The half-life of the papers to emerge yesterday from the Chairman of Main Committee 1, the NAM and the joint position complementary to the EU common position from Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway is anyone's guess. All contain interesting elements that indicate shifts in various quarters.

The paper from Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway gives the date of 2005 for entry into force of the CTBT and the same date for the conclusion of negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. It goes on to encourage the US and Russia to proceed with the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons. For five European NATO countries to highlight the danger of tactical nuclear weapons and the need to eliminate them, is a creative use of this Review Conference, indicates a shift in thinking and spells out non-nuclear NATO state expectations for START III. Language on the need for increased transparency is particularly welcomed by NGOs. The five countries suggest commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to provide periodically the aggregated numbers of warheads, delivery systems and stocks of fissile materials for explosive purposes. Using the Strengthened Review Process of the NPT as a collection point for written accounts of the progress achieved and establishing an open ended working group in the CD for the exchange of information and views towards nuclear disarmament, while neither new nor radical, would be a far cry from where we are now in both fora.

The 47-paragraph NAM text opens with a novel idea: the utilisation of the recommendations and texts we all pained over during the Preparatory Committee Meetings. Another idea that stands out is the establishment, at this Review Conference, of an open-ended standing committee which would work inter-sessionally to follow up recommendations concerning the implementation of the Treaty. The NAM's principled position on nuclear disarmament is by far the closest to that of NGOs, who agree that Article VI has not been fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. NGOs fully support the NAM in their push for compliance on every article (with the exception of Article IV), with one request: please stop using the out-of-date generic term "mankind" in all documents.

Felicity Hill
Director UN Office - WILPF

"Slavery was accepted in much the same way as nuclear weapons now are – by the establishments of a small group of predominantly Western/Northern nations and their allies."

Rob Green
from his book The Naked Nuclear Emperor
(see page 2 for a book review)
The Naked Nuclear Emperor: Debunking Nuclear Deterrence
by Robert Green

On 12 January 1991 before a crowd of 20,000, Rob Green became the first ex-British Navy Commander with nuclear weapon experience to speak out against them. The first part of his new book which questions deterrence explains why and how he rejected this theory. His concise, comprehensive and accessible critique with a foreword by Helen Clark, Prime Minister of New Zealand, concludes that there are safer ways to achieve security.

The central question of Green's book is: What if nuclear deterrence is in fact impractical, politically unsound and counter-productive to our real security needs, as well as immoral and illegal - and there are alternatives. Synthesising the often fragmented and academic discourse on deterrence to clear definitions, Green goes on to trace the history of deterrence, from Controlled Response to Mutually Assured Destruction, from 1941 to today.

"The twists and turns of nuclear deterrence dogma demonstrate how it was adjusted to accommodate the latest ratcheting up of the nuclear arms race which it has provoked", he says. Challenging the basic assumptions that deterrence has prevented wars, has induced self-deterrence and that nuclear deterrence works against chemical or biological attacks, Green explains how deterrence undermines security, creates instability, threatens democracy, provokes proliferation and is a ludicrous and indiscriminate response to terrorism.

Examining the morality and legal issues involved, Green proposes that there "definitely is a way back from the abyss towards which nuclear deterrence dogma is driving us. The key is to see nuclear disarmament as part of a process of building confidence and security, where nuclear weapons are a liability and a security problem."

Stockpile Stewardship or Disarmament Friendly?

A new report from Tri-Valley CARES by Dr. Robert Civiak looks at five alternatives for maintenance of U.S. nuclear weapons as they await dismantlement. The current approach, called Stockpile Stewardship, is a massive programme to expand the science and technology of nuclear weapons and develop sophisticated computer codes that will allow the United States to make qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons without full-scale nuclear explosive tests underground.

The report evaluates Stockpile Stewardship and four other options for maintaining nuclear weapons against six criteria including: maintaining weapons safety and security; supporting arms control and non-proliferation; maintaining weapons reliability; the ability to improve and modernize nuclear weapons; cost; and environmental impact. The alternatives are a Remanufacturing Option, under which components would be replaced on a regular schedule. Nuclear components would not be upgraded, but electrical and other non nuclear components would be; a Curatorship Option, under which components would be replaced only if they fail and in all cases with new ones as close as possible to the original designs. A Passive Arms Reduction Option, under which weapons would be removed from the stockpile if components, other than traditional limited life components, fail. And, for completeness, a Returning to Testing Option. The report presents new technical data and analysis, and makes a compelling case for constraining the current Stockpile Stewardship programme. Copies of the report are available outside Conference Room 4.

HOW WILL CLINTON REGAIN THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT INITIATIVE IN MOSCOW IN JUNE?

On 1 May, the N-5 issued their first-ever joint statement at an NPT Review Conference, in which they claimed to be complying with Article VI. However, this ignored the fact that the US has rejected out of hand an offer by Russia to move rapidly beyond START III, and cut strategic US and Russian arsenals to 1,500 warheads or less. Also, the US has ignored Russia's responsible proposal to deal with the remote threat of ballistic missile attacks by so-called "rogue" states by reviving and strengthening the missile control regime.

The ball is in the US court. What will President Clinton offer President-elect Putin in Moscow at their Summit on 4 June? The US, in its opening statement to Main Committee 1, professed to be doing all it could to expedite nuclear disarmament. What better way for President Clinton to regain the initiative than for him to challenge Putin to race to less than 1,000 strategic warheads? And what is his response to the Russian proposal on controlling ballistic missiles?

Commander Rob Green, Royal Navy (Retired)
Chair, Strategy Planning Committee
Middle Powers Initiative
Who’s Who - NGO profile

Merav Datan
Program Director, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

1. What are your hopes or expectations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review 2000 Conference?
A final document with forward-looking elements, establishing subsidiary bodies and/or working groups with a life beyond the RevCom on nuclear disarmament, universality, the Middle East and the next review conference.

2. What topics do you work on most or find the most interesting in this forum?
Nuclear disarmament, the New Agenda Coalition, the Nuclear Weapons Convention as a way to focus and promote immediate measures critical to nuclear disarmament, universality, the Middle East, international law and nuclear weapons.

3. What led you to be doing the work that you are doing now?
A combination of fear, frustration and fate. The increasing militarisation of the world, and the concept of national security through threat of mass destruction leads to instability and terror. My graduate studies in physics ended when I learned that “defense” interests would dictate the terms of my future choices. I switched to international law then joined the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy at a time when it was engaged in research in support of the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons. This has led to work on the legal and technical aspects of a comprehensive framework for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons - a nuclear weapons convention.

Who’s Who - Diplomat Profile

Ambassador Antonio De Icaza
Mission of Mexico to the United Nations

1. What are your hopes or expectations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review 2000 Conference?
Clear and unambiguous commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon states.

2. What topics do you work on most or find the most interesting in this forum?
Nuclear disarmament — working towards the elimination of the threat these weapons pose to humankind.

3. What led you to be doing the work that you are doing now?
I don’t remember. I started this exercise in March, 1962 at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) and I am still doing the same thing, which I guess shows a lack of imagination on my part!

Quote of the Day

“I hope this conference will pave the way to peace, not through nuclear deterrence but through wisdom and concurrence.”
Ambassador Baali
Conference Chair
speaking at the NGO Presentation session on May 3, 2000

Vox Pop

“Deterrence is illogical: It drapes a veneer of reason over sheer mayhem and horror. ... deterrence does not merely defend existing arsenals; it commends nuclear weapons to others. It is the intellectual fuel that propels proliferation.”
Jonathan Schell
The Nation Institute
speaking at the NGO Presentation session on May 3, 2000
April 12, 2000
President William J. Clinton
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to express our concern about the state of nonproliferation and disarmament efforts undertaken by the United States on the eve of the upcoming Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We laud the clarity of purpose expressed in your March 6th statement in which you reiterated the goal of ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, we are concerned that the nonproliferation regime will be corroded at the NPT Review Conference in April unless you take dramatic steps to back up your words with actions.

The world’s confidence in America’s commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament has been compromised by several recent events in the U.S. First, the Senate failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), an action that weakens the commitment made by the U.S. at the last review of the NPT in 1995. In addition, the U.S. continues to push for modifications to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, a cornerstone of the international disarmament regime, to allow establishment of an unproven national missile defense system (NMD). Not only will deploying a NMD threaten the ABM Treaty, it will stimulate a new arms race with China and Russia. Finally, the strident American responses to efforts by friendly countries to set forth a new disarmament agenda send the signal that the U.S. is wavering in its commitment to the disarmament requirements of Article VI of the NPT.

At a time when we should be moving away from a reliance on nuclear weapons, the years since the last review conference have shown that nuclear-weapon nations continue to rely heavily on these weapons. In the United States, the 1997 Presidential Decision Directive 60 stated that nuclear weapons remain the “cornerstone” of our security policy. NATO has reaffirmed that nuclear weapons “will continue to fulfill an essential role” in its strategic policy and declared that it will not comply with a “no first use” policy. Russia has reacted by retracting its previous “no first use” commitment and, due to financial problems in funding its conventional forces, it is now much more reliant upon its nuclear arsenal. The problems are not restricted to NATO and Russia -- the recent tests in South Asia, unequivocally introduced India and Pakistan to the nuclear weapon community. In contrast, virtually all countries in the Southern Hemisphere are members of nuclear-weapons-free zones. Yet, when they attempted to make the Southern Hemisphere one unified nuclear-weapons-free zone, the United States objected. For these and other reasons, confidence in the commitment of nuclear weapon states to disarmament has been seriously weakened. We propose some simple steps that you can take during the remainder of your Administration to help restore confidence in the United States and the nonproliferation regime.

With over 180 nations gathering in New York for the NPT Review Conference, we believe this will be an ideal forum to announce some or all of these initiatives. In particular, we encourage you to take the following actions:

- Since the U.S. has affirmed unequivocally that there are legally binding obligations to engage in good faith negotiations toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, the U.S. should identify a proper forum to begin discussions leading to multilateral negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons, complementing the recent United Nations General Assembly resolution sponsored by the “New Agenda Coalition” (Ireland, Sweden, South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, Egypt, New Zealand) which calls for disarmament negotiations;
- The U.S. should encourage Russia to ratify START II and subsequently negotiate further verifiable, deep cuts in nuclear arsenals in a manner consistent with national security; [Editors Note: Russia has, of course, since ratified START II]
- The U.S. should negotiate with Russia, China and other nuclear weapon states to develop and implement verifiable methods to remove all nuclear weapons from “hair-trigger” alert;
- The U.S. should take clear steps to diminish the salience of nuclear weapons by reducing national and allied reliance on them, by pledging never to use them first, by negotiating a legally binding agreement which assures Non-Nuclear Weapon States that nuclear weapons will not be used against them, and by committing to an international prohibition on the development of new nuclear weapons;
- The U.S. should promote the establishment of an international accounting system for all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade materials, and continue to push for a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty; and
- The U.S. should encourage NATO to adopt a policy of “no first use of nuclear weapons”.

Mr. President, since the last Review Conference of the NPT, the U.S. has made some progress on its commitments under the NPT, but many uncertainties remain. Unless the United States takes tangible steps now to move beyond the lethargic bilateral processes commenced during the Cold War, arms control and disarmament will stagnate and the nonproliferation regime will be weakened. People around the world would forever be indebted to you if you took some simple practical steps to help fulfill one of humanity’s deepest longings: beginning to build a world free from the threat of nuclear destruction.

Sincerely,

An expanded role for NATO nuclear weapons?

Do the various sections of the Canadian Government talk to each other? What about the other Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) members of NATO? These questions are on the lips of many NGO observers to the 2000 Review conference of the NPT here in New York. A recent press report circulating at the conference outlines a new NATO nuclear strategy, proposed for adoption by May 9, which would expand the role of NATO nuclear weapons and potentially wreck chances of progress on disarmament. This is despite good statements from many NNWS NATO members about the need to reduce nuclear stockpiles and de-emphasise their strategic role. Clarification is urgently needed!

Retargetting nuclear weapons – a new trick for an old dog

The heart of this problem is the issue of justifying the continuing possession of nuclear weapons by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). With the end of the Cold War, the rationale for nuclear weapons was seriously eroded, if not removed. There was widespread optimism that disarmament efforts would accelerate in the new, more secure environment that emerged from the rubble of the Berlin Wall. But the hopes were short lived. Instead of eliminating their nuclear arms, the NWS - particularly the US - retargetted them, devising new threat scenarios to justify their existence and further development.

The most common new targets are so-called “rogue states”. These are countries who, it is alleged, may develop a nuclear, chemical or biological weapons capability some time in the future with which they could threaten the US and its NATO allies. The discovery of Iraq’s secret weapons programs after the 1991 Gulf War and the ongoing North Korean safeguards inspection crisis help to fuel the argument that nuclear weapons have to be retained in order to deter weapons of mass destruction that may be deployed in the future. Thus, with a new enemy identified, the military-industrial complexes were back in business, and continue to enjoy massive funding to maintain existing stockpiles and develop new weapons to enhance their destructive capability.

The New NATO doctrine

Given this trend, it is perhaps not surprising to see reports that NATO is now seeking to enshrine these new threats in its nuclear doctrine. Last week, Swiss newspaper, Die Tagesanzeiger, reported that in the next week NATO is seeking to approve a new strategy paper - MC400/2 - which formally expands the role of NATO nuclear weapons to counter (alleged) biological and chemical weapons threats from non-nuclear countries. The report quoted a NATO Military Committee spokesperson saying “because the alliance does not possess either biological or chemical weapons the nuclear threat is the only thing that’s left for us”.

The implications of this twisted logic becoming NATO policy are immense: it would mean an expanded role for nuclear weapons in NATO’s defence doctrine, in direct contravention of the legally binding commitment made by the UK and US as NWS under Article VI of the NPT to pursue disarmament; it would see for the first time a nuclear weapons doctrine that officially threatens their use against non-nuclear weapon states, destroying a key confidence building demand of NNWS and undermining the negative security assurance resolution at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference; it would fuel proliferation by providing renewed justification and excuse for nuclear weapons development by NNWS.

Double standards?

This is where the confusion over the position of NNWS members of NATO comes in. In their statements at the NPT they have warned of exactly the kind of developments that the new NATO strategy represents. In Canada’s opening speech to the Conference, Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy warned of “the tendency of some to justify retaining nuclear arsenals as a defence against other weapons of mass destruction”. NATO member, Norway, in its opening statement to the Conference, stated: “Nuclear weapons seem to become more important for certain actors in international politics. This is a trend that must be reversed”. Turkey, a country in which nuclear weapons are stationed, called for an ad hoc committee in the CD whose goal would be “to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”.

On Tuesday this week the EU presented a paper to Subsidiary Body I calling for the establishment of an ad hoc working group in the Conference on Disarmament entitled “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament”. Yet EU members, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the UK not only continue to host US nuclear weapons on their soil as members of NATO, but are reportedly considering a policy which would provide an enhanced justification for their continued possession and development, thereby fuelling the arms race.

These reports are extremely disturbing. If accurate they could fatally undermine the Conference. What is needed is an immediate, unambiguous and public statement by all members of NATO that reports of this new doctrine are wrong and that they will not now, or in the future, support such a role for NATO nuclear weapons. Otherwise? We might as well all go home.

Greenpeace delegation
What's On

4 May 2000

event: Presentation: “Toxic Legacy of the Nuclear Age”; Alexey Yablokov, Centre for Russian Environment Policy; Pamela Ransom, Women’s Environment and Development Organisation & others

place & time:
UN Headquarters @ 1-3pm

Main Committee 1:
Sessions begin @ 3pm
General Assembly Hall

Subsidiary Body 1
Sessions begin @ 10am
Conference Room 4

Main Committee 2:
Sessions begin @ 10am
General Assembly Hall

Main Committee 3:
Sessions begin @ 3pm
Conference Room 4

Credentials Committee:
Sessions begin @ 10am
Conference Room 6

General Committee:
Sessions begin @ 9.30am
Conference Room 6

Nagasaki
Must Be The Last Bombed!

An International NGO Conference, Nagasaki, November 17-20, 2000

A fortunate convergence of two motivating forces for peace occurred in Nagasaki City where the second atomic bomb was dropped on August 9, 1945.

First, the Mayor of Nagasaki, who attended the Hague Appeal for Peace Conference in May 1999 to witness the empowering NGO activities for peace, has come to believe that it will be the concerted work of NGOs that will vigorously advance the cause of nuclear abolition. Subsequently, in his Peace Declaration on August 9, 1999, he emphasized the importance of NGO roles in future efforts for nuclear disarmament, and then he expressed his willingness to host a major international NGO assembly in Nagasaki in the year 2000 to demand nuclear abolition.

Second, long-term efforts by the Nagasaki Peace Institute, a citizen-based institute, to maintain a neutral relationship with various local citizen groups have made it possible to unite these groups for nuclear abolition conference. A two-year test run of a non-partisan committee in Nagasaki to intervene in the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament process ended successfully last year in cooperation with independent national NGOs, including the Peace Depot. This committee has now become "The Year 2000 Nagasaki Citizens' Council for Nuclear Weapons Abolition". It is truly a history-making coalition of the broadest range of Nagasaki citizen groups as it transcends the differences of 'isms' and beliefs. The primary objective of this coalition is to bring the Mayor's idea of international NGO assembly for nuclear abolition into reality.

The title of the Conference is tentatively:"Global Citizens Assembly in Nagasaki: Challenging the 21st Century to Abolish Nuclear Weapons -- Nagasaki Must Be The Last Bombed!" As the 20th Century comes to a close, the Assembly aims to rally the will of NGOs to abolish nuclear weapons in the earliest days of the new century. To that end, the pioneering activities of NGOs will be highlighted and shared at the Assembly. Also, the Assembly is intended as a venue to launch specific campaigns (programs) in the cause of nuclear abolition by a variety of NGOs. The Assembly will issue a declaration to demonstrate the will and the strategy of the participants.

For more information contact:

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PHOTO: Robert Del Tredici