, however, the resolution has been updated to include references to the developments regarding the use of chemical weapons in Syria and the third review conference of the CWC. The specific changes and additions were discussed in last week’s edition.

The representatives of India and Cuba complained that L.32 does not reflect the outcome document of the CWC review conference in a balanced manner and regretted that the sponsors of the resolution had not taken their concerns into consideration. Both also called for more comprehensive consultations. Pakistan also considered the current resolution to be “a bit lopsided” as it does not include a paragraph on the peaceful uses of chemistry. The representative hoped that this could be avoided in the future to preserve the consensus nature of this resolution.

The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic expressed concern that the question of the use of chemical weapons in Syria is explicitly addressed in preambular paragraph 4 and that it references an incident that was partly covered in the report of the UN-OPCW investigation while failing to mention that the investigation into other incidents is still on-going. He objected to the reference to UN Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), as 2118 does not exclusively address chemical weapons, but has other aspects that “should not be included in a technical resolution like this one.” Because of this selectivity in language, Syria did not include itself in the consensus.

Over the past month, the debate on other weapons of mass destruction clearly has been dominated by the recent use of chemical weapons in Syria. Some states also criticised the lack of a clear verification mechanism for the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and underlined the need for universal adherence to the Convention, while welcoming the accession of Cameroon, Guyana, Malawi, the Marshall Islands, and Nauru. Some also stressed the need for increased cooperation on cooperation on disease control and response to epidemics and pandemics.

However, most states stressed that the use of chemical weapons has served as a reminder of the catastrophic consequences and the need to prevent these weapons to ever be used again. The majority of states highlighted the diplomatic successes of the past months in this connection: the joint UN-OPCW investigation was widely welcomed by member states and broad support for both the decision of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as well as the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) was expressed. Yet, many states called for the thorough implementation of these obligations and the need to ensure the complete destruction of Syrian chemical weapons stockpiles.
The human suffering that resulted from the use of chemical weapons in Syria raised the serious concern of states and global publics. The majority of states strongly condemned the use of these weapons and called for the perpetrators to be brought to justice, with several calling for the case to be referred to the International Court of Justice. Many states also stressed that while the consequences of the use of chemical weapons are catastrophic, those of nuclear weapons usage would be even more severe. Thus, there is a need to “adequately reconcile the clear international message about chemical weapons with a less clear message about nuclear weapons,” as Mr. O’Reilly of Ireland put it.

WMD FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Jacqueline Treboschi | NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security

This year, two draft resolutions pertaining to the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East (MEWMDFZ) were presented in First Committee.

In a general statement regarding the first of these resolutions, A/C.1/68/L.1, “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,” the delegate of Venezuela expressed disappointment at the failure to convene an international conference on creating a MEWMDFZ in 2012. He emphasized that the conference should be convened as soon as possible, saying that such a zone would be a key step towards peace in the Middle East. Finally, the delegate from Venezuela urged nuclear-armed states in the Middle East to adhere to the stipulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), UN Security Council resolutions, and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The Iranian delegation offered an explanation before the vote on L.1. Issuing support for the resolution, the delegation noted with regret that there has been little progress towards realizing the goal of an MENWFZ, which he asserted was the result of Israel’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme and its noncompliance to adhere to IAEA safeguards and the NPT as a nuclear weapons free state. Citing continued international support, the delegate of Iran stressed that the convening of a conference in 2013 that would foster an agreed plan of action for establishing a MEWMDFZ was of the utmost importance.

This global support was demonstrated when L.1 was adopted without a vote. Following the adoption of this resolution, the Israeli delegation made a statement explaining that it did not object to this resolution due to its continued commitment to an eventual MEWMDFZ. The delegate reiterated that Israel’s view towards resolving the issues surrounding the fulfillment of this goal remain pragmatic and realistic. He argued that progress should be incremental in nature and should be addressed within the context of the Middle East region. The greatest obstacle, from Israel’s perspective, is the lack of a forum for regional dialogue that could ease tensions and build the trust that is necessary for a successful MEWMDFZ.

Prior to the Committee’s vote on the second resolution A/C.1/68/L.2, “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East,” delegates from Israel and the United States each stated the reasoning behind their states’ apprehensions about this text. The representative of Israel questioned the motivation of the states supporting L.2 and argued that this resolution would not be conducive to inhibiting proliferation in the Middle East. He asserted that the resolution was unbalanced due to its call for Israel to adhere to the NPT while there was no mention of Iran and Syria’s “failure to cooperate” with relevant IAEA investigations. Likewise, the US representative stated that while his country supports the establishment of a MEWMDFZ, the omission of other states’ “noncompliance to IAEA standards” is unacceptable.

The Committee first conducted votes on preambular paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution L.2, which resulted in outcomes of 160-2-4 and 163-2-4, respectively. In an explanation after the vote, the representative of India stated that his country chose to vote against the paragraphs on the grounds that the resolution should call on states solely in the Middle East to join the NPT as nuclear weapons free states. The delegate from Pakistan stated a similar reasoning for his country’s abstention on the two preambular paragraphs.

The committee’s vote on L.2 as a whole had a result of 158-5-9. Most states that abstained or did not vote in favor of L.2 did so because of the resolution’s failure to address other proliferation concerns in the Middle East aside from Israel’s nuclear programme. In statements after the vote, Australia, Canada, and the European Union argued that the IAEA and NPT “violations” of Iran and Syria ought to be included in the resolution as well. New Zealand’s delegation, which voted in favour of the resolution, also expressed concern with the absence of reference to other proliferation concerns in the region.
OUTER SPACE
Adam Wolf | NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security

During First Committee’s segment dealing with action on resolutions, the Committee adopted two texts dealing with outer space.

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.40 focuses on confidence-building measures in outer space affairs. Sponsors included some of the larger space faring countries, such as the United States, Russia, and China. The second draft resolution, A/C.1/68/L.41 was the annual resolution focusing on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). It aims to promote the peaceful uses of outer space by preventing the placement of weapons in its domain.

Cuba’s delegation, which co-sponsored both draft resolutions, issued a general statement emphasizing the common interest of all member states in the exploration of outer space. Cuba also reiterated the importance of both resolutions in promoting the right for all to use outer space for peaceful purposes. In regards to L.41, Cuba stated that the Conference on Disarmament will play an important role in future negotiations on PAROS.

There was overwhelming support for both resolutions. L.40 was adopted without a vote while L.41 was adopted with only two abstentions, from the United States and Israel. Both resolutions had little substantial changes within their texts since they were presented to the Committee last year.

The delegation of Iran was the only one to offer an explanation of vote on L.40 after it was adopted. The representative of Iran expressed his delegation’s support for no state to place weapons in outer space. He noted that current international treaties stipulate that no party will be the first state to place weapons of any kind in outer space.

Outer space security remains an issue of concern in First Committee. Only a handful of member states possess space-based technology, highlighting a disparity of capability. Outer space technology is in its early stages and poses unforeseen questions about its future use. The favourable positions of delegations on these two draft resolutions offers a sense of optimism on future negotiations pertinent to the peaceful uses of outer space and PAROS, though the ongoing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, past tests of anti-satellite technologies, and the development of new capabilities pose significant challenges to the development of norms and international laws relevant to this issue.

HIGH-TECH WEAPONS
Tereza Steinhublova | Global Action to Prevent War

During relevant thematic debates of First Committee, missiles, anti-missile systems, drones, and fully autonomous weapons were once again taken up.

Missiles
Missiles were addressed by one draft decision at this year’s session of First Committee. Draft decision A/C.1/68/L.8, sponsored by Egypt, Indonesia and Iran, was adopted on 31 October without a vote or comment. This document recalls past decisions and decides to include the topic of missiles in the provisional agenda of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

During the thematic debate on conventional weapons, the delegations of the United States and Israel discussed the use of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), or shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles. The representative of the United States warned against the acquisition of these weapons by terrorists, insurgents, and criminals and explained that the US government has established strict export controls over the transfer of these weapons.

Armed drones
There were no resolutions on the topic of armed drones; however, this matter received a substantial amount of attention during the thematic debate on conventional weapons, as well as during the thematic debate on other disarmament measures and international security. The delegations of Pakistan, Costa Rica, and Ecuador all expressed concern regarding indiscriminate killings of civilians and compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). Mr. Khalil Hashmi, Counselor of Pakistan, stated that the principles of proportionality, distinction, and precaution established by IHL are violated by armed drone use.

Delegations also discussed legal questions surrounding drones. Ms. Maritza Chan, Minister Counselor of Costa Rica, explained that while Costa Rica acknowled-
edges that drones are not illegal, they also recognize that “through their use, States can deploy deadly and selective force within another State’s territory, thus undermining the protection of the right to life.” Similarly, the representative of Pakistan noted that drones challenge state sovereignty and their use is contrary to UN Charter provisions restricting the use of force, due to the lack of express permission from states in whose territories drones are used.

Furthermore, delegations addressed the necessity for a legal framework. The representative of Ecuador called on the international community to strengthen the debate surrounding drones. The delegate of Costa Rica welcomed the report of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the UN Register of Conventional Arms, which clarified that drones are covered in the Register, and further urged UN member states to “seek to build an international framework” that would “address problems of transparency, accountability and proliferation.” Finally, the representative of Pakistan remarked that drones must be brought under international regulation before they “spiral out of control.”

Costa Rica and Pakistan also discussed the role of drones in the fight against terrorism. The representative of Pakistan stated that the “use of drones is counter-productive in fighting terrorism” due to a lack of transparency of information, causing drones to be “perceived as a blunt tool to use brute force to kill humans.” He also warned against the dangers of drones being acquired by non-state actors and terrorists.

Finally, drones were also considered by NGOs in the statement focusing on emerging technologies, delivered by Cesar Jaramillo of Project Ploughshares. The group of organizations that signed onto this statement warned against the growing use of armed drones on the battlefield, as well as against the increased use of drones for surveillance purposes. The statement called upon states to “stop using, deploying, and developing armed drones” and demanded that the US government “clarify its procedures for determining how its drone strikes are in compliance with IHL and human rights, and that it publish disaggregated data on casualties of its drone attacks.”

**Fully autonomous weapons**

There were no resolutions concerning fully autonomous weapons, however, with growing interest of member states on this matter, there might be more progress in next year’s session of First Committee. Delegations highlighted the serious humanitarian implications of lethal autonomous robotics (LARS), namely the lack of clarity on the allocation of responsibility and the ability to distinguish civilians from combatants. Mr. Khalil Hashmi, Counselor of Pakistan, declared that not only do LARS pose “a fundamental challenge to the protection of civilians,” but they also “alter traditional warfare in unimaginable ways.” Ambassador Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel of France also highlighted the role of humans in the decision to use lethal force.

Delegations of Japan, Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, United States, Pakistan, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, and India reaffirmed the need to begin discussion on this topic, arguing that the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) is the most adequate forum for gathering military, technical, and legal experts. These delegations also noted the need for further clarification on the definition of LARS and their compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law. The Ambassador Simon-Michel reiterated that France, as the chair of the next CCW conference, fully believes in the appropriateness of this forum for the discussion on LARS.

Several delegations provided other thoughts and recommendations on this topic. Mr. Breifne O’Reilly, Director for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Ireland, argued that the same principles that formed the foundation for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) must be applied to LARS. The representative of Switzerland advised that the UN Secretary-General should consider commissioning a comprehensive study in cooperation with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and other think tanks. The representative of Costa Rica also called on states to contemplate installing national moratoria on the development, production, and use of these weapons, and contemplate eventual prohibition.

LARS were also addressed by NGOs in a statement delivered by Mary Wareham of Human Rights Watch and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. The statement urged all states to impose “an immediate moratorium on weapons systems that can select and engage targets without further human intervention” and advised states to adopt a broad CCW mandate. Moreover, the statement pointed out that the blinding laser weapons ban should serve as an example of a weapon being preemptively prohibited.
As debate shifted to conventional weapons, focus turned to the newly adopted Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which states welcomed as a “landmark” achievement that was a “testimony to the efficacy of multilateral diplomacy.” Despite strict time constraints imposed by the Chair, the vast majority of states used the time allotted to emphasize their support for the Treaty, highlighting its passage as “a major breakthrough” in the field of conventional disarmament and applauding its expected humanitarian impact.

Discussing their support for the Treaty, most states first emphasized its anticipated contribution to peace and security, with the Czech Republic noting that the “positive influence of the ATT” would “change the rules of the game to the advantage of those suffering from the illicit trade in weapons.” Many states echoed this sentiment, commending the inclusion of provisions relating to international humanitarian law and human rights, armed violence, and gender-based violence (GBV), which they argued would help address the “security, social, economic and humanitarian consequences” of the arms trade. Speaking during the “other disarmament measures” cluster, Denmark’s delegation delivered a powerful statement noting that the ATT is the first ever arms control treaty to give GBV a place of prominence and calling the Treaty a “huge step forward” in the fight against sexual violence. This sentiment was reflected by statements in the conventional weapons debate, with a number of states, including Austria and the UK, voicing strong support for the GBV provisions. Others drew attention to the Treaty’s focus on reducing human suffering more generally, such as Togo, which praised it as a central tenet of the Treaty. Togo noted that “weapons, unlike victims, survive conflict” and continue to spread destruction long after their sale.

A number of states welcomed the Treaty’s role in the progressive development of international law, lauding its ability to establish effective common standards for arms transfers, promote transparency, and reduce the risk of diversion to unauthorized or irresponsible individuals or groups. However, most states noted that the passage of the Treaty is only the first step, and called for swift entry-into-force, universalization, and robust implementation of the ATT, to allow it to begin its life-saving work.

The momentum of the Treaty’s signature and ratification was on display throughout the conventional weapons debate, with several states, such as Finland and Mexico, positing that the Treaty could enter into force as early as next year. This suggestion was underscored by Cambodia’s signature and Grenada’s ratification earlier in the week. Almost every state called on others to sign and ratify as soon as possible, remarking that the real strength of the Treaty is based on universal implementation. This sentiment was also reflected in the significant number of states that used their interventions as a space to outline their upcoming plans for signature/ratification. Japan, Greece, Lesotho, Ireland, Slovenia, Switzerland, Paraguay, Croatia, Austria, France, Guatemala, New Zealand, Mozambique, Latvia, Moldova, Republic of Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, the Philippines, and the European Union all discussed imminent ratification plans, with Spain and Austria highlighting their intention to also provisionally apply articles 6 and 7 prior to entry-into-force. In a significant development, China, which abstained from the vote on the ATT adoption on 2 April, said it had no problem with the content of the Treaty and is “seriously considering signing.” Others, including Thailand and Israel, also indicated their support and possible signature.

Given that several of the other topics being discussed during the conventional weapons cluster related to small arms and light weapons (SALW), many states wove those considerations into their statements on the ATT. Many developing countries spoke eloquently of the disproportionate effect of the arms trade on their nations, and applauded the inclusion of SALW into the scope of the Treaty, spotlighting the immeasurable impact this would have on the well being of their regions.

While many states and regional organizations described their plans for upcoming workshops and training programs aimed at supporting ATT ratification and implementation, many others stressed that without technical assistance and cooperation from wealthier nations, the ATT could become an “empty shell.” Encouragingly, many Western European and Others Group (WEOG) states agreed with this assessment, pledging assistance both in the form of trainings and information sharing, and in funding. Notably, several governments, including Spain, Australia, and the Netherlands, announced contributions to the UN Trust Facility (UNSCAR), which supports implementation efforts for both the ATT and the UN Programme of Action on small arms. The possibility for collaboration and cohesion between the ATT and other agreements, such as the UNPoA, was also highlighted by many states as a cost-saving mechanism that could mutually reinforce and benefit both arms control instruments.
While the future work of states on the ATT was focused around the entry into force and implementation of the Treaty, other areas of consideration were also raised. Reiterating previous statements, both Switzerland and Trinidad and Tobago volunteered to host the ATT Secretariat. France supported Switzerland, while Guyana and the CARICOM regional group both supported Trinidad and Tobago. Other states discussed the first Meeting of States Parties, with Nigeria extensively outlining considerations that would need to be taken into account for African countries to be able to fully participate in the ongoing ATT process. Very positively, many states also pushed for the continued collaboration with NGOs, citing their hard work as “instrumental” to the process and noting their role to play in the future monitoring of the ATT.

The ATT co-author states (Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya, and the UK), tabled draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.4, “The Arms Trade Treaty”. The resolution welcomes the adoption of the ATT, calls on all states to sign and ratify “at the earliest date,” and asks for any state in a position to do so to provide assistance to requesting states intending to become parties to the Treaty. The resolution was adopted as a whole by a margin of 141-0-28, following a paragraph vote on OP1 (“Welcomes the adoption of the ATT”), which was retained with a vote 137-0-27, and OP3 (“Calls upon all States that have yet to do so to sign...”), which was retained with a vote of 136-0-28. Several states changed their vote from the previous First Committee resolution on the ATT (A/67/L.58), most notably China and Myanmar, which both abstained during the previous vote but voted yes on L.4. New Zealand made a general statement prior to the vote supporting the resolution, while Ecuador, Belarus, Egypt, Iran, Cuba, China, Mexico, Singapore, Pakistan, Canada, DPRK, Venezuela, India and Sudan offered explanations of votes. Most of these countries deplored the Treaty’s imbalance between exporter and importer states and voiced consternation that the Treaty was not adopted by consensus. Some of these countries also feel the Treaty should have included restrictions on arms production and the volume of transfers of conventional weapons, while others expressed concern that the treaty does not explicitly prohibit transfers to countries engaged to aggression or occupation against other states. However some explanations of vote, such as those by Mexico and China, were more positive, with Mexico in particular reiterating that the ATT is an “historic achievement.”

Seven other resolutions also included references to the ATT, including A/C.1/68/L.30, “Transparency in Arms” and A/C.1/68/L.31, “National Legislation on the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods.” Of those, five were adopted without a vote, while two (A/C.1/68/L.30 and A/C.1/68/L.31) had paragraph votes on the sections relating to the ATT. The explanations of votes (by Ecuador, Venezuela, and India) that followed largely echoed the sentiments expressed during the EOVs on the ATT resolution.

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**SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS**

Marianne Rijke | Global Action to Prevent War

During the final week and a half of First Committee, the subject of small arms and light weapons (SALW) received a lot of attention during the thematic debate on conventional weapons and the adopting of draft resolutions. Most delegates repeated their concern with the illicit use, illicit transfer and trade, and the accumulation of SALW and its ammunitions. In addition to this, delegates emphasized the need for universal and binding instruments to curb this trade and trafficking.

The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) shared its concern about the effects of illicit transfer and circulation of firearms and ammunition that pose a challenge for the sustainable development of societies. The African Group added to this the concern of the excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread of SALW in many regions in the world, particularly in Africa. As in previous weeks, several delegations, such as from Norway, the Netherlands, and Spain, argued that SALW can be seen as the “real weapons of mass destruction of our time” because they cause more victims than any other category of weapons. As Mr. Zoran Jokovic, the Third Secretary of Croatia, said, “Small arms and light weapons are neither small nor light in their impact and our response to this challenge must therefore be strong and united.”

Representatives of the European Union (EU), Japan, and South Africa stated that the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA), after twelve years, still remains a universal tool to respond to the challenges posed by the illicit trade and excessive accumulation of SALW. UNASUR agreed, but stressed that for the UNPoA to refer to the issue of SALW “in all of its aspects,” ammunition and explosives need to be included. According to the
African Group, full implementation of the UNPoA and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) is a “key element to promoting long-term security and for creating conditions of security and sustainable development in Africa.” The representative of Lesotho agreed and stated that the need for the implementation of UNPoA cannot be overemphasized. For this implementation, close cooperation and shared responsibilities between importing and exporting countries are needed, as pointed out by the delegations of Thailand and South Africa.

Several representatives, such as from the EU and Moldova, welcomed the consensus outcome document of the Second Review Conference (RevCon) to examine the UNPoA. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) emphasized that “a considerable amount of work was done.” The delegation from Norway stated that even though Norway had argued for a stronger outcome document, full advantage should be taken of its potential. The importance of full and effective implementation of this consensus outcome of the conference was stressed by the African Group.

The delegations of Colombia and Spain hailed UN Security Council resolution 2117 on SALW as a landmark in the struggle against SALW. According to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the resolution “recalls the threat these weapons pose and it urges states and inter-governmental organizations to cooperate on their regional and sub-regional level.” The Ambassador of Australia stated that the resolution reinforces the UN Security Council’s efforts to comprehensively tackle the problems of SALW transfers.

The Representative of Finland stressed the value of the UN’s International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) as they “provide clear, practical and comprehensive guidance to practitioners and policymakers on controls of small arms and light weapons.”

Delegations of the United Kingdom (UK) and the Czech Republic shared their disappointment with the inability of this year’s Groups of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the UN Conventional Arms Register to reach consensus on the proposal to include SALW as the eighth category of the Register. This view was shared by several other delegations, such as those of Slovenia, Switzerland, the United States, and Costa Rica, and they stressed the need to include SALW during the next GGE.

On 29 October, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) addressed SALW in a statement to First Committee. In a joint statement by Control Arms and the International Action Network on Small Arms, these groups noted that “it is not only countries suffering from conflict that are feeling the costs of small arms proliferation and misuse. Armed violence affects all societies, all countries and people of all walks of life.” The NGOs addressed the uneven and incomplete implementation of the UNPoA and stressed that the focus should be directed to “peace-building, effective arms control and regulation, not on further accumulation.”

During the final week of First Committee, member states adopted two resolutions on SALW. Resolution A/C.1/68/L.38, “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,” was adopted by First Committee without a vote. Resolution A/C.1/68/L.9/Rev.1, “Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them,” was also adopted without a vote after it was revised. The revisions included cutting a paragraph welcoming UN Security Council resolution 2117 on SALW and altering the paragraph covering the ATT. The original sentence, “Welcomes the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty by the General Assembly on 2 April 2013,” was changed into “Welcoming the inclusion of small arms and light weapons in the scope of the Arms Trade Treaty, as well as the inclusion of international assistance in its provisions.”

Looking at future efforts to enhance the framework to tackle the problems of the illicit trade in SALW, many delegations stated that they are looking forward to the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider Implementation of the UNPoA (BM55) that will take place in New York from 16–20 June 2014. UNASUR explained that the BM55 “will constitute an excellent opportunity to deepen our discussions on international cooperation and assistance and on marking, record-keeping and tracing in the framework of the ITI.”
The use of cluster munitions continues to inspire abhorrence among the international community, as clearly demonstrated by the last days of First Committee debates. France, Japan, Lesotho, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and South Africa, as well as the European Union, made strong statements condemning use of the weapon by Syria or by any actor. In particular, France referred to the use of cluster munitions as being a violation of international humanitarian law while the Netherlands said the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) had placed cluster munitions under a widely accepted and respected ban. Norway stressed that “the use of cluster munitions today is considered illegitimate, and unbecoming of responsible members of the international community.” Turkey, a state not party to the CCM, strongly condemned the use of cluster munitions against civilian populations.

The debate was marked by numerous calls for all states to join the CCM, with Australia, Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, France, Japan, Lao PDR, Lesotho, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, and South Africa emphasizing the need to universalize the Convention. In particular, New Zealand, as Co-Coordinator of the Convention’s Working Group on National Implementation Measures, reiterated that it stands ready to assist states with implementing the CCM in their domestic legal frameworks. Chile reiterated the goal of achieving a cluster munition-free region in Latin America and the Caribbean, and spoke about the regional meeting it will host in December to promote this goal.

The African Group expressed its support for the humanitarian objectives of the CCM while the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) said it is working to ensure all its members join the Convention as soon as possible. The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) spoke about the humanitarian, economic, and social consequences of cluster munitions on civilians.

The CCM is largely a preventative instrument and its provision on the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions is essential to ensure the weapon is never used again. Remarkable progress has already been made, with over 70% of states parties’ declared stockpiles destroyed so far under the Convention. During the last two weeks of debates, Chile announced it had completed the destruction of its stockpiles, Moldova offered to share its technical expertise, and the United Kingdom said it was on track to destroy its entire stockpile by the end of 2013, five years ahead of its mandatory deadline.

International cooperation is a central component of the CCM, which calls on those in a position to do so to provide technical, material, or financial assistance to affected states. In this context, Lao PDR, the world’s most heavily affected state, issued a call for support to its ninth Millennium Development Goal that aims at addressing unexploded ordnance contamination. Australia noted its AUS123 million contribution to mine action since 2010. The United States, which has not joined the CCM, reported a global contribution of US$2.1 billion since 1993 for conventional weapons destruction including the clearance of unexploded munitions. China, another state not party, spoke about its support to clearance activities including in Lao PDR. (Other contributions to mine action from Finland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are listed in the report on Landmines.)

Austria emphasized that “we need to ensure that we effectively fulfill our obligations to assist those who have fallen victims and step up our efforts to meet the rights and needs of survivors, affected families and communities.” Norway and the European Union echoed that call, with the latter highlighting the strong linkage between the CCM’s victim assistance provisions and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Thailand, which has yet to join the Convention, expressed its support for the humanitarian aims of the CCM. Myanmar, also a non-signatory, spoke about the adverse impact of the “indiscriminate and excessive use” of cluster munitions. Although in 2011 deliberations under the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) failed to conclude a protocol aimed at regulating cluster munitions, two non-signatories, Greece and Pakistan, expressed the view that the CCW forum was the best one to address issues related to cluster munitions.

During the NGO presentations segment, the Cluster Munition Coalition welcomed the important statements of concern and condemnation over the ongoing use of cluster munitions in Syria. It urged all states to join the CCM, and reiterated that it stands ready to share its expertise in support to states’ efforts to join and implement the Convention.

Like last year, no resolution on cluster munitions was tabled. The next Meeting of States Parties will gather states, UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, civil society, and other stakeholders in San José, Costa Rica, in September 2014.
Fourteen years after its entry into force, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines (or Mine Ban Treaty, MBT) still galvanizes support. This was evidenced by the strength of the calls for the full universalization of the treaty issued by Australia, Austria, Japan, Lesotho, Lithuania, Moldova, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, as well as the European Union during the last days of First Committee debates. In other solid expressions of support, New Zealand said the MBT was the trailblazer in the field of humanitarian disarmament, and Norway hailed the Treaty’s “immediate humanitarian effect on the ground.”

The Netherlands emphasized that with adequate resources and national ownership, the issue of antipersonnel mines “could be crossed off the global to-do list within a decade following next year’s Third Review Conference.” In this context, it noted its contribution of 45 million Euros to humanitarian demining activities in 2012–2016. The United Kingdom explained it had contributed £30 million to mine action in the past three years, and announced it had adopted a new set of guiding principles on funding. Finland said it would continue to support mine action with approximately 6 million Euros annually. Referring to other forms of cooperation and assistance, Thailand announced the adoption by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations of the terms of reference for a future center providing countries in the region with technical support on clearance issues, while the Republic of Korea offered to share its expertise on demining. Both Australia and the European Union encouraged concrete measures to enhance coordination between donors. (Other contributions to mine action from Australia and the US are listed in the report on cluster munitions.)

Austria, Norway, Thailand, and the European Union noted the importance of providing comprehensive assistance to victims, with Austria emphasizing that the MBT and Convention on Cluster Munitions set the norm for the recognition of the rights of victims on a non-discriminatory basis. Interestingly, Myanmar, a state not party where government forces have made extensive use of landmines in the past decade, said that assistance to victims is a very effective approach to directly address the impact of landmines.

The Arab Group called on past users of landmines to provide maps and other information to affected states, to defray clearance costs, and to offer a compensation for damages. In a statement delivered during the civil society segment, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines recalled that the stigma on antipersonnel mines holds so strong that most of those remaining outside the Treaty abide by the ban norm. It also called on all states to come to the 2014 Review Conference with a public pledge to complete their remaining Treaty obligations.

Resolution A/C.1/68/L.3 on the “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” co-sponsored by Algeria, Cambodia and Slovenia, was adopted on 1 November 2013 with a vote of 154-0-18, close to last year’s vote. Eighteen states not party voted in favor of the resolution, thus clearly expressing support for the humanitarian aims of the MBT (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Libya, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tonga, and the United Arab Emirates). The resolution invites all states to join the MBT and stresses the importance of the full implementation of the Treaty and Cartagena Action Plan. It only included technical updates to last year’s version.

A number of states provided explanations of votes. For the first time, Libya changed its vote from abstention to a vote in favor, noting that the temporary government was not in a position to join the MBT but that it shared international concerns about the “humanitarian tragedies” caused by the weapon. Morocco voted in favor and voiced its support for the humanitarian aims of the Treaty. Among those that abstained, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Singapore claimed that the weapon plays a legitimate defensive role. However, all of these delegations also noted the international community’s concerns over the humanitarian impact of landmines.

The Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the MBT will take place from 2 to 5 December 2013 in Geneva and will be the last stop before the Third Review Conference scheduled for June 2014 in Maputo.
EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS

During this year’s First Committee, several states raised concerns over the use of explosive weapons in populated areas and their impacts on civilians. In doing so, they responded to growing international concern with the deaths, injuries, destruction, and suffering caused by explosive weapons use in public places.

Norway and Austria highlighted that these weapons cause a consistent pattern of humanitarian harm, with the majority of victims being civilian.

Austria called on states to act on this critical issue and to consider the concrete steps that can be taken to reduce the humanitarian impact of explosive weapons in populated areas. Norway stated that this issue warrants “a comprehensive and systematic response by the international community, on normative, regulatory and operational levels,” stating that it will support and encourage efforts to develop better responses.

Austria, Costa Rica, and Norway all highlighted the UN Secretary-General’s reports to the UN Security Council on the Protection of Civilians (PoC) in situations of armed conflict. The most recent Secretary-General’s report on this topic from June 2012 recognises the humanitarian problem of explosive weapons in populated areas as one of the main challenges for civilian protection. It provides four concrete recommendations that serve as a road map to reduce the harm caused by explosive weapons in populated areas. These include: calling on parties to a conflict to refrain from using explosive weapons with a wide-area impact in densely populated areas, calling on the Security Council; whenever relevant, to call on parties to conflict to refrain from using such weapons in densely populated areas; calling on member states, UN actors, international organisations, and NGOs to intensify their consideration of the issue by having focused discussion and undertaking or supporting further data collection and analysis; and for member states to help make information available on harm to civilians from the use of explosive weapons and to issue policy statements outlining conditions under which certain explosive weapons may or may not be used in populated areas.

In the last two years, around thirty states have raised concerns over the use of explosive weapons in populated areas and the resulting impacts on civilians during the Security Council’s open debates on the protection of civilians.

Civil society also used First Committee to raise concerns with this issue. The International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW) delivered a statement calling on states to avoid the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas. The Network also reiterated calls by the UN Secretary-General to lay out national policies around the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, and to hold further discussions on this topic.

There will be opportunities for such further discussion in 2014, during which states can and should aim to raise the level of protection afforded to people affected by conflict and armed violence.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY

Cyber technologies drew much attention in this year’s First Committee. As Ambassador Peter Woolcott of Australia observed on 30 October, the role of such technologies is “an issue that is rapidly moving up the international security agenda.” Discussion revolved around the report (A/68/98) of the Group of Government Experts (GGE) released in June (see sidebar), a resolution sponsored by Russia establishing a new GGE, and the pervasive surveillance revealed by Edward Snowden’s release of US National Security Agency (NSA) documents.

Draft resolution L.37, “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security,” was adopted without a vote on 5 November. It provides for the establishment of a GGE in 2014, to report to the 70th session of the General Assembly in 2015, to continue studying issues examined by previous GGEs on information and communication technologies (ICTs). The one new area for study relates to use of ICTs in conflicts and how international law applies to the use of ICTs by states.

This addition reflects the view that there are numerous international law issues on which common understandings need to be reached. Those issues were not addressed by this year’s GGE report, which simply affirmed that the UN Charter and other international
law applies to the ICT environment. For example, when does a disruptive cyber operation have effects reaching the level of an “armed attack” to which use of force in self-defense is permissible? How should the problem of attribution of attacks be handled within the law of armed conflict? Further, as the report observes, additional norms specific to ICTs could be developed over time.

In other respects, the draft resolution largely tracks the resolution of the same title adopted last year by the General Assembly (A/RES/67/27). One noteworthy new preambular paragraph affirms “the importance of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” in the use of ICTs. In introducing the draft on 30 October, Vladimir Yermakov of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said regarding the paragraph, “we proceed from an assumption that the respect for human rights is not set against other important norms of international law and should be observed in a balanced way, along with the principle of national sovereignty and non-interference into the internal affairs of states.”

In a general statement on 5 November delivered on behalf of 40 delegations joining the consensus on L.37, Jan Lodding, Deputy Director, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, welcomed the report of the GGE released this year. A fundamental point, he said, is that the internet should remain open, facilitating the free flow of information. The same rights that individuals have offline must be protected online, especially the freedom of expression, the freedom to seek and impart information, and the freedoms of assembly and association. Joining the statement delivered by Sweden, Canada expressed its deep concern that some governments fear free expression and therefore their own citizens.

Cuba and Venezuela highlighted the vulnerability of state sovereignty and privacy of citizens to cyber surveillance. On behalf of Venezuela, Alfredo Fernando Toro-Carnevali quoted from a 3 November New York Times article, “No Morsel Too Minuscule For All-Consuming N.S.A.”. It reports on a document released by Snowden revealing that Venezuela was one of six “enduring targets” for surveillance in a 2007 mission list. One agency goal was “preventing Venezuela from achieving its regional leadership objectives and pursuing policies that negatively impact U.S. global interests.”

A general statement by the United States, Italy, and Japan delivered by a US representative expressed disappointment that the programme budget contemplates that the new GGE established by L.37 will have 20 members at a nearly doubled cost from the previous 15-member GGE. In contrast, in an explana-

### Presentation of report of GGE

In June, the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security released a consensus report (A/68/98). On 19 October, Ambassador Peter Woolcott of Australia, speaking on behalf of the chair of the GGE, Ambassador Deborah Stokes, presented the report to First Committee and summarized its findings and recommendations.

As Ambassador Woolcott noted, the report finds that the expanding use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) creates new possibilities for disruption. The rapid increase in the use of mobile devices, web services, social networks, and cloud computing services expands the challenges to security. Different levels of capacity for ICT security among states can increase vulnerability.

The report holds that international law, and in particular the UN Charter, is applicable to the ICT environment. Also, state efforts to address the security of ICTs must go hand in hand with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The report recommends confidence-building measures—exchange of information, consultative frameworks, law enforcement cooperation—as well as capacity-building measures, including assistance to states. It observes that the private sector and civil society are stakeholders in development of norms and capacity and confidence-building measures.

In the following informal session, the only comments came from Amr Aljowaily of Egypt. He underlined the important of paragraph 29 of the report, which recommends “regular institutional dialogue with broad participation under the auspices of the United Nations.” He said that this policy should be implemented in the work of the future GGE envisaged by draft resolution L.37 put forward by the Russian and other delegations. Mr. Aljowaily also urged that the next GGE pay even more attention to capacity-building.
As the First Committee wrapped up its work for 2013, the future of the disarmament machinery remains uncertain.

Last year, new and innovative resolutions like the establishment of an open-ended working group and a group of governmental experts on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials were adopted. This year, however, governments seemed to struggle to think further on how to move towards making significant decisions on the future of disarmament negotiations.

While no one can any longer contest that the existing disarmament machinery is facing significant problems, a wide range of reasons for the stalemate, proposed solutions, and ways forward were put forward. Unfortunately, most of proposals continue to focus on what others should do, rather than what can be done at this point.

High-level meeting and its follow-up
Resolution A/C.1/68/L.6/Rev.1, “Follow up to the high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament,” was one of the most contested resolutions at First Committee this year. The resolution calls for the “urgent commencement of negotiations, in the Conference on Disarmament,” on a nuclear weapons convention. It also convenes, no later than 2018, a high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard, and declares 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

Despite a revised version that included a reference to article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), quite a few states seemed skeptical about the text. With 129 votes in favour, 28 votes against and 19 abstentions, the resolution just passed the two-thirds majority support needed for adoption.

The resolution was mainly criticized by nuclear-armed states and other states reliant on nuclear weapons. Despite being considerably behind in the implementation the 2010 NPT action plan themselves, the France, the United Kingdom, and the United States believe that this resolution will undermine the action plan. An additional 21 states, mostly nuclear umbrella and NATO states, also highlighted that their vote against the resolution stemmed from a lack of balanced references to the NPT and non-proliferation efforts.

This group of states also voiced fears that a conference in five years would be “a potential vehicle” to negotiate a nuclear weapons convention, something they argued could undermine efforts towards the 2015 Review Conference. These 21 states did not, however, provide any concrete arguments on how such potential effort to rid the world of nuclear weapons in 2018 could undermine efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons three years earlier. As has been done unsuccessfully for the last 16 years, this group of states also called for the adoption of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work in the CD.

Fortunately, other states were less pessimistic. In a joint explanation of vote, Austria, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, New Zealand, and San Marino saw the resolution being entirely consistent with the NPT, its objectives, and the 2010 NPT action plan. In a constructive manner, these states stated that they were “favourably disposed towards any set of effective measures to achieve the objective of complete nuclear disarmament and the maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons, regardless of how such measures might be elaborated.”

While highlighting that it wished to see more references to the 2010 action plan, Switzerland also saw the resolution as consistent with existing obligations under the NPT and looked forward to the opportunity to provide impetus to efforts on nuclear disarmament.

**Revitalizing the work of the disarmament machinery and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations.**

A few uncontroversial decisions and resolutions related to the disarmament machinery were adopted. The draft decision to keep “revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament” on the agenda for the next session of the General Assembly was adopted without a vote, just as the reports of the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission.

Last year, a resolution on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices decided to establish a group of governmental experts (GGE) to convene in 2014 and 2015. Waiting for the GGE to convene, this year only a decision to put the issue on the agenda for next year was put forward. Despite this, Pakistan voted against it and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Israel, Syria, and Zimbabwe abstained. In similar fashion to the nuclear-armed states opposition to any initiatives on nuclear disarmament, Pakistan called a GGE on fissile materials “an unwise move” and threatened that it would “undermine the CD”. It also believed that “a GGE on FMCT without the participation of all those countries with the capability to produce fissile material would be still-born.” Egypt abstained because the original resolution referred to in this decision did not adequately include past production and stockpiles of fissile materials.

The draft resolution entitled “Taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations” as contained in A/C.1/68/L.34 was adopted by a vote of 151-4-21 with France, Russia, UK, and US voting no. The resolution had been comprehensively updated to reflect the work of the open-ended working group (OEWG) and other developments of the last year, but did not schedule another session of the working group.

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The first weeks of this year’s First Committee saw little promotion of gender equality in disarmament. Few references were made to recent historic steps taken by states and the UN on this theme, and the annual resolution “Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control” (L.7), adopted by the Committee without a vote, lacks any substantial improvements. As previously pointed out in the First Committee Monitor, L.7 should have been strengthened at least through a reference to the gender provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Some countries apparently remain sceptical of this resolution, with the Iranian delegation explaining that it joined consensus on L.7 but find this resolution acceptable only as much as it is line with Iran’s constitution, laws, and administrative procedures.

However, the last week of First Committee did see some improvement with regards to gender and disarmament.

As part of the presentations by the UN regional centres, Mélanie Régimbal, Director of United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), spoke about the Inter-institutional Training Course on Combating the Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives (IITC). UNLIREC previously offered this as a “women’s only” course and will do so again in December this year.

During the thematic debate on conventional weapons, the European Union noted that the ATT “recognizes the link between gender-based violence and the illicit or poorly-regulated international arms trade.” EU representative Ms. Clara Ganslandt called for intensified efforts to better control small arms and light weapons, and listed the integration of a gender perspective as one of those areas “where significant obstacles to full implementation [of the UN Programme of Action] persist.”

Finland’s delegation said it is “convinced that the ATT has the potential to reduce gender based violence.” Mr. Breifne O’Reilly of the Irish delegation underlined that his country holds out the shared responsibility “to ensure that the trade in arms does not … contribute to gender-based violence.”

Further welcoming of the ATT gender provisions came from Ambassador Thomas Hajnoczi, who said that Austria “remains committed to preventing gender-based violence” and strongly supports the inclusion of gender provisions into the ATT. Ambassador Hajnoczi argued that “the recognition of the impact of illegally and irresponsibly transferred conventional weapons on gender-based violence in the Treaty is an important step forward.” Speaking for the UK, Ambassador Matthew Rowland said the ATT “is making important steps to make the world a safer place” by requiring

Changing methods of work and attempting new ways forward might seem scary for some. But allowing for multilateral disarmament negotiations to continue stall for another decade is not acceptable. All states must consider the risks of doing nothing, and any state that is serious about taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations must act now.
states parties to assess, prior to authorizing exports, the risk of the arms in question being used to commit serious acts of gender-based violence. Ambassador Rowland also referred to the UK-led Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, introduced during the Ministerial Week of this year’s UN General Assembly. The declaration has been endorsed by 136 countries that “express serious and ongoing concern with the role played by illicit weapons in the commission or facilitation of serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.”

Guatemala, one of the few states that spoke out on gender and disarmament during earlier meetings of this year’s First Committee, reiterated its welcoming of UN Security Council resolution 2117 (2013), as it strengthens the link to preventing gender-based violence. In UNSCR 2117, the Council recognizes that the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation, and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW) exacerbate sexual and gender-based violence. It urges states, UN entities, and organizations to take further measures for women’s participation in combating the negative effects of SALW.

Last, but certainly not least, Ambassador Uffe A. Balslev from Denmark dedicated a whole statement to the issue of gender and disarmament during the thematic debate on other disarmament measures, non-proliferation, and arms control. Ambassador Balslev welcomed the gender provisions of UNSCR 2117, as well as the inclusion of gender and disarmament references in the agreed conclusions of this year’s Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) and in UNSCR 2106 (2013). These deliberations, he said, “are important and should form basis for the mainstreaming of gender awareness” into the work of First Committee. He referred to the ATT as “a huge step forward” and rightly pointed out that “this should have been properly reflected in several of the resolutions on conventional disarmament,” including resolution L.7. Ambassador Balslev said he regrets this was not the case, adding “we must see how we can do better next year.”

Denmark also called on states to “affirm the importance for our work of women’s political, social and economic empowerment” and referred to the important role played by women, including women’s organizations, in efforts to prevent and reduce armed violence and armed conflict, as well as in the promotion of disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control. Ambassador Balslev further referred to UNSCR 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security (WPS), saying this obliges states to take into account how “men and women are affected differently by weapons and armed conflict.” Important steps to this effect have been taken lately with the inclusion of disarmament references into the newly adopted Security Council resolutions 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013), both part of the WPS agenda.

All of the above demonstrates a very welcome increase in gender references during the thematic debates on conventional weapons, as well as on other disarmament measures. As Ambassador Balslev concluded in his statement, “there may be small pockets of opinion” who still argue that gender issues are not part of the core occupation of the First Committee, but “they must have been living on Mars”. He continued, “Nothing could be more wrong. It is about time it is reflected in our work.”

Gender awareness should indeed inform and improve the work of states in all parts of the disarmament arena—including in policy and practice on nuclear weapons. It is time to recall and rearticulate what the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC), headed by former IAEA Secretary-General Hans Blix, concluded in its final report from 2006. The report said: “Women have rightly observed that armament policies and the use of armed force have often been influenced by misguided ideas about masculinity and strength. An understanding of and emancipation from this traditional perspective might help to remove some of the hurdles on the road to disarmament and non-proliferation.” It is high time to recognize and challenge these misguided notions, which falsely frame the possession of weapons of mass destruction as an expression of strength and a tool for protection, while reinforcing old-fashioned norms that connect nuclear weapons to masculinity. These gendered ideas should be challenged as part of shifting the debate towards a human security approach that paves the way for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. •
DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
Anna Eknor | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On 5 November, First Committee adopted draft resolution “Relationship between disarmament and development” (A/C.1/68/L.15) without a vote. The resolution stresses the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development, highlights the need to divert funds from military expenditures to economic and social development, and so encourages the international community to achieve the Millennium Development Goals “and to make reference to the contribution that disarmament could provide in meeting them when it reviews its progress towards this purpose in 2013.” The resolution also calls on states “to make greater efforts to integrate disarmament, humanitarian and development activities.”

In relation to the adoption of the resolution, Cuba underscored that disarmament and development must be seen as two sides of the same coin and strongly stressed that the “unacceptable” US$1.75 trillion should be allocated to combat extreme poverty and economic and social development. The United States, however, argued that disarmament and development should be viewed as two distinct issues. It dissociated itself from the consensus on the text. France and the United Kingdom expressed their support for the resolution in general but questioned the notion of a symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development. The plausibility that funds spared through reduction in military expenditure could go directly to development needs was also questioned by France and the UK, which called for a more nuanced discussion.

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.45, “Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures,” was also adopted without a vote. The resolution is mindful of the provisions of the UN Charter’s article 26, which calls for the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources. Furthermore, the resolution stresses that “transparency in military matters is an essential element for building a climate of trust and confidence between States worldwide and that a better flow of objective information on military matters can help to relieve international tension and is therefore an important contribution to conflict prevention.” The draft calls for the establishment of a group of governmental experts to review the operation and further development of the UN’s instrument on military expenditure and expresses growing concern about the downward trend in military expenditure reporting over the past decade. At the adoption of the resolution, the Cuban delegation again expressed concern about the increasing military expenditure. Pakistan underscored the huge disparity between different countries’ military expenditure and called for the countries with the largest expenditures to make reductions.

As called for by the previous First Committee resolution on information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures, a new easy-to-use database and submitting platform for reporting military expenditure has been facilitated and introduced this year. However, the submission rate is currently low; only about one third of UN member states have submitted information. The landmark adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty does nonetheless provide hope that an increasing number of states will submit information, though the related ATT provision is somewhat undermined by the exemption of commercially sensitive or national security information.

Throughout this year’s First Committee, a great deal of delegations have highlighted different intersecting factors relating to disarmament, which exacerbate shortcomings in development. The issue of excessive military expenditure has been prevalent. Close to every country considering developmental aspects have mentioned the gap between resources allocated to military expenditure and for development. The annual global total official development aid amounts to US$128 billion, which can be compared to the global total military expenditure amounting to US$1.75 trillion. The global total expenditure on nuclear weapons, including modernization, amounts to an estimated US$105 billion each year.

The international arms trade is also an issue affecting development. The vast majority of delegates welcomed the Arms Trade Treaty as beneficial for development, not least due to its regulation of trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW). The illicit trade in SALW has by a great deal of delegations been pointed out as a major impediment for development as it fuels and prolongs conflict, has devastating humanitarian consequences, and causes setback in social and economic development.

Several delegations emphasized that the root causes of conflict, such as lack in development, must be addressed and not merely the symptoms in order to reach global security. During this year’s First Committee, many delegations have from different perspectives expressed the need to redefine security from military terms to include a humanitarian perspective in terms of banning and eliminating WMDs, assuring fulfillment of human rights, and diverting funds to social and economic development.
On Tuesday, 29 October 2013, the Permanent Mission of Finland hosted the final side event of this year’s First Committee on the challenges of chemical weapons. In his welcoming remarks, Ambassador Jarmo Väinölä of Finland drew attention to the challenges that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) present to the international community and that require cooperation on the national and international level. While the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) already has 190 member states, full universality is yet to be achieved. He stressed that as the use of chemical weapons in Syria has demonstrated, the destruction of these weapons is not a thing of the past.

The UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Angela Kane, pointed out that it might be premature to put forward lessons learned from the UN-OPCW mission in Syria, as it is still on-going and the most sensitive activities have just begun while the civil war continues. However, as a preliminary observation, the global norm against the use of WMD had been strengthened with the overwhelming revulsion among governments and the general public at large. This reaction has reaffirmed the value of the CWC as an instrument of both prohibition and elimination. Ms. Kane noted that nuclear weapons are the only WMD without a comparable instrument.

Addressing the case of Syria, Ms. Kane pointed out that the cooperation between the UN, WHO, and OPCW on information sharing and joint exercises enabled them to be prepared only days after the last incident when allegations of use of chemical weapons emerged. Both the investigation and the elimination-mission have proven the indispensability of the UN and presented a triumph for multilateralism.

Hugh Gregg, Head of the OPCW Laboratory, presented the work of his laboratory and explained how the mission in Syria has been conducted. Before the mission in Syria, the OPCW laboratory had been trained mostly in collecting and analysing environmental samples and only recently increased trainings with biological samples. Environmental samples usually contain a “neat” agent in residue on e.g. contaminated clothing, hair, or soil. The concentration of the chemical is usually fairly high, which allows a survey analysis to declare which chemical was used. In biological or medical samples such as urine or blood the analyte is not intact and the concentration level is usually quite low, making a definitive analysis more difficult. The OPCW has designated 21 laboratories around the world to conduct off-site analysis of samples to support the work of the OPCW laboratory.

After the incident in Syria on 21 August 2013, the OPCW-WHO staff were able to collect both environmental and bio-medical samples, which were dispatched to designated laboratories. The final report was presented to the UN Secretary-General on 13 September and concluded that Sarin was used in the attack. With regard to lessons learned, Mr. Gregg pointed out that far more samples than expected had been collected, which proved to be a burden for the laboratories to analyse in such limited amount of time and under the significant pressures for quick results. The standard reporting form developed during the training exercised proved itself too time consuming and the media interest presented an unexpected challenge.

Paula Vanninen, Director of VERIFIN, focused on the role of the designated laboratories. The training and research institute VERIFIN is the national authority of Finland for the CWC and its implementation. With regard to the Syria mission she explained that the request to analyse bio-medical samples was made on very short notice. Among the challenges Ms. Vanninen cited were the limited resources of the laboratory, instrument problems, the varying amount of samples, and the fact that the whole team had to be involved for several days. Like Mr. Gregg she also identified the strong pressure from the media on the scientists to produce results.

Many participants eagerly engaged in the ensuing question and answer session, which focused on technical questions regarding the methods of sampling and analysing, the role of both the OPCW and the designated laboratories, implications for addressing biological and nuclear weapons, and further lessons learned from the joint mission in Syria.

Ms. Kane explained that the emotional effect of going in only a few days after the incident had been underestimated. Especially hard had been the helplessness in the face of people suffering without being able to provide assistance. In this context, Mr. Gregg regretted that the assistance provision of the CWC did not apply to Syria, as it had not been a state party to the CWC at the time of the attack, but Ms. Vanninen pointed out that analysing samples of survivors to clarify whether they had been exposed to Sarin was a humanitarian issue.

Ms. Kane also cited the “media onslaught” as a major challenge they had not been prepared for, and identified the need for better communication and coordination between the organisations. Overall, she said, there is a much better view of what is needed now.
The First Committee Monitor is a collaborative NGO effort undertaken to make the work of the First Committee more transparent and accessible. The Monitor is compiled, edited, and coordinated by Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).

Contributing organizations and programmes to this edition:
- Article 36
- Cluster Munition Coalition
- Control Arms
- Global Action to Prevent War
- International Campaign to Ban Landmines
- Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy
- NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
- Reaching Critical Will of WILPF
- Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Swedish Section