In the build up to this Review Conference, NGOs were worried about a few things. Firstly, would the establishment of subsidiary bodies consume the first weeks? Would the Middle East issue block consensus until the last moments? Would the ABM/NMD disrupt the process? Would lack of consensus among the N-5 inhibit them from addressing the nuclear disarmament question effectively? How would the nuclear weapon states gloss over their recent public declarations reaffirming the role of nuclear weapons as an essential security component for the foreseeable future? And would the non-nuclear weapon states parties believe declarations made in New York over those made publically in N-5 capitals?

Ambassador Baali resolved the subsidiary body issue quickly, steering the forward looking action plan on nuclear disarmament and the Middle East/universality question into the most productive and focused venue on offer. The ambiguity of the N-5 statement on the ABM has, however, sidelined an issue which certainly can’t be resolved here, but must be further addressed by NPT States parties. NPT States parties have registered concern about the implications of US plans for a National Missile Defence but stopped short of offering alternatives, leaving only a tacit complicity in the maintenance of Russian and the US nuclear arsenals.

Will the N-5 statement silence much needed challenge to a potential new arms race? There is broad based frustration with the tactics of China on the issue of the ABM - but alternative criticisms or strategies to address US plans to deploy NMD and to militarise space that would be more fruitful are not being heard loudly enough.

While a storm is not required to instigate results, a false sense of calm induced by disingenuous statements of intent will undermine the NPT just as badly as a divisive showdown. The productive and constructive results on procedural issues that opened the conference have not yet carried over into the substantive work of the conference.

However, the first late night meeting of Subsidiary Body 1 is unfolding as NGOs take their place at the couches to wait. Chairman Clive Pearson of New Zealand has already produced a second draft text outlining the possible nuclear disarmament agenda for the coming five-year period (see www.basicint.org). This forward looking document contains the logical next steps in the process. NGOs continue to hold out hope that the nuclear weapon states will realise that their security depends not on nuclear weapons but on international cooperation and a successful NPT. Success depends on reaching a turning point whereby the role of nuclear weapons in security policy is diminished and eliminated.

Felicity Hill
Director
UN Office - WILPF

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Recommendations for increased NGO involvement

As an integral part of the strengthened review process, Canada believes that each session of the Preparatory Committee should continue to report publicly on its work pertaining to the operation and implementation of the Treaty. As my Foreign Minister noted in his plenary speech last week, if we are to have real accountability then we need to have real transparency. Welcome moves in this regard are the inclusion of NGO advisors on a number of delegations to this conference – including two on Canada’s delegation – and the opportunity provided to the NGO community to make its views and recommendations known directly to this Review Conference.

The issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation have been democratized. These are no longer the exclusive purview of military officials, diplomats and government scientists. Several NGOs include as members retired arms control negotiators, former weapons scientists, academic experts and individuals from many different walks of life. Our experience in this context, going at least as far back as 1985, demonstrates that the commitment and expertise of NGO advisors can do a great deal to enhance the openness and public accountability of our work, to involve civil society in our important issues, and to mobilise public support for, and participation in, our efforts directed at achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

With the global reach of the Internet and its associated revolution in information technologies, we are very ill-advised to ignore NGOs and civil society. Citizen verification and information distribution are valuable tools in countering proliferation. We recommend that each Review Conference, including its full Preparatory Committee process, encourages greater transparency, including increased NGO access and participation, and enhanced media awareness.

In practice, this would involve enhancing the present level of access and participation provided to NGOs. We recommend that NGOs should be allowed, upon request, to attend most meetings other than those designated as closed consultations. In addition, NGOs should be permitted to make presentations to each of the Main Committees at Review Conferences as well as to meetings at the Preparatory Committee devoted to specific subject areas.

Such enhanced access and participation would be open to eligible NGOs working in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The eligibility of NGOs may be decided by the President of the Review Conference and Chairman of a Preparatory Committee session, on the basis of a list provided by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. NGO participation could be considered on the basis of geographic representation, but with each NGO having a demonstrated record of appropriate work in this field.

From the Statement of Mr Tariq Rauf
Advisor to Canada’s NPT Delegation
Presented to NPT Review Conference 5 May 2000

Bomb shelters - your vision for the future?
Felicity Hill  
Director UN Office  
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom - WILPF  

1. What are your hopes or expectations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 2000 Review Conference?  
I hope, and I expect an ambitious five year action plan for disarmament to come out of this Review Conference. A lot can be achieved in five years. The five year action plan will only be meaningful if it is prefaced by a commitment by the nuclear weapon states to disarm. Completely. That is the goal. This treaty body offers a venue for the nuclear weapon states to hear from the majority of the world's governments and the majority of the world's people. I hope that all states and NGOs use this forum to its maximum potential - both in the halls of the UN but also in the press as well as local and national contexts.

2. What topics do you work on most or find the most interesting in this forum?  
Nuclear disarmament and nuclear disarmament. I see the issues of safeguards, energy and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones as urgently relevant, but they can only be dealt with coherently in a framework and political climate of commitment to disarmament.

3. What led you to be doing the work that you are doing now?  
I am the daughter of an incredibly intelligent woman who led me to believe that humans are capable of evolution. When our democratically elected government was removed in Australia in 1975, the lowest, most despair-filled political moment in Australian living memory, the slogan "Maintain Your Rage" was coined. At that time, and ever since, my mother has maintained that anger should never be violent, but was about investing hope in justice - and I believe her.

I'm angry about nuclear weapons - but that anger is tied to a hope and a knowledge that evolution is inevitable and that humanity will evolve from this nuclear age. But when? Part of my anger is about the time, energy and brilliance of people in both the governmental and non-governmental community that is being wasted in repeating the painfully and embarrassingly obvious fact that nuclear weapons are suicidal, genocidal and ecocidal. I look around the conference room and think about all the things we could be creating and really doing with our brains and time. But we can't until this monumental impediment to human evolution is erased. I'm angry that I spent my childhood knowing that Australia was a nuclear target because of our alliance with the US; that the UK tested nuclear weapons in Australia; that we export uranium; that nuclear weapons were created under conditions of absolute secrecy in blatant disregard of any notion of democracy; that the gene pool of life on earth has been altered by what I can only see as a psychotic and embarrassingly unevolved era in human history. But I do think that the UN’s first resolution will eventually be implemented as will Article VI of the NPT.

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NGO Recommendations

At the NGO Presentations of 3 May 2000, there were a series of excellent recommendations made by the speakers on behalf of the NGO community. We are featuring these recommendations each day this week.

Universality & Nonproliferation: The Case of the Middle East

We propose [that Subsidiary Body II] evaluate the causes for lack of implementation of the Middle East Resolution and seek ways to ensure its implementation in the future. We ask the subsidiary body:

1. To recommend measures to encourage Israel, the only Middle East state that has refused to join the NPT, to accede as soon as possible to the Treaty and to accept full IAEA scope safeguards.

2. To urge States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear weapon states and above all the United States, to refrain, in compliance with NPT Article I, from transferring, directly or indirectly or by any means, any material, instrument, or technology which can be used to produce nuclear weapons or their delivery systems, to any country which does not accede to the NPT and abide by its provisions.

Due to the lack of progress on implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East from the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, it is essential that an ongoing mechanism be established to monitor future compliance with the Resolution.

Mr. Bahig Nassar  
Arab Coordination Center of NGOs
All the World’s a Stage

If the Non-Proliferation Treaty were a theatre performance, I would be hard pressed to say if it were a comedy of errors or an historical tragedy.

Every five years, it is the task of States Parties to the Treaty to review their own performance, which is rather like telling the actors in a play to decide whether those in the leading roles forgot their lines deliberately, or whether they were simply overstretched in their ability. And since this cast of actors (or their predecessors) also collectively wrote the text of the play, the fatal flaw may simply lie in the complexity and absurdity of the lines, or the plot itself, which seems to make no sense.

For those who are not familiar with the storyline of this play, it is set in New York in windowless, airless rooms. Five years have passed since the decision to indefinitely extend the running time, so that no one is sure when the play will actually reach its conclusion.

The characters agreed, thirty years ago, that there will be five main characters and that the play exists to prevent more than five achieving this status. There is a limited number of supporting roles and a number of extras that are always showing interest in attaining a higher status. From the five main characters, two play the lead, both of whom constantly try to upstage the other. In the last five years, due to various ailments, one of the leading actors has been showing a weaker performance, leaving the stage free for the other to dominate, although things indicate that this ailing performer is about to make a forceful comeback.

The play is about power between states, abuse of the agreement through its inherent contradictions, a tale of broken promises and lies, of anger and complacency. The characters are required to hold lengthy monologues onstage, the content of which is minimal, while the real dialogue takes place backstage, in the wings, the dressing rooms and the green room or coffee bar. There are a multitude of directors, who send each actor instructions from afar, all of whom are working on other, more interesting and more lucrative productions. There is no room for improvisation.

No one is watching this play from the general public. The performance dates are barely advertised, the critics no longer come to the opening night of each re-run, having seen it so many times before. Few have noticed that in this latest version, the lines are not entirely the same and that there is a new sub-text.

There is an interesting piece of theatre accompanying this long-running production which is produced by a number of non-state actors and is also little known to the public or media, but is worth more attention. This play is called Abolition 2000 and it has been running now for five years to an ever-growing audience. This is definitely worth a visit, although you may not entirely understand it if you have not been following the story of the state-sponsored play, "The Non-Proliferation Treaty".

Xanthe Hall
IPPNW- Germany

The Non-Proliferation Treaty will be showing till May 19th at the United Nations in New York.

The story goes like this:

Sam makes a powerful weapon to destroy Fritz with whom he is at war, thinking that Fritz is also working on such a weapon. Although he finds out that Fritz is not actually building a weapon to destroy him, Sam continues building the weapon and tests it on Akira, despite the fact that Akira has already told Sam’s friend Igor, that he will surrender to Sam.

Actually, Sam doesn’t like Igor either and uses the weapon on Akira to show Igor that he could kill him too. This action shows the world that the weapon in question is the most powerful and destructive weapon known to humankind and gives everyone a terrible fright.

Igor knows that this weapon might be used against him, so he builds one of his own and arms race begins between Igor and Sam.

Jack and Pierra, long-standing friends of Sam, also decide to build a few of these weapons, followed by Lee, who hates being left out of anything because he has the biggest population in the world.

At this point, all the characters negotiate an agreement called the Non-Proliferation Treaty that allows only the five main characters to have these weapons, so long as they promise to negotiate to get rid of the weapons altogether as soon as possible. In return, the five agree to share the technology with all the characters (which will enable everyone to make nuclear weapons) so long as these others only use it peacefully.

Now Sam is inventing a new weapon - one that he does not call a weapon, but a shield against weapons. He is telling Igor that he wants to be friends, but encourages him to maintain a large number of weapons to be the only one that Sam will allow to be powerful enough to overwhelm his shield. He thinks that Igor will be flattered by this gesture but instead Igor tells everyone about it because he doesn’t trust Sam.

Everyone is worried that some of the actors might walk out of the play entirely and start their own production. Despite the reductions in the numbers of these weapons in the theatre during the lengthy run of the play, the main actors are still unwilling to give them up entirely, although they repeatedly promise they will get round to it eventually. When the other actors ask for a date, even an approximate one, they are told to be patient and sometimes they receive gifts for their homes in return for their silence on these matters.

And so it goes on...
FEATURE ARTICLE

Language & Pointillism, Minutiae & Macro-disarmament

If you stand close to a Georges Seurat painting all you see is dots, periods really, or maybe commas. It is only when you step back that the big picture emerges. It is the same with international treaties and negotiations. The nagging questions surrounding the details of language often obscure the larger goal.

A fundamental dispute which surrounds the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty involves a comma. A comma in Article 6, which reads:

Each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The comma in this article is the subject of numerous articles, debates, and policies. The question involved is if and how the comma links the two clauses. It is the debate over such small details that has stopped the process toward nuclear disarmament from evolving positively. It is the minutiae in language which can derail progress already made.

In fact, this comma may be the one dot which, used procedurally, is holding up nuclear disarmament. That is, the nuclear weapon states say that nuclear disarmament is contingent upon general and complete disarmament. Others say, abolish the nuclear arsenals first and then address conventional arsenals. Which is held to be right, is a product of interpretation and perspective.

With this in mind the efforts toward a Nuclear Weapons Convention face similar challenges. Fundamental definitions are not held to be the same by all involved parties. Getting to the core assumptions is difficult given such differing perspectives. The details of language, the pointillism, need to be addressed but should not stop the overarching goal of macro-disarmament from being achieved.

The architects of the nuclear weapon abolition regime have a weighty job.

Addressing fundamental assumptions will require asking hard questions. Questions like: When working toward nuclear disarmament, what is the final goal? Is it the dismantlement of the weapons themselves? Or will it include the shutting down of all nuclear research facilities? How does nuclear power fit into achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament? How do nuclear arsenals relate to conventional weaponry? What of other industrial uses of radionuclides, and what of the medical uses? Will nuclear disarmament only happen after the weapons design industry has created the next obscene generation of weaponry thus making the existing nuclear arsenals obsolete? How will the culture of secrecy and hegemony be transformed as part of this new global structure of disarmament? How will the power structure be defined without Mutual Assured Destruction behind it to blackmail full participation? How have nuclear weapons affected the level of violence in our world, and what needs to be done to address the legacies of MAD? And how will the waste, the millions of tons of toxic waste, be dealt with in the next hundred thousand years and beyond?

Further complicating this situation is the disconnected reality that the various "actors" have regarding each other on this stage. On one side, you have the diplomatic community who are for the most part career civil servants who may or may not have disarmament experience or even find it a compelling topic to address. Then there are the state governmental players who have both national and regional security and economic concerns. They make decisions based on electoral concerns and influenced by potential or existing contracts and the creation of jobs. Adding to the mix, there are the people who represent non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Special interest, this group is often called. In this case, the NGOs who focus on nuclear weapons tend to be calling for the survival of the planet. Not exactly a special interest for only one part of the society. Lastly, but not at all least, there are the designers and makers of the nuclear weapons themselves.

These actors on the nuclear stage are considered by many in the above-mentioned groups to be passive mouthpieces or spear-carrying characters. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The directors of the nuclear weapons labs have the future of the world in their radioactive hands and are fighting dirty for the life of their guild.

It is through doublespeak and black budget items that the designers get the new facilities and all the resources they need to continue qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. The Stockpile Stewardship program used to be called Reconfiguration and then it was Complex 21. The working assumption of all these schemes is to continue making nuclear weapons work. Today, the US is spending annually more on nuclear weapons development than at the height of the cold war. The madness of nuclear weapons has not yet been cured. The communities of people working for a nuclear weapons free world can also get bogged down in the language. Ultimately though, the labels are meaningless; it is the actions which are of paramount importance.

The fundamental truth is that the issue of nuclear disarmament is connected to every person's life on this planet, including the beautiful baby girl recently born in a tree in the flooded region of Mozambique.

Achieving a Nuclear Weapons Convention will take the common understanding of all people that genocide is to be avoided, and that planning for genocide is tantamount to achieving it. A rejection of the economic structures that threaten extinction is called for, along with the embrace of a vision of a world thriving, with every person working toward a future without the threat of extinction.

Stephanie Fraser
Reaching Critical Will
From Nuclear Weapons Convention Monitor, April 2000
Legal, Political, and Technical Strategies for Nuclear Disarmament

A panel discussion took place yesterday afternoon, exploring the legal, political, and technical elements and requirements of a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC). Speakers included Dr. Penelope Simons of the Simons Foundation in Canada; Merav Datan of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War in Cambridge, Massachusetts; Dr. Eugene Miasnikov of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies in Moscow; and Dr. Jurgen Scheffran of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation in Darmstadt, Germany. Alyn Ware of the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy in New York and the Disarmament and Security Centre in New Zealand moderated the session.

Ambassador Hasmy Agam of Malaysia was unable to attend the session as originally scheduled. However, the statement and working paper Malaysia had submitted on the previous day provided the starting point and context for the discussion that followed. Malaysia, together with Costa Rica, had submitted a working paper to Subsidiary Body 1 following up on the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion on nuclear weapons, calling for negotiations leading to a NWC, and suggesting some of the elements that such negotiations might address.

Dr. Simons spoke about international law and its institutions as mechanisms to promote nuclear disarmament. "Apart from codifying and systematising required behaviours of states in their relations with each other, international law, its institutions and mechanisms can be used in a way that will help to create a political climate that will increase the effectiveness of international law itself." Arguing that law is a dynamic rather than a static process, she said that the NWC can be seen as one of the means to create a stronger international legal system, as well as an end product. She then offered three specific legal strategies to promote the NWC.

Ms. Datan discussed the content of the Model NWC released in 1997 as a discussion document and the responses it has received, which help to identify some of the critical questions that must be addressed to make the NWC feasible and effective. The Model NWC presents a phased approach to prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons. The critical questions include the nature of a future international security regime, ways to minimize the danger of breakout, the future of nuclear energy, and the possibility of converting the nuclear weapons industry to a nuclear disarmament industry. (These arguments are contained in Security and Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention and the follow up NWC Monitor.)

Dr. Miasnikov presented a proposal for START III that includes 1,500 deployed warheads, 200 SLBMs, 200 silo-based ICBMs and other measures that would go beyond current negotiations. The proposal has circulated among government agencies in Russia and received favorable responses. Dr. Miasnikov also identified areas of potential disagreement between Russia and the US if START III talks proceed. Stressing the important role that ballistic missile defense (BMD) would play in the future of nuclear arms reductions, he suggested that experts draft a model convention against the development of BMD.

Dr. Scheffran underscored the close link between technology and security, stating that a nuclear weapons free world has two elements: politics (what should be done?) and capability (what can be done?). Once political problems are addressed, the technical solutions can be found. He noted that the technocratic question of how we can be sure we’ve found the last nuclear weapon only makes sense if nuclear weapons have value. Therefore it is necessary to improve security conditions, rather than wait for an improved security environment. He then listed measures to increase security, confidence, and cooperation with respect to nuclear capabilities and policies.