Open-ended Working Group taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations\(^1\)

Geneva 2016

Item 5 of the agenda
Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT):
effective measures to facilitate establishing the norm against nuclear testing

Submitted by Japan and Kazakhstan

1. In order to realize a world free of nuclear weapons, it is indispensable to place a total ban on nuclear testing, which has been a source of nuclear arms race. This is precisely what the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is aimed at. By completely prohibiting nuclear testing, which used to take place every year and every month, the CTBT will constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons by all states and put an end to nuclear arms race.

2. Since the CTBT was opened for signature, its universalization is progressing – to this date, 183 States have signed and 164 States have ratified it. Particularly, during the years between the 2010 and 2015 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Conferences, visible progress was made in terms of the increase in the number of states that signed or ratified the Treaty.

3. In the final document adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the States resolved on five specific actions related to the CTBT, one of which confirmed that nuclear-weapon States bore special responsibility.

4. Both Japan and Kazakhstan are committed to realizing a world free of nuclear weapons, and as we construct such a world, the two countries see the CTBT as an indispensable block on which we must build. On that basis, as the 2015-2017 Co-Coordinators for Article 14 process, the two countries recognize the responsibility to take leading roles towards the early entry into force of the CTBT. This joint working paper by Japan and Kazakhstan elaborates on the ban on nuclear testing as effective legal and practical measures towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

5. In view of the fact that the CTBT is making substantial achievements as a norm against nuclear testing, and recognizing the new developments in nuclear disarmament, it is

\(^1\) Established pursuant to resolution 70/33 of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
useful to further discuss, at the Open-ended Working Group, the following efforts and measures to be taken by the international community to develop, through the entry into force of the CTBT, a fully established norm against nuclear testing.

**Effective Practical Measures**

6. A de-facto international norm against nuclear testing has been emerging in this century since no nuclear testing has been conducted in the 21st century except those by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The fact that the international community has expressed strong condemnation against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear testing also illustrates the strong normative character against nuclear testing. For further development of the norm, the international community should continue to react resolutely against nuclear testing so that the norm against nuclear testing will be further reinforced.

7. In this regard, the international community should stand firm once again and urge North Korea not to conduct any further nuclear tests and to sign and ratify the CTBT immediately, in addition to fully complying with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks.

8. We are yet to witness the entry into force of the Treaty. Still, it is worth noting that almost all annex 2 States that have not ratified the Treaty have observed the moratorium on nuclear testing. This effort to maintain the moratorium is of crucial importance. Therefore, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, all states that possess nuclear weapons should be urged to declare and/or maintain all existing moratoriums on nuclear test explosions and refrain from any action that could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. Issuing political statements individually or jointly by all states that hold nuclear weapons declaring commitment to moratorium on nuclear test explosions could be an important and effective measure to strengthen the norm against nuclear testing.

9. A robust verification regime under the Treaty, as shown by the steady advancement of the International Monitoring System (IMS) and successful conduct of Integrated Field Exercise (IFE) 14, has been developed. The effective functioning of the IMS upon nuclear testing by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 6 January 2016 has been appreciated and valued by the international community. The international community should thus make necessary efforts for achieving the finalization of the regime. In this regard, the importance of further cooperation by the international community on maintaining and enhancing the IMS as the sole, effective regime for nuclear test detection should be emphasized. States are encouraged to make further personnel and technical contributions to states in need, in order to further improve the capability of detecting nuclear explosions.

10. Another important and effective approach is to spread awareness about the reality of the use of nuclear weapons at the grassroots level across national borders and generations. It will contribute to deepening the understanding of the importance of early entry into force of the Treaty.

**Effective Legal Measures**

11. As a core element for constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, the earliest possible entry into force of the CTBT would bring an effective advancement in nuclear disarmament. It is a common responsibility of the international community to fully make the emerging norm against nuclear testing legally-binding, while the finalization of the verification regime is also pursued.
12. Bearing in mind that twenty years have now passed since the opening for signature of the CTBT, it is a matter of urgency that the remaining eight annex 2 States, whose ratifications are necessary for its entry into force, sign and ratify the CTBT without further delay and take individual initiatives to do so without waiting for others, while confirming a special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States.

13. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization has provided the most inclusive forum next to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon. In addition to all signatory States (not just States that have ratified, but all States that have only signed the Treaty), even non-signatory States can participate as observers. This means that this nuclear disarmament forum is virtually open to all States, which provides an ideal forum for nuclear disarmament efforts. It is highly encouraged that this forum be utilized to promote political efforts, at highest levels possible, to facilitate the signature and ratification of the CTBT by those States which have not yet done so.

14. Japan and Kazakhstan express readiness to take a lead in considering what measures may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty and practical options for firmly establishing the norm against nuclear testing in a manner consistent with international law and invite cooperation and engagement of other countries to that end.

15. As this year marks the 20th anniversary since the opening for signature of the CTBT and the 25th anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in Kazakhstan, we renew our resolve to extend the non-use record of nuclear weapons until they are eliminated, and renew our strong commitment to achieving the early entry into force of the CTBT.