An enormous amount of expertise on security issues is brought together at meetings of the states parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. While focused on nuclear weapons, nuclear energy and safeguarding nuclear material, the broader political context always guides the discussion. This meeting will be no exception, especially considering the US decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty, the content of the new US Nuclear Posture Review, the bloodshed in the Middle East and Afghanistan, with Iraq possibly next in the line of fire. Will the opportunity for a frank discussion about security concepts, unilateralism, nuclear dangers and the nature of terrorism be taken up at this PrepCom, or will debate stay at a surface level as it did during the UNGA First Committee of 2001, along the lines of "everything has changed, but let's stick to business as usual"? These are among the questions over 300 NGO observers will be asking as they watch the struggle between 5 nuclear weapon states and 182 non-nuclear weapon states.

The New Agenda Position Paper will hopefully raise the standard of exchange, with its emphasis that "International security is a collective concern requiring collective engagement" and placing "the risk of a new arms race on earth and in outer space" firmly on the table. While recognizing the measures taken by one nuclear weapon state to unilaterally reduce the operational status of its nuclear weapons, the paper underlines the lack of positive development towards implementation of the blue print for disarmament developed at the 2000 NPT Review conference, expressing deep concern regarding "emerging approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons as part of new security strategies" and the "worrying signs of the development of new generations of nuclear weapons."

Many NGOs agree with the New Agenda emphasis on accountability and the need for reports to be submitted to each PrepCom on measures taken to implement the NPT. The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom has undertaken extensive research using publicly available material to produce "Accountability is Democracy, Transparency is Security: an NGO Shadow Report on Nuclear Disarmament" as an illustration of the information that should be shared as part of this reporting exercise (a shorter printed version is being circulated today, and a larger version is online at www.reachingcriticalwill.org). For this reporting to be meaningful, WILPF firmly believes that a standardized structure should be followed by nuclear weapon states and the remainder of the 44 states listed by the International Atomic Energy Agency as having nuclear power reactors and research reactors.

NGOs will be producing this newsletter on a daily basis to share opinion, analysis and news with delegations. Please send comments to emily@reachingcriticalwill.org

Emily Schroeder
Reaching Critical Will, WILPF
1. What are your hopes or expectations for the 2002 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 2002?

A recognition of the need to fill the gap between rhetoric and reality. We know what needs to be done. Let’s do it. We know the facts, we have the analyses and we face clear and present dangers. Now the danger is in not acting on what we know.

2. What topics do you work on most or find the most interesting in this forum?

I am convinced of the need for a Nuclear Weapons Convention as a goal and as part of the process towards disarmament.

3. What led you to be doing the work that you are doing now?

As a national of two countries - the United States and Israel - I don’t believe that nuclear weapons provide security for any country. In fact they undermine security.


0/120

This year, with the exception of a few bright lights, progress towards a nuclear free world was virtually non existent. We list below the 11 points of the original Abolition Statement, writing in 1995 in a cloud of hope at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference:

0/10 - initiate immediately and conclude negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement;
0/10 - immediately make an unconditional pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons;
0/10 - rapidly complete a truly comprehensive test ban treaty with a zero threshold and with the stated purpose of precluding nuclear weapons development by all states
0/10 - cease to produce and deploy new and additional nuclear weapons systems, and commence to withdraw and disable deployed nuclear weapons systems
0/10 - prohibit the military and commercial production and reprocessing of all weapons-useable radioactive materials;
0/10 - subject all weapons-useable radioactive materials and nuclear facilities in all states to international accounting, monitoring, and safeguards, and establish a public international registry of all weapons-useable radioactive materials;
0/10 - prohibit nuclear weapons research, design, development, and testing through laboratory experiments, including but not limited to non-nuclear hydrodynamic explosions and computer simulations, subject all nuclear weapons laboratories to international monitoring and close all nuclear test sites.
The nuclear non-proliferation regime is, once again, at a critical juncture. Festering proliferation dangers in the Middle East, South Asia, the Korean Peninsula, as well as the residual nuclear dangers of Cold War arsenals demand international cooperation and action. Unfortunately, this vital task has been complicated by the George W. Bush administration’s plans to keep its nuclear weapons options open and resist lasting nuclear arms limitations. Bush’s approach threatens to undermine the fundamental foundation for global cooperation to stop the spread of nuclear weapons -- the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The NPT is crucial to international security because it makes the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons technically challenging and widely unacceptable. But the NPT does not simply aim to maintain the status quo. Article VI of the NPT requires that the original five nuclear weapons states pursue effective nuclear disarmament measures. Until now, U.S. leaders have grudgingly recognized that to preserve the objective of global non-proliferation, the nuclear weapons states need to respect and act on their disarmament commitments.

Two years ago, at a key review conference on the NPT, the nuclear weapon states reaffirmed this approach by agreeing to a thirteen-point program of action for non-proliferation and disarmament. However, as diplomats from around the globe gather in New York for the next round of NPT consultations, they will find that the Bush administration has systematically dismissed and disavowed virtually all the arms control and disarmament measures agreed upon at the 2000 NPT meeting.

From the White House's narrow perspective, the NPT is merely as a tool to constrain the nuclear capabilities of states such as Iraq, North Korea and Iran, and improve the proliferation behavior of Russia and China. At the same time, the administration seeks to maintain its current nuclear capabilities and keep open the option to develop new nuclear capabilities to deter, dissuade and defeat existing and unforeseen threats, including those from what it calls the "axis of evil." Contradicting its disarmament pledges under the NPT, the Bush administration has announced it will withdraw from the ABM Treaty and pursue unproven missile defenses. It has shelved -- for the time being -- the nuclear test ban treaty. The U.S. delegation to the NPT meeting will point to Bush’s current support for the nuclear test moratorium. Though important, the permanence of this commitment has been undermined by Bush’s plans to shorten the time needed to resume U.S. nuclear testing and develop new nuclear weapons capabilities to defeat deeply-buried and hardened targets. Efforts to enhance the credibility and range of options for the possible use of nuclear weapons blur the line between nuclear and conventional warfare. Bush’s "do as I say, not as I do" policies only undermine nonproliferation efforts by suggesting to other states that nuclear weapons are necessary for their defense.

U.S. diplomats will try to defend their record by touting Bush’s effort to negotiate a “legally-binding” agreement with Russia to reduce operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 2,200 each by the year 2012. Though helpful in some respects, the U.S. proposal is far less than meets the eye. In keeping with the Pentagon’s new nuclear posture review, Bush wants to retain the ability to rapidly redeploy 2,400 stored warheads if necessary. Further eroding the security value the proposal, the U.S. is suggesting to Russia that either side should be allowed to exceed the numerical limits on deployed warheads by simply notifying the other party.

The United States, and indeed the world, has benefited from the NPT. As a nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty, the U.S. has assumed disarmament obligations that are in its own security interests, but it has failed to fulfill them, as have the other nuclear-weapon states. All states parties bear responsibility for the NPT’s implementation, but the Bush administration’s emphasis on nuclear weapons and its failure to take concrete steps to reduce their saliency particularly is particularly damaging to the non-proliferation regime. To work, the NPT requires good faith implementation by all parties. To survive, the NPT must serve the interests of all treaty partners, not just a few.

Daryl G. Kimball is the Executive Director of the Washington-based Arms Control Association, a non-partisan, non-governmental organization which publishes the journal, Arms Control Today. See <www.armscontrol.org> for details.
What's On

WEEK ONE

Daily: Abolition 2000 Morning Caucus, 8am to 9am, Monday to Friday, Episcopal Center, 815 Second Avenue,

Monday, April 8th, 2002

"Nuclear Weapons and Human Security: Ending the Conflict"
1pm - 6pm (public 1pm -3pm) , Conference Room 4, Middle Powers Initiative

Tuesday, April 9th, 2002

"Nuclear Dangers and the State of Security Treaties" 11am-12:30pm; 2pm-5pm; 6pm-9pm; Conference Room B (IEER)
IEER Reception, 6:00pm-9:00pm. 777 UN Plaza, Speaker: Jayantha Dhanapala, UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament,
Missile Defence and the ABM Treaty:"Voices from Greenland"
1:00 pm -3:00pm , Conference Room D., Greenpeace International

Wednesday, April 10th, 2002

NGO Presentations: 10:00 am - 1:00 pm, Conference Room 4, Official NPT Session
NPT Online Tutorial Information Session & Demo , following the round-table discussion in Conference Room D, CNS in cooperation with the NTI

NGO-Delegate Reception -
6:00 pm - 8:00 pm 777 UN Plaza, 12nd Floor

Please check venue and times against daily schedule as these may change