...the results of the sixth Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are still worth getting excited about:

- the first ever "unequivocal" political commitment that binds the five biggest nuclear armed nations to the "total" elimination of their arsenals. With this new unequivocal political commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, NGOs and governments have a new tool. While many point out that these words must now be turned into actions, the fact is that until now we have not even had these words.

- a commitment to "reducing the role" of nuclear weapons in security doctrines and policies, an essential policy shift that connects the necessary changes in military logic, theory and policy to action on nuclear disarmament.

- a commitment to the concept of "irreversibility" (meaning no putting weapons back together once they have been taken apart);

- promises to report "regularly" on the process of eliminating nuclear weapons. NGOs hope that this reporting will occur once a year when the NPT meets and will be standardised so that all nuclear weapon states provide information rather than propaganda;

- calls for the reduction of non-strategic weapons (or tactical nuclear weapons, like the US NATO weapons on European soil and numerous Russian tactical nukes pointed in their direction).

While these, and the other commitments outlined in the document will take a lot of effort to be implemented, increased activity on the part of the 182 non-nuclear governments as well as NGOs is guaranteed after this result, which is better than anyone predicted.

Going into the conference, many were disheartened but spirits lifted when Russia ratified START II and the CTBT. Other concerns centered on tension between the nuclear weapon states and potential conflict around procedural issues.

However, with a lot of help from the Secretariat, active delegates and NGOs, the President of the conference, Ambassador Baali of Algeria steered the group towards consensus on 6 documents that comprise the final report: a forward looking action plan on disarmament, a backwards looking document on the disarmament efforts of the past five years, a report on the safeguarding of nuclear materials and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, a report on the so-called "peaceful uses of nuclear energy", and a short paper on how the Review process should be conducted for the next five year period.

Tensions were high on the final day as another installment of the never-ending Gulf War unfolded, threatening to hold a month’s work by NGOs and 155 governments in the balance. A linkage was made between the explicit naming of Israel and Iraq's non-compliance under the Treaty. The compromise language agreed to forty hours later described the inability of the IAEA to assess Iraq's compliance due to lack of inspections.

Until this point, the NPT had been fairly constructive and convivial. The Nuclear 5 and the New Agenda Coalition states had worked through their disagreements and, under the excellent chairmanship of Clive Pearson of New Zealand, the forward looking document enjoyed consensus. Ambassador Westdal of Canada had skillfully navigated the stormy and oil-slicked waters of the Subsidiary Body devoted to the Middle East Resolution, Universality and Compliance, but was reduced to the role of messenger boy between the US and Iraq because of US refusal to meet face to face with Iraq. Ambassador Westdal’s patience and good will were commendable while the Iraqi-US tantrum was merely pathetic, albeit time consuming.
After two solid years of activity, the New Agenda Coalition was institutionalised at this NPT Review Conference. The flexible but determined leadership of Ireland, South Africa, Mexico, New Zealand, Brazil, Egypt and Sweden encouraged other groupings and individual states to take a stronger and more creative stand for nuclear disarmament. Many items on the new agenda proposed by NAC in the General Assembly and supported by over one hundred states are contained in the final outcome document of the NPT. The Secretary General has also enthusiastically taken up the idea of an international conference on nuclear disarmament and nuclear-non-proliferation, which could facilitate the consolidation of a new agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Essential to the implementation of the NPT Review Conference outcome will be the work of NGOs through awareness raising and movement building activities, as well as lobbying and research efforts. It is notable that not one government or coalition statement at the conclusion of the NPT acknowledged the work of NGOs. Thanks goes to Ambassador Baali for mentioning our work, facilitating NGO access and actually participating in NGO events in the build up and during the conference.

This final edition of News In Review features some of the analysis and work of major coalitions following the NPT and nuclear disarmament issues throughout the world. On behalf of WILPF and the Reaching Critical Will project, I would like to thank the numerous NGOs that lobbied their governments, undertook local solidarity actions, organised media, sent or brought information and analysis to New York and continue to work for the implementation of the positive results from this NPT. The Department for Disarmament Affairs and many delegates also deserve thanks and recognition for their tireless efforts. The 2000 NPT Review Conference was a success thanks to us all.

Felicity Hill  
Director UN Office  
WILPF

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**International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War - Statement on Conclusion of NPT 2000 Review**

At the conclusion of this year’s NPT Review Conference a considerably detailed final consensus document was issued. This document provides an important basis for measuring the success, and/or shortcomings, of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. In our view, the Review Conference produced some modest victories for those who advocate the prompt and complete abolition of nuclear weapons. It was also a political success for the New Agenda Coalition (NAC).

Deeds, not words, however, will ultimately determine whether the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and indeed the NPT itself, has succeeded in its avowed purpose. Some aspects of the final document are very encouraging. Advocates of abolition, both NGOs and states, must now use the leverage provided by the final document to push, prod and compel all NPT parties to fulfill their commitments.

We are also cautious in our appraisal of the NPT Review Conference at this stage because of an issue that loomed over the conference without being addressed directly in the final document, and that is the possible U.S. deployment of a national missile defense system (NMD). Russia, China and even many NATO allies are firmly opposed to NMD. We are, therefore, mindful that any progress on non-proliferation or disarmament that may have been made in New York could be undone if U.S. President Clinton, or his successor, decides to proceed with NMD.

Enforcing compliance with Article VI of the treaty is particularly important to IPPNW. Article VI contains the core promise, the essential quid pro quo, that lies at the heart of the NPT: a promise from the nuclear states to eliminate their own nuclear arsenals in exchange for the non-nuclear weapon States’ pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons.

Below is a brief overview of what we consider to be the key elements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference final document.

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**1. Unequivocal Undertaking:** Throughout much of the NPT’s history the nuclear powers have stated that the abolition of nuclear weapons was an “ultimate goal.” These words, “ultimate goal,” were used as a rhetorical shield by the nuclear weapon states against accusations that nuclear disarmament was not proceeding quickly enough. The word “ultimate” was dropped from the Review Conference final document to describe the goal of elimination of nuclear weapons. Instead, the final document, in referring to Article VI, speaks of “an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals...” This is the strongest political statement on abolition by the nuclear weapon states to date. While no timetable is established, this wording narrows the “wiggle room” available to the nuclear powers to indefinitely defer their full compliance with Article VI. The statement further asserts that “the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.” Again, however, deeds, not words, are needed to turn rhetoric into reality.

**2. Preserving and Strengthening the ABM Treaty:** NMD was implicitly addressed at the NPT Review Conference when the parties called for “preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty.” Without modifications, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would prohibit NMD and the U.S. is seeking to negotiate such modifications with Russia. The language of the document allows Russia and the vast majority of NPT state parties to argue that the ABM Treaty must remain unchanged. Our concern, however, is that the U.S. might argue that modifying the ABM Treaty qualifies as “preserving and strengthening” -- a transparent and, in our judgment, disingenuous argument that would undermine the basis of consensus that led to the final document. Abolition advocates, and opponents of NMD, must vigorously support the majority view.
3. Nuclear Doctrines: The final document’s unprecedented commitment toward “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination” provides a basis for challenging the nuclear doctrines of the nuclear weapon states and NATO.

4. Irreversibility: Another first for the NPT was agreement on the “principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.”

5. Increased Transparency: The final document calls, for the first time in the history of the NPT, for “increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI...” Although there are no specific examples of how the nuclear weapons states are to fulfill this obligation, there is now a bona fide basis for demanding it.

6. Further Reductions of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Again, for the first time, the NPT parties have explicitly called for the “further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives....” This assertion takes on particular significance in light of current NATO practice as well as Russia’s new nuclear doctrine.

7. De-alerting: Although the final document does not explicitly call for the de-alerting of nuclear weapons now on high alert, it does call for “concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.” This language provides potential leverage for abolition advocates who view de-alerting, as we do, as a high priority.

8. De-linking Nuclear and General Disarmament: The nuclear weapon states, and the U.S. in particular, have historically argued that the language of Article VI only contemplates nuclear disarmament in the context of general and complete disarmament. The final document now clearly de-links nuclear disarmament from general disarmament while re-affirming “that the ultimate objective of the efforts of the States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.”

9. Universality: The final document urges all states not party to the NPT to accede as non-nuclear weapon states “promptly and without condition.” The document also explicitly states that despite their nuclear test explosions in 1998, India and Pakistan are not considered by the NPT state parties to be nuclear weapon states, and it calls upon India, Pakistan, and Israel to place their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

10. Fissile Materials Ban: The final document recognizes that fulfillment of NPT Article VI requires a “non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” and “regrets that negotiations have not been pursued on this issue.”

In our view, these are among the most significant developments to arise from the 2000 NPT Review Conference. We see the final document as further support for the view that abolition is a legitimate and achievable goal and that possession, use, and threatened use of nuclear weapons is, as the World Court has said, illegitimate and illegal under international law. We believe the final document provides rhetorical and political leverage for our efforts to de-alert nuclear weapons, to prevent deployment of NMD, to bring about prompt, dramatic reductions in nuclear arsenals, and, most importantly, to advance the complete elimination of nuclear weapons through negotiation and implementation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

At the same time, we recognize that the signing of the NPT some thirty years ago raised similar hopes that were dashed as the years passed. Nuclear disarmament has proven an elusive goal. Accordingly, we take a guardedly optimistic view of the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The NPT remains intact and the parties have evinced a commitment to try and realize its full promise. For that promise to be fulfilled, however, IPPNW and other NGOs, as well as the non-nuclear parties to the NPT must be prepared to wage a constant and energetic campaign.

The 1996 World Court Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, which IPPNW was instrumental in securing, played a significant role in the deliberations of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and is cited in the final document as a legal basis for some of the commitments the parties have agreed to undertake with regard to nuclear disarmament.

In summary, the 2000 NPT Review Conference produced a final document that reflects many important and favorable developments. Since the late 1980s, IPPNW has been a staunch advocate of the abolition of nuclear weapons. Our understanding of the health and environmental consequences of nuclear warfare, and our solemn obligation as physicians to protect and preserve life and health, make abolition, for us, a moral imperative. Thousands of nuclear warheads remain on hair-trigger alert and tens of thousands more could be launched in hours. Just one of these weapons is capable of slaughtering millions. And explosion of just a few could have devastating and long-lasting effects on the environment, disrupt transportation and delivery of food, fuel, and medical supplies, and possibly trigger famine and mass starvation.

The NPT remains vitally important to efforts not only to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, but to achieve a nuclear weapons free world. It is now up to IPPNW, the NGO community, and sympathetic state parties to the NPT to make the abolition of nuclear weapons, the promise of the NPT, a reality.

(The full text of the IPPNW statement is available at www.ippnw.org or by e-mail from mdatan@ippnw.org.)

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
**CRND ARTICLE**

**After the 2000 NPT RevCom**

The 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference has been hailed a success on account of the fact that it produced a new, “unequivocal” declaration of the five recognized nuclear weapon states that they will eliminate nuclear weapons. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan praised the commitment to nuclear disarmament as a “a significant step forward in humanity's pursuit of a more peaceful world.”

In the face of the active diplomacy of the New Agenda Coalition and strong pressure from the majority of the world's non-nuclear nations, the five recognized nuclear weapon states – Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States – reluctantly reaffirmed their commitment to fulfill several unfinished nuclear risk reduction measures, including:

- The importance and urgency of early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
- A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.
- The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and their conclusion within five years.
- The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament.
- Further efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals unilaterally, increase transparency, further reduction of non-strategic initiatives, concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems, and diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies, and the engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

In addition, the Conference took unprecedented and important steps towards highlighting the dangers of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty. It also focused necessary attention on the problems and solutions to nuclear testing and nuclear weapons in South Asia.

While the Review Conference outcome is a psychological boost to the beleaguered nuclear non-proliferation regime, the final conference document still leaves the nuclear weapon states room for recalcitrance and many excuses for inaction on vital aspects of the nuclear disarmament agenda. While the Conference agreed about the “importance,” “urgency,” and “necessity” of practical steps to implement Article VI of the Treaty, a timetable for action and a requirement that the nuclear powers document their steps toward disarmament during the next five years was dropped at the urging of the United States and other nuclear states.

Language on specific initiatives were also weakened at the urging of the nuclear weapon states. For instance, while the Conference adopted strong language in support of the CTBT entry into force and the de-facto global test ban moratorium, the nuclear weapon states rejected language that would have called "upon all States not to conduct [non-explosive] tests for the further development and modernisation of nuclear weapons."

Such a commitment would have been valuable and important given the fact that the U.S. has been able to develop and deploy modified versions of previously tested weapons, such as the B-61 Mod 11 (which has earth penetrating capabilities designed to make it more usable against underground bunkers) without the aid of nuclear test explosions. These activities are contrary to goals of the CTBT as described in its Preamble.

Most significantly, the 2000 NPT Conference missed the opportunity to meaningfully address the most urgent and controversial issue affecting the non-proliferation regime and the architecture of bilateral arms control: national missile defense. Adopting language crafted by the five recognized nuclear weapon states, the Conference called for progress on "early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability."

What constitutes "preserving and strengthening" the ABM Treaty is a matter open to interpretation. Such language allows the United States to perpetuate the charade that it seeks to "strengthen" the ABM Treaty by modifying it to allow a "limited," but open-ended national missile defense system. President Clinton made a mockery of the interpretation of the vast majority of the NPT RevCon when he told the Russian Duma on June 4 that "I do not believe the decision before me is a threat to strategic stability and mutual deterrence."

Adding further uncertainty to the future direction of the United States on the ABM Treaty, on June 4 Vice-President Gore, when asked specifically if he would consider scrapping the ABM treaty, Gore replied, "I'm not ruling it out." Speaking on May 23, Governor George W. Bush was less equivocal in expressing his willingness to ignore the ABM Treaty and move ahead with a more open-ended approach to missile defenses than proposed by the Clinton Gore administrations -- an approach that is even more clearly opposed by Russia and China and would undercut the benefits of his proposals to reduce the number of weapons and take "as many weapons as possible" off "hair-trigger status."

Because of key differences between Democrats and Republicans and between Washington and Moscow, progress on the START process is indefinitely postponed, despite the NPT RevCon's exhortations. The U.S. Senate, which approved START II ratification in 1996, still must ratify 1997 protocols to the Treaty before entry into force can take place. While those protocols are non-controversial, they have been linked to protocols which update the ABM Treaty and have become entangled in the debate over national missile defense. It is unclear when President Clinton will deliver these agreements to the Senate and it is doubtful that the Senate will approve them.
Less than a month after the NPT RevCon, the Senate voted 51-47 for legislation that requires maintaining the U.S. arsenal at START I levels of 76 B-52H bombers, 18 Trident ballistic missile submarines, 500 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 50 MX missiles until START II enters into force or until a new "nuclear posture review" is conducted in late 2001. That the impasse on strategic nuclear reductions can be broken with a U.S.-Russian agreement on modifying the ABM Treaty to allow limited U.S. missile defenses and a START III agreement is doubtful given the strong opposition of a large number of U.S. Senators for such a "grand bargain" and the fact that the U.S. will seek additional modifications of the ABM Treaty to allow for "phase 2" deployment.

The 2000 NPT Conference also gave Russia, China, and other states ample room to delay progress on unilateral nuclear weapons reductions, increased transparency, dismantlement of tactical nuclear weapons, "de-alerting," and diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies if such steps do not, in the view of any state, promote "international stability" and provide "undiminished security for all."

As U.K. Defence Secretary Geoffrey Hoon noted on May 22, early action to destroy nuclear weapons should not be expected following a pledge by five major powers to eliminate their arsenals. Mr Hoon said: "What we have agreed there, together with the US, is that in principle we would like to see the end of nuclear weapons. I think every sensible person around the world agrees to that, but there is no specific timetable agreed and obviously it is dependent on every other nuclear weapons state agreeing the same and taking appropriate action."

Thus, the value NPT 2000 RevCon will be determined not so much by what the final conference document did or did not say, but by whether or not there is sufficient political will to realize concrete and lasting nuclear weapons risk reduction initiatives in the years to come. Mr. Hoon's statement also reminds us that the solutions (and the obstacles) to the stalled non-proliferation and disarmament situation are principally to be found in the capitals of the nuclear weapon states and their close allies. The job for NGOs and governments is to translate good intentions into concrete tangible actions to reduce nuclear dangers.

In the immediate near term, the excellent efforts of the New Agenda Coalition and many other states at the NPT RevCon must be built upon with concerted action to avoid a U.S. decision on national missile defense that produces an action-reaction cycle between the U.S., Russia, China, India and Pakistan that increases the overall threat from nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.

The international community must also make it clear that the U.S. and Russia can and should agree to even lower START III limits -- to 1500 deployed strategic weapons or below. As candidate George W. Bush said on May 23, that: "It should be possible to reduce the number of American nuclear weapons significantly further than what has already been agreed to under START II, without compromising our security in any way. These unneeded weapons are the expensive relics of dead conflicts, and they do nothing to make us more secure."

Finally, the international community must redouble its efforts to secure the signatures and ratifications necessary for CTBT entry into force. Without greater advocacy on behalf of the CTBT, it will not likely be reconsidered by the United States, China may continue to delay its ratification process, and the Indian and Pakistani accession will remain hostage to domestic politics and vulnerable to a new outbreak of hostilities in Kashmir.

The next opportunity to address the post-2000 NPT RevCon agenda will be at the Millennium Summit in September in New York. Leaders should use the conference to press for more specific commitments on these near-term non-proliferation issues, action on key negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament, and agree on a framework for the international conference (proposed by Secretary General Annan) on eliminating nuclear dangers to help explore and resolve these and other nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament challenges.

Daryl Kimball
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More analysis of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 2000 Review Conference can be found at:

www.reachingcriticalwill.org
NPT Momentum Rolling into the NATO Process

The NPT Review Conference 2000 demonstrated clearly that the nuclear status quo is changing in this new era. States are no longer willing to play along with the Cold War games that gave tacit approval of a delayed entry into force of Article VI. The message at the conference was clear, ‘Not enough, not fast enough’. This was taken on board by the nuclear weapon states (NWS) as they agreed to unprecedented language pushing them to deliver on their commitments under the NPT. Movement in this direction has been creeping along for several years, but reached a new peak at the RevCon when a final document was adopted that incorporated new and constructive measures. While the New Agenda Coalition is largely responsible for the success of the outcome, it was only possible because they represented the views of the majority of countries and were able to bring effective pressure to bear.

This interest in reviving the nuclear debate post-Cold War is reflected in other fora as well, most notably NATO. During the Soviet era, it was an easier sell to convince partners that nukes were needed to keep western Europe safe from the ‘Communist threat’. As the Wall collapsed, so did the argumentation (and some would contend, never existed to begin with). In the last 10 years NATO has been evolving to adapt to the changed security environment, planning for more peacekeeping and related tasks, restructuring forces and partially opening its very closed doors to the wider public.

Before their 50th anniversary summit in Washington in April 1999, a new Strategic Concept for NATO was drafted. Some countries within NATO wanted a re-think, or at the very least a discussion, about the nuclear posture of the Alliance. While Canada and Germany were vocal in their support for this dialogue, other member states supported the idea more quietly. A handful of Allies, most notably the nuclear members and Turkey, were vehemently opposed and wanted to squash the smallest ‘debate’ on the nuclear question. They were successful in this, buying dissenters with a promise to set up a longer term study group to look at the matter. This group was outlined in Paragraph 32 of the Washington Communiqué, and has hence been referred to as the Paragraph 32 Working Group.*

The tasks mandated in Para 32 have been spread around to various standing committees, and a report is scheduled to be presented to ministers in December of this year. As most of the substantive work will probably happen in the autumn, the results of the NPT RevCon will certainly play a part in the discussions – especially as several key players in New York are also NATO members. Before the RevCon, there were meetings held at NATO Headquarters and many démarches to prepare for the NPT and the criticism they would inevitably receive. Now that it is over, there is a collective sigh of relief that they did not get hit harder than they did. There is a danger that this sentiment may turn into complacency, as the squeaky wheels got their grease in New York, so there will be no perceived need for more concessions for awhile.

A number of items from the final document have strong implications for NATO and its policies. Mostly importantly, the treaty as a whole was reaffirmed, especially the article on nuclear disarmament commitments, which should add impetus to the discussions underway in Brussels. To support these claims, the final document states, ‘The Conference reaffirms its conviction that the preservation of the integrity of the Treaty and its strict implementation is essential to international peace and security’. And ‘An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI’. [Emphases added].

The group has already talked about possibilities for some sort of trade-off between Russia’s tactical nukes and NATO’s European-based ones, which would be in line with the NPT final document paragraph:

‘The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process’. They have also brought up the topic of de-mating, which would correspond to the document’s paragraph: ‘Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems’. It is not clear what the state of the negotiations are, or what the likelihood is for success, but a high-level discussion is welcome and necessary.

That leaves a core sentence, and general sentiment, for action: ‘Administering role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination’. [Emphasis added]. This was crafted very intentionally with NATO in mind. After the renewal of a robust (to use a favourite word of Lord Robertson) nuclear posture at the Washington Summit, states were outraged that the most conventionally powerful military alliance in the world would see fit to shore up nuclear deterrence at a time when the salience of nuclear weapons was on the sharp decline. That decision dealt some serious damage to the regime and highlights the need for an open and frank discussion on the role of these weapons in NATO policy.

As NATO decides on the course of action it will take under its Paragraph 32 mandate, the political context has been altered with the outcome of the RevCon. It is clear that the vast majority of states are opposed to the use or possession of nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever. It is also now evident that the NWS are bending to external pressure to move more decisively towards their legal obligation to disarm. As well, there will be serious consequences if at the end of the internal NATO process no real progress is made to review its nuclear stance; and it will bode ill if a discussion cannot even be begun at all in the Alliance.

Is NATO prepared to accept the costs of maintaining these weapons indefinitely? Are all 19 countries ready to share the political burden of doing so? What will be the result of a handful of powers inside the Alliance forcibly silencing the others on a matter of key concern to states not just in NATO, but globally? All NATO members were present at the RevCon and adopted the document individually. What would be the consequences of these 19 countries ignoring or moving away from the commitments made in New York? These and other questions can be justifiably raised in the NATO context. How they deal with them will be of vital interest to all NPT states parties. A failure to address the New York promises will negatively affect not only NATO and European security, but impact the international security environment as well.

*Elements of the Paragraph 32 mandate are delegated to different groups within the NATO structure. The Senior Political Committee–Reinforced (SPCR), at Deputy Permanent Representative level oversees the work and is responsible for the report to ministers in December 2000.

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