Over the past few days, the PrepCom has largely dissipated from Conference Room IV, spreading out into the lobby, other basement conference rooms and Permanent Missions sprinkled across the east side of Manhattan so that States Parties could convene bilateral and plurilateral consultations with one another as they prepare to make the final recommendations for the 2005 Review Conference.

The Third PrepCom is mandated to make recommendations on both procedure and substance but, with agreement on most substantial issues far from sight, States Parties have given their implicit or explicit permission to Chairman Sudjadnan to prepare a Chairman's summary, to be affixed as an appendix to the final report. Even with that compromise, States Parties still find themselves in disagreement over a variety of important procedural issues, with only a few hours of the PrepCom left to go.

Some Non-Nuclear Weapon States, with Mexico at the helm, want changes to the Rules of Procedure on the basis that they do not allow for participation by international and NWFZ organizations- such as the CTBTO and the Organismo para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina y el Caribe (OPANAL) - at the same level given to the IAEA. The United States, however, is adamantly opposed to the CTBT. The dilemma therefore is whether to accept the current exclusion or push for something wider in the hope that it can be agreed upon at the 2005 Conference.

This situation also applies to the contentious issue over NGO access. This year, NGOs were allowed access to the Cluster Debates for the first time in PrepCom history, a practice that is in direct conformity with the rules of procedure.

States Parties also disagree whether the agenda for 2005 should explicitly acknowledge the consensus Final Document of 2000 as well as the decisions and resolutions of 1995 as the basis for the substantive debate in 2005. While dozens of States- including groupings such as the Non-Aligned, the Caribbean Community and the European Union- expressed strong support for the 13 Steps throughout these past two weeks, the United States remains adamantly opposed to the inclusion of the 2000 Final Document as a basis of reference for this PrepCom's final document. Russia's proposed compromise, which would have referenced the final documents from all Review Conferences "particularly the 2000 Review Conference," was rejected by Washington outright. Today we shall see whether they can reach an agreement on this critical issue.

This PrepCom utterly failed to incorporate any of Chairman Mónlar's extolled "interactivity"- the signature phrase of the 2003 PrepCom that signified actual debate and discussion amongst States Parties. Rather, each session- from the General Debate to the Cluster Debates as well as Special Time- offered only prepared statements without any divergence by the speaker. Real dialogue between States is needed if we are to move forward with the disarmament and nonproliferation regime, yet two weeks of prepared statements and regurgitated obstinate State policy proved the norm as States scrambled to maintain the successes of the past.

Now, crushed in the final frantic hours of this PrepCom, States are clambering to ensure even a mention of the celebrated 2000 Final Document, without any substantive discussion on how to ensure its implementation.

Obviously the United States opposes the continued application of the 13 Steps due to several of its components, including the entry-into-force of the CTBT (Step 1), maintenance of the ABM Treaty (Step 7), and the "unequivocal undertaking" (Step 6), to name a few. As was made clear numerous times during this conference, the U.S. opposes the continued focus on these agreements precisely because they, along with other Nuclear Weapon States, believe that issues of non-proliferation compliance must take precedence over what John Bolton referred to as "Article VI issues which do not exist." This misconception aside, the United States must understand that if they want to uphold and strengthen the nonproliferation regime and seriously address the problems that they rightly recognize as urgent, they must not renege on past agreements and achievements. As warned by South Africa earlier this week, "...undermining one agreement reached in the context of the NPT undermines all such agreements, including on issues that may be of particular importance to them. One cannot undermine one part of an agreement and hope that other parts will continue to have the same force, or that others will not turn in attempt to follow the same practice."
Coming when delegations are contemplating the creation of a subsidiary body to deal with Negative Security Assurances, the presentation yesterday by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Resources (IEER) on "Nuclear Targeting" couldn't have been timelier. "The gratuitous targeting of non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) began on May 5, 1943," argued Dr. Arjun Makhijani citing the United States' decision to target Japan instead of Germany, made on that day, thus establishing the policy of first use and first threat. Dr. Makhijani, a nuclear physicist, is the director of IEER. The Institute also brought Dr. Alla Yaroshinskaya, former nuclear advisor to Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin, from Moscow to address delegates and NGOs.

Dr. Yaroshinskaya opened the seminar by reciting a harrowing history of nuclear development and targeting in the former Soviet Union. Occupied with war and revolution at the beginning of the century, the Soviet Union did not develop independent investigations into the nature of nuclear physics, and thus only entered the fray in 1939 by spying on the Western scientific establishment. Even though Stalin called for an atomic bomb project in 1942, Western scientific secrets remained in Kremlin safes unavailable to Soviet scientists until the establishment of the Kurchatov Institute in early 1943. After WWII ended, Moscow did not doubt that the US would attack the USSR with atomic weapons, and Stalin make a Soviet bomb a top priority. This priority became reality on August 29, 1948. By 1949, the USSR had 70 targets in the US, and fearing US attack, the Soviets began to bluff. Thus, twenty-five years before the NPT a mad race with escalating mutual targeting began. "Thirty-five years after the NPT, we still have no peace," stated Dr. Yaroshinskaya, adding, "We have more nuclear weapons now than before the NPT was signed." Her litany of today's nuclear reality continued, and included the nuclear weapons of India, Pakistan and Israel; the 44 states with nuclear reactors, and the "20 countries on their way to becoming nuclear weapon states." Finally, she cited Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei's well-known statement earlier this year (January 2004) that "the danger of nuclear war was never greater [than now]." She concluded her chronology of NPT "nuclear leakage" by naming the biggest challenge of the nuclear black market as "secret bilateral state contracts," and linked the US with Sweden and Israel; the US, France and Israel with South Africa; and the Russian Federation with Iran.

With respect to current US-Russian Federation relations, she said that the Russian Federation was shocked to learn in the 2002 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that it is a target, especially given the Moscow Declaration on Mutual Nontargeting [with the US] of January 14, 1994. (China and the Russian Federation also have such an agreement.) As a result of the US NPR, according to the Russian Federation's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivanov, the Russian Federation will not now destroy warheads, has begun modernizing its arsenal, and will employ a first strike if threatened. In March of this year, he announced a new Russian aerospace defense.

At the end of Dr. Yaroshinskaya's talk, one participant said she felt like crying. Dr. Makhijani's section of the workshop continued in the same vein, but from the perspective of the United States. Harking back to the May 5, 1943 decision, Dr. Makhijani mused that people then only asked: "What if Hitler gets the bomb?" not "What happens if the US gets monopoly of the bomb?" When the retargeting decision became known to the Manhattan Project scientists, only one scientist had the courage to walk away: Joseph Rotblat (a Pugwash founder and recipient of the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize). For those scientists who remained, the Manhattan Project transformed from a project intended to prevent world domination by Hitler to the first step in the US preparing to take over the empire from Great Britain, as well as an "aggressive project to bomb nonnuclear countries."

Post-WWII, all US military threats could be seen as "nuclear-tipped." Dr. Makhijani too cited a litany of examples, capping them with the 1971 war in South Asia over Bangladesh. The context was this: China had tested a nuclear weapon in 1964, but India, though capable, restrained itself and continued to call for nuclear disarmament in the UNGA. But when the US sent the nuclear-laden USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal in 1971, the hawks in India won, with the predictable result: an Indian nuclear test three years later in 1974.

Now we face a crisis of the US as the world's sole national nuclear superpower saying: "We don't have to obey treaties, but you do," a belligerent attitude that has its roots in the 1840s policy of manifest destiny. The world faces the choice of "universal disarmament or universal chaos." Perhaps the

continued on page 3
heaviest burden lies with the US allies in NATO and Japan. Only they can "tell the US where to get off." But will they? "We can't have the worst proliferators acting as if Hiroshima [and Nagasaki] didn't exist." But that, according to Dr. Makhijani, is the situation we face.

The Q&A which followed covered NATO's expansion to the borders of the Russian Federation, the double identities of European states (in NATO and the EU) and what that means for nuclear politics, the UK and France as the nuclear elephants of the EU and whether the other EU states will confront them directly. One NGO called attention to the two separate dialogues going on in Washington DC and here in the halls and meeting rooms of the UN: in DC, the talk is all about how much easier it is to get nuclear weapons with globalization, and what about those bad guys? In the UN, much of the talk is about US belligerence. How can we bridge those dialogues? Can we?

In conclusion and in response to this question, Dr. Makhijani quoted Daniel Ellsberg, the Pentagon defense analyst most famous for his release of the Pentagon Papers during the Vietnam War and an announced member of this panel who could not be present. When Dr. Ellsberg visited the high school classroom of Dr. Makhijani's daughter, he told the students "every US President since Harry Truman could be convicted as a war criminal." Dr. Makhijani's question to all of us was this: "How can war criminals teach democracy to the world and expect to counter terrorism?"

(Dr. Yaroshinskaya is also deeply aware of the dangers of nuclear power. As a journalist in Ukraine in 1986, she reported on the Chernobyl accident, eventually writing Chernobyl: The Forbidden Truth. Later, as a member of the Supreme Soviet, she uncovered and revealed to the world the secret protocols issued by President Gorbachev to cover up the accident. In 1994, Sweden honored her for these activities by awarding her the Right Livelihood Award, often known as the alternative Nobel prize. She was here last week when this year's Oscar-winning documentary, Chernobyl Heart, was shown in the General Assembly hall under the sponsorship of the UN secretariat and the Permanent Missions of Belarus, Russian Federation and Ukraine.)

With the doors to Conference Room IV unexpectedly flung open to NGOs at this PrepCom, it was gratifying to witness so many nations calling on the Nuclear Weapons States for more meaningful compliance with the NPT's nuclear disarmament requirements. Repeatedly we heard that the NPT bargain requires not only assurances of non-proliferation but genuine, irreversible disarmament from states with nuclear arsenals. But it was dismayingly to hear so many of those same countries emphasize what they term the "third pillar" of the treaty: the inalienable right to "peaceful" nuclear technology.

Will no country take a stand against the folly of "peaceful" nuclear energy? Developing countries can ill afford the costs associated with this patently unsustainable and grossly expensive method to essentially boil water. Perhaps NGOs have not adequately explained and demonstrated the proliferation costs, the destruction to health, the environment, and our very genetic heritage, with nuclear waste that remains lethally toxic for over 250,000 years. Or has the dual-purpose mission of the IAEA, of both preventing nuclear weapons proliferation, while at the same time promoting industrial uses, been corrupted by corporate interests, rapaciously pursuing government subsidies and loans of over $200 billion annually?

The failure to finance a just transition to a safe, clean renewable energy supply will force the world to pay billions for disaster aid and accept a huge loss of life and human misery, while risking further weapons proliferation. Promoting a sustainable energy future based on locally available and abundant sources of energy from our sun, wind, and tides—equally available to every nation on our planet—is an idea whose time has come.
Panel Spotlight: What Next for the CTBT?

- Dulce Fernandes, WILPF UNO

The current status of the CTBT and the prospects of its entry into force where analyzed yesterday by Mr. Bernhard Wrabetz, an Austrian diplomat and special assistant of the executive secretary office of the CTBTO, in a briefing sponsored by the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security. Mr. Wrabetz reviewed the technical development of the International Monitoring System (IMS) that is being set up to monitor compliance with the Treaty, once it enters into force. The IMS, the foundation of the verifiability of the CTBT, comprises a network of monitoring stations and laboratories that look for evidence of nuclear explosions in all environments. Mr. Wrabetz indicated that the development of the system is proceeding in good pace, now monitoring about 20 thousand non-security related events per year. This accounts for an annual investment of $1 million, which represents a substantial commitment by states to the verification system and raises good perspectives for the entering into force of the CTBT.

Mr. Wrabetz drew attention to the fact that 32 of the 44 states which are required to ratify the Treaty (the Annex II states) have already done so, including three Nuclear Weapons States (U.K., France and Russia). He further categorized the states which have not yet ratified the Treaty into two groups: one concerning those states that have no reservations in fully acceding to the nuclear test ban regime, but that for a variety of difficulties have not yet done so; and the group of states that have political issues with the Treaty.

In the first group, states like the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Colombia have already expressed their willingness to ratify the CTBT, although technical, administrative or legal difficulties have prevented them for doing so until now. In the context of the second group, Mr. Wrabetz mentioned the states in the Middle East, the situation between India and Pakistan, and the positions of North Korea, China and the U.S.

In the Middle East, Israel signed the Treaty but continues to link its ratification to the peace process. On the other hand, Egypt, also a signatory, will not ratify the CTBT until Israel does so. Moreover, Iran, which has also signed and has been very cooperative with the development of the IMS, has invoked a mix of legal and political issues preventing ratification.

Concerning India and Pakistan, Mr. Wrabetz underlined that in both - continued on page 5

Women and Weapons: A Paradigmatic Shift

- Susi Snyder, WILPF UNO

On Tuesday, May 4, the Women's International League hosted a panel on "Women, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Prevention" in Conference Room A. The panelists, including Mr. Nobuyasu Abe, Under Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, Felicity Hill, Peace and Security Specialist with UNIFEM and Carol Cohn of the Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, presented unique perspectives on women, gender and WMD. Each panelist mentioned the importance of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, as a tool to urge member state and UN agency action on gender mainstreaming, . The panel was followed by a lively discussion with participants which brought forward specific recommendations for NGOs to further their work at next year's Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty Review Conference.

Mr. Abe spoke about the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) Gender Mainstreaming Action Plan, elaborating on how the department is mainstreaming gender into all aspects of their work. He noted, for instance, that there are more women participating in Expert Group Meetings convened by DDA, more women participating in the UN Disarmament Fellowship programs, and that the DDA is an active participant in the Interagency working group on 1325. Mr. Abe announced a database of women experts in disarmament issues another tool which the DDA is contributing to UN efforts on implementing 1325. He also said that the guidelines for gender mainstreaming in mine action will soon be finalized.

Felicity Hill began her talk by commending participants at this NPT PrepCom for looking at the issue of gender and women's participation, noting that before the passage of UNSC 1325, the Commission on the Status of Women was one of the only conferences that truly examined issues related to women. She noted that peace and security are inextricably tied to equality between men and women. Ms. Hill noted that from 1992-2002 there were only 33 women who were heads of delegations to the NPT, in comparison to 660 men. Ms. Hill also spoke about the psychological impact of the nuclear age and that there has been no substantive research on the social and cultural impacts of nuclear weapons.

- continued on page 5

continued on page 5
countries domestic public support for their respective nuclear capabilities is very high, which constitutes an obstacle to the adherence to the CTBT. The CTBTO, he acknowledged, has no idea as to Pyongyang's position on the Treaty.

In regard to China, Mr. Wrabetz mentioned that ratification is expected in the next 12 to 15 months, a move that would provide Beijing with the necessary moral ground while retaining space to manoeuvre.

As to the U. S., Mr. Wrabetz expressed his regret that the greatest nuclear power in the world continues to say that it has no interest in ratifying the CTBT. A frequent reply from Annex II states when asked to endorse the Treaty is that they see no reason to do it if not even the U. S. has yet ratified it. Washington continues to invoke its doubts about the technical possibility of verifying the Treaty, but has nevertheless been a very important contributor to the International Monitoring System. On this point Mr. Wrabetz referred to the National Academy of Science evaluation that indicates that nuclear tests non detectable by the verification system would be militarily insignificant: only very small explosions, conducted in very limited conditions, and carried out along with near decoy explosions, would go undetected by the IMS.

Mr. Wrabetz underlined that nevertheless the CTBT is an American baby. It was promoted by the Clinton administration and would never have come about if not for the U. S. In his view, the U.S. is currently keeping its options open both for ratification as well as for complete withdrawal from the CTBT. As the U.S. position on the Treaty has changed dramatically before, it can also change in the future.

He further indicated that some States continue to see nuclear capabilities as a condition to enter the "big boys club" and that this attitude has been fuelled by the latest U.S. policies. When asked what possibility the CTBTO will have to orally address the working sessions of the NPT, Mr. Wrabetz indicated his hope that an oral presentation will be possible at the next Review Conference next year.

Mr. Wrabetz closed the briefing on a hopeful note, indicating that by 2007 the CTBTO expects to have the IMS firmly established and that the organization is fairly optimistic that the Treaty will enter into force by then.

She highlighted some recommendations for NGOs as they prepare for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, suggesting that NGOs lobby for more women to be on delegations (preferably at their head), support the DDA Gender Mainstreaming Action Plan, and call for an exhibition of the women and peace movements cultural products— the buttons, posters, leaflets and images which have been generated by the women and peace movements.

Carol Cohn elevated the discussion out of the context of women specifically and brought it into the more abstract issue of gender and security. Referencing her recent paper (co-authored with Sara Ruddick) "A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction", she spoke to the issues raised in that paper (which can be found online at: www.ksg.harvard.edu/wappp/research/working/cohn_ruddick.pdf) A certain paradigm of thinking has been left out of decision making, said Ms. Cohn, because it is seen as "wimpy" or feminine. She discussed how, in certain circles, the emotional, concrete and particular issues relating to a discussion are left out entirely, and this impacts foreign policies, nuclear strategies, and other major issues and by leaving these issues out, good thinking is pre-empted. This is most clearly defined by the assumption that violence is strong, and nonviolent responses are weak. An example of this is the use of sexual humiliation and violence as a tool of war, which clearly speaks to the interconnection between gender and power.

Following the panel, the audience engaged in a lively discussion, in which participants offered several recommendations for the future work of NGOs in relation to the NPT. In the midst of calls for a paradigmatic shift from patriarchy to matriarchy, participants offered various ways of bringing the world closer to nuclear disarmament. One participant urged the international community to reframe our vision of the world from "out there" to "our household." While the international disarmament peace and security regime shrinks in the shadow of rising horizontal and vertical proliferation, it is clear that an entirely new paradigm is needed to assert a true international security for the 21st century. And while delegates in Conference Room IV scratch their heads trying to figure out how to save the NPT, solutions might just have been found down the hall.
It is utterly imperative for the people involved with the NPT Review Process to keep heart.

The path to disarmament is one fraught with peril, wise decisions are crucial at every step. Unfortunately, to fail is to guarantee disaster. That said: keep up the hard work.

This NPT review process is a grinding, detailed study in slow, epochal change; truly, a subject for the intrepid. However, the implications of the process and the decisions made here in this 2004 NPT PrepCom have reverberations across the world and for the next year’s Review Conference.

There has been very little news coverage about this PrepCom. It is unfortunate given the timely nature of this topic. Right now, a global war is being fought over the possession of and the desire for nuclear weapons. (It is also being fought to define hegemonic power structures in the Middle East, and is repeating history without learning anything but we’ll let that go for a minute.)

A new initiative Banningthebomb.tv is an attempt to bring the NPT Review Process some spotlight. By webcasting video clips of the NPT NGO Presentations and interviews with participants to the PrepCom etc., we hope to allow an inside view of the international negotiations for nuclear disarmament. This initiative will continue to build toward the next Review Conference in 2005.

So, pass the word about this new website. We want the world to know that these conferences are happening, and are the place where people talk, negotiate and communicate about these issues, as opposed to the many places where people are killing and dying for these illegal weapons with far too little talking, negotiating nor communication going on there.

We must connect this process to the outside world, for all of our sakes.

To the diplomats and delegates: for the NGOs, it is harder and harder to participate here. The funding for this issue is drying up. It is unbelievable that while the U.S. is spending 4 billion dollars a month in Iraq, some of the NGOs here are going without pay or support to be here. This makes their dedication and participation even more important.

Some way must be established to solve this dilemma, civil society needs to be represented much more widely here. The delegates need the NGOs, just like the NGOs need each other to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament.

To the NGOs: we need to be more creative in our funding, because it is imperative to the goal of nuclear disarmament that we are here, and in greater numbers. So, to those in funding positions, think hard and dig deep, this effort, these negotiations for nuclear disarmament may be the only way ‘as the only international agreement with binding language on nuclear disarmament’ that we can save the world.

I would conclude by encouraging: Hold tightly to the norms set in 2000, the 13 points are important. The CTBT is important. Stopping the detonation of all nuclear bombs forever is vitally important.

I know that we are all holding our breaths until November. Say a prayer often to whomever you pray to, because we can use all the help we can get.

Thank you all for your work. The world doesn’t see this, but it is essential nonetheless.

Countdown continued from page 1

With the current political climate strife with mistrust, rising proliferation and ongoing war, perhaps the preservation of the 13 Practical Steps is the best outcome for which we may hope. True strengthening of the international disarmament and nonproliferation regime, then, must be postponed for another year.

If only it survives that long.

-Rhianna Tyson, Reaching Critical Will