1/ Approaches on how to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons

In order to move forward in nuclear disarmament and ultimately to eliminate the risk of catastrophic humanitarian consequences from the use of nuclear weapons, the international community should focus not on differences but on common ground by identifying concrete and practical "building blocks" for that shared goal.

While ultimate measures for achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons will need to be multilateral, effective disarmament will require mutually reinforcing "building blocks" that are multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral or unilateral.

Promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education including on humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons

The holding of regular meetings in various stings and formats to keep the topic under continuous review, with the aim of building up the support of the international community for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Immediate establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, with a negotiating mandate, within the Conference on Disarmament.

Establishment, as the highest priority and as soon as possible, of an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament.

Develop a clear time bound internationally verifiable road map for nuclear disarmament.

Based on a thorough and comprehensive assessment of all elements necessary to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons, develop and adopt a building blocks approach as an alternative to the step-by-step or the comprehensive () approaches. Such an approach must be legally binding with clearly defined benchmarks and timelines and backed by a strong verification system.

Clearly identify the elements (treaty negotiation, implementation and universalization) of the step-by-step approach.

Agree on an universal commitment and agreed multilateral framework for a global and non-discriminatory step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament and achieving and maintaining a nuclear weapon free world.

Campaign to create conditions for disarmament without linkages. Disarmament should be regarded as a process, not an unachievable end-state.
An intergovernmental forum, such as the OEWG, to hold substantive discussions and clarify all the aspects of the elements, which would be part of the road towards nuclear disarmament, such as definitions, fissile materials, stockpiles destruction, verification and confidence building, etc.

Convene a global nuclear summit at which all States should solemnly pledge to cooperate and work together on an agenda and timetable for nuclear disarmament.

Establish an expert group to address all policy and specific legal, technical and other aspects of nuclear disarmament, such as reducing nuclear arsenals, verification, transparency, etc.

Action Plan for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Non-Violent World order for attaining the goal of a nuclear disarmament in a time-bound, universal, non-discriminatory, phased and verifiable manner.

Establish a working group, to work on a draft legally binding instrument on providing unconditional security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis.

It is vital that a mechanism would be established to ensure that the elimination of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States and all measures relating to compliance with nuclear disarmament obligations are done in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner.

Convening a United Nations Summit on nuclear disarmament to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear weapons, at the earliest possible date, with the objective of an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction is a matter of urgency.

The building block approach appears to have the most potential to bridge the gaps between alternative approaches, provide a process for addressing the security needs of all States in the disarmament process, and take forward multilateral negotiations. The OEWG should recommend the further development of the building block approach by States – and make this one of the key tasks for the OEWG should its mandate be renewed. This would include identifying and exploring the full range of building blocks that will be required drawing on the elements outlined in the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention.

The building blocks approach includes measures that could be developed, adopted and implemented in the near term, and other measures that will require prior steps, conditions and/or the engagement of nuclear weapon States. The OEWG should recommend that States commence work on developing, adopting and implementing the building blocks already identified, while simultaneously exploring other building blocks that will be required.

The OEWG should recommend the development of a road map to nuclear disarmament. This would include discussion of the relationship and sequencing of the building blocks required for a nuclear-weapons-free world.
The OEWG should recommend to governments that they elevate the political attention devoted to disarmament and to the OEWG. This includes making nuclear disarmament a core issue for heads of government and foreign ministers. Governments should also consider dedicating a ministerial position and/or government department to disarmament.

The OEWG should recommend that the UN General Assembly renew its mandate for a subsequent year, meeting for up to five weeks during the year, and tasked to continue work on proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, with a work mandate to include further exploration and development of building blocks for a nuclear weapons free world, and preparation of a roadmap to achieve a nuclear weapons free world.

The OEWG should recommend the establishment by the United Nations General Assembly of a UN Decade for Disarmament Education.

Complete elimination of nuclear weapons

Prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

Prohibition of the possession, stockpiling, development or transfer of nuclear weapons.

Prohibition of the production of or the use of already existing fissile material for nuclear weapons and placing all such fissile material under international safeguards.

Prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests in all their forms, including both supercritical and subcritical tests.

Open-ended Working Group on nuclear disarmament should recommend to the General Assembly that its mandate be extended through 2014 in order to further develop a concrete work plan for nuclear disarmament

2/ Elements to consider in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons

Pending negotiation and entry into force of such a treaty (FMCT), maintenance or declaration by all states possessing nuclear weapons of moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes

Designating fissile material no longer required for military purposes and the development of legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of the IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of such fissile material

Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, maintenance or declaration by all states possessing nuclear weapons of moratoriums on nuclear weapons tests, as well as restraint from the use of
new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty.

A return to substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament, including on its other nuclear-related core issues, notably dealing with nuclear disarmament and substantive discussion, without limitation, of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument increasing the transparency of nuclear arsenals and fissile material in stockpiles.

Adoption of measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear-weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear-weapon research and development.

Application of the principles of transparency and irreversibility by the nuclear-weapon States in all measures relating to compliance with nuclear disarmament obligations.

Initiation of negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, including the negotiation of a convention on nuclear weapons that prohibits the development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that stipulates their destruction within a given period.

Commence immediate negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, comprehensive and internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT).

Examine how existing transparency and verification institutions and mechanisms at our disposal could be used for confidence building and nuclear disarmament.

Agree on a building blocks approach that could include, in parallel, elements, such as:

- negotiation of FMCT;
- CTBT entry into force; achieving the universality of the CTBT;
- achieving the universality of the NPT;
- strengthening the NWFZs and establishing new NWFZs;
- transparency;
- legally binding instrument on NSA;
- identifying baseline data for verification,
- reviewing the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines,
- strengthening IAEA
- Negotiating a Nuclear Weapon Convention(s) which may be a set of treaties on stockpiles destruction, verification, etc.
Continuing work on developing verification schemes, including technical know-how for nuclear disarmament, in order to guarantee that nuclear materials and technology are used for peaceful purposes.

Dismantling or converting for peaceful uses facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

Establishment of a mechanism for verifying the elimination of nuclear weapon

Reinstitution of traditional verification functions, development of new verification tools and procedures, and restoration of the principle of non-exceptionalism.

Immediate resumption of substantive work at the CD

Any reduction of nuclear weapons, whether strategic or non-strategic, should be conducted in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner.

There should be regular reporting by standard forms of the disarmament measures by the nuclear weapon states

Further efforts to be made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally

Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the Treaty and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress in nuclear disarmament.

Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems

The engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. These required measures by the international community could be considered as a basis for the 2015 Review Conference for further elaboration

The elimination of an entire category of weapons requires, on the one hand, the complete destruction of all existing stockpiles of such weapons and, on the other, a comprehensive set of prohibitions banning the development, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, retention, testing, use and/or transfer of such weapons under any circumstances and at any time in the future.

All related implementing activities would need to be transparent, verifiable and irreversible.

A clear, legally binding and multilateral commitment, on the part of all States, to the goal of nuclear disarmament, with clearly defined benchmarks and timelines.

Provision of a clear baseline to measure progress of nuclear disarmament, including a complete inventory of nuclear stockpiles, nuclear warheads, delivery systems, and fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and dealing with already existing stocks of such material.

Treaty banning nuclear weapons as a constructive and effective path towards the elimination of nuclear weapons and maintenance of a nuclear weapons free world.

3/ Review of the role of nuclear weapons in the security context of the XXI century

Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines and the further reducing the risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons

Reducing the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons

Reducing the number of non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons

Uninterrupted progress in reducing all types of global nuclear-weapon stockpiles

Adoption of measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear-weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear-weapon research and development

Immediate and permanent cessation of nuclear-weapon testing of any kind, including that carried out by supercomputers and subcritical testing, and the closure of all nuclear-weapon test sites

Elimination of the role of nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines

Gradual reduction of the operational status of nuclear-weapon systems until they have been totally eliminated

Adoption of measures to reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons

Reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines

Devise new strategic concepts recognizing that nuclear deterrence is not a viable security doctrine. New security paradigms can holistically address three nuclear dangers-existing arsenals, non-proliferation and the risk of nuclear terrorism - and shift commitments and security arrangements toward nuclear disarmament

Re-conceptualization of the nuclear disarmament debate: increasing focus on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament instead of the traditional security aspect

Delegitimating and devaluing nuclear weapons as a significant first partial norm-setting step by NNWS

Address nuclear weapons in their totality with nuclear warheads being the units of account
Disaggregation of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons

Adoption of measures by nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear danger, including the risks of accidental nuclear war, de-alerting of nuclear-weapons to prevent unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons

Gradual reduction of nuclear arsenals to lowest possible level on the basis of an agreed timetable

Given that there are no formal historical proofs that nuclear deterrence has prevented an armed conflict, change perception of nuclear weapons and review the deterrence role of nuclear weapons in the military doctrines of the nuclear weapon possessing States

Promoting plurilateral or multilateral nuclear reduction negotiations with prior commitment to freezing the number of deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons

The nuclear disarmament should be aimed at achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a framework of time and should not be limited to the bilateral and unilateral reductions in the nuclear warhead

The nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing, or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities

A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies so as to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination:

The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

Promoting plurilateral or multilateral nuclear reduction negotiations with prior commitment to freezing the number of deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons.

Time-bound, progressive and irreversible reduction of nuclear arsenals, including the irreversible removal of nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of NNWS, accompanied by an international verification regime and the placement of all nuclear facilities under such a regime.

Measures to enhance the security of nuclear weapons and to reduce the operational readiness of nuclear-weapons systems, including through the development of legal instruments and other measures, to minimize the possibility of nuclear detonations, whether intentional, accidental or as a result of miscalculation.

Enhancing the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones by removing the conditionality and reservations that have been imposed by NWS and broadening their reach by establishing new zones where they do not already exist, particularly in the Middle East.
4/ The role of International Law for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons

Negotiating a verifiable and non-discriminatory treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, which deals with all relevant questions for the achievement of its purpose.

Continued commitment by all states possessing nuclear weapons to fully respect their commitments with regard to security assurances or to extend such assurances if they have not yet done so.

Supporting and strengthening the IAEA safeguards system, including universal adherence to comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols.


Strengthening nuclear-weapon-free zones and creating new nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in pursuit of NPT universalization.

Creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Urgent adoption of a treaty that provides universal, unconditional and legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

Adoption of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty that bans the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and also covers issues of stockpiles, as a step towards the achievement of the main objective of nuclear disarmament.

Initiation of a legal debate on nuclear disarmament in the IHL context.

Include the threat of the use of nuclear weapons as a core international crime that can be investigated and prosecuted by the ICC along with genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.

Negotiation of a legally-binding instrument committing all States to a world without nuclear weapons and containing elements that need to be covered.

Negotiation of a global agreement among nuclear weapon States on 'no-first-use' of nuclear-weapons.

Negotiation of a universal and legally-binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States.
Negotiation of a Convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified timeframe

Entry into force of the CTBT

The nuclear-weapon States should comply firmly with their obligations under article I by refraining from nuclear-sharing, under any pretext, including security arrangements or military alliance.

Creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones will contribute to the goal of nuclear weapon free world if creation of such zones would spread over all areas in the world without exception, especially in the Europe and Middle East.

For the establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East, the double standard and selective policies must be abandoned and instead of unilateral support from the only non-party of the NPT in the Middle East as the sole obstacle in the way of creation of such a zone in the region the international pressure must be augmented for its accession to the NPT and putting all its nuclear programs under the comprehensive safeguard system of the IAEA.

The universalization of the NPT

Providing legally binding negative security assurances whereby nuclear weapon States assure non-nuclear weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons in national and alliance strategies/policies/postures.

A single treaty approach, e.g. a comprehensive arrangement. For example, both a nuclear weapons convention and a ban treaty have been suggested by some States and/or civil society representatives.

A number of free-standing instruments or treaties built around the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), each dealing with specific aspects of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

A framework convention with protocols, for example as in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which would cover in a systematic and mutually reinforcing manner multiple aspects of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

5/ The role of different actors in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations

Non-nuclear weapon states could make an active contribution by focusing on addressing nuclear weapons as a humanitarian and human security issue.
Non-nuclear weapon states could make an active contribution by focusing on challenging the patterns of attaching value and special status to nuclear weapons.

Non-nuclear weapon states could make an active contribution by focusing on building partnerships with civil society actors.

Non-nuclear weapon states could make an active contribution by focusing on education of the public and of future generations.

Non-nuclear weapon states could make an active contribution by focusing on ensuring that proliferation of nuclear weapons does not take place.

Non-nuclear weapon states could make an active contribution by focusing on addressing the urgency of nuclear disarmament and the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons.

Non-nuclear weapon states could make an active contribution by focusing on exploring the further potential of NWFZ for the promotion of a nuclear weapon free world.

Cessation by the nuclear-weapon States of the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and related infrastructure.

Unequivocal commitment of all nuclear-weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Integration of parliamentarians in national delegations.

Establish an expert group to address all policy and specific legal, technical and other aspects of nuclear disarmament, such as reducing nuclear arsenals, verification, transparency, etc.

Countries which support multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament should pursue this objective in the Conference on Disarmament which brings together all the relevant countries and avoid setting up alternative forums or processes parallel to the CD.

Engage NWPS outside current nuclear disarmament and arms control arrangements in the conceptualization and formulation of nuclear disarmament initiatives - this OEWG could be a good beginning.

Engage NWPS outside current nuclear disarmament and arms control arrangements in the conceptualization and formulation of nuclear disarmament initiatives such as this OEWG.

The OEWG should highlight the positive role of civil society in the OEWG and recommend that participation be granted for civil society participation in the same way in other multilateral disarmament forums including in the UN General Assembly. The OEWG should also highlight the importance of engaging youth and propose special attention to this be given by the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs including through the establishment of a youth disarmament forum.
Others

Implementation of the action plan on nuclear disarmament, as agreed at the 2010 Review Conference

Effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which establishes the commitment to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control

Implementation of practical measures that impede the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems

Develop nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education programmes

Given that nuclear disarmament should not be held hostage to non-proliferation objectives, pursue unconditional nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation on parallel tracks

A clear time frame for the full implementation of article VI, namely 2025, as proposed by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries should be set

Monitoring and reporting on the full implementation of undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference

That undertaking should be demonstrated without further delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to achieve systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world

Monitoring and reporting on the full implementation of action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted in 2010 [NPT 2010 Review Conference]

The nuclear-weapon States must fulfil their obligations under the Treaty [NPT?] and their unequivocal commitments undertaken at the successive Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty and refrain from:

- any kind of development of and research on nuclear weapons;
- any threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty;
- any modernization of nuclear weapons and their facilities;
- the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of other countries; and
- maintaining their nuclear weapons in the trigger-alert situation.

Considering a decision on the prohibition of the development, the modernization and the production of any new nuclear weapons, particularly mini-nuclear weapons, as well as a ban on the construction of any new facility for the development, deployment and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery at home and in foreign countries is an urgent task for the realization of nuclear disarmament
Immediate realization of a world free from nuclear arsenals through the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty

In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, there is an urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. [Cessation and Prevention of Arm Race in Outer Space]

The OEWG should recommend that governments dedicate additional resources to nuclear disarmament, including to undertake tasks involved in the development, adoption and implementation of building blocks for a nuclear-weapons-free world. Those countries currently dedicating resources to nuclear weapons should, in particular, shift some of those resources towards nuclear disarmament tasks.