Preliminary reports from chairs of the 3 Main Committees were given in a plenary meeting on Friday, revealing that the work of the Review Conference is proceeding smoothly. The general debate and exchange of views has finished, and states parties and NGOs now turn to the task of influencing the draft texts submitted by Chairs. Addressing the overlap between Main Committee’s 1 and 2, Ambassador Baali indicated when opening the plenary that both Committees could draft language on the issue of compliance.

Main Committee I
Ambassador Reyes of Colombia reported that the debate and discussion has taken shape in this Committee with some rhythm and positive elements. In the four meetings of this committee so far, 17 general statements were read, and after consultations a Chairmans paper was submitted on Thursday afternoon (see basicint.org). Hereafter the work of the Committee will be devoted to hearing reactions and submissions to this paper. Ambassador Reyes reported that the Subsidiary Body on Nuclear Disarmament had held two meetings and that Ambassador Pearson of New Zealand had submitted a text which has began to receive reactions and proposals. When Ambassador Reyes indicated that time will be needed for informal consultations, Ambassador Baali responded that time could be used as the chair sees fit.

Main Committee II
Ambassador Adam Koberacki reported that the discussion had been lively in the three plenaries of this Committee on safeguards, export controls, physical protection and illicit traffic, financial matters related to safeguards, NWS and others with unsafeguarded nuclear activities, plutonium and highly enriched uranium management. Fifteen working papers and six conference room papers have resulted. Ten working papers and four conference room papers have been introduced and a total of seventeen Main Committee III papers have been submitted (many also online).

Ambassador Baali was pleased to note the very constructive and cooperative spirit in the conference thus far, and indicated that “we have every chance of fulfilling the task within the time frame successfully... I find it very encouraging that the Chairs have already circulated Chairman’s papers.” Ambassador Baali encouraged delegates to focus on the papers and to avoid long statements so that “by the end of next week we have agreed texts.”

Credentials Committee
Ambassador Widodo presented a preliminary report that 139 states had presented their credentials to the conference, indicating that the Committee remains open to those who have not already presented their credentials to do so.

While NGO’s hope the Conference remains productive, the issues of nuclear disarmament and NMD/ABM, not to mention the Middle East should not be avoided for the sake of calm.

Felicity Hill
Director UN Office
WILPF
Follow the Money:

An Analysis of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Request for Nuclear Weapons Activities

On February 7, 2000, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) budget request for fiscal year 2001 was transmitted to Congress. The funding requested for nuclear weapons activities (i.e. the Stockpile Stewardship program is $4.594 billion, which is an increase over comparable activities in the current fiscal year. Further, when one considers that some items in the 2001 budget request were shifted out of Stockpile Stewardship, where they had been included in years past, and put into other funding categories, the Stockpile Stewardship monies add up to $4.7 billion for the whole of the program.

The amount of money in the budget request for evaluating, testing and performing maintenance work on existing weapons is $408 million, or about 10% of the Stockpile Stewardship budget. One may well wonder what the other 90% of the budget is needed for.

Looking further into the budget, one finds an aggressive program of research, design, development, engineering and production for major upgrades or replacements for weapons systems in the U.S. arsenal. In particular, the 2001 budget proposes that DOE begin full-scale engineering development of new warheads to replace the W76 and the W80 warheads and to design a new secondary assembly and other components of the B64 bomb. DOE also has a major development program to manufacture new pits for the W88 warhead. During the next year, DOE will be installing major modifications to improve the performance of the B83 bomb and the W87 warhead.

Tri-Valley CAREs has brought a written analysis of the DOE budget to the NPT Review Conference. It is our belief that these activities do not comply with the U.S. disarmament obligation under Article VI of the NPT.

Tri-Valley CAREs is a non-governmental organization headquartered in Livermore, California, USA. The group monitors activities at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and throughout the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. This 4-page analysis of the DOE budget request was completed for Tri-Valley CAREs by Dr. Robert Civiak, a physicist who from 1988 to 1999 served as Program Examiner for the DOE budget in the White House Office of Management and Budget. Copies are available at the NGO table outside of Conference Room 4.

Marylia Kelley
Tri-Valley CAREs

Sustainable WHAT??!

While NGOs were meeting, lobbying, conferring, gleaming information, and proposing new ways to break the deadlock on nuclear disarmament at the NPT review, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), on Friday, held its final session of a two week meeting down the hall in the UN basement.

The Report of the Ad-Hoc Open-Ended Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Energy and Sustainable Development has been submitted to the CSD which "took note" of its recommendations. In a long list of items for future consideration at the next CSD in 2001 which will address energy issues, it is shocking to see "nuclear energy technologies" sandwiched among such items as accessibility of energy, energy efficiency and renewable energy! The report further asserts that "nuclear energy will continue to contribute to the overall energy mix." This bald assertion comes with the caveat that, "[i]t is necessary, however, that acceptable responses be found to such concerns as reactor safety, radioactive waste management, proliferation of fissile material and life cycle cost.” NGOs monitoring the NPT will have a lot to tell them about that!

The nuclear industry has apparently reached the members of the CSD's Ad-Hoc Energy Committee, just as it is now engaged in corrupting the Kyoto process by pressuring that body to include funding for nuclear energy as an option for developing countries, in the Clean Development Mechanism being established under the Kyoto accord to assist poor nations. At the NPT NGO presentations last week, we heard from Alexey Yablokov that nuclear energy, touted as a solution to global warming caused by fossil fuels, may actually contribute to global warming, through the release of radiocarbon. Further, one must factor in the huge quantities of fossil fuel used to manufacture, run and decommission a nuclear plant, as well as fossil fuel expenditures over the course of 250,000 years to manage toxic radioactive waste.

The CSD accepted the report but it's not too late to bury its recommendation. Next year, the CSD will address the issue of sustainable energy. A PrepCom in February will revisit the Energy Report in preparation for the Spring, 2001 meeting. Just as the NPT Review Conference is being urged by NGOs to re-examine the implications of Article IV's guarantee of the "inalienable right" to so-called "peaceful uses" of nuclear technology, a strong presence is needed at the CSD, as well as Kyoto, to make known the toxic effects of the nuclear fuel cycle, in increased cancer, birth defects, and mutations, as well as the impossibility of controlling nuclear weapons proliferation while spreading the technology and materials through "peaceful" use.

Alice Slater
GRACE
Alice Slater
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE)

1. What are your hopes or expectations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review 2000 Conference?
I hope that we are able to have an impact on the US media to let Americans know of their government’s responsibility for the current deadlock in nuclear disarmament so that public pressure can be brought to bear to change US policies.

2. What topics do you work on most or find the most interesting in this forum?
Communicating to the delegates and to the public that “Ballistic Missile Defense” is merely the camel’s nose under the tent of a far more menacing plan to “dominate” and “control” the military use of space according to the US Space Command Report, Vision for 2020. Linking up with the Commission for Sustainable Development, meeting concurrently, to organize against any inclusion of nuclear energy as an option for sustainable development.

3. What led you to be doing the work that you are doing now?
I’ve been a “cause junkie” since the Vietnam War and believe that people do have the power to make a difference. When my children were grown, I dropped out of volunteer work on issues of poverty, civil rights and peace, and went back to school for law. After graduation, I saw a notice for a meeting of the Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control (now LAWS) and plunged back in to “world work” where I learned more than I ever thought I’d need to know about nuclear weapons which now impels me to work for their abolition.

Who’s Who - Diplomat Profile
Ian Soutar
UK Ambassador
to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

1. What are your hopes or expectations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review 2000 Conference?
I hope for a substantive outcome which confirms the continuing relevance of the NPT and sets achievable steps towards our shared goal of nuclear disarmament.

2. What topics do you work on most or find the most interesting in this forum?
All aspects of the Treaty have their own intrinsic interest, but I suppose the most absorbing is nuclear disarmament which is critical to all of our concerns.

3. What led you to be doing the work that you are doing now?
I first became involved in arms control and disarmament in the eighties, more by chance rather than design, I must admit. Somewhat to my surprise, I found myself enjoying the work, although at the time the external conditions were not very favourable. When after of ten years my present job came up, I jumped at the chance.

Quote of the Day
“The very first resolution of the General Assembly adopted in January 1946 sought to address the challenge of, “the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction”. We must face the fact that after countless initiatives and resolutions, we still do not have concrete and generally accepted proposals supported by a clear commitment by the nuclear weapon states to the speedy, final and total elimination of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capabilities. We must ask the question, which might sound naive to those who have elaborated sophisticated arguments to justify their refusal to eliminate those terrible and terrifying weapons of mass destruction:

WHY DO THEY NEED THEM ANYWAY?

In reality, no rational answer can be advanced to explain in a satisfactory manner what in the end is the consequence of Cold War interia and an attachment to the use or the threat of brute force to assert the primacy of some states over others. “

Nelson Mandella
Governments and NGOs have identified and studied the next logical steps in control and reduction of nuclear weapons and related technology. These include bilateral arms reductions, deep cuts, de-alerting, fissile material register, cut-off, and ban, and changes in security policies regarding missile technology, no use or no first use of nuclear weapons, and deterrence.

Progress along these lines can only contribute to the goal of complete nuclear disarmament, but by themselves these steps do not guarantee the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Incremental steps, without a coherent overarching policy of nuclear disarmament, are not enough to meet the obligation to negotiate and conclude nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

The elimination of nuclear weapons will not necessarily follow a linear progression from arms control and non-proliferation to disarmament. A qualitative change in national security concepts is a more essential prerequisite. This change is related to concepts of self-defense, sovereignty, and national identity – concepts that are fundamental to the psychological mindset of any policy-maker living today, or even within the past few centuries. Today these concepts are in a state of flux, and their very foundations are being challenged by social, political, and economic forces resulting from the complex set of changes typically summed up in the word "globalization."

To say that change is inevitable, however, is not to say that it will necessarily lead to nuclear abolition. But many of the policies and institutions that are likely to be challenged over the next few decades are related, directly and indirectly, to the policies and institutions that depend on nuclear weapons. So there are likely to be opportunities to further the goal of total nuclear disarmament at the level of policy making and also through attention to the causes and consequences of current nuclear policy.

In today's disarmament debates the exercise of looking beyond immediate measures is often termed unrealistic and admittedly some of the proposed next steps might appear farther away than ever in the current political environment. As a result, initiatives that focus from the outset on the "ultimate" goal – elimination of nuclear weapons – are accused of idealism. This perspective argues that only incremental progress can pave the way for future disarmament steps, leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons. This "realistic" approach, however, tolerates dangerous political trends and current power struggles, allowing them to dictate the terms of nuclear disarmament. Is this realism, or is this fatalism?

The word "ultimate" divides arms control and abolition, deflecting the urgency of the latter and obscuring the distinction between proliferation and possession in the policies of the nuclear weapon states. Nuclear weapon states use the word "ultimate" to reconcile demands for total nuclear disarmament with their own possession and this makes the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons even more remote. Yet, if there is an element of good faith in the nuclear weapon states' declared ultimate goal, then the question arises whether "ultimate" can serve as a bridge between arms control and abolition by identifying a shared goal and allowing incremental movement forward to the extent that there is a common purpose.

In other words, "ultimate" should not be used to justify the indefinite extension of the status quo, but it could be used to build consensus on the urgency and necessity of disarmament. This would require examination of the concepts that are obscured by the use of the word "ultimate" and might reconcile the step by step approach with the qualitative change necessary for nuclear disarmament to occur.

Merav Datan
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

"A global regime which makes safety the result of terror and can speak of survival and annihilation as twin alternatives makes peace and the human future dependent on terror. This is not a basis for world order which this Court can endorse. This Court is committed to uphold the rule of law, not the rule of force or terror...."

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Christopher Weeramantry, International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8 July 1996
At the NGO Presentations of 3 May 2000, there were a series of excellent recommendations made by the speakers on behalf of the NGO community. We will be featuring these recommendations each day this week. Watch this space.

**Nuclear Disarmament**

There must be a commitment to refrain from actions undermining the fulfillment of Article VI, including resuming nuclear tests, developing and deploying new or modified weapons, producing fissile materials for weapons, and modifying or abrogating the ABM Treaty. There must also be a clear affirmation of the commitment to full implementation of Article VI, and, in this context, acceptance as authoritative the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ concerning Art. VI, adopted unanimously, which states that “[t]here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”.

This affirmation will be meaningful only if demonstrated by further commitments and actions, including:

1. The NWS’ unequivocal commitment to engage without delay in an accelerated process of nuclear disarmament including through commencement of multilateral negotiations leading to complete nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control.

2. Immediate action by the Russian Federation and the U.S. to implement START II and to conclude and implement START III at an early date. During these negotiations, the two powers should progressively de-alert and reduce their arsenals in reciprocal steps independent of an existing treaty, as they did in 1991. Such cuts could later be codified in START or a Continuous Arms Reductions Talks.

3. The early involvement of other nuclear-armed states in a process addressing de-alerting, transparency, reductions, and elimination.

4. Reduction and elimination of infrastructure and capabilities for nuclear weapons research and development, to accompany or precede reduction and elimination of warheads and delivery systems.

5. Adoption of policies that diminish the role of nuclear weapons in order to create a stable atmosphere for disarmament and contribute to international confidence and security. In this context all states possessing nuclear weapons, whether or not they are parties to the NPT, should take early steps to:
   - withdraw nuclear weapons deployed in other states
   - eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons from their arsenals
   - proceed to the de-alerting and removal of all nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles
   - adopt doctrines and postures that preclude the use of nuclear weapons
   - formally recognize that existing security assurances are legally binding, apply in all circumstances, and permit no exceptions other than those already expressly stated
   - respect the letter and spirit of the CTBT by recognizing that it is an instrument of nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation in all its aspects, and by ceasing the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the production of new types of nuclear weapons
   - refrain from producing any weapons-usable fissile materials for military-purposes pending the conclusion of a ban on their production, put all fissile materials declared in excess of military requirements under appropriate IAEA safeguards, and refrain from producing tritium for military purposes.

6. Development and negotiation of a global regime to control and eliminate or convert missiles.

7. Creation of additional nuclear weapon free zones, and strengthening of existing zones, including through ratification and strict observance of their protocols, linkage among the zones, and extension to cover sea and air transit of nuclear weapons.

8. Preparation for a universal disarmament regime through NPT-based consultations with states possessing nuclear weapons now outside the NPT.

**National Missile Defense**

The international community must pursue a number of steps, some short-term, some long-term, that will address the potential missile threat. Those include:

1. The weapon states themselves should agree now on a verifiable no-increase agreement on their own holdings of ballistic missiles configured for military use. This ceiling should be progressively lowered.

2. The international community should increase sharing of information on missile-related activities and capabilities. This could include an international launch notification regime and a global early warning system to monitor launches and provide real-time information to the international community.

3. There should be greater efforts to share the benefits of space-launch delivery vehicle and satellites. With joint activities every nation can pursue and benefit from space technology, without adopting it for military uses.

4. The international community should lay the groundwork for international sanctions and possible action against countries that use ballistic missiles in conflicts. The use of ballistic missiles should be delegitimized.

5. Countries should begin work on a regime to reduce and eventually eliminate ballistic missiles entirely except for space-launch purposes. An important and visible step would be a missile flight-test ban, which would halt ballistic missile development. Such a regime would include a missile monitoring and safeguarding system.

**Dr Daniel Ellsberg**

**Conveners, John Burroughs and Jim Wurst**

**Lawyers’Committee on Nuclear Policy**

**Lisbeth Gronlund**

**Union of Concerned Scientists**
Paul Newman presents a video taped message to the NPT 2000 Review Conference which has been playing outside of Conference Room 4 regularly.

If you are interested in obtaining a copy of this strong statement from Paul Newman, please contact the following phone number (212) 557-2501 - donation of $10 welcomed to cover cost of reproduction.

The video was produced by the Center for Defense Information

Song Competition
...to the tune of Waltzing Matilda

We’ll keep our weapons;
we’ll keep our weapons;
we’ll keep our weapons and we won’t let go

Or we’ll scream
and we’ll shout
and we’ll run around the conference room,
we keep our weapons
or we’re getting out

Up jumped a Kiwi
and threatened to change the whole darn deal,
the lads cried and screamed,
a tantrum then ensued.

It was the saddest sight
to see a country with such might
behave like a madman
who’d just lost a fight

“We’ll go ballistic;
we’ll go ballistic;
we’ll go ballistic;
if we don’t get our way

For my way is your way
and your way is no way,
we’ll go ballistic and break off the deal.”

And we sighed
as we watched
as we saw the world’s position go down
as they all did a Monica for the US weapons crown.

Anon.