On Tuesday, Amnesty International criticised “irresponsible arms transfers” authorised to the Philippines, which, as it said in its statement delivered on behalf of the Control Arms Coalition, “has seen deliberate and widespread killings of alleged drug offenders that appear to be systematic, planned and organised by the authorities.”

On Thursday, the Philippines’ representative to the conference issued a right of reply to the Amnesty statement, saying that such information is false and deriding the civil society group for “politicising” the conference.

Amnesty’s comment is based on its credible, independent research. Such research—by Amnesty, Human Right Watch, the United Nations, and investigative journalists—as well as first-hand accounts from international organisations operating in countries around the world as well as local, grassroots groups, are indispensable sources of information for the global community to understand the reality in any given country or situation. We rely on this information—gathered and disseminated by human beings who in many cases are risking their lives to get information out to the world—to understand what is happening in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, South Sudan, Ukraine, Burma, and countless other places currently experiencing conflict or violence.

But while Amnesty’s comment is based on the objective of bringing reality to light, in order to foster discussion, the Philippines’ comment seems oriented towards obscuring or denying this reality, and to shutting down discussion. While the Philippines later in the day welcomed Amnesty’s offer of dialogue, it did so while reiterating its warning that such discussion is not appropriate for the ATT process, that it “politicises” this process.

In the meantime, the original right of reply to Amnesty has similarities to “gaslighting”—in which someone in a dominant position attempts to undermine someone else’s sense or understanding of a situation. In this case, a government representative of a
Editorial, continued

country denies a charge not based on the provision of counter-evidence or an exchange of views, but on the grounds that the civil society organisation is a) simply wrong, and b) making these claims outside of agreed parameters of discussion and discourse.

In this way, the Philippines’ reply also reflected some elements of “mansplaining,” by informing a well-respected, internationally renowned expert on human rights (Amnesty International) that they are essentially lying, and proceeding to explain to them what they are and are not allowed to say in a conference space in which Amnesty has operated many times before. Typically, this type of behaviour is exhibited from men towards women, but it is a phenomenon that appears in other situations where those power dynamics are similar. A state “explaining” something to an NGO about its own area of expertise certainly fits the bill. (For more on “mansplaining,” see https://www.facebook.com/GvaDisarm/videos/1917606608506354/ for a video of the side event on this subject held Thursday on the margins of CSP3.)

But it is not only the Philippines that has engaged “gaslighting”-like behaviour at CSP3. The silence of the representatives of most governments attending this conference in regards to Treaty violations is also reminiscent of this insidious technique. Civil society and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have presented evidence—based on research, journalism, UN panel investigations, and also first-hand accounts from a Yemeni citizen and the ICRC president—about the decimation of Yemen by the Saudi-led coalition, which is largely stocked with weapons from ATT states parties and signatories. But this evidence and appeals for action are met with deafening silence. It is enough to make one feel crazy, like we are screaming into the wind and losing our sense of direction.

It is surprising behaviour from diplomats—from people who are supposed to be trained to engage in dialogue, listen to each other, and seek common solutions. International forums, including conferences of states parties, are supposed to be opportunities to review the implementation of agreements. Talking about failures of implementation may be “political”—but so are the instruments under consideration. They are instruments agreed to by governments—which are by their very nature political entities. These types of discussions take place all the time in other treaty bodies—indeed, that is what these bodies are typically designed for.

During ATT negotiations, many governments seemed quite willing to point out the egregious human rights abuses or war crimes committed with weapons, giving specific details from specific cases and cajoling each other to commit to do better through this instrument. Syria is a prime example. Yet since the Treaty was adopted, throughout all the working group meetings and three CSPs, suddenly governments will speak about the consequences of the arms trade in only the vaguest terms. They talk about what this Treaty was designed to change without acknowledging that their own behaviour hasn’t changed, or that fellow states parties or signatories are committing or facilitating the same crimes and abuses they once criticized in others. So far during CSP3, only Costa Rica has acknowledged there is a conflict in Yemen; only Chile has said it shares the concerns of civil society regarding possible failures to implement articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty and transfers of weapons to zones of conflict; and only 12 states have called for cessation of arms transfers to one country, Venezuela, due to current levels of state repression and human rights abuse.

There are many other governments at this meeting that take their commitments to reducing human suffering seriously. Governments that have put energy and resources into preventing gender-based violence, resolving conflicts, reducing armed violence, or prosecuting war crimes. Yet even these governments remain silent on possible Treaty violations. They speak not a word about states parties’ and signatories’ contributions to Yemen’s destruction. They speak not a word when the Philippines says civil society must not bring up certain issues.

What is it about the arms trade that holds their tongues? Is it because, in some ways, so many states parties are making profits from arms production and transfers, and speaking out against the “bad apples” means risking the spotlight eventually turning to their own sale or use of weapons? Is it because some of the worst offenders supply them with weapons, or that they have other trade relationships at stake? Is it because they too feel that talking about the reality of the arms trade is too “political” for a meeting about the arms trade?

Maybe we need a different approach to the arms trade than an international treaty. Maybe we need a different approach to holding states to account for failing the treaties they adopt. Or maybe governments just need to have more courage to do what is necessary to protect international law and to protect civilians. Whatever needs to change, it should be at least clear that telling civil society or international organisations they cannot bring issues forward for discussion or present evidence for consideration is not an acceptable response to hearing information that you do not necessarily want to hear. •
NEWS IN BRIEF

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he news in brief is not a comprehensive report on all statements but provides brief highlights on a range of themes and positions.

Right of reply
• The Philippines issued a right of reply to the statement of Amnesty International on behalf of Control Arms from Tuesday’s discussion on implementation, saying it regrets the generalisations in the statement about the arms transfers that have been authorised to the Philippines and used in the widespread killings of drug users. Philippines rejected this claim and this “type of discourse” in the CSP, stating that doing so will impact universalisation. It defended the status of the rule of law in the Philippines, which is in an advanced stage of ATT ratification.
• Control Arms responded later in the day that its policy is to seek information from relevant state authorities and welcomes dialogue with the Philippines. It stands by the findings of Amnesty International. Philippines said it is thankful for the offer of engagement and reiterated its warning against “politicising” the ATT process.

International Assistance
Ambassador Biontino of Germany and Chairperson of the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) selection committee presented a report on the VTF:
• Pledged financial contributions total $21,116,876 USD from 11 states.
• States are encouraged to announce intended contributions during CSP3.
• 21 applications from 19 states were received during the first call for proposals. Shortlisted proposals were reviewed and nine were approved.

Mr. Dumisani Dladla, Head of the ATT Secretariat, presented further details about the nature of the funded projects:
• Eleven grant agreements have been signed; and 17 projects approved.
• The majority of approved projects are in the area of capacity building, such as workshops and training. Others are in the areas of assessment/gap analysis; legislation; national control list development; and other.
• 75 per cent of recipients are states parties and 25 per cent are signatories. Eleven recipients are found in Africa; three in the Americas; two are in Oceania, and one is in Asia.
• Some grantees have decided to partner with NGOs or regional or international organisations.
• There are lessons learned including challenges faced by the Secretariat and those faced by the VTF selection committee.

The presentations were followed by an informal question and answer period. Guinea-Bissau asked if it is still possible to apply. It was explained that the first cycle has closed but another one will open soon. It was explained that the VTF and UNSCAR funding streams work closely together and share information. Togo enquired about the status of its fund transfer, which was confirmed as been initiated. Côte d’Ivoire shared experience from its own project implementation, emphasising that expertise can be as useful financial resources.

In closing, Ambassador Biontino further outlined the intention of the committee to conduct an “outreach study” concerning four areas of outreach activities that are linked to implementation and that could be supported by the VTF. He stressed that the capacity to implement the VTF must be “enabled” to account for an anticipated increase in workload. The committee seeks a mandate from CSP3 to consider and pursue options to do this. A new round of proposals will open in October.

The floor was opened to formal statements on the subject of international assistance.

Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF)
• New Zealand, Japan, Germany, Ireland, and Finland supported taking measures to build capacity.
• EU and the UK urged avoiding duplication with other funding programmes such as UNSCAR.
• Japan said some portion of VTF should be used for risk management and it should operate in a more transparent manner.
• New Zealand encouraged all states to be open about sharing their experiences as recipients. EU, Germany, and Switzerland made similar statements.
• Switzerland suggested that it could be useful to establish strategic guidance or qualitative standards to be fulfilled to ensure sound project management. This could be informed by the experiences of the initial funding cycles.
• Switzerland agreed with the challenges outlined by Mr. Dladla, particularly those of assessing the political commitment of applicants that are not party, or what constitutes “implementation”.

Sponsorship
• EU encouraged ongoing support for bringing experts to participate in conference meetings. South Africa noted that more experts should come to preparatory meetings, in addition to conferences of states parties. Jamaica supported continuing sponsorship possibilities.
• UNDP presented a report on how it operates the sponsorship programme to attend ATT meetings, including taking decisions about who the recipi-
News in brief, continued

- Control Arms underscored that universalisation should not happen without implementation, as effective implementation will encourage other states to ratify the ATT.

Matters pertaining to CSP4

President and bureau
- Ambassador Takamizawa of Japan was confirmed as President of CSP4, endorsed by Australia, Guatemala, Sierra Leone, and Cameroon. He urged a focus on substance and expressed commitment to do his utmost to advance work in implementation and universalisation. The ambassador will outline his vision for the presidency at a lunch event on Friday.
- The four candidates for Vice-President were confirmed: Argentina, Georgia, France, and South Africa.
- The new management committee will be elected after the current committee presents its report.

Logistics
- Proposed dates for CSP4 are 20–24 August 2018.
- Japan has proposed hosting CSP4 in its country rather than the default location of Geneva. Questions have been raised about the financial implications, as costs may be higher than the amount approved for that meeting. Domestic procedures to confirm this offer have been started, but are not yet concluded. Japan will provide an update on that process, including with respect to exact location.
- Guatemala, Cameroon, and Japan expressed appreciation for Japan’s offer.
- Guatemala noted that small and medium-sized countries may have challenges with participation and requested that generous contributions be made to the sponsorship fund to offset this. Sweden supported that, but is comfortable with the approach taken by Japan in managing costs and budgetary matters.
- Sierra Leone said that the sponsorship programme should also cover non-capital based delegates who participate in the preparatory meetings such as in Geneva.
- Cameroon welcomed the offer and Japanese efforts to avoid budgetary mishap. It encouraged the conference to accept this offer but keep Geneva as a default.
- Mauritius said that states must plan for the possibility of states hosting the CSPs in locations outside of Geneva and related costs, in future.

Universalisation, continued
- Ghana suggested that regional universalisation “champions” could be established. These people might be sitting or former heads of states, or sitting or former leaders of regional, or intergovernmental organisations.
- Colombia updated that after having signed in 2013, the instrument reached a technical “impasse” and will be presented again to the Congress.
- Chile updated that its ratification is in a very advanced phase and being dealt with urgently.
- Canada explained that legislative changes were submitted to parliament in April 2017 affecting export and import license permits and its criminal code, brokering on military goods, and other changes necessary to become treaty compliant. Brokering is an area of particular focus and where many changes are needed. An investment of $13 million CAD has been allocated to reinforce Canada’s export system.
- Cameroon has engaged in work with civil society in the sub-region towards aiding the domestic ratification process.

New pledges
- France announced support for a second phase of assistance via its programme, “Expertise France,” to assist implementation. It committed itself to support sustainably to projects, particularly those related to legal aspects of treaty implementation.
- Switzerland intends to make a similar contribution as its current one to the next VTF project cycle.
- Australia said it will contribute a further amount to the VTF.
- Republic of Korea said that as a new state party, it will continue to actively review on how to effectively contribute to VTF projects.

Regional initiatives
- Argentina said the MERCOSUR firearms meeting earlier in the year included discussion about cooperation and assistance at the regional level.
- Australia described work it has funded in the Asia-Pacific region, such as workshops in Fiji and Cambodia, among others.

News in brief, continued

- Control Arms thanked donor states for contributing to the civil society sponsorship programme, which as enabled diverse representation at international meetings over the past ten years.
- Many states stressed the value in cooperating with civil society partners when implementing assistance projects.

Universalisation, continued
- Members are and how funding is allocated. Sierra Leone noted that sometimes there are a lot of costs associated with obtaining a visa, such as travel to a third country, and this should be accounted for.
- Control Arms thanked donor states for contributing to the civil society sponsorship programme, which enabled diverse representation at international meetings over the past ten years.
- Many states stressed the value in cooperating with civil society partners when implementing assistance projects.
News in brief, continued

been undertaken at the CSP to harmonise their proposed terms of reference. The president of CSP4 will confirm the chairs, but Ambassador Korhonen recommends that the president of the conference also chair the group of universalisation.

- France, on behalf of 25 countries, stated that there is a lack of multilingualism at meetings. The documents of working groups, the VTF, etc. should be available to all. The current practice of only translating for the CSPs is not satisfactory.

- Guatemala asked for clarity from the Secretariat if the 2018 budget would account for additional translation of document and services during the intercessional period, from the Secretariat. Mr. Dladla confirmed that the budget for CSP4 includes provision for intercessional translation, as “preparatory work”.

- Australia and New Zealand noted that there are inconsistencies on how representation is categorised in the bureau and the management committee. For example, certain countries are included as “Asia” in one, and as “WEOG” in others. They proposed text to solve this, and be included in the final report and invited input from other states.

- Japan pointed out there is ambiguity about how representative vice-presidents must be, and welcome any greater clarity.

- Netherlands said it could support re-addressing the nature of the management committee’s composition, which was supported by Mexico.

- Australia suggested staggering the membership for continuity.

Agenda

- Control Arms urged the CSP welcomed comments from Mexico and Chile about identifying Treaty violations, an issue ignored by the majority of states parties, noting that, “the silence on Yemen has been deafening”. It recommended scheduling preparatory meetings in advance and that interpretation at all meetings is crucial.

Matters pertaining to the Secretariat

Mr. Dumisani Dladla reported that the Secretariat is fully staffed, with three positions filled. The tasks given to them have been completed, across three categories of financial management, administration, and preparations for CSP3. Highlights include:

- Working with the management committee on the financial situation of the Secretariat;
- Receiving and posting both initial and annual reports and sending reminders about deadlines;
- Developing a procurement policy;
- Supported working groups and the president as needed; circulate and translate conference documents; and
- Supporting the operationalization of the VTF.

He highlighted that supporting the VTF in future is not sustainable given current capacity and increasing workload. The Secretariat requests a mandate to investigate and determine a workable solution to this, and also to not have to wait until CSP4 to take a decision about the outcome and act sooner. Three options were provided:

- VTF can make a determination in own deliberations that percentage of budget/contributions used toward ensuring its administration cost;
- Approach the EU with a project proposal to fund VTF activities, in line with EU activities on universalisation and outreach; or
- Hire an additional staff person.

States offered some views:

- Sweden said this is just the “tip of the iceberg” with respect to resources required to manage a grant programme. It prefers the first option as most logical, as does New Zealand, which also expressed support for the third. New Zealand suggested that the conference mandate the Secretariat to take a portion of the VTF’s fund to apply to its administrative costs.

- Bulgaria supports the Secretariat exploring these and other options.

- Sierra Leone asked if we have to wait until CSP4 to take decisions.

- Mexico noted that there was not any dialogue between states parties and the management committee during the intercessional period to discuss such issues.

- UK noted this is the first year of the VTF and while the workload may increase, it could also be easier once systems are in place. It is concerned with their being able to implement a decision on way forward immediately and without consultation, given financial implications. It proposed consulting with states parties in some format.

- The US, a signatory state, said it has always opposed the Secretariat taking on capacity building projects, and more discussion is needed than we have time for this topic at the CSP3.

- Switzerland suggested exploring the way forward after one cycle of the VTF is complete, in cooperation with the selection committee.

Budget

- Switzerland registered concern that contributions are not all being made on time, which has posed problems in other conventions. It proposed putting uncommitted funds into a savings fund to ensure future liquidity of the Secretariat.
IT’S TIME FOR DEEDS, NOT JUST WORDS
Dr. Natalie Goldring | Acronym Institute and Georgetown University

When the President of CSP3 took the floor at the beginning of the session on Thursday, he made a point of mentioning that he was speaking from the podium rather than from his normal place. The implication was that he was raising even more important issues than usual. He then said that we were moving into a new phase of the CSP3, the phase of action.

The President’s statement instantly captured my attention. Perhaps now states would talk about some of the difficult issues at the core of implementing the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), including how to decide when to refuse to make a particular sale. Unfortunately, my excitement was short-lived, as he continued by explaining that he was referring to procedural issues such as the election of the President and the Vice Presidents for CSP4 and the status of various working groups.

Words matter. And process matters. We need words to formulate policies and programmes, and processes to carry them out. But as was the case at the first two Conferences of States Parties, the words and the process discussions have gotten in the way. States have spent far too much time on general statements and far too little on consideration of challenges in implementing the ATT and specific proposals to secure robust implementation of the Treaty. Their statements have generally been set pieces, rather than exchanges among states with concerns about the Treaty and states that could help resolve those concerns.

Those who criticize this process are regularly told that this is a young instrument. It is, but how states act now will help determine its future viability. And it’s demonstrably not too early to talk about the human cost of indiscriminate arms sales; that human cost is what led to the development of the Treaty in the first place. Yet to take an obvious example, Yemen has scarcely been mentioned, except in civil society presentations, and despite the fact that Human Rights Watch and others have documented indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians, using weapons provided by states parties and by Treaty signatories.

Similarly, representatives of civil society are often told to be patient. But we speak on behalf of the victims of conflict and violence and are working to stop the killing. Put simply, patience costs lives. How old is old enough? At what point will states start taking the crucial step of holding other countries responsible for their actions?

We have a day to make the transition into more substantive discussion, but it looks as though the time will be filled with more process discussion. That means we have to look to CSP4 for help. And if we wait until the conference next year, it will be too late. These discussions need to begin now, and they need to be linked to actions. Otherwise, in the words of the fictional character Eliza Doolittle, it’s just “words, words, words.”

CHALLENGES FOR THE JAPAN PRESIDENCY FOR CSP4
Mitzi Austero | Nonviolence International

Asia-Pacific continues to have the lowest ATT ratification rate compared to other regions, despite having several champions. Most countries in the region seem to be working on the implementation aspects first, before universalisation—so the main challenge is to translate these implementation efforts into ratifications. The careful approach of “compliance first before ratification” that more conservative signatory states seem to be taking will remain a major issue for Japan’s presidency, which hopes to see the increase of ratifications in the region during their Presidency.

Another challenge for CSP4 and Japan’s presidency is taking into consideration the current global trends in arms imports. Asia has been the biggest importer of arms around the world over the last five years due to several factors, including the military “modernisation” efforts in the region. The misconception that the Treaty will hamper modernisation efforts of developing countries have to be addressed, especially now that the region has become a theatre of new conflicts.

The region should see the broader benefits of the Treaty as it prioritises development over regulation of the arms flows—linkages between the ATT and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will need to pick up more traction. In a region where poverty is still very visible, making the Treaty relevant to states that are addressing poverty alleviation will greatly help in Japan’s goals of increased ratification in the Asia-Pacific.
The side event “Gender-based violence and the ATT” provided an opportunity for participants at the Third Conference of States Parties (CSP3) to explore practical guidance relating to the key elements needed to make an assessment for risks relating to serious acts of gender-based violence (GBV), an aspect of the Treaty that some states are struggling to implement. It was convened by the Control Arms Coalition in cooperation with the permanent missions of Ireland and Sweden.

Ms. Cindy Ebbs of Control Arms opened the panel with a quick overview of how GBV is included in the ATT and the rationale for this event. Ms. Sarah Boukhary from the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) underlined the various ways in which weapons contribute to GBV and what GBV actually constitutes. Speaking from her experiences working with women in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, she noted that women question where the weapons come from, despite the assumption that they lack interest in political issues. Ms. Boukhary introduced WILPF’s toolkit on Weapons, War and Women in the MENA region, which seeks to share information about arms flows and their impact through graphics, a webinar, and a video. She also presented WILPF’s new briefing paper, Preventing gender-based violence through effective ATT implementation that outlines key questions export officials should ask about the prevalence of GBV in an assessment.

Ambassador Paul Beijer of Sweden welcomed the working paper from Ireland as providing a comprehensive analytical framework of Article 7(4) of the ATT. Noting that the concept of GBV is completely new for licensing officers, he explained that Sweden had organised a seminar for its licensing authorities to train them on the concept of GBV, and how to assess for it, and recommended it as a basic initiative that states parties should take. He pointed out that in practice, governments take various considerations into account such as security policy, energy security, or counterterrorism to strike a balance in an export decision. Civil society should also question these other factors.

Ms. Emma Tobin of Ireland reiterated her country’s commitment to gender equality and tackling the challenges that arms pose to women, such as through its research on women’s participation in disarmament and a current project that assesses the impact of explosive weapons on women and children. Ms. Tobin presented her government’s working paper for CSP3, stressing that states need guidance to implement it. She stressed the importance of inter-disciplinary dialogue to inform the development of GBV indicators and working alongside civil society to achieve this task.

The discussion confirmed that this is seen as a less-explicit area of ATT implementation. The discussion demonstrated the need for further clarity on the notions of “serious” and “overriding” risk, and asked what would mitigating measures on GBV look like. One participant suggested that GBV could be taken up as a thematic topic for the next CSP, and that further work should be done by Ireland to discuss the recommendations at regional level. The challenges of gathering evidence and of demonstrating causation between the use of weapons and gender-based violence were highlighted, especially when seeking legal recourse for such violations. Interest in this aspect of the ATT is high and it is hoped that discussion will continue through the intercessional period.
288,633,575 dollars. This was the total value of arms and ammunition exports by Brazil between January and August 2017, according to the Brazilian Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services. The amount represents a daily average of almost half a million dollars in weapons sold to 61 countries in all regions of the world. This is an increase of about 25% over the value exported in the same period of last year. The United States (USD 124 million) and Saudi Arabia (USD 103 million) account for almost 80% of the purchases of weapons and ammunition manufactured by Brazil in the first eight months of 2017.

The details of Brazilian arms exports, including the criteria adopted for the authorisation of sales, are unknown. This is because the policy that regulates the export of arms and ammunition by Brazil, called Pnemen (National Export Policy for Military Equipment), is based on a secret document, enacted during the military rule and in force since the 1970s. However, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) may change this scenario.

As the third largest exporter of small arms in the world, Brazil signed the Treaty in June 2013 and, as a signatory state, participated in the ATT conference of states parties for the third time in a minor role, without the possibility of voting on substantive decisions and with a reduced capacity to influence the functioning of the agreement.

The ATT text follows a slow process in Brazilian National Congress, a necessary step towards the conclusion of the ratification process. It has been more than four years since TCA was signed. Fortunately, in early September, a favourable opinion was approved by the Committee on Public Security and Combating Organized Crime of the House. The text will now follow the Lower House’s plenary and then to the Brazilian Federal Senate.

Brazil’s full membership in the ATT regime is expected to contribute to increasing the transparency of Brazil’s arms exports, which is acknowledged to be one of the most opaque in the world. Several cases illustrate the impact of the lack of transparency of Brazilian arms sales in the protection of human rights.

Reports from the United Nations have already pointed to the illegal presence of weapons manufactured in Brazil in Côte d’Ivoire, a country that is under embargo by the UN Security Council. Also in Yemen, a country experiencing one of the bloodiest civil wars in the world, armaments “made in Brazil” were found with a well-known arms trafficker, himself under UN embargo.

Also on Yemen, civil society organisations have reported on the presence of cluster munitions—banned by international law—similar to a Brazilian manufacturing model in 2015, 2016, and 2017, possibly employed by the Saudi-led coalition. Saudi Arabia, as already mentioned, is the second main destination for Brazilian arms exports in the first seven months of 2017.

Last June, information published by the Venezuelan press reported the imminent shipment of thousands of tear gas grenades to the Caracas regime, in direct opposition to the position previously expressed by Brazil’s government. Subsequently, the shipment of this material was interrupted by a decision of the Ministry of Defense—although the extent of the shipment restriction nor the criteria adopted to establish it have been made clear. In any case, it is clear that the current arms export policy is, in addition to being secret, flawed in its application.

As an ATT state party, Brazil will be obliged to take steps to make its arms export policy more transparent and ensure that its arms transfers are not used to commit war crimes or crimes against humanity, genocide, transnational crimes, and serious violations of human rights. This obligation includes the need for the establishment of a risk analysis procedure that considers, at each arms transfer, the possibility of committing international crimes. The obligations of more rigid and transparent control in the international transit of arms also have a systemic effect by establishing the obligation to create national lists and systems of control in a world where not all states have such a mechanism, thus enhancing collective security. Fewer arms circulating illegally across borders means fewer small arms falling into the wrong hands and thus bringing a positive impact in the area of public security and armed violence.

The international regime inaugurated by the ATT came into force in December 2014, with the ratification of the 50th country. A wide range of topics are currently being defined during the state party conferences and working group meetings held throughout the year. As long as Brazil does not complete the ratification process, it will be a mere spectator of the regulation of the criteria for control of global arms transfers. The sooner Brazil enters the regime, the greater its influence on the destiny of the ATT.

In sending the ATT text to the Brazilian National Congress in July 2014, the Executive branch’s message signed by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Justice affirmed that the treaty would bring important positive impacts to international peace and security and internally to public security and for the reduction of armed violence. More than three years later, the assertion remains valid. It remains for the Brazilian government to give priority to the topic it deserves. •