13 paragraphs comprising a forward looking action plan and the “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI” almost enjoy consensus on the penultimate night of the NPT.

The compromise text worked on until 2am by the New Agenda Coalition and the Nuclear Five contain a watered down version of the elements refined from Subsidiary Body I, chaired by Clive Pearson of New Zealand.

The price of the consensus is the inclusion of “strategic stability”, insisted upon by Russia and the elimination of the accelerated action in the 2000-2005 time frame but does at this stage include:

- further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;
- increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;
- further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons based on unilateral initiatives and as a part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
- concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;
- a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
- the engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

NGOs had a mixed reaction to the text, with Greenpeace calling the ambiguous language “meaningless” and “not good enough” and others declaring the language “something we can build on.”

Felicity Hill
Director
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

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News In Review  is funded by Ploughshares Fund, The Simons Foundation, The Ford Foundation & others

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Who’s Watching?
Effects of the RevCon in other fora

It is easy to lose perspective after hours of light-deprived, airless negotiations discussing minutiae contained between square brackets. While RevCon participants and observers have done an admirable job focusing in on key NPT issues, as we near the end one begins to wonder … Does anyone care? The answer is, of course … but the question is How much?

The actual texts or papers or outcomes or whatever are important, albeit only a piece of the puzzle. They will be read and quoted from frequently in the future, and give the next PrepCom in 2002 a jumping off point. The Conference on Disarmament will also take RevCon language on matters like the nuclear disarmament subsidiary body and the fissile material cutoff treaty to push for action in that forum. The IAEA will be able to use and build upon agreements and stated support here for work in Vienna and beyond. The CTBT gets a shot in the arm with so many countries reiterating (much-needed) backing for that interim measure. These documents will generally assist activities in other areas, occasionally providing added impetus to states to either get moving or keep moving.

Where else will events here have an impact on activities in other fora? NATO’s policies have been discussed and condemned many times during this RevCon. There were special démarches and meetings held at NATO Headquarters to prepare for the NPT and the criticism they would inevitably receive. Have no fear that the results (paper-based, political and otherwise) of this meeting will be very closely examined by NATO and its members. Parliaments will be able to judge the efficacy of their government’s efforts to forward the aims of their respective populations after reading documentation and analyses of the session, with Europeans especially sensitised at the moment. Non-NPT states parties have been meticulously following the proceedings to assess the political terrain which will help determine their future actions. These fora, as well as many others, are using this unique event to chart future courses and fix priorities.

One of the most important elements of the RevCon is the ‘litmus test’ of political will exhibited by NPT members. While the overwhelming majority of member states would like to see the NWS move faster towards nuclear disarmament, are they capable of exerting enough collective pressure to actually create new advancements? On which issues can states parties come together on the stated goals of the treaty to move as one and agree? Or are the NWS still able to impede and/or direct outcomes of the NPT sessions? While it is too early for the final analysis on these questions, it is clear that there have been some fundamental paradigm shifts that will alter the future of the NPT and its review process. A notable example was the bilaterals between the P-5 and the New Agenda – which have now set a precedent and signify a shift in the balance of power for, quite possibly, the life of the treaty.

When the cloud of NPT Fatigue settles and if we have before us agreed documents containing elements the majority of states find useful, we will see building blocks for future action, and more importantly an increased sense of accountability for those countries that make the existence of the NPT a continuing necessity.

Sharon Riggle
Director
Centre for European Security and Disarmament

WILPF Scorecard for NPT Delegations

9/10:
Ireland, South Africa, New Zealand, Mexico, Brazil, Egypt, Sweden - you stuck together, you pushed and worked really hard, you gave others courage, you compromised when you were forced, you got the unequivocal commitment - lead on.

6/10:
NAM - you held your anti-nuclear weapon line, but remain deeply confused about nuclear power.

5/10:
Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Norway - you used your alliance creatively in pushing hard for transparency and tactical nuclear weapon reductions, it remains for you to put the nuclear umbrella down and get out of that ridiculous alliance.

Minus Several Million:
US, Russia, China, France, UK - you are doggedly addicted to suicidal, genocidal and ecocidal weapons and stubbornly stood in the way of democracy when the majority of the world's countries and the majority of your own people want you to disarm.

UK, you will get out of detention earlier because you were more flexible than the rest and at least offered food for thought about the verifiability of disarmament. We suggest making friends with more desirable types, checking into a rehab and going cold turkey.
1. What are your hopes or expectations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 2000 Review Conference?

As many people here will agree, my hopes for this Conference differ greatly from what I expect at the meeting’s conclusion. The nuclear weapon states need to reduce the threat that nuclear weapons pose to the world by eliminating their arsenals, and they need to begin NOW. Regional tensions in various parts of the world show that possession of nuclear weapons will only lead to further escalation of technologies, arsenal sizes, and conflicts worldwide. However, this meeting’s outcome will not be so progressive. I’m still learning how to understand the diplomatic maneuvers since this is my first Review Conference, but even I can see that the most likely result will be an ineffectual document, and the NPT regime’s integrity will suffer even more for it.

2. What topics do you work on most or find the most interesting in this forum?

My organization tracks the nuclear disarmament negotiations most closely, but I follow the entire conference since BASIC provides all of the documents and working papers on-line. Scanning and proofing the majority of the papers from the meetings has allowed me to broaden my scope to follow the universality issue and negative security assurances language more closely. I’m also keeping a close eye on statements and developments that relate to the impending US decision to deploy a national missile defense; it’s important to relate international opinion back to US lawmakers to show the strong opposition to such a farcical idea.

3. What led you to be doing the work that you are doing now?

My interest in international stuff in general stems from my upbringing in the Washington, DC area, where American politics dominates every moment of every day. I chose to reject the self-obsession of US politics and explored Russian affairs for a school report at age 10. Since my parents disliked my fascination with Russia and US military/defense, I pursued the issues with vigor. After attending university, I stumbled upon a job opening with BASIC. I began by working on the organization’s website and publications, but also became involved with BASIC’s weapons trade work. I’ve always been interested in the technical elements of larger weapons systems and the politics of the US-Russian relations, and combined with a desire to do “what’s right”, the transition to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament work was almost natural.

Leunig cartoon - from the Suit Series
Why the Target Lists Should Shrink

LAST WEEK, several leading newspapers reported that the Pentagon is reviewing U.S. nuclear force “requirements” in connection with ongoing U.S.-Russian talks on the outlines of a third strategic arms reduction treaty (START III). According to a “senior” Pentagon official who spoke with The New York Times and who is familiar with the review: “We are not looking outside the [2000-2500] range, and no one has come to us yet with pressure to say, we need to go below those numbers.” This week the Senate Armed Services Committee is scheduled to hear testimony from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the nuclear force review.

Why can’t the Pentagon accommodate a lowering of the START III floor to a level below 2,000 strategic weapons? The answer is actually quite simple, algebraic actually. It is because the strategic war plan - known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) - consists of a very long and redundant list of targets in Russia and a shorter list of targets in China that Pentagon planners say the U.S. needs to be able to destroy in order to meet the latest presidential guidance on nuclear war planning (Presidential Decision Directive 60, issued in November 1997).

Nuclear Target Proliferation

Oddly enough, the targeting list has been growing instead of contracting since START II was originally signed in 1993. The target list has grown by 20% over the last five years alone. The vast bulk of the targets are located in Russia. The former nuclear republics of the USSR (Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) were dropped from the SIOP in 1997, but nevertheless the list grew from 2,500 in 1995 to 3,000 in the year 2000. There are about 2,260 “vital” Russian targets on the list today, divided into the four traditional categories nuclear (1,100), conventional (500), leadership (160), and war-supporting industry (500). It is important to consider that there are 500 nuclear weapons aimed at a Russian army on the verge of a nervous breakdown; that there are 160 nuclear weapons aimed at leadership targets in a country that is practically devoid of leadership; and nuclear weapons aimed at 500 factories that produced almost zero armaments last year.

As a rule of thumb, U.S. strategic planners historically set the required level of damage against vital targets at the 80% "damage-expectancy" level. This is tantamount to requiring our strategic forces to be able to destroy 80% of the 2,260 Russian targets, which in turn requires the ability to deliver approximately 1,800 warheads to their targets. It is no accident that we have about 2,300 strategic missile warheads on launch-ready alert at this very moment (98% of the Minuteman III and Peacekeeper land-based force on two-minute launch readiness plus four Trident submarines, two in the Atlantic and two in the Pacific, on fifteen-minute launch readiness). The land-based missiles need to launch on warning to ensure the survival and launch of U.S. forces that are sufficiently lethal against very hard targets such as Russian silos to meet the damage requirements.

If U.S. strategic forces have to quickly deliver at least 1800 warheads, then the Pentagon says we need a larger arsenal in total because of the unavoidable demands of replenishment and maintenance. For instance, typically, six out of the eighteen Trident submarines are port-bound at any time and cannot be counted upon to survive and deliver nuclear warheads. Thus, the U.S. needs one-third more sea-based strategic weapons than it can expect to deliver in wartime.

New Targets for American Nuclear Bombs

Additional targeting requirements drive up the numbers of total strategic weapons in the U.S. arsenal. In 1998-99, the Pentagon put China back into the SIOP after a hiatus of about 20 years. (This was the result of President Clinton's 1997 nuclear guidance.) There are now two “Limited Attack Options” (LAOs) involving a handful of U.S. Trident sub and bomber weapons in each case assigned to attack Chinese leadership, nuclear targets, and critical industries. By comparison, the SIOP consists of 65 LAOs against Russia, each ranging from 2 to 120 weapons; and a handful of Major Attack Options, the smallest of which would send more than 1,000 U.S. strategic warheads to attack Russia's nuclear complex. In addition, there are hundreds of non-SIOP targets in China, Russia, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea that have been assigned to the U.S. strategic forces (so-called strategic reserve forces). This targeting requirement further drives up the size of the U.S. strategic arsenal.

Add it all up, and you get 2,500 U.S. warheads at minimum that are deemed necessary to fulfill the SIOP goals against Russia and China (the two countries that, as Vice-President Gore says, represent our "vital partners", not our "enemies"). The START III floor may be lowered somewhat because several hundred hard targets (silos) in Russia will disappear as a result of START II or III reductions or obsolescence over the next decade.

Dr. Bruce Blair
President of the Center for Defense Information

Toward A More Sober Nuclear Policy

Getting below 2,000 will be difficult unless the SIOP target requirements are eased by new presidential guidance. Which of course they could be. No sober U.S. general, much less a political leader really believes that deterrence depends on the present scale of massive nuclear operations in wartime. Almost without exception, they regard the “Major Attack Options” that unleash thousands of nuclear warheads as absurd and grotesquely massive. They do not believe that a cold-blooded, deliberate nuclear strike by Russia or the United States against each other is remotely plausible. The only plausible scenarios for them are usually contingencies that involve the use of one or a handful of U.S. nuclear weapons (usually tactical rather than strategic weapons) against a country other than Russia.

There is no doubt whatsoever that deterrence would remain robust with far smaller arsenals on far lower levels of alert. The United States could easily drop to 1,500 warheads the force ceiling under consideration in the START III talks with Russia. Such a force could consist of: 10 Trident submarines armed with 24 missiles each, and 2 warheads per missile (480 in total); 300 Minuteman III land-based missiles with one warhead apiece (300 warheads); 20 B-2 bombers with 16 weapons apiece (320 in total); and 50 B-52 bombers modified to carry 8 warheads apiece (400 in total), for a grand total of 1,500 warheads. Alternatively, the Trident submarines could carry START II loadings of 5 warheads per missile, for a total of 1,200 warheads, in lieu of the B-2 and B-52 bomber force, which could be retired from the strategic arsenal. However, U.S. strategic planners cringe at the thought of removing a leg from the vaunted TRIAD, a vestige of Cold War-era inter-service rivalry. Various intermediate loadings offer practical alternatives.

U.S. nuclear deterrent "requirements" could be adequately met with 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons. This force level would be more than necessary to assure the destruction of 250 targets of any choice in retaliation for any sudden strike under normal conditions, and assured destruction of 1,000 targets in retaliation to an attack in crisis conditions. If this degree of nuclear threat projection does not deter a prospective adversary, it is difficult to conceive of a retaliatory threat that would.

Reproduced from Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers
Issue Brief Volume 4 Number 7 May 18 2000
Nuclear Waste Manifesto

The 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference is drawing to a close and will offer little to abolitionists who are determined to see the elimination of nuclear weapons from our planet. The unholy bargain for the inalienable right to poison the planet with the so-called “peaceful uses” of nuclear technology, which many non-nuclear weapon states continue to cling to, aided by the collusion of nuclear supplier countries, threatens to turn our planet into a nuclear waste dump and destroy our genetic heritage. A clear call must be issued around the planet to stop this insanity!! Here are some simple rules proposed to change the thinking and speaking about nuclear waste and weapons for the millennium:

1. Stop uranium mining;
2. Stop producing new nuclear waste;
3. Don’t transport waste - leave it as near as possible to the site where it is generated;
4. Don’t process waste - don’t cook it, classify it, ceramify it, transmute it, mox it;
5. Isolate waste from the air, soil, and water in above ground retrievable storage in sturdy containers that can easily be replaced over time;
6. Keep contained waste under international guard;
7. Establish a Global Sustainable Energy Agency; and
8. Establish a Global Waste Project which will devote intellectual and financial resources to studying the long term problem of nuclear waste, commensurate with the resources that were devoted to poisoning the planet with nuclear weapons and nuclear power.

Alice Slater
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment

Where will we go from here?

Review of the NGO Panel on 18 May, 2000 at the Dag Hammarskjold Library Auditorium

At the invitation of the NGO Committee on Disarmament ten panelists addressed the question of “What should NGOs be doing to make much speedier progress in achieving nuclear disarmament - and ending war?” They were Rebecca Johnson (Acronym), William Potter (Monterey Institute of International Studies), Senator Douglas Roche (Middle Powers Initiative), Vladimir Orlov (Center for Policy Studies in Russia), Jacqueline Cabasso (Western States Legal Foundation), Joseph Cirincione (Carnegie Endowment), Felicity Hill (Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom), Daryl Kimball (Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers), Alice Slater (Global Resource Action Center for the Environment), Bill Hartung (World Policy Institute), with Vernon Nichols, Chair of the Committee, moderating.

One can hardly address the question without giving thought to where we are and where we have come from. With the meeting taking place as the NPT Review Conference draws to a close, the departure point of the introspection for most was the review process. Though recent progress was welcome, there was disagreement over whether Thursday morning’s “breakthrough” in progress toward a final document indicated an historic turning point.

Most of the panelists were cautious in forecasting the outcome of the Review Conference, although they agreed that the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) has been an important player in advancing the movement toward nuclear disarmament. This grouping, which would have been inconceivable in 1995, has identified realistic and practical steps which NGOs can support, including irreversibility, reference to non-strategic weapons, and reducing operational status. Although their inclusion in a final document would be in the form of a compromise, these would be commitments that NGOs could follow and push.

Several speakers emphasized that we are all in this process for the "long haul" and should not expect immediate results, and that disarmament, like other movements, has ups and downs. Some considered this to be a time of crisis - noting US and Russian policies in particular - and felt that there has been no substantive progress since 1995, perhaps even regression. Nevertheless, even solid pessimists offered some avenues for hope and action, including, respectively, public opinion polls in Russia (75% against transfer of nuclear weapons or technology) and a suggestion to recognize the challenges, not aim too high, and solidify tentative gains.

Three concrete avenues for NGO action include pressure (“never let up”), analysis (“counter the other side”) and outreach (“not just outreach - you must also think up and reach the elite”).

Others drew hope from the spirit of endurance that long-time peace and disarmament NGOs have demonstrated, and from recent developments in other spheres, notably the reactions to globalization in Seattle and Washington, DC. Several speakers emphasized the importance of making links to this and other movements, and criticized the “insular” nature of the NPT review process and the corresponding insularity of disarmament NGOs.

It was noted that Abolition 2000 has this week reached 2000 signatories. It is now one of the largest NGO networks in the world, and the next task is to broaden and deepen the network. Panelists agreed that national missile defense deployment would adversely affect the NPT regime and any further efforts to verifiably eliminate nuclear stockpiles.

Edith Ballantyne
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

Merav Datan
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
A Successful Conference?

This is being written at 8.00pm at night one hour before the delegations go back into discussions on regional issues, so, who knows what will happen over the next twenty four hours. One thing is clear, however, the two-page forward looking document on disarmament is being accepted as a package, no amendments, by everyone except China.

As we all know the Chinese government has a problem with transparency as they do with many other human rights and freedom of speech issues. Trying to find out what China has, in terms of fissile materials stocks and nuclear weapons capabilities is next to impossible. Therefore this comes as no surprise. On this basis, here are my initial thoughts on the outcome of this conference. Sadly, the bad outweigh the good if you look at the last four weeks.

On the good side there was overwhelming support for the need to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons except from the nuclear-weapon states. The United States faced a wall of opposition to its plan to deploy a national missile defence system. There were also some surprises from the nuclear-weapon states, who, in many areas, were much more cooperative than in previous years. Britain stands out in this area.

On the bad side it is clear that major political and ideological differences still loom large over the NPT. Whether it is US policy towards Israel and Iraq, the right to nuclear power for peaceful uses, Sino/Soviet relations with the United States, South Asian nuclear tests or many others, every five years we are destined to go through the same tortuous four weeks unless more is done to fulfill the legal obligations enshrined in the NPT.

This means that greater progress must be made before 2005 on bringing about a world free of nuclear weapons. Even if this is only full entry-into-force of the NPT, negotiation of some form of Fissile Material Treaty and the completion of START III negotiations, that would be a major achievement.

However, as I sit writing this I realise that these three simple measures are likely to remain nothing more than a pipe dream unless there is greater political commitment to nuclear disarmament by the Nuclear Weapon States.

By the end of this year, despite worldwide opposition, the US could take the decision to deploy a Missile Defence System. We are all aware of what the Russian and Chinese reactions will be if this occurs, the dark cloud of a new arms race looms.

At the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, given the current lack of consensus at the NPT, and the clear differences of opinion that arose during discussions, there is little hope that the CD will start its work programme anytime in the near future.

At the UNGAFirst Committee much of the anger and frustration expressed during the NPT will undoubtedly spill over (as it usually does).

A successful conference?

You can look at it one of two ways. Yes, it was a success because we agreed a final forward looking set of proposals on nuclear disarmament and the NPT did not collapse. No, it was not a success because the package agreed was “the best we could get” but has so many pieces of vague phraseology with many of the positive action points enshrined in caveats, that we will be arguing until 2005 about what the text actually means and whether the States Parties are living up to it or not.

Given the divisions witnessed over the last four weeks about so many issues, there is little hope in the near future of achieving any progress in the international nuclear disarmament process. Unless, of course, there are fundamental changes of view by a minority of delegations represented at the NPT. They know who they are, we can only hope that in the coming months they think long and hard about what happened over the last four weeks and listen to the opinions expressed by many delegations on behalf of the people they represent - the world wants to be free of nuclear weapons.

Let’s hope that in 2005 things are better. The alternative is unthinkable.

William Peden
Greenpeace

Quote of the Day

“Over the past three weeks, administration officials have made no perceptible progress in convincing the Russians that the U.S. proposal to base 100 base interceptor missiles in Alaska poses no threat to their nuclear deterrent but instead is aimed at ‘rogue states’ such as North Korea and Iran. Rather than press the issue and be rejected by Putin, Clinton is expected to repeat familiar U.S. positions to the Russians, and to get back familiar responses in return.”

Roberto Suro
Washington Post, May 19, 2000

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