Reaching Critical Will’s

GUIDE TO THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

2008

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Reaching Critical Will is a project of the
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

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Introduction

The Conference on Disarmament (CD), based in Geneva, is mandated to negotiate multilateral disarmament treaties. Recent successes of the CD include the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Since the CTBT, the CD has not been able to resume serious substantial work, and critical issues on its agenda have been left unresolved, much to the peril of international security. This means non-government organization (NGO) attention to this body is needed more than ever.

The success of the CD in negotiating these crucial treaties depended largely upon the tireless efforts of NGOs, which served an immensely important role in an advisory or technical capacity, and in awareness-building and public education roles during past negotiations.

This coming year, 2008, is an active year for disarmament issues. The 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review cycle got off to a timid start in 2007, but the CD itself came closer than ever to adopting a programme of work. In 2008, NGOs need follow the diplomatic moves in Geneva, engage their country representatives, and encourage consensus on a programme of work, or at the bare minimum, continued substantive discussions in the CD.

Reaching Critical Will, a project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, created this Guide as an advocacy and learning tool for everyone. In it, you can find a history of the CD, learn about the items on its agenda, a summary of the major issues, an overview of the current political context, and much more.

If you or your organization would like to learn more about the CD, the issues, or what you can do to engage your representatives, please contact Reaching Critical Will at info@reachingcriticalwill.org.

In peace,

Ray Acheson, Project Associate
Reaching Critical Will
January 2008

Table of Contents

General information about the CD 1
CD Groups 2
CD Agenda 3
Chronology 3
Summary of Critical Issues 6
Fissile Materials 6
Outer Space 7
Nuclear Disarmament 7
Negative Security Assurances 8
Radiological Weapons 8
Transparency in Armaments 9
References and more information 9
NGO Participation 11
RCW Resources 12
General information about the CD

WHAT: The CD is the world’s sole multilateral disarmament treaty negotiating body. Decisions are made by consensus. While the CD is independent of the United Nations, its secretary is appointed by the UN Secretary-General, it is required to consider recommendations from the General Assembly, and it submits reports at least annually to the General Assembly.

WHEN: The CD has three sessions each year. The first begins in the penultimate week of January and lasts for 10 weeks. The second begins in May and lasts 7 weeks, and the third in July lasts for 7 weeks.

ACCESS: The CD holds at least one public plenary per week that it is in session. In 2004, the CD took its first decision on NGO access, officially formalizing access to open debates. In addition, the 2004 decision permits NGOs to submit documents as official documents of the Conference, and allows NGOs to present their documents (at their own expense) twice annually in front of the CD chamber.

PRESIDENTS: Each year, the CD has six Presidents (the P6). For 2008, the P6 will be Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela. In 2006, the P6 began coordinating their presidencies to serve the CD more efficiently. In 2006 the P6 worked almost as a single unit, conducting consultations with member states in between CD sessions, and building off one another’s terms. This P6 initiative has led to smoother transitions between monthly presidential rotations, avoiding duplicitous work, and could be credited for the steps towards a programme of work that took place in 2007.

NEGOTIATIONS: When the CD is ready to begin negotiating a treaty, an ad hoc committee with a mandate is established, and continues meeting until the text is finalized. The meetings of ad hoc committees are held in private. The whole conference must agree by consensus to the mandates given to ad hoc committees.

RECENT PAST EFFORTS: In 1994, four ad hoc committees met: Nuclear Test Ban, Outer Space, Negative Security Assurances, and Transparency in Armaments. In 1992, the CD concluded negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention. In 1995 and 1996, only one ad hoc committee met: Nuclear Test Ban. In 1996, the CD completed the negotiations for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In 1998, the CD agreed to a fissile material cut-off negotiating mandate, but has been unable to establish an ad hoc committee needed to carry forward talks.

DANGER: No programme of work has been adopted since 1996, putting at risk the future of the CD and undermining the development of international security.
CD Groups

There are a number of groupings among countries within the CD. Some of these work in cooperation with each other on specific issues rather than unilaterally. They usually meet at least once a week when the CD is in session, in a closed, informal meeting.

**Western Group (25)**
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States

**Group of 21 (33)**
Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, DPR Korea, DR Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tunisia, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe

**Eastern European Group (6)**
Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Romania, Russian Federation, Ukraine

**Group of One**
China often refers to itself as the Group of One

**Non-Member Participant States**
Every year there are general observers to the CD. They have the right to attend meetings of the CD ad hoc committees, and can speak, circulate papers and make contributions, but cannot deny consensus on any issues. They have to renew their status as non-member participant states each year, whereas CD members maintain their status permanently.
CD Agenda

The CD has a permanent agenda, known as the Decalogue, which addresses the following issues:

- Nuclear weapons in all aspects;
- Chemical weapons (removed from agenda in 1993 after the CD completed the Chemical Weapons Convention on 3 September 1992);
- Other weapons of mass destruction;
- Conventional weapons;
- Reduction of military budgets;
- Reduction of armed forces;
- Disarmament and development;
- Disarmament and international security;
- Collateral measures; confidence building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties; and
- Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Decalogue includes practically all multilateral arms control and disarmament problems, so a narrower agenda is adopted each year. Currently, the CD primarily focuses its attention on the following issues:

- Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
- Prevention of nuclear war; including all related matters;
- Prevention of an arms race in outer space;
- Effective international arrangements to assure non nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (negative security assurances);
- New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, including radiological weapons;
- Comprehensive programme of disarmament; and
- Transparency in armaments.

In recent sessions, some member states have raised the idea of discussing “new issues” at the CD, including terrorism, missiles, and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), following the rules of procedure (para 41) which allows for any issue to be brought up at any time.

Brief Chronology

1960. What is now the CD was first known as the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament (TNCD), and was formed in March 1960 in Geneva. The TNCD was made up of five Eastern Bloc countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union) and five Western Bloc countries (Canada, France, Italy, the UK, and the US), jointly chaired by the US and the USSR. During this time, it tried, unsuccessfully, to attain consensus on the many complex issues facing both sides on their way to general disarmament. The TNDC’s failure to reach agreement can be understood in the context of the strained relations between East and West at the time.

1960-1968. The institution became known as the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC), jointly chaired by the US and USSR. The ENDC first convened in March 1961 following a resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1961, making the addition of eight “non-aligned” states. Parties of the ENDC were: Burma, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and the Soviet Union.

1963. An accomplishment of the ENDC was the negotiation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which banned all
nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. The US, USSR, and UK are signatories (and also depositories). It was negotiated in six weeks.

1969-1978. The institution became the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), expanding to 30 members.

1970. The CCD concluded negotiations on the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which seeks to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them, and prevent the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes. The NPT became international law in 1970. At that time there were five nuclear weapon states: US, UK, USSR, France, and China. Since then, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan have developed nuclear weapons and remain the only countries outside the Treaty (North Korea ratified the NPT but later withdrew).

1972. The CCD negotiated the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), banning the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. The BTWC entered into force in 1975 and, as of 2007, has 159 States Parties and 15 signatories. It builds on the protocols of the Geneva conventions that first banned the use of gas in war. It is the first treaty to ban an entire category of mass destruction weapons. However, the BWC has no verification provisions. A verification protocol has been under negotiation since 1995. Hopes of progress during the CD’s 24th session (13 July 23 - 17 August 2001) were effectively dashed on the third day with the rejection of the current draft Protocol—the Chair’s composite text—as were further efforts to negotiate such an agreement. Current discussions on a BTWC verification mechanism take place in the framework of annual meetings of states parties to the BTWC.

1977. The CCD negotiated the Environmental Modification Convention, banning all significant hostile use of environmental modification techniques. This Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques entered into force in 1977 and attempts to inhibit the development of new types of warfare.

1979. The Committee on Disarmament was established as a result of the first Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly held in 1978.

1982-1989. The General Assembly’s second special session on disarmament was held in 1982, which prompted the CD to continue negotiating a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament. At the end of the CD’s session in 1989, however, it suspended work on the programme “until the circumstances were more propitious for progress.”

1983. The re-named Conference on Disarmament (CD) grew to 38 members.

1992. The CD negotiated the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC was opened for signature in 1993, and entered into force in April 1997. It has 182 States Parties, including the US, Russia, and China. It bans the “development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons” (earlier agreements only banned the use). The treaty contains an extensive list of banned chemicals and precursors and provides for an elaborate and intrusive verification regime as well as a secretariat, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).


1995 and 1996. Only one ad hoc committee met, on the Nuclear Test Ban. In 1996, the CD expanded its membership to 61.

1996. The CD negotiated the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), banning nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The final negotiations were difficult, and divisive issues remained until the end. Nevertheless, the CTBT was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution A/RES/50/245
on 10 September 1996 and opened for signature on 24 September. The CTBT has been signed by 177 countries and ratified by 141. It requires ten more ratifications, from the states listed in Annex II of the Treaty, to enter into force.

1998. The CD appointed ad hoc committees on negative security assurances and a fissile material cut-off treaty, and it appointed special coordinators to deal with issues related to prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), a comprehensive programme of disarmament, and transparency in armaments. In addition, it appointed three reform coordinators to review the agenda, consider membership expansion, and improve the CD’s functions. The Conference considered adopting five new members—Ecuador, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and Tunisia—but failed to reach consensus. Work on the other reform areas did not make much progress.

1999. The CD approved the 1998 proposal for expansion, and membership of the CD expanded to its current level of 65 countries. However, the Conference failed to agree on a programme of work, and the ad hoc committees on fissile materials and negative security assurances were not reconvened.

1999-2002. The US opposed any negotiating mandate on PAROS or nuclear disarmament, while China opposed negotiating a fissile material treaty without negotiations on PAROS. The CD appointed three special coordinators to examine its agenda, improve its functioning, and consider membership. Failing to find consensus on these issues, the three coordinators recommended that the CD reappoint special coordinators for these issues in 2002.

2002. The Ambassadors of Algeria, Belgium, Chile, Columbia, and Sweden, in what became known as the A5 proposal, proposed the establishment of four ad hoc committees—two to negotiate a fissile material treaty and negative security assurances and two to discuss PAROS and nuclear disarmament—and for special coordinators to seek the views of states on new types of weapons of mass destruction, a comprehensive programme of disarmament, and transparency in armaments. Despite enjoying widespread support, this proposal ultimately did not succeed in breaking the impasse, yet is still frequently referenced in discussions on a programme of work.

2003. Although the A5 proposal was updated and received more support, including from China, the CD closed without agreeing on a programme of work.

2004. The CD engaged in informal plenaries to assist its work, however it was ultimately unable to reach agreement on a programme of work. It did, however, reach consensus on formalizing and enhancing NGO access and participation in the CD.

2005. The President of the CD in March circulated a “food for thought” non-paper, based on the A5 proposal, establishing ad hoc committees for each of the CD’s four priority issues and providing for negotiations on a fissile materials treaty. The final session’s President circulated a similar paper. Neither proposal gained consensus.

2006. The six Presidents of the CD for the year, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Senegal and Slovakia, decided to cooperate closely in order to assure continuity by consecutive Presidents and named themselves the “P6”. They appointed a group of states to act as “Friends of Presidents” to assist the P6 throughout the year in informal consultations on gaining consensus on a programme of work and on improving the CD’s methods of work. The Presidents encouraged the submission of working papers, proposals, and ideas from delegations and NGOs in a thematic timetable for the year. In May, the US tabled a draft Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and draft mandate for its negotiation, which, in its refusal to specifically note issues of verification and compliance (the US delegation frequently argues “the so-called effective verification of an FMCT cannot be achieved”) was unsatisfactory to the rest of the CD. While the CD saw the most substantive discussions and submissions of working papers in years, it was still unable to agree on a programme of work or to begin negotiations on a fissile materials treaty.

2007. The next six Presidents continued to work closely together and engaged in intensive consultations with member states between and during CD sessions. The CD came very close to adopting a programme of work,
contained in document L.1, which called for negotiations on a fissile materials and substantive discussions on the other three priority issues. Only three states—China, Iran, and Pakistan—visibly withheld their support for the comprehensive package tabled by the Presidents, though it is believed China and Iran would not continue to object if Pakistan agreed to the programme.

Summary of Critical Issues

**L.1 - Presidential Draft Decision**

In 2007, the six Presidents of the CD tabled a Draft Decision (CD/2007/L.1**) outlining a comprehensive programme of work, which was developed based on consultations with member states, and provided arguably the best chance for progress in the CD. L.1 “decides, without prejudice to future work and negotiations on its agenda items,” to appoint four Ambassadors as coordinators to preside over:

- substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war;
- negotiations, without any preconditions, on a non-discriminatory and multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- substantive discussions dealing with issues related to Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space; and
- substantive discussions dealing with appropriate international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (negative security assurances).

**Fissile Materials**

In December 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution recommending the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Early on, the issue of existing stocks blocked consensus on the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Some states, such as those belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, believe that a cut-off level should include fissile materials already produced and stockpiled. Others, such as the US, UK, and Japan, favour a future-production cut-off. Some states also think an FMCT should include management of fissile material, not only a ban on production.

On 25 January 1994, the CD appointed a Special Coordinator, Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, to seek the views of member states on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate the type of FMCT requested by the UN General Assembly. In March 1995, the resulting “Shannon Mandate” proposed that an ad hoc committee, charged to pursue the negotiations, would settle the issue of existing stocks and other issues.

All of the States Parties to the NPT endorsed the immediate commencement and early conclusion of FMCT negotiations at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, and the negotiation of an FMCT was agreed as one of the 13 practical steps towards disarmament at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

For years, China and Russia insisted that starting work on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space be linked to starting work on an FMCT. In August 2003, China and Russia broke from this position, and agreed to go forth with FMCT negotiations based on the Shannon Mandate.

The US did not announce its position on an FMCT until July 2004, when Ambassador Sanders declared that while the US supported negotiations on an FMCT, they did not believe that such a treaty would be verifiable. This is contrary to the 16 UNDC principles of verification published in 1988, as well as a US National Academy of study in 2005, which indicated that a verifiable FMCT would be expensive, but achievable. This change in US policy appears more politically driven than scientifically sound.

Many delegations have argued that specific references to matters such as verification and existing stocks in the
negotiation mandate is crucial, worried that if negotiations begin “without any preconditions,” as described in L.1, these issues are sure to be rejected during negotiations by key players such as the US. Pakistan in particular has argued this, pointing out that if an FMCT does not include existing stocks or verification, it will freeze or accentuate asymmetries between the nuclear weapons possessors—especially between Pakistan and India—and thus undermine regional “strategic balance” and international security. The US-India deal, which would allow India to import nuclear fuel from the US for its energy reactors, freeing up its own indigenously-produced materials for military purposes, further exacerbates Pakistan’s concerns about an FMCT.

Outer Space
An ad hoc committee began work in 1985 to examine outer space arms control issues, including the current legal framework. The main space security issue, prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), has been blocked in the CD, primarily because the US delegation believes the concept of an arms race in outer space is absurd, and that existing legal regimes for outer space activities (ie. the Outer Space Treaty) are adequate to handle any space security issues. The Outer Space ad hoc committee has not met since 1994.

China and Russia have traditionally maintained that the early establishment of an ad hoc committee is necessary to start substantive work on PAROS, with a view to concluding a more effective international treaty on this issue at an early date. They have submitted numerous papers on relevant issues, including verification aspects and existing international legal instruments. In 2007, they revised and submitted their PAROS working paper CD/1679 for the third time. However, both Russia and China have expressed their willingness to allow negotiations on an FMCT to begin without simultaneously starting negotiations on PAROS.

During 2007, substantive discussions were held on the PAROS in the CD, which resulted in calls for a treaty to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space (PPW) rather than a treaty on PAROS, in order to escape the “linguistic and philosophical debate” associated with the term PAROS. The discussions also produced interest in developing “best practices” or “rules of the road” for safe and responsible space operations, and transparency and confidence-building measures that could complement future international legal instruments regarding space security.

Outside of the CD, several developments both fostering and undermining space security have occurred. In January 2007, China tested an anti-satellite weapon against one of its own ageing weather satellites. The United States, while condemning the test, forged ahead with several space and missile defence projects with dual-use capabilities. On the other hand, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the General Assembly adopted debris mitigation guidelines, and several states submitted proposals on space security to the Secretary-General pursuant to GA resolution 61/75. Substantive discussions on PAROS were included in the CD’s proposed programme of work in 2007. Since 2004, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has held seminars in the CD chamber on space security issues. These conferences have generated food for thought, and promoted informal, confidence-building dialogues.

Nuclear Disarmament
Many members of the CD have openly expressed their wish that the CD undertake multilateral negotiations in this area, and calls were made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to establish a subsidiary body in the CD to deal with nuclear disarmament. Article VI of the NPT requires the nuclear weapon states to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to ... nuclear disarmament,” and in 1996, the International Court of Justice found that nuclear weapon states have an obligation to negotiate and complete a treaty banning all nuclear weapons. A Model Nuclear Weapon Convention, developed by nuclear disarmament experts and analysts, has been submitted to the NPT and the General Assembly by member states, and has also been submitted by NGOs as an official document of the CD.

Nuclear weapon states claim reductions in nuclear arms should be carried out directly by the states that possess them, in view of the many complexities involved, but many non-nuclear weapon states argue, as Egypt did in
2007, that the “emphasis on arms control and the bilateral efforts ... can not be regarded as alternative to the implementation of the commitment contained in Article VI ... We would like to reiterate the centrality of the 13 practical steps [outlined in 2000 Review Conference of the NPT to implement Article VI] which in our view, represent an internationally endorsed roadmap to fulfill the obligation of nuclear disarmament.”

However, the CD has not established a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. It was included as a topic for substantive discussion in the 2007 comprehensive programme of work.

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**Negative Security Assurances**

A negative security assurance (NSA) is an assurance from a nuclear weapon state to a non-nuclear weapon state that nuclear weapons will never be used against them. Currently, the only assurances that exist are not legally-binding, such as unilateral declarations, those contained within Nuclear Weapon Free Zone protocols, and in Security Council Resolution 984 (1995).

The Non-Aligned members of the CD (the G-21) increased their demands for a legally-binding instrument after the completion of the CTBT negotiations and the extension of the NPT in 1995. Most non-nuclear weapon states continue to demand legally-binding assurances, although the context remains a debate. Some states argue legally-binding assurances should be negotiated at the CD; others, such as those in the New Agenda Coalition, argue that NSAs should only be given to and by States Parties to the NPT. In 2007, New Zealand argued there are many complications in negotiating legally-binding NSAs in the CD, such as “the potential conferring of the status of Nuclear Weapons States on all of the States that possess nuclear weapons” if they are bound to give legally-binding assurances under a treaty.

The NSA ad hoc committee, while re-established in 1998, has not yet met; substantive discussions on NSAs were included in the 2007 comprehensive programme of work.

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**Radiological Weapons**

The CD also has on its agenda the negotiation of a ban on radiological weapons (RW), a new type of weapon of mass destruction that could disperse radioactive materials without a nuclear explosion. Such weapons could include waste material from non-military nuclear applications such as spent reactor fuel.

In 1979, the US and USSR jointly submitted to the CD major elements of a treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling, and use of radiological weapons. Conclusion of a multilateral treaty within the CD has been held up because no such weapons presently exist, and because of questions about verifiability. Some states also insist that, under this agenda item, discussions be held on a treaty to ban attacks against nuclear facilities.

RWs are currently not being discussed in the CD. While there is no treaty banning radiological weapons, a Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which entered into force in 2001, includes provisions for the management, storage, and transportation of radioactive waste from civilian and military reactors. In addition, the General Assembly adopted a RW resolution for the first time at its 60th session in 2005, on “Preventing the risk of radiological terrorism.” In 2007, the General Assembly adopted resolution A/62/46 on “Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources.”

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**Transparency in Armaments**

In 1991, the General Assembly adopted resolution 46/36-L, entitled “Transparency in Armaments,” which promoted openness and transparency in the field of military matters. One consequence of the resolution was the establishment of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The resolution also requested the CD take up the issue
of transparency in armaments (TIA), and specifically asked the CD to address interrelated issues arising from the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms. No time frame was attached to the CD’s work.

The CD added TIA to its agenda in 1992, the first new agenda item in over ten years. TIA was also the CD’s first agenda item related to conventional arms control. Since the topic was new to the CD, member states decided to conduct a year of informal meetings as a way of introducing the CD to the subject. In 1993, the CD established the TIA ad hoc committee, which began working to develop practical means for increasing openness and transparency in military matters. In 1994, the CD made little progress on this issue, and in 1995, the ad hoc committee was unable to reconvene. An experts group met in 1997 and there was agreement to promote transparency but not to expand the reporting requirements. The ad hoc committee has not been reestablished in the years since then.

There is often a resolution on TIA tabled in and adopted by the General Assembly, from which a small group of Non-Aligned states regularly abstain because the UN Register does not include nuclear weapons. The Register also does not require a comprehensive accounting of armament or military spending overall—which would be a potentially positive first step in meeting the Security Council’s obligations under Article 26 of the UN Charter.

References and more information

L.1 - Presidential Draft Decision
CD/2007/L.1**
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/papers07/L1rev.pdf

Statements in the 2007 CD Session
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches07/topics.html#a5

Fissile Materials
Statements in the 2007 CD Session
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches07/topics.html#FMCT

Working Papers in the CD

Shannon Mandate
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/shannon.html

Perspectives in the 2007 First Committee
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/FCM07/week4.html#fissile

NGO Resources
Institute for Science and International Security: http://www.isis-online.org/
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation: http://www.inesap.org/
International Panel on Fissile Materials: http://www.fissilematerials.org/

Outer Space
Statements in the 2007 CD Session
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches07/topics.html#paros

Updated Chinese-Russian Working Paper on PAROS
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/papers07/Feb14RussiaNote.pdf
2006 Working Papers on PAROS
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/papers06/index.html

Perspectives in the 2007 First Committee
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/FCM07/week3.html#space

UNIDIR Conference Reports

**NGO Resources**
Reaching Critical Will: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros/parosindex.html,
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/corporate/dd/aerospace.html
Space Security Index: http://www.spacesecurity.org/
Western States Legal Foundation: http://www.wslfweb.org/

**Nuclear Disarmament**
Statements in the 2007 CD Session
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches07/topics.html#nd

Perspectives in the 2007 First Committee
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/FCM07/week4.html#disarmament

**NGO Resources**
Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy: http://www.acronym.org.uk/
Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy: http://www.lcnp.org/
Middle Powers Initiative: http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/index.html
Reaching Critical Will: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/
Western States Legal Foundation: http://www.wslfweb.org/

**Negative Security Assurances**
Statements in the 2007 CD Session
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches07/topics.html#nsa

Perspectives in the 2007 First Committee
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/FCM07/week4.html#NSA

**NGO Resources**
Reaching Critical Will: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/issues.html#NSA
Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC): http://www.vertic.org/

**Radiological Weapons**
**NGO Resources**
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War: http://www.ippnw.org/
Nuclear Policy Research Institute: http://www.nuclearpolicy.org/

**Transparency in Armaments**
UN Transparency in Armaments
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/untia/index.html

UN Register on Conventional Arms
http://disarmament.un.org/cab/register.html
NGO Resources
Arms Trade Resource Center: http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/index.html
RCW’s Model Nuclear Inventory: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/about/pubs/Inventory07.html

NGO Participation

Civil society can help activate the CD by staying informed, spreading the word, and engaging with their representatives in the government.

Write to your Minister of Foreign Affairs or the CD—send letters and position papers, urging the CD to work toward disarmament. Also send a copy of your letter to your Ambassador in New York and Geneva. For a full listing, see the Governmental Contact Database: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/govcontacts/govindex.html

Make an appointment to speak with a representative at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or equivalent in your country; encourage the Foreign Minister to attend the Conference to publicly urge CD members to agree on a programme of work so that productive negotiations can begin.

Attend the CD meetings in Geneva, meet with your representatives personally to explain the critical issues, draw attention to the problems, and encourage your representative to pressure their colleagues to achieve a successful outcome.

Monitor the CD sessions through the Reaching Critical Will website, and react to what your government does or does not say. Subscribe to RCW’s free weekly email reports on the CD by emailing info@reachingcriticalwill.org with “subscribe cdreport” in the subject line.

Write letters to the editor or start your own media to publicize your view and your government’s policies in the CD; encourage your fellow citizens to engage with the issues, too.
Reaching Critical Will Resources on the Conference on Disarmament

RCW monitors and collects all statements delivered to the CD and posts them on our website at www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/index.html

We offer a free, weekly reporting service for all those interested in the CD. These reports are available through an email subscription service, and are posted on our website at www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/reports.html

You can find all press releases from the United Nations at www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/press08/pressindex.html

We also offer a very useful Summary of Statements By Topic each year, available at www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/topics.html

This booklet, the Reaching Critical Will Guide to the CD, can be found online at www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/cdbook2008.pdf

Other background information on the Conference can be found at www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/basicinfo/basicinfoindex.html

Governmental Contact Information for Permanent Missions in Geneva is at www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/govcontacts/govindex.html

All CD Resources can be found at www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/cdindex.html