Ambassador Molnar is looking a bit harried these days, and with good reason: the long-awaited and highly anticipated Chairman’s Factual Summary is due today, at the close of the PrepCom. The Factual Summary is the document that lays the foundation for next year’s PrepCom, the last Preparatory meeting before the big Review Conference in 2005.

Chairman Molnar has done a splendid job thus far. In the months leading up to the PrepCom, he met with dozens of States Parties and NGOs in order to ensure a smooth process in Geneva. He hosted a fabulous reception at the Hungarian mission, and he briefed the NGOs last Friday during our Morning Caucus. He even contributed to the NGO News in Review (see page 4). Most importantly, he has ably avoided the potential minefield of procedural quagmires that could have paralyzed the conference from its start. His creative solution to the DPRK nameplate problem is one such example. (To avoid choosing sides over the question of reserving a place for the DPRK in the Conference Hall, he maintained his neutral position by simply pocketing the nameplate. Bravo, Ambassador, bravo.)

So, to express our appreciation for all of Mr. Molnar’s hard work, allow us to alleviate the good ambassador of some of his burden. We offer to you, sir, a Factual Summary... from the brown badge perspective.

- Issues of compliance to the NPT dominated discussions throughout the two weeks. Although every NWS has thus far failed to fulfil their obligation under Article VI, the alarming words and actions of the Bush administration (i.e. the Nuclear Posture Review, the National Security Strategy document, research and development of 75 kiloton yield Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrators, and an illegal and unauthorized war on Iraq, to name a few) positioned the United States as the primary bearer of the brunt of criticism from NGOs and NNWS alike.

- The issue of compliance was also the framework for the discussion over Iran’s questionable nuclear energy program, which the United States labeled a clandestine nuclear program in their opening statement. In its defense, Iran reminds us that it is operating said program under full legality of Article IV of the NPT. Although it has not yet adopted the additional protocol of the IAEA, it has welcomed Director-General ElBaradei to inspect their facilities. Also, as they pointed out yesterday, a top Iranian official is currently in Vienna to consult with the IAEA on its nuclear energy program. NGOs have offered a solution to this debate: nix Article IV altogether. (See the News in Review No. 8, available at: www.reachingcriticalwill.org/npt/nir/nir2003index.html)

- The DPRK’s withdrawal has led to two conclusions: 1) that the NPT must establish a mechanism to mitigate such emergencies and to prevent future crises. This proposal was put forth in both an NGO presentation (see: www.reachingcriticalwill.org/npt/NGOpresindex.html) and a panel on Tuesday. The German statement also devoted attention to the establishment of an emergency mechanism. 2) Future withdrawals may be averted with the codification of Negative Security Assurances, and, of course, Article VI fulfilment. (See the NAC working paper and draft protocol on the subject.)

- Key promises made in 2000 have been either brushed aside, ignored, or nullified. For instance, the importance attached to entry-into-force of the CTBT- step 1 of the 13 Steps agreed upon unanimously at the 2000 Review Conference- has been severely diminished, a shift embodied by the success of the US to prevent an oral statement by the CTBTO. This is an appalling reversal of the progress made three years ago and must be dealt with accordingly.

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Who's Who –

NGO profile

James Courtney
Greenpeace, Australia

1. What are your hopes or expectations for the 2003 PrepCom? Now that it is nearly over, how have they changed?

My hopes for the PrepCom were that I would come and see countries united in their commitment to real disarmament... I think now that it’s almost over, I hope that the countries can take this more seriously and send representatives to the meeting who demonstrate a real feeling for disarmament, a real drive for peace and a commitment to cooperation and fulfilling those objectives.

2. What topics do you work on most or find the most interesting in this forum?

I’ve been most interested in ascertaining Australia’s role and other smaller NNWS to see how they can make the opinions of their countries noticed and heard. Also to see what role the so-called “peaceful uses” of nuclear energy have and how they handle issues of dual-use technologies.

3. What led you to be doing the work that you are doing now?

I first got into disarmament work because my hometown of Freemantle in Western Australia is frequently visited by nuclear powered war ships and submarines and the official US policy has neither confirmed nor denied the presence of nuclear weapons. I wondered how we could ever prepare for an accident effectively and that got the process of inquiry going that led to me employed by Greenpeace and ultimately being here at the NPT.

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Quote of the Day

“The problem is not what to do with the loser, but rather what is to be done with the victor. For what is a victor but one who has learned that violence works?”

-Niccolo Tucci, 1945.

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- The issue of NGO participation, or lack thereof, also continued to rear its head throughout discussions, both inside Conference Room XVIII and elsewhere. Many States Parties (most notably Canada, which submitted a working paper on the subject) expressed their gratitude to NGOs as experts in both their knowledge of, and dedication to disarmament and nonproliferation issues. Only 8 States included NGOs on their delegations; the numerous other NGOs were shut out from all but two of the ten days of meetings. We are confident that in 2005 the States Parties will open even more of their plenaries to civil society as both a transparency measure and a confidence building measure.

- In the absence of NWS Article VI fulfilment, civil society has demonstrated a rising interest and increased participation in Citizens Weapons Inspections and direct disarmament actions. To meet the demand for citizens inspections, For Mother Earth held a workshop on Thursday, May 1st, that culminated in a follow-up meeting the following day. The message: if the governments of the world do not eliminate nuclear arsenals, the people of the world will do so themselves. (See NIR #9 at www.reachingcriticalwill.org/npt/nir/nir2003index.html OR www.motherearth.org for more information)

- The war on Iraq, for all of its illegality, immorality and damage to the international inspections regime that it has wreaked, has resulted in one positive effect: disarmament issues have been brought to the fore of international and grassroots political discourse. At
LET'S MAKE AN END TO NUCLEAR TERROR

The French nuclear doctrine does not just need to be "rethought", as former Defense Minister Paul Quil's declared recently ("Libration", 9 January). Nor does it need to be maintained, as is the view of Bruno Tertrais (former president of the National Assembly’s Defense Commission). No, it needs to be abandoned now! This "doctrine" is criminal in its essence, absurd in its justification (it claims to ensure national security), and catastrophic in its effects. It is invalid today not simply because "we live in a changing world", but because it always was criminal, absurd and catastrophic, right from the beginning.

"Criminal" is a very accurate word for this doctrine, because it depends on threatening, or rather promising (a precondition of credibility) to explode nuclear weapons of mass destruction on enemy cities - what is called the "anti-cities" strategy. Its brutal principles were formulated by General de Gaulle in the Council of Ministers on 3 January 1963: "When we are sure that we can kill 40 or 50 million of our aggressor's people (as we will be in 6-9 years), then we will be sure that we won't be attacked." (Alain Peyrefitte: C'tait de Gaulle, p. 342).

Today, counting our bombs as equaling 56.7 million tonnes of TNT (one tonne of dynamite for each French man, woman and child) and comparing the figures with Hiroshima, France can theoretically kill a billion people. This is only a modest contribution to overkill, however, since USA and Russia together have the capacity to kill everybody 15 times.

The international Court of Justice in The Hague declared on 8 July 1996, after examining the existing treaties since Nuremberg (where "crimes against humanity" were first defined), that the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons are "generally contrary to the rules of international law". The Court also confirmed unanimously that there exists a legal obligation for the USA, Russia, France, the UK and China to negotiate a global disarmament treaty banning all nuclear weapons. This obligation is even more obvious today, since on 19 May 2000 those five states signed an "unequivocal undertaking" to eliminate all their nuclear arsenals (the revised Article VI of the NPT - the Non-Proliferation Treaty). Two months later France "honored" this undertaking by deciding to build a new nuclear-missile-launching submarine of the new generation (a fourth SNLE-NG).

Given the fact that morality, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international law in general all condemn the use and the threat of nuclear weapons, can one argue nevertheless that threat is not the same as use, that threat is intended to avoid use, and that really a deterrence strategy protects us from war? No, one cannot. The alleged "realism" of this "strategy" is a tissue of nonsense.

Let us recall that during Giscard's presidency (1974-81), as also during Mitterrand’s (1981-95), the "doctrine" said that in the event of an attack by the "designated enemy" and a threat to France’s "vital interests", France would send a "final warning" in the form of a nuclear strike against the enemy’s numerous tanks (which we hoped would stay tightly grouped, so as to ensure an effective strike).

Giscard tells in his memoirs of a "full-scale (tactical nuclear) exercise," which took place in May 1980 and began in the "French Zone" of West Germany. The generals, when they were forced to "pull back" by a much more numerous enemy (as was written into the game), "considered that it was better to keep our battle forces intact and available rather than expose them to nuclear destruction A limited strike by us would immediately trigger retaliation direct onto French soil. Then there would remain only the choice between the white flag of surrender and "mutually assured destruction." (Ibid., p. 210)

That leaves us with "our strategic" weapons lurking in the ocean deep. What value do they have as deterrents? It cost 1500 billion francs between 1945 and 1997 and will cost at least 400 billion between now and 2010 (Cf. Bruno Barrilot, Audit atomique). Besides providing fantastic profits for some people, and breeding fantasies of power which are encouraged by a lobby that constantly besieges the government, the National Assembly and its Defense Commission, these weapons are needed to acquire "a useful value for France."

What useful value? Revenge. That is what Giscard had resolved, at least that is what he said: "If France’s destruction was begun by the enemy, I would immediately make the decision necessary to avenge her". In this scenario, the enemy would have "begun the destruction" of France (by nuclear strikes), and the President would retaliate. Perhaps so as to incite the enemy to finish the job, to complete "the annihilation of France"?

Suitable neither for deterrence nor revenge (except in a madman’s hands), nuclear weapons are not usable (except by madmen). They have never achieved anything except to proliferate (on the principle that "what’s good for you is good for me") and thus to create the conditions for a catastrophe - a catastrophe which is inevitable, unless the great powers decide to rid the whole planet of all weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical, nuclear or emerging technologies. (India has just indicated a willingness to join them in this). Which nation could take the initiative in setting up the elimination process? France, for instance. Fifty NGOs in five continents and numerous prominent people have appealed to France to do just this.

We have reached 2003, and seem on the point of reopening the Pandora’s box that was closed after the bombing of Nagasaki. Is there still time to act? What is required is the political will to act. And that is precisely what should be expected of the President of the Republic, who is bound by the French Constitution to respect international treaties, and therefore to honor the NPT - and expected of the Prime Minister, who wrote recently: "When one listens to the planet, one sees how much it needs France. A crazy world needs a wise France. Independent of the religious fanatics who can lead the world to war and of the "petrodollar fanatics", [...] we will devote all the forces we can to the essential task of humanizing the world. France will fight for international law, so that all forms of violence weaken and retreat."

Nuclear violence should be top of our hit list!

By Jean-Marie Matagne, Ph.D., President, Action de Citoyens pour Disarmement Nucleaire, France
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the verge of collapse, the international disarmament regime has a renewed opportunity to push forward and demand inspections to verify the disarmament of all countries.

NGOs have conquered the tempting feeling of defeat that many would expect in the face of such regression from NPT obligations. We have renewed our sense of determination and launched several new initiatives in preparation for the next NPT PrepCom. (See NIR #11, due out next week at: www.reachingcriticalwill.org/npt/nir/nir2003index.html)

We hope that you and your overworked staff found our Factual Summary helpful, Ambassador Molnar. But before you can even ask, if you are looking for a musical version of this summary, you should probably look elsewhere. I'm sure Mr. Salander will oblige.

Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will
WILPF

Who's Who - Diplomat Profile

Laszlo Molnar
Chairman, Permanent Representative of Hungary

1. What are your hopes or expectations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 2000 Review Conference?

That the PrepCom will consider in a comprehensive manner the state of health of the Treaty and prepare the ground for a fruitful completion of the present review cycle. Like the 1995 and 2000 RevCons, I expect that the next one will also significantly enhance the implementation of this major international legal instrument.

2. What topics do you work on most or find the most interesting in this forum?

As Chair, I am interested to approach all aspects of the Treaty in a balanced manner, and as far as the priorities of the review process are concerned, I am guided by the States parties. By way of example, I can just briefly mention that the issue of compliance with all provisions of the Treaty received increased attention in the deliberations this year.

3. What led you to be doing the work that you are doing now?

Hungary and Hungarian diplomats have traditionally played an active role in different global and regional fora on disarmament and non-proliferation. This is an expression of my country’s strong commitment to the advancement of international peace and security through multilateral diplomacy. In the beginning of my professional career as a scholar, later as a diplomat, I was closely associated with these issues, and I see my present role as Chair both as a great responsibility and a great professional and intellectual challenge.