Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation’s gratitude is again extended to panelists for their interesting and stimulating presentations. Before making discussion on the issue of transparency, for the record, allow me to briefly touch upon two issues raised by quite a few delegations.

The first point is states outside of the NPT. Since this Working Group is held under the GA, a reporting mechanism which includes States outside of the NPT may be worth exploration.

The second point is verification. As the “Progressive Approach” paper presented by Australia and joined by Japan stipulates, an internationally reliable verification regime with effective verification techniques and methods” needs to be established to achieve and maintain a world free of nuclear weapons. One of the important components of effective verification regime is “trust”, especially trust between NWS and NNWS, as lack of trust in verification leads to anxiety and suspicion, which induces cheating or re-start of arms race. Therefore, it is extremely important to start working on the reliable and effective
verification techniques and methods under the collaboration of both NWS and NNWS. The international Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), which has been referred to by a number of States so far, is quite significant. Japan has been active in this Partnership and is planning to host the next Plenary in Tokyo. My delegation also supports the suggestion by Australian colleague about the briefing on IPNDV in the next session of OEWG in May.

Now, let me turn to the issue of risk reduction. The necessity of the measures to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons is referred to as one of the 13 practical steps contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and as one of the important nuclear disarmament measures in the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

The NPDI has also attached importance to this issue and submitted a working paper on this issue to the Preparatory Committee in 2014. The Hiroshima Declaration issued at the NPDI Hiroshima Ministerial meeting in April 2014 described this issue as follows; “De-alerting nuclear forces is also important not only as a step towards a world free of nuclear weapons, but also to avoid and reduce the risk of catastrophic humanitarian consequences from any unauthorized or accidental launch of nuclear weapons.”
Further, the standard reporting form proposed by the NPDI which I alluded to in the morning session also includes the measures to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons as one of the items that should be reported regularly.

On the other hand, however, specific measures to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons may vary as each nuclear weapon state employs different formulation in their nuclear development and deployment. Therefore, instead of discussing these measures too much in detail here, it would be more realistic and productive if nuclear weapon States are to come up with concrete and specific measures that have already been taken and can be taken to reduce such risks.

Finally, Mr. Chair, this topic reminds me, once again, of importance of having the NWS in the deliberations of this Working Group.