It’s no secret that the international arms trade is a full of secrets. Stories of corrupt brokers, forged documents, erratic supply chains, hidden cargo, and cash pay-offs are not just the stuff that films are made of—it’s the unfortunate reality of how many aspects of the arms trade operates. Bringing the arms trade “out of the shadows” was one of the motivating factors behind the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), in the hope that improved control of legal markets would prevent diversion to illicit ones.

The tool built into the ATT to achieve this objective is its reporting requirement. The original idea was that in lieu of a verification mechanism, regular and mandatory reporting would increase transparency, build trust, facilitate information sharing, and all of those important things. As the representative of Japan stated today, a good reporting system can build confidence amongst states, and thus help them to decrease military spending, freeing up resources for socioeconomic development. All of this makes sense—but it only works if all states parties submit reports, do so publicly, and establish a way to utilise the information they provide.

During today’s session on transparency and reporting we heard that reporting rates for both initial and annual reports are largely disappointing. For example, only five of the 19 states meant to submit an initial report...
in the last reporting period did so. By the end of the second reporting period in May 2017, a total of 75 annual reports should have been submitted, but as of early June, only 31 had. Some are partially complete or ambiguous; not all use the format.

In some cases this is purely a matter of capacity, which is being addressed through initiatives like the ATT Baseline Assessment Project and various proposed initiatives of the working group on transparency and reporting. The suggested online reporting option could also assist in this.

A more strategic way to increase and maintain reporting rates over time, however, is to provide an incentive for completing them. No one wants to report for reporting’s sake alone—and it becomes futile if the information contained in the reports is not being utilised, whether for monitoring, or assisting through sharing of experience. Today, Argentina suggested cross-referencing and assessing reports submitted by other states to see if they contain any contradictory information. Switzerland likewise suggested cross-country comparisons of reports, including via a database. Mexico urged establishing a mechanism to assess national reports in order to draw a roadmap for future activities. These are proactive suggestions that could become a foundation for the type of information sharing and cooperation needed to ensure that states parties are complying with the Treaty and providing accurate information, and also to prevent diversion. Most of the measures to prevent diversion that states parties “shall” take under Article 11 refer to information sharing and transparency activities. This clearly a priority for both states and many others in their region, as was made evident today.

Public accessibility to reports and related resources strengthen the ATT and the way in which it is regarded. The possibility that the yet-to-be established database of national ATT focal points will be restricted to states parties is not only bizarre, but damaging to the Treaty’s credibility and success. In addition, it’s concerning that there seem to be more states making reports private. Liberia, Panama, and Senegal have done so with their annual reports. Burkina Faso, Cyprus, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo did the same with their initial reports. When challenged by civil society, vague responses fell short. In one case, the state party—Senegal—later clarified that the report is public, but only to other states parties and possibly signatories. Sweden, which has withheld some information in its report, attempted to justify this by explaining it is acceptable to do so on the basis of “military secrecy” because the majority of that report is public.

Publicly accessible reporting cannot be a half measure. Transparency only builds confidence when everyone participates equally and fully. It has been said that a lack of transparency results in distrust and a deep sense of insecurity—a very dangerous combination for such a young treaty—not to mention for the arms trade at large, which is already accounting for so much death and destruction around the world.

The Permanent Missions of Sweden and Ireland, and Control Arms invite you to a side event on:

**Gender Based Violence and the ATT**

**Thursday, 14 September 2017**

13.15 – 14.45

Room 6, CICG

This side event will explore practical guidance for ATT States Parties on key elements of an assessment for risks relating to serious acts of GBV, and explore elements such as: what GBV obligations does the ATT place on States Parties; what information should licensing officials gather and review in order to inform their transfer decisions; and what are the key elements necessary for a practical and straightforward framework of indicators that directly relate to the risk that weapons could be used to commit or facilitate acts of gender-based violence and acts of violence against women and children?

The event will be chaired by Ms. Cynthia Ebbs – Senior Policy Adviser, Control Arms.

Panelists include:

- H.E. Ambassador Paul Beijer, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN in Geneva.
- H.E. Ambassador Michael Gaffey, Permanent Mission of Ireland to the UN in Geneva
- Ms. Sarah Boukhary, Programme Associate, Crisis Response, WILPF

Sandwiches will be provided

Third Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty

Geneva, Switzerland – 11-15 September 2017
The news in brief is not a comprehensive report on all statements but provides brief highlights on a range of themes and positions.

Transparency and reporting

Report by ATT Secretariat

Mr. Dumisani Dladla, Head of the ATT Secretariat, gave a statistical overview of compliance with initial and annual reporting requirements. For initial reports, of 92 states parties, 85 are due to submit initial report; of these, only 61 have done so (72%). 24 states parties have not yet done so (25%). Of those that have submitted initial reports, 51 (84%) used the reporting template. 7 others have used baseline assessment project template and three have used other formats. For annual reports, 64% of those due to submit a report in 2016 have done so, while 27% have not. Three reports have not been made public in 2016.

The working group on transparency and reporting (WGTR) co-chairs, Guillaume Michel of Mexico and Paul Beijer of Sweden, gave a report on the work of the WG. Mr. Michel said the WGTR had three meetings in 2016, from which the co-chairs produced a factual summary. They also agreed to submit to CSP3 for consideration: an annex with the WGTR’s proposed work plan for September 2017–August 2018; an annex containing the WG’s recommendations; a revised paper on compliance; and a draft working paper on reporting on actual imports and exports of weapons covered by the ATT. The WGTR also considered developing a more structured means of exchanging information on Treaty related issues; a Swedish proposal on national level measures from CSP2; a Belgian proposal on draft guidance for reporting on imports and exports; and a Mexican paper on guidance for preventing diversion of arms to illicit market.

Ambassador Beijer outlined the WGTR’s recommendations to CSP3:
1. That the topic of compliance with mandatory reporting obligations be added to agenda of CSPs;
2. That the WGTR be tasked to propose items for discussion between CSP4 and CSP5;
3. That the CSP3 recommend the document “national level measures to facilitate compliance with reporting commitments” to states parties for consideration;
4. That the WGTR be adopted as a standing working group with the same terms of reference as the other WGs;
5. That CSP3 make available for reference the comprehensive Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) guide for the ATT annual report, which was put together by Belgium and reviewed by rest of WGTR;
6. That the ATT Secretariat put together consolidated list or database of general points of contact mandated under the Treaty, with a view that they could be made use of to exchange information on the issue of diversion; and
7. That there is better communication to the points of contact about their roles.

Another recommendation not in the WG report is that the reporting templates should be left stable for now, noting that states parties need the chance to get used to them and provide their views on how they could be improved.

Ambassador Beijer also reported on topics not covered this year, which could be tasked to WG next year, including:
1. Continuing to exchange lessons learned at national level on reporting, which could be transmitted to the WG on implementation;
2. Facilitating information exchange through organisational means;
3. Developing online templates;
4. Harnessing information for the WG on implementation regarding how states tackle particular questions; and
5. Preparing recommendations for the next CSP cycle.

Following these reports, conference participants delivered statements on the topic of reporting and transparency, including:

Reporting obligations and templates
- EU, Germany, ICRC, Japan, Peru, and Switzerland called on all states parties to fulfill their mandatory reporting obligations.
- Bulgaria and France said they make their reports public.
- ICRC encouraged comprehensive public reporting to help create awareness of decision-making processes and relevant institutions.
- Control Arms encouraged all states parties to report in full and in public, noting that secrecy can convey the impression states are hiding something.
- Peru expressed regret that the reporting templates don’t include information for reporting on actions related to articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty or on elements that could be included in assessments of violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.
- Spain encouraged all states to use the reporting templates.
- Brazil emphasised the voluntary nature of using the reporting templates.
- UK argued that reporting is a tool to help reduce illicit arms flows, not about filling out forms. It warned that reporting should not be used in such
News in brief, continued

a way as to deter states from moving towards greater transparency, suggesting that that the Treaty community is “too new” for these conversations about transparency to happen in plenary meetings where criticism would undermine our objectives.

• France warned against making reporting obligations too cumbersome.

Reporting benefits and links

• Bulgaria, EU, France, ICRC, Mexico, and Panama highlighted links between reporting and effective Treaty implementation.

• EU, ICRC, Japan, Netherlands, Panama, and Switzerland highlighted links between reporting and building confidence and trust.

• Control Arms said transparency is an antidote to corruption, a tool to tackle diversion and to expose treaty violations.

• Japan suggested that reporting and could lead to decreased military budgets and increased budgets for socioeconomic projects instead.

Utilising reports

• Mexico suggested creating conditions to assess the data from national reports, to help draw up a road map for future activities.

• Switzerland urged cross-country comparisons of reports, including via a database.

• Argentina noted it is important to cross-reference and assess the reports submitted by other states to see if there is any contradictory information.

Working group (WG) recommendations

• Norway suggested the outcomes from the WGs on implementation and on reporting should feed directly into work on outreach and universalisation.

• Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mauritius, Netherlands, Nigeria, and Switzerland supported all WGTR recommendations.

• Costa Rica and Switzerland in particular supported adding compliance with reporting obligations to the CSP agenda.

• South Africa supported making the WGTR into a standing group.

• Bulgaria, EU, France, Germany, Netherlands, Nigeria, and Spain welcomed Belgium’s written guidance for the reporting template. South Africa supported on the basis it is a non-binding document.

• Belgium called on CSP3 to endorse the FAQ document as an informative and open-ended document under permanent review, and for Secretariat to make it publicly available.

• Spain suggested translating this document into Spanish.

• Bulgaria, EU, Germany, and Netherlands welcomed Sweden’s paper on national level measures to facilitate compliance with reporting requirements. South Africa supported on the basis this is a non-binding document.

• Argentina, Panama, South Africa, and Spain supported Mexico and Japan’s suggestion of creating a database for national points of contact for Treaty implementation.

• South Africa noted that such a database is already part of the Secretariat’s mandate.

• Panama also suggested the development of a platform to trace arms transfers and help identify criminal networks.

• Control Arms supported developing a point of contact database but expressed concern that it would be limited states parties, arguing that restricting access to the database would not be consistent with Treaty’s declared commitment to transparency.

• Costa Rica, Bulgaria, and Germany supported Mexico’s suggestion of utilising the national point of contacts for exchange of information on diversion.

• Mexico explained that its initiative on a diversion information exchange is based on the need for transparency, shared responsibility, and efficiency, in order to help states put in place mitigation measures.

• Argentina said it included information on diversion in its reports and that it is happy to share its template for others to adapt.

• EU and Germany supported the development of online reporting templates.

• Netherlands and Norway supported inviting experts from capital to participate in WG meetings.

• Netherlands and Spain supported having translation for WG meetings.

Other

• Peru requested the ATT Secretariat to keep in tight collaboration with OHCHR to create synergies, in particular with regard to the report on the “impact of arms transfers on the enjoyment of human rights”.

Universality

Mr. Dumisani Dladla, Head of the ATT Secretariat, provided an overview of Treaty universalisation. Amongst other statistics, he provided information on ratification by region—the highest numbers of states parties remain in Europe, the lowest in Asia and Oceania. He also outlined the proportion of the arms trade for which ATT states parties and signatories account. 28 states parties are among the top 50 arms exporters (56%). Eight of the top 50 are signatories (16%). This means that states parties account for 30% of global exports and signatories account for 39%.
**News in brief, continued**

Ambassador Emmanuel E. Imohe of Nigeria, co-chair of the working group on treaty universalisation (WGTU), prevented the WG’s report to CSP3. It had met twice during 2016. It recommends that CSP3 reestablish the WGTU in 2017 and endorse the initial work plan for 2017, which includes: reviewing membership status; and engaging in outreach activities on international, regional, and national levels, as contained in its working paper.

Ambassador Ambassador Klaus Korhonen of Finland, President of CSP3 and the other co-chair of the WGTU, gave a report back about the outreach visits the co-chairs undertook to promote universalisation of the Treaty throughout 2016.

Following these reports, conference participants delivered statements on the topic of universality, including:

- Australia, Bulgaria, and EU welcomed new states parties since CSP2.
- EU, France, and South Africa called on all states to ratify or accede to the Treaty.
- Argentina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, EU, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, ROK, and Switzerland urged all states parties to engage in outreach for universality and/or highlighted their outreach activities.
- UK asked if universality efforts should set a target for membership levels or if they should focus on specific countries or regions.
- Netherlands emphasised the importance of outreach in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Argentina suggested focusing on countries with many conventional weapons or in regions with the least ratification rates.
- Sierra Leone suggested that in view of the vast disparities of ratification between and within regions, regional organisations need to be utilised to promote universality, as do parliaments and civil society.
- Brazil and Haiti highlighted the links between the ATT and socioeconomic development, and/or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Haiti suggested a compilation of indicators to demonstrate value of the ATT, including in fostering support for the SDGs.
- Brazil highlighted the negative impacts of small arms in cities, arguing that ATT can contribute to close the circle of illicit arms trade.
- Haiti said the ATT is significant step forward for better arms control, which is a key element to reduce human suffering.
- Chad sees the ATT as an integral part of humanitarian disarmament efforts.

**Working group (WGTU)**

- Paraguay and South Africa supported establishment of standing WGTU.
- South Africa suggested that WGTU meetings should include experts from capital and documents should be translated.

**Other**

- Australia welcomed Japan’s candidacy for the next CSP president.
- Sweden supported the “troika proposal” for CSP presidents to ensure continuity of efforts.

**General debate**

**Links between the ATT and other issues**

- Brazil and Haiti highlighted the links between the ATT, socioeconomic development, and/or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Haiti suggested a compilation of indicators to demonstrate value of the ATT, including in fostering support for the SDGs.
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**Transparency and reporting**

- Brazil hoped new versions of reporting template can be agreed by CSP3, because national control
News in brief, continued

systems cannot necessarily deal with all possible variations at this stage.

Universalisation
• Brazil said universalisation should be a priority, noting that all major exporters must join the Treaty to avoid loopholes.
• Haiti appealed for universalisation.
• Brazil, Haiti, and Malaysia said they are undertaking efforts to ratify the Treaty.
• Malaysia said while waiting ratification it will abide by the Treaty.
• Angola said its parliament has approved accession to the Treaty and is now waiting promulgation by the president.
• Kazakhstan said it has submitted the Treaty to the lower chamber of parliament for consideration and hopes to participate in CSP4 as a state party.

Implementation
• Malaysia said the CSPs have shown all states are keen to see the treaty develop and evolve; as the process moves forward, it hopes that common understandings and interpretations will lead to more effective implementation and cooperation and assistance to implement the Treaty in a consistent, objective, nondiscriminatory manner.
• Control Arms reminded delegates they have the responsibility and the power to stop arms transfers causing human suffering.
• Control Arms also argued that ratification without implementation is just another law on the books; worse, it can provide cover without accountability.

National control systems
• China, not a state party, said its arms export activities adhere strictly to three principles: that the weapons are for legitimate self-defence; will not undermine regional or global peace and stability; and should not be used as means of interfering in internal affairs of other countries.
• Wassenaar Arrangement said its collectively agreed munitions list, which is updated annually by experts, may help countries to develop and maintain a national control list as required by the ATT.

Cooperation and assistance
• Angola said there is need for greater exchange of information and technical assistance with those countries facing challenges in implementation.
• Wassenaar Arrangement said it has a compendium of best practices for export controls that states could use to establish and maintain their own systems.

Sponsorship programme
• Haiti welcomed the sponsorship programme, which made it possible for it to participate in CSP3.

Other
• China said ending arms transfers to non-state actors should be an urgent priority.
• UNMAS noted that stockpile management is important to prevent diversion in accordance with articles 11 and 16.
• Wassenaar Arrangement said it wants to explore complementarities with the ATT.
• ECOWAS said it has amended the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons to account for ATT.
• The Civil Society Youth Delegation said it time to “disarm indifference,” calling on states parties to act to fulfill their obligations.

Image part of the Art the Arms Fair in protest of DSEI arms fair © Serann
As has been highlighted on numerous occasions throughout the week by non-governmental organisations, the war in Yemen is an extremely worrying example of how arms transfers—despite the ATT—continue to flow from states parties and signatories to parties involved in the conflict. This has also been a key concern for the Dutch peace organisation PAX, which launched a new report called Under the radar—the United Arab Emirates, arms transfers and regional conflict.

Arms transfers to Saudi Arabia have received significant attention and condemnation in light of their use in Yemen—with very good reason. Yet similar transfers to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have taken place largely unquestioned. Part of the reason is that the “Saudi-led coalition” has been very secretive about operations carried out by individual coalition members, including the Emirates.

While largely unknown to the general public as a major regional actor, the UAE over the past 15 years has developed an assertive, or even aggressive, foreign policy to advance its economic and foreign policy interests in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. It has shifted its stance from traditional neutrality to power projection. Since the Arab Spring in 2011, the UAE has intervened militarily in Bahrain, Libya, Syria, and, most recently, Yemen.

The impressive build-up of the UAE’s military forces has been essential to its changed posture. The UAE has recently become the world’s third largest importer of arms. Indeed, it is the fifth largest arms importer over the last 20 years. Considering the Gulf state’s small size, these statistics are significant.

The United States is by far the largest supplier of weapon systems to the UAE, with around two-thirds of the UAE’s arsenal supplied by US companies. In recent years, 19 per cent of all US arms exports went to the UAE. The United States has supplied much of the UAE’s air force equipment, including vast quantities of bombs and missiles. That supply has continued since the UAE’s involvement in the war in Yemen. The second largest supplier of arms to the UAE is France; fighter aircraft and warships dominate the list of purchases. Russia, Italy, and Sweden are other important sources of military assets.

The UAE is deeply involved in the war in Yemen, conducting land, air, and naval operations. Emirati plans earlier this year to invade the key Yemeni port town of Hodeidah were deeply worrying, though they were called off under international pressure. Still the naval blockade, in which the UAE plays a key role, continues to contribute to the suffering of the people of Yemen.

Yet it is business as usual for most states supplying arms to the UAE. This is deeply worrying. The risk that weapons will be used to violate international human rights or the law of war, or that they will be diverted to embargoed destinations, is considerable and should be more than sufficient reason to stop arms supplies to the country. As long as countries continue to export arms to the UAE, they also bear responsibility for the continuation of the conflict in Yemen and the suffering of the people there.

The report is available in hard copy (mail to: slijper@paxforpeace.nl) and can be downloaded online at https://www.paxforpeace.nl/publications/all-publications/under-the-radar.
A sudden onset of severe diarrhea is usually the first symptom. Rapid fluid loss often leads to life-threatening dehydration. If left untreated, certain strains can cause death within hours of becoming ill. Those who survive initial symptoms must endure repeated vomiting, low blood pressure, dry mouth and skin, extreme thirst, and incapacitating nausea.

Cholera has an ugly face. And more than half a million Yemenis are afflicted.

While it has been virtually eradicated in developed countries, Yemen is currently experiencing the largest epidemic of this disease in the world. Malnutrition, failing sanitation systems, and the collapse of critical infrastructure have exacerbated the crisis.

So what does a cholera outbreak in Yemen have to do with effective implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty? Everything.

The earliest cases were reported in Sana’a, where airstrikes by a Saudi-led military coalition destroyed the capital city’s sewer system. The International Committee of the Red Cross, the World Health Organisation, and the United Nations have pointed to the Saudi bombing campaign as the primary cause behind the outbreak, which is widely considered to have been entirely preventable.

Dire as the situation is, it is but the latest manifestation of the catastrophic humanitarian crisis inflicted upon Yemen. A UN panel has denounced the “widespread and systematic targeting of civilian targets.” Yet the crisis continues to unfold amidst the disconcerting and shameful timidity of the international community. In real time. On social media and in The New York Times print edition. In 2017.

However complex the regional security dynamics, the key factor that has enabled and sustained this crisis is remarkably straightforward: the unscrupulous and irresponsible transfer of weapons to Saudi Arabia despite the clear and present risk that they may be misused.

Remarkably, one won’t hear other ATT states parties drawing attention to such instances of flagrant non-compliance—not even during sessions specifically devoted to discussions on effective Treaty implementation. At the same time as the last Preparatory Committee for the Third ATT Conference of States Parties, the United States—an ATT signatory—announced an arms deal in excess of $100-billion USD with Saudi Arabia. Not a single state present raised the issue. Had it not been for civil society representatives, one of the largest arms deals in history with a known human-rights violator would have gone without a single mention in the context of a Treaty specifically designed to curb such irresponsible behavior. The attention given to procedural matters related to implementation—important as they are—has come to the detriment of substantive discussions related to effective treaty compliance, which must be a central dimension of the implementation debate.

The United States is not the only culprit. Other states—including states parties such as France and the United Kingdom, as well as others who will soon join the Treaty, such as Canada—continue to authorise weapons transfers to the Saudi regime, regardless of the numerous red flags.

Peculiarly, the states that are engaged in irresponsible arms transfers tend to be among those speaking most loudly—and eloquently—about the importance of full compliance with the very Treaty they are violating. For a growing number of observers, in and out of government, such rhetoric rings increasingly hollow and detached from reality.

The credibility of the still-recent ATT is being eroded. Irresponsible arms transfers to countries like Saudi Arabia exacerbate armed conflict, enable the violation of human rights, and sustain repressive regimes. They create conditions where innocent civilians die, every single day—whether from an airstrike directly or from cholera, famine, or other consequences of the bombardment. They validate the skepticism of those who feel that the most questionable arms transfers will continue unabated regardless of the adoption of the ATT.

While there are other challenges facing the Treaty, there is no more egregious violation of its spirit, objectives, and specific provisions today than arms transfers to Saudi Arabia. If such instances of non-compliance are not addressed at ATT meetings, it is hard to see where they might be.

States parties to the ATT must call out and scrutinise treaty violations—and ATT conferences are the obvious, natural forum to do so. In the meantime, civil society will continue to address any and all elephants in the ATT room. No matter the pushback.
SIDE EVENT: ACHIEVING ATT UNIVERSALISATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
Katrin Geyer | Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)

On Wednesday, Control Arms, SIPRI, and Sweden organised the side event “Achieving ATT universalisation and effective implementation: the role of outreach and assistance activities”. The panel emphasised the need for increased and holistic involvement of civil society actors, industry experts, and control arms experts if the ATT’s implementation is to be effective.

Anni Matundu Mmambi, Director of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)’s Section in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), participated in a training on the ATT offered by Control Arms and Pace University in Nairobi in 2016. Whilst she stated that thanks to the training, she has strengthened her “ability to engage in technical discussions around Treaty obligations,” she also highlighted the lack of resources for civil society to further strengthen non-governmental actors’ ability to assist government officials and parliamentarians and to train other civil society members to ensure the DRC’s ratification.

Mr. Below, a representative from the Export Control Division of the German Federal Office, agreed that universalisation can only be ensured if Germany’s funding and workshops also will also extend to non-signatory states, whose civil society requires support to pressure their governments to ratify.
ATT Side-event

Mansplaining Gender and Disarmament

Thursday, 14 September 2017, 13:00 -15:00
CICG, Room 3

Is gender really a serious issue in disarmament? Do gender issues really have a place in debating weapons use and determining international security policy? Our highly-qualified mansplainer will answer these questions definitively, based on an inflated ego and essentially zero knowledge. Fortunately, our panel of genuine gender and security specialists will bring in their expert knowledge and tactfully set the mansplainer straight. Join us for this unique discussion of women’s representation in disarmament forums, the link between masculinity and militarism, and the differential impact of weapons proliferation and use on women. It will also be an opportunity to reflect on what we can do concretely to integrate a gender perspective into our daily disarmament work.

Featuring:

- Mr. Rory Logan, Advisor Strategic Management, GICHD as ‘The Mansplainer’
- Ms. Ray Acheson, Director, Reaching Critical Will
- Mr. Callum Watson, Project Officer Gender and Security, DCAF
- Ms. Marion Provencher, Junior Programme Officer, GMAP

A sandwich lunch will be served outside the room