Intervention of the Delegation of the I.R.IRAN

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Morning:

Transparency measures related to the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons:

Mr. Chairman,

While underlining, once again, that there is no absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons other than their total elimination, the Islamic Republic of Iran stresses that no measure can replace the total, irreversible and internationally verifiable elimination of all nuclear weapons. However, pending such a time, there is a strong need for taking all necessary measures to reduce the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons. However, in the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, measures to reduce such risks are not confined to “transparency measures” only. Therefore, the role and relevance of other measures in reducing the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons should not be underestimated.

In this context, Iran believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world can contribute to reducing the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons. However, they are not a substitute for the total elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide. They should be considered incomplete unless and until the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world. At the same time, the effectiveness of such zones can be promoted through granting, by all nuclear-weapon States, of full, effective, non-discriminatory, unconditional and irrevocable legally binding security assurances to all the parties to treaties establishing these zones against the threat or use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.

Moreover, the establishment of such zones in certain parts of the world, including in particular, the Middle East is of outmost importance. Taking into account the fact that the refusal of the Israeli to participate in the implementation of the resolutions and decisions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is the only obstacle for the realization of such a zone, the international community should continue to exert outmost pressure on this non-party to compel it to accede, without
any precondition or further delay, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as a non-nuclear-weapon party, and to place all of its nuclear facilities and activities under the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It should be recalled that, the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty was regrettably unable to adopt a final document due only to the refusal of Israel to accept the implementation of the 1995 resolution and the 2010 plan of action on the Middle East, as reflected in the unwillingness of certain nuclear-weapon States to support the adoption of such an outcome document.

Moreover, taking into account the serious security threat that the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons continues to pose to the very survival of humankind, and the fact that as long as such weapons exist, the risk of their possible use or threat of use persists, and thus, the total elimination is the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use, and taking into account the fact that current frameworks to provide security assurances are very limited, conditional and insufficient, there is a dire need, pending the realization of this objective and as an interim measure only, to grant to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to Non-Proliferation Treaty, effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.

Additionally, preventing terrorist groups from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear weapons is among the important measures that can contribute to reducing the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons.

Likewise, ceasing all efforts to upgrade existing nuclear weapons or to research on and develop new types of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and their means of delivery, as well as not to conduct nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and nuclear-weapon tests in alternative ways, including subcritical nuclear tests or computer simulated nuclear explosions and to close and dismantle any sites for nuclear-test explosions and their associated infrastructure, are among the measures that can contribute to reducing the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons.

Similarly, reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons, including through complete de-targeting and de-alerting, as well excluding the role of any type of nuclear weapons in the security strategies, concepts,
policies or doctrines of all nuclear-weapon States are among the measures that can reduce the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons.

As regards the specific transparency measures, Iran believes that taking, inter alia, the following measure by all nuclear-weapon States can also contribute to reducing the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons:

   a. To publish regular updates about the number, types, destructive power, status and place of their nuclear weapons, as well as the number and type of their delivery vehicles;

   b. To publish regular updates about the plans, expenditures and number of facilities related to the modernization of nuclear weapons, as well as the amount of their fissile material for military purposes;

   c. To release all information related to the measures they have taken aimed at reducing the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons; and

   d. To conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for enabling the Agency to verify the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations, including to prevent further diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to place under the Agency safeguards fissile materials transferred from military programmes.