F. Scott Fitzgerald once wrote, “The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function. One should, for example, be able to see that things are hopeless and yet be determined to make them otherwise.”

After a month of the deplorable diplomacy, lack of leadership and dominance of narrow national interests that crippled the Seventh Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is more difficult than ever to heed Fitzgerald’s advice. But, as UNIDIR Director Patricia Lewis so eloquently stated, “It is imperative that we remain optimistic. In times of despair, it is easier to become cynical... but it is hope that will get us through to the next stage, when the political climate is a bit more conducive to progress on the disarmament and nonproliferation front.”

It will not be easy to retain our hope. The failure of this Review Conference has shaken the world’s faith in the Treaty to an unprecedented degree. The promise of the 1995 indefinite extension - that of “permanence with accountability” - now seems hollow. Many are wondering how, during such a crisis of nuclear proliferation and a growing threat of actual use of nuclear weapons, the Review Conference of the NPT could have failed.

And fail it did. While a few pieces of paper labeled “Final Document” were produced and agreed upon, this document does not contain an iota of substantive recommendations or actions to strengthen the global disarmament and nonproliferation regime.

It failed due to the intrusiveness of a few States, which effectively sabotaged the Conference and allowed it to be bogged down in procedural quibbles. These States, namely Iran, Egypt and the United States, allowed the Conference to fail - or perhaps, more accurately, willed it to fail - precisely because they have lost their faith in the Treaty to ensure their own security.

Let’s look at the Treaty for a minute, and remember why States subscribe to it. The US favors the NPT because it is a legal instrument to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by those which do not already possess them. Egypt remains a party to it based on the belief that it constitutes a norm by which it will be possible to reign Israel in to the nonproliferation family, thus freeing the Middle East from the nuclear weapons that currently plague it. Iran’s reasons are probably similar to that of Egypt’s, though they also hope to use the NPT as a way by which to obtain security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons.

Under the NPT, as under any effective global mechanism, States receive benefits and achieve certain objectives in exchange for certain behaviors. All States, then, are accountable to others for their actions. With such lamentable erosion of the Treaty, some States are now thinking that they can achieve their same objectives through other means, which may lack any of the accountability of a multilateral treaty.

The US has been working hard these past few years to set up a system of unverifiable, non-universal, plurilateral agreements and frameworks which help to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, Security Council resolution 1540, and the G8 Partnership, among others. These initiatives may prove themselves to be very effective tools in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons - and all without the promise of nuclear disarmament in return.

Ten years after the 1995 Review Conference’s
Spineless NPT Conference Papers Over Cracks and Ends with a Whimper

- Rebecca Johnson, Acronym Institute

Delegates from 153 countries at the 2005 NPT Review Conference failed to build on past agreements and adopt any kind of decisions or recommendations for furthering progress in the vital security issues of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. From start to finish, this conference did little more than go through the motions, and was one of the most shameful exhibitions of cynical time-wasting seen outside the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

The failure of the conference to adopt consensus agreements was due to politics, especially the entrenched positions and proliferation-promoting policies of a tiny number of influential states, including the United States and Iran, as they pursued their narrowly defined self interests and sought to keep open their different nuclear options. At the expense of the security interests of the vast majority, a few others facilitated or coasted behind. They are no doubt delighted at this lowest common denominator outcome because it temporarily protected them from international criticism and action to encourage them to live up to their legal and political obligations.

Even so, it should still have been possible to use the conference to give a strong message about the importance of preventing the use, acquisition and spread of nuclear weapons and the nuclear materials used to make nuclear weapons. In failing to address these issues seriously or send any kind of principled message along those lines, the governments have betrayed the hopes, aspirations and security interests of their citizens from around the world, who have made clear again and again that they desire to live free of the threat of nuclear weapons.

Since this administration is quick to accuse critics of being anti-American, here is the analysis of the indisputably American Daryl Kimball of the Washington-based Arms Control Association: “The arrogant and clumsy US strategy (which was the brainchild of former Under Secretary of State John Bolton) has most certainly reinforced the view of the majority of countries that the United States and the other nuclear-weapon states do not intend to live up to their NPT-related nuclear disarmament commitments. This not only scuttled the chance that this conference might have supported useful US proposals on strengthening the nonproliferation elements of the treaty, but it will in the long-run erode the willingness of other states to fulfill their own treaty obligations, much less take strong action to condemn the transgressions of North Korea and Iran.”

While for most of the conference it was clear that no-one had a positive strategy, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this impotent impasse was the desired outcome of at least some game plans. The question why and the implications and consequences will have to wait for my longer analysis, once I’ve had the chance to talk to a lot more people.

Briefly, however, here are some obvious points:

· Nonproliferation is unsustainable without real and significant progress in nuclear disarmament.
· The nuclear fuel cycle is a much bigger security problem than recognized when the treaty entered into force in 1970, and will have to be addressed.
· Good ideas and proposals remain on paper without the strategies and game plans for how to achieve them – in 1995 and 2000 there were not only good ideas, but innovative, pragmatic strategies and active presidents willing to use the rules and procedural tools to their maximum possibilities in order to achieve a useful and regime-building outcome.
· The group system based on the Western Group and Others (WEOG), Eastern European leftovers, and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is outdated, severely dysfunctional and provides a refuge for scoundrels and naysayers to hide within.
· Issue-based coalitions, groups or alliances should form and stay together only when the can form a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts, and if they have coherent strategies as well as good positions. It’s not unusual that political priorities and personalities change over time; if the whole becomes less positive, active and effective than the individual members would be on their own or by forming other ad hoc alliances to achieve further objectives, then it is time to recognize this and move on. A dysfunctional coalition constrains its members rather than empowering them.
· It is unwise to trust those who seek preferment, status or a seat on the security council.
· Though there may be superficial similarities, there is a telling difference in the style, objectives and effectiveness of regime-builders and managers. In diplomacy, managers are very likely to split differences and sacrifice principle to expediency.

Finally, in view of the failure of the 2005 Review Conference, the agreements obtained in the review conferences of 1995 and 2000 still stand as the legal and political benchmarks for measuring progress and promoting compliance until the NPT can be fully implemented in all its nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation aspects. Lack of agreement to build substantively on these commitments and undertakings may be disappointing, but the problems of the 2005 conference neither invalidate nor undermine the relevant obligations and undertakings previously agreed to. If anything, the lack of consensus in 2005 for further disarmament steps underscores the fact that the principles, measures and steps adopted by consensus in past review conferences have not yet been implemented, and more work must be done to ensure that they are.

The complete version of this and other reports from the NPT Review Conference can be found at: www.acronym.org.uk.
Seeing the RevCon in the Rearview Mirror

-Matt Martin, BASIC

The 2005 NPT Review Conference is history. Like the prostrate pedestrian victim of a hit-and-run Hummer accident, for those of us along for the ride, the conference is only dimly visible through the kicked-up dust in the rearview mirror. But what can be seen is not pretty.

At the end of the Cold War, many expert observers wondered what direction the global body politic would go without the East-West/Communist-Capitalist construct. Some saw great opportunity in the resulting freedom of movement that powerful countries could exert in such a world; others saw the danger of chaos. Now almost fifteen years later, we are beginning to learn that both of these aspects are true. A US-led coalition of the willing can invade and overthrow governments without fear from the Eastern Bloc; North Korea can withdraw from the NPT to pursue its nuclear programs with relatively little resultant pressure from the fractured international framework.

The nuclear nonproliferation regime is the epitome of this post-Cold War dilemma and the current state of affairs demands answers to two questions: do we believe in the value of an international community and what value do we place on international law? If we value the first, then overarching issues that cross state boundaries demand attention beyond narrow and minimalist understandings. If we value the second at all, we will move to strengthen the international framework with a firm knowledge that in doing so, we not only benefit the larger community, but ourselves as well.

And so we come to the 2005 RevCon. The original text of the NPT has its shortcomings. But as a negotiated agreement between States, this is so nearly a truism as to be an empty assertion. Indeed, the very purpose of the review conferences is to monitor the operation of the treaty and suggest improvements as necessary. In that light, it is no surprise that an array of States have submitted over fifty working papers that offer improvements to the treaty in this year’s conference. What is unconscionable is that no progress was made at all on any suggestion, due to the hijacking of the process by a very few States - two to be exact: the United States and Iran.

Both sides contort their arguments to make their case, relying on a narrow reading of the NPT. Iran asserts its right to civilian nuclear power- and by extension, a complete fuel cycle- while denying that any intention exists to create a domestic nuclear weapon capability. The United States demands tighter controls and stricter enforcement of non-compliance, while claiming that it itself is in full compliance with Article VI.

Stephen Rademaker, the head of the US delegation, likes to say- and says often- that people should read the text of Article VI to see how little is obligated on disarmament, conclud-

ing that under any reading, the US is compliant. However, this is only potentially true under the strictest of readings. What it crucially ignores are past commitments given by the US, particularly during the RevCons of 1995 and 2000, that go well beyond the original Art. VI text, without which there would be no NPT today. These commitments are well known: ratification of CTBT, negotiations on FMCT, irreversibility of reductions, negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, etc.-yet the US has followed through on none of them and instead investigates new generations of nuclear weapons.

Similarly, Iran pins its claims to its nuclear program on an equally constrictive reading of Art. IV, asserting that as long as it is in compliance with its other NPT obligations (relevant here are Art. II and III) it has the right to pursue a civilian program however it sees fit, i.e., a complete domestic nuclear fuel cycle. This is also not without problems. First, Iran has only in the kindest sense been cooperative with the IAEA, the body that monitors compliance, and has been found violating its obligations in the past, raising widespread suspicions that Iran is insincere in its stated intentions. Second, alternatives to a domestic fuel cycle exist and are embraced by many other Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). Indeed, several suggestions for improving options for access to nuclear fuel by NNWS have been made over the last few months.

With this intransigence, inflexibility, and perhaps sleight-of-hand, two countries (and their proxies) hijacked the conference, preventing, for the first time ever, any of the three working parties to forward a substantive document to the chair. Inside the NPT, there will be no progress. Starkly, outside the NPT, events will unfold nevertheless. North Korea has withdrawn from the treaty, with consequences yet to unfold. Iran and the EU-3 negotiate for a settlement. The Bush administration will pursue new nuclear weapons and construe its disarmament obligations as it sees fit. Three States- India, Pakistan, and Israel-remain outside the treaty. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and their materials around the globe remains the number one international security threat facing us all.

The end of the Cold War has brought the prospect of dramatically improved options and rights for many. But with rights come obligations. In the end, we must learn that overarching frameworks, both national and international, must circumscribe the enjoyed freedom of movement brought about by the end of the Cold War. The more we undermine these systems, we not only encourage others to do likewise, but perhaps more importantly, we hamper our abilities both to deal with problems when they arise and to encourage others to help us in our efforts. With the end of the 2005 RevCon, we have frittered away a valuable opportunity.

As we grow five years older in 2010, let’s hope we grow a bit wiser, too.
Evolution is slow, but it happens. The first draft text emerging from the 2005 discussion on nuclear disarmament at the NPT Review Conference used the term mankind. The final version used the term humanity. That is because the term mankind is out of date and redundant.

I can’t find much else to get happy about on the penultimate afternoon of this month-long conference supposed to organize the total elimination of the nuclear weapons, which is why I’m going on about it.

In 2005, it is not appropriate or acceptable to use the term mankind. Nuclear weapons were invented, developed, are wielded and threatened by men. These men endanger everything on the planet, they threaten the genes of biosphere and mutate the future in an experiment that is not reversible, including for human adults and children, that is, humankind.

Okay. Got it. Shall we consider this word permanently deletes from international negotiation? Oh lets.

Today the Credentials Committee presented its report in a two-minute speech. Frankly, I would have liked some more analysis and detail. I don’t know, maybe sitting outside closed conference rooms just makes me hungry for speeches. But I do think this Credentials Committee, which basically generates a list of who was at the meeting, has an interesting, if not very important task on its hands of documenting who is responsible for this meeting and moment in disarmament history.

According to the Credentials Committee Chair, we now have 149 states signed up, which is up from the 133 that had sent in their names for the printing of the 4 May Provisional List of Participants (NPT/CONF.2005/Misc.1)

According to the 4 May - by which 133 states had managed to get around to submitting their forms - 12 countries sent women to lead their delegations: Bahamas, Colombia, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Kuwait, Lesotho, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden, Thailand, Tonga.*

A whopping 51 of the 133 delegations had no women whatsoever in their delegation. Below is a list of these Problem Countries - or PCs for short. **

I look forward to the final list of participants at the 2005 meeting so the final calculation of the gender credentials, and the list of countries that have some evolving to do.

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* Bahamas: Ambassador Dr. Paulette A. Bethel
  Colombia: Sr. Maria Angela Holguin Cuellar
  Denmark: Ms. Ellen Margrethe Joj
  El Salvador: Sr. Carmen Maria Gallardo Hernandez
  Estonia: Mrs. Tiina Intelmann
  Kuwait: Ms. Nabeela Abdulla Al-Mulla
  Lesotho: Ms. Lipuo Moteetee
  Mexico: Sra. Patricia Olamendi
  New Zealand: Ms. Marian Hobbs
  Sweden: Ms. Laila Freivals
  Thailand: Mrs. Kyunying Laxanachantorn Laohaphan
  Tonga: Mrs. Fekitamoeloa Utoikamanu

** Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chile, Comoros, Congo, Croatia, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen
As the world looked again at nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament throughout the prism of a four-week long failed review of the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York in May, you may be forgiven for wondering why we are still discussing this problem. Why are nuclear weapons such a concern? Why do States still want them? Didn't this problem end with the end of the cold war? Dream on.

Five years ago at the 2000 Review, States agreed thirteen steps to be implemented to approach a more secure world. Recently the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) proposed seven steps to help us along our way.

If only they had taken the advice of Alcoholics Anonymous and come up with a twelve-step programme. Then we might have stood a chance. We are - after all - dealing with a severe addiction problem.

We have a growing number of states addicted to nuclear weapons. Until recently these were designer weapons. Available, like cocaine used to be, only to the rich and famous – the "nuclear five". In the early 1990s, these five desperate junkies tried to give them up. They did really. They really did. They agreed pact after pact with each other and with their wider families promising to give them up. Their doctors, PhDs in non-governmental organizations, who had been pleading with them and cajoling them for years to give up their dangerous habit – began to have hope and worked with them to overcome their addiction. But we made one classic mistake. When they said they'd give them up gradually, step-by-step, all by themselves, we believed them.

But I'm afraid it was a case of “make me good, but not just yet". Like the smoker, they will always need one more cigarette. Like the heroin addict, they will always need one more hit, another shot in the arm. They cling on to the weapons like an addict hordes his cocaine, like Gollum clutches his precious.

To give them due, they have cut down. Not quite to one or two packs a day and they’re certainly not on a methadone programme. The 20,000 plus nuclear weapons that are left doesn’t make much of a dent in risk reduction. Nuclear weapons are bad for your health and each silo should come with a government warning, but they have taken a step in the right direction. However, as every former smoker, drinker or dieter knows, cutting down can easily lead to a plateau where people get stuck, they stay at that level and never quite kick the habit. And the consumption soon creeps up again. They are at a stage of self-deception. “Look I have cut down, I can do it. But the time is not right just now for cutting things out completely. As you can see though, I am in control. This stuff is not in control of me. When the time is right, I will give it up completely. Honestly. And anyway, in the meantime what harm does it do? Stop putting so much pressure on me, this only increases my stress. Let me do it in my own good time. I’m heading in the right direction. Leave me alone”

But close friends and relatives also must be made aware of their own co-dependence on the addiction. We should all join Al-Anon, the organization for the relatives of addicts who conspire, unwittingly or unwittingly, to maintain their addiction. What is it the rest of the world gets out of it? Some close allies of the nuclear-weapons states believe that they are protected by the nuclear weapons held
by their addicted friends. At the same time these co-dependents preach disarmament. You can’t have it both ways. Either nuclear weapons are bad for you and you want your addicted friends to give them up, and you really shouldn’t be making such silly statements about nuclear umbrellas, which only encourage your addicted friends to keep clinging to their emotional nuclear props. Or deep down, you really think that nuclear weapons are a good thing. You don’t want to actually become addicted yourself but you secretly want your close ally to damage themselves on your behalf. This is of course reprehensible and you need therapy big time.

Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous have all developed 12-step programmes for beating addiction. A twelve-step program is a self-help group whose members attempt recovery from various addictions and compulsions through the use of a plan referred to as the “twelve steps”. Not thirteen and not seven, but twelve. One of the most widely-recognized characteristics of twelve-step groups is the requirement that members admit that they “have a problem”. In this spirit, many members open their address to the group along the lines of, “Bonjour, I’m France, and I’m a nuclear addict” Perhaps some adaptation of this approach can be put forward at the Review Conference in a few weeks time:

The twelve steps for Nukes Anonymous might be as follows.

1. We admit that we are powerless over our nuclear weapons addiction -- that our arsenals have become unmanageable.
2. We believe that a Power greater than ourselves – i.e. our citizens - through the voices of civil society could restore us to sanity.
3. We make a decision to turn our political will and our nuclear weapons over to the care of the IAEA.
4. We shall make a searching, accurate and fearless inventory of our nuclear weapons.
5. We admit to ourselves and to another human beings the exact nature and extent of our nuclear weapons – in writing.
6. We’re entirely ready to have all of these nuclear weapons destroyed and removed as they are defects of character.
7. We humbly ask the IAEA to remove our nuclear weapons and destroy them all.
8. We shall make a list of all persons we have harmed through the testing, development and use of nuclear weapons, and became willing to make amends to them all.
9. We shall make direct amends to such people wherever possible, except when to do so would injure them or others more than we have already.
10. We shall submit ourselves to inventory inspections and if we transgress on our promises we shall promptly admit it and rectify it.
11. We ask the world to pray for us and grant us the power to carry out our promises and achieve – unequivocally - complete nuclear disarmament.
12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we shall now to carry this message to all other nuclear weapons addicts, and we undertake to practice these principles in all of our affairs.

Archiving the Review Conference

In 1999, an independent videographer created the documentary, Banning the Bomb, as part of the Reaching Critical Will project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.

This documentary has expanded into a daily video-log of updates covering the 2004 PrepCom and the 2005 Review Conference.

Banningthebomb.tv, headed up by the original documentary-maker Stephanie Fraser, has evolved into an online video resource, archiving the insights and perspectives of delegates and NGOs at the Conference, tracking the events as they unfolded.

Get the inside scoop on how the Conference unraveled from experts including:
- Jean DuPreez, Monterey Institute
- Rebecca Johnson, Acronym Institute
- Senator Doug Roche, Middle Powers Initiative
- Ambassador François Rivasseau, France
- Alice Slater, GRACE
- Daniel Ellsberg
- Matt Martin, BASIC
- Ambassador Abdul Minty, South Africa
- William Peden, Greenpeace

Who says the NPT has no institutional memory?

Be sure to check out www.BanningtheBomb.tv today.

For more information, contact info@banningthebomb.tv.
Nuclear Theatre of the Absurd

- Diane Perlman, PsySR and Xanthe Hall, IPPNW

“The splitting of the atom has changed everything save our mode of thinking and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe... We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.” - Albert Einstein

Thought experiment
Imagine you were responsible to a world in which there were several nuclear weapons states, several more eager to join the nuclear club, and about 40 more that were capable of joining. And let's say that these developments have already caused and threaten to cause more intolerable suffering, affecting the quality and of life on earth and even its very existence. What if you were in charge of designing, from scratch, an international process to address this crisis? How would you design a successful process? Would it look anything at all like what the 2005 NPT Review Conference Delegates experienced in May 2005?

Working Against Nature
What delegates are trying to do while wearing the traditional diplomatic straitjacket won't work. It is impossible. This archaic system – one that is formally institutional, ritualistic and environmentally negative – has grown over decades. With it a detached universe has been created that is internally self-fulfilling in its consistency, while not at all conducive to solving the problem it is charged with.

Delegates, mostly men in suits, sit in a windowless basement and listen for days on end to more than 180 repetitive monologues in different languages through a plastic earpiece. Other than in a conference like this, there may never have been a time in all of human evolution when people were confined underground to listen to interminable speeches. Our brains were not designed for that kind of experience. Research shows that people in hospitals recover faster with a window view. Long working hours, lack of fresh air and sunlight, in a building with poor air quality has deleterious effects on concentration and the ability to think creatively.

One delegate said that the experience was like beginning smoking. At first you feel ill because you are at the initial stages of asphyxiation, then you get used to it and feel like it is something important. Then you get addicted to it and feel like you are being initiated into some kind of arcane priesthood. But humans adapt to unnatural situations at a cost.

In this negative environment, decisions that affect all present and future generations of innocents, and the environment, are being made by parties delegated to represent the interests of individual States. Added to this is the political dynamic: political considerations outweigh true positions. For example, representatives who want a seat on the Security Council are afraid to lose support from dominant powers, or rewards and punishments influence positions against the interests of humanity.

Whereas delegates to NPT conferences have been assigned this work, and have mostly not chosen this issue as their life’s work, the people who have devoted their lives to studying aspects of nuclearism, and who are the most knowledgeable on the subject, are hereby restricted to a role of observation. They are prevented from participating and have no formal power.

Non-proliferation and the Asymmetrical World
The focus on controlling the weapons themselves is necessary but not sufficient. The relationship between non-proliferation and disarmament sets up an impossible tension that is not sustainable, which has no endgame and which provokes proliferation in the name of preventing it. Counterproliferation is an oxymoron. It constitutes a form of “nuclear narcissism” - wherein those who have nukes insist others can't - which in turn provokes fear, humiliation and envy, magnifying the desire for these weapons.

It is essential to address the underlying conflicts, political relations, asymmetrical power and other root causes that fuel the desire and need for the weapons. Nuclear weapons are not just weapons; they are symbols of power and are bound up with world order and our perceptions of what the world should look like. For some, they are a way of redressing the balance. They are the ultimate blackmailer and hostage taker.

The spirit of consensus is misused and misnamed in the diplomatic process of negotiation. The wishes of the overwhelming majority of citizens and leaders can be sabotaged by a very few, not acting in good faith. This is not a conflict between multilateralism and unilateralism, but between cooperation and domination.

And now for something completely different...
The NPT process didn't work and cannot possibly work because it is filled with flaws, contradictions, false premises, beliefs and assumptions, and because it operates under unnatural conditions. Doing more of the same in the future will not work either. If this were a business, it would fail. Organizational development consultants would be brought in to learn how to make the company effective beneficial to employees and profitable.

It is time for a paradigm shift. Time for intelligent, appropriate design specific to the problem it is charged with solving. It is time for vision. In any case, time for something completely different!
Negotiating 101

In the May 24 NPT update from the Acronym Institute, Rebecca Johnson breaks down the basics of negotiations, as she has witnessed them over the years:

Many and varied have been the negotiating tactics at this Review Conference, mostly to impede progress and divert attention from the substantive issues.

**First the negative, obstructive tactics.**

**Delaying tactics:**
- *Waiting for Godot* – insist on waiting for the time to become ripe (while slyly impeding all attempts by others to create more positive conditions).
- *Quicksand* – bog a proposal or initiative down in questions, objections or demands for definitions, or call for an inquiry or further expert consultations.
- *Ping-Pong* – have the initiative referred to another committee, forum or authority and, if possible, shunt it back and forth between competing bodies for as long as possible.

**Concealment**
- *Hide and Seek* – conceal real objectives in high-minded rhetoric or a mass of technical data and extraneous detail.
- *Slipstreaming* – conceal your own preferences and coast behind another delegation, allowing it to take the flack.
- *Fronting* – a form of collaborative slipstreaming, in which one delegation adopts a position that is stronger than its own interests would require, enabling others to benefit by coasting in its wake.
- *Two-Faced* – pretend to support a proposal that you actually oppose; this may also involve manipulating (or just allowing) another country to oppose openly and then be left carrying the blame. Of course, there is always the risk that your bluff may be called, as happened when the Soviet Union suddenly accepted NATO’s zero option in the 1980s (and we got rid of the intermediate nuclear forces from Europe)!

**Defection tactics – when a state doesn’t really want an agreement**
- *Moving the Goalposts* – whatever is achievable becomes by definition inadequate: the objective or required standards are moved further away to ensure that agreement is rendered more and more inaccessible.
- *Best versus Good* – rejection of adequate or useful agreements on the grounds that they do not match up with some grander but less accessible ideal.
- *All or nothing* – a.k.a. ‘nothing to be agreed until everything is agreed’ usually results in nothing, which is often the real preference of those that employ this tactic.

**Linkage**
- *Linkage* – tie progress or agreement on one issue with achievement of agreement or gains on another issue (a favorite CD pastime).
- *Hostage-taking* – coercively present a contested point or resolution in your favor as a make or break issue for the whole negotiations

**Now for some positive tactics that some have tried to employ, but with scant success at this RevCon, though I’ve seen them work wonders in other situations.**

**Bridging and Trading**
- *Concession-trading* – a process of trade-off and bargaining with issues that may be directly connected or, in substance terms, unrelated, with players making concessions to win favourable compromises from others.
- *Mediation* – when a third party or parties help to facilitate agreement by enabling antagonists to address underlying causes of disagreement.
- *Third party bridging* – aka ‘the honest broker’, in which a third party or group of middle powers facilitate agreement by exploring solutions midway between the extremes and identifying and fostering concessions that bring antagonistic parties closer together.
- *Bridge-building* – in which one or more of the antagonistic parties are prepared to concede or modify demands to promote convergence.

**Regime-building ‘cognitive’ tactics**
- *Norm-shaping* – often associated with the strategies of civil society, in which the problem is stigmatised and the pay-off matrix itself is changed or redefined.
- *Reframing* – in which the problem is recast in more positive, less adversarial terms, offering an integrative solution with mutual gains.
- *Step-ladder* – deployment of new information (perhaps new technical information or data on consequences) to enable parties to surmount obstacles (or to perceive them from a different vantage point).
- *Unpacking* – in which a problem is disaggregated or separated into its constituent parts to facilitate incremental agreement or progress.
US Nuclear Hypocrisy: Bad for the US, Bad for the World

- David Krieger, NAPF

Every five years the parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty meet in a review conference to further the non-proliferation and disarmament goals of the treaty. This year the conference ended in a spectacular failure with no final document and no agreement on moving forward. For the first ten days of the conference, the US resisted agreement on an agenda that made any reference to past commitments.

The failure of the treaty conference is overwhelmingly attributable to the nuclear policies of the Bush administration, which has disavowed previous US nuclear disarmament commitments under the treaty. The Bush administration does not seem to grasp the hypocrisy of pressing other nations to forego their nuclear options, while failing to fulfill its own obligations under the disarmament provisions of the treaty.

The treaty is crumbling under the double standards of American policy, and may not be able to recover from the rigid “do-as-I-say, not-as-I-do” positions of the Bush administration. These policies are viewed by most of the world as high-level nuclear hypocrisy.

Paul Meyer, the head of Canada’s delegation to the treaty conference, reflected on the conference, “The vast majority of states have to be acknowledged, but we did not get that kind of diplomacy from the US.” Former UK Foreign Minister Robin Cook also singled out the Bush administration in explaining the failure of the conference. “How strange,” he wrote, “that no delegation should have worked harder to frustrate agreement on what needs to be done than the representatives of George Bush.”

What the US did at the treaty conference was to point the finger at Iran and North Korea, while refusing to discuss or even acknowledge its own failure to meet its obligations under the treaty. Five years ago, at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the parties to the treaty, including the US, agreed to 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. Under the Bush administration, nearly all of these obligations have been disavowed.

Although President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, the Bush administration does not support it and refused to allow ratification of this treaty, which is part of the 13 Practical Steps, to even be discussed at the 2005 review conference. The parties to the treaty are aware that the Bush administration is seeking funding from Congress to continue work on new earth penetrating nuclear weapons (“bunker busters”), while telling other nations not to develop nuclear arms.

They are also aware that the Bush administration has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to pursue a destabilizing missile defense program, and has not supported a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, although the US had agreed to support these treaties in the 13 Practical Steps.

The failure of this treaty conference makes nuclear proliferation more likely, including proliferation to terrorist organizations that cannot be deterred from using the weapons. The fault for this failure does not lie with other governments as the Bush administration would have us believe. It does not lie with Egypt for seeking consideration of previous promises to achieve a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.

Nor does the fault lie with Iran for seeking to enrich uranium for its nuclear energy program, as is done by many other states, including the US, under the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would no doubt be preferable to have the enrichment of uranium and the separation of plutonium, both of which can be used for nuclear weapons programs, done under strict international controls, but this requires a change in the treaty that must be applicable to all parties, not just to those singled out by the US.

Nor can the fault be said to lie with those states that, having given up their option to develop nuclear weapons, sought renewed commitments from the nuclear weapons states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. It is hard to imagine a more reasonable request. Yet the US has refused to relinquish the option of first use of nuclear weapons, even against non-nuclear weapons states.

The fault for the failure of the treaty conference lies clearly with the Bush administration, which must take full responsibility for undermining the security of every American by its double standards and nuclear hypocrisy.

The American people must understand the full magnitude of the Bush administration’s failure at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. This may not happen because the administration has been so remarkably successful in spinning the news to suit its unilateralist, militarist and triumphalist worldviews.

As Americans, we can not afford to wait until we experience an American Hiroshima before we wake up to the very real dangers posed by US nuclear policies. We must demand the reversal of these policies and the resumption of constructive engagement with the rest of the world.
A Treaty Worth Fighting For

Ambassador Paul Meyer of Canada was one of many States that took the floor on May 27 to express outrage over the Conference’s failure as well as to offer some glimmers of hope and ideas for next steps in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime.

Below is an excerpt of Canada’s speech, which can be found in its entirety at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/GDstatements/canada27.doc

Mr. President,

Four weeks ago, at the beginning of this Review Conference, Secretary-General Kofi Annan reminded us of the historical reality and the still present danger of a nuclear weapon explosion. He recalled the great security benefits that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has bestowed over 35 years, but warned us against complacency in underlining the great stress the Treaty was currently under. I fear that this Review Conference has not risen to the Secretary General’s call.

We have let the pursuit of short-term, parochial interests override the collective long-term interest in sustaining this Treaty’s authority and integrity. We have seen precious time that might have been devoted to exchanges on substance and the development of common ground squandered by procedural brinkmanship. We have witnessed intransigence from more than one state on pressing issues of the day, coupled with the hubris that demands the priorities of the many be subordinated to the preferences of the few. Our community is weakened by the refusal of the delinquent to be held to account by its peers and by the deflection from that community of a state without suffering any sanction. We have been hampered, frankly, by a lack of imagination and will to break with the status quo and adopt new ways of conducting our business.

Despite the scenes these rooms have witnessed over this month, the Review Conference must not be reduced to a theatre where we play at nuclear non-proliferation or disarmament. We cannot afford merely ‘to suspend disbelief’ in enacting the NPT review process or the curtain is soon likely to come down on our production.

If there is a silver lining in the otherwise dark cloud of this Review Conference, it lies in the hope that our leaders and citizens will be so concerned by its failure that they mobilize behind prompt remedial action. In that regard, it is important to realize that what happened here reflects a larger reality. The world is confronting many of the same disarmament and non-proliferation challenges in other fora as well. If we want this Treaty’s authority to be sustained, we need to tackle, on an urgent basis, some of these core challenges and resolve them in ways that generate real-world benefits for states and their citizens.

To begin with, the NPT States Parties have to demonstrate support for, and implementation of, political commitments they have undertaken as part of this Treaty’s process. To deny or denigrate the agreements of the past is to undermine all the political commitments made in implementation of the Treaty and to cast doubt upon the credibility of engagements entered into by governments. If governments simply ignore or discard commitments whenever they prove inconvenient, we will never be able to build an edifice of international cooperation and confidence in the security realm...

If there is a silver lining in the otherwise dark cloud of this Review Conference, it lies in the hope that our leaders and citizens will be so concerned by its failure that they mobilize behind prompt remedial action.

We believe this is a Treaty worth fighting for and we are not prepared to stand idly by while its crucial supports are undermined. To this end, it remains our belief that the health and implementation of the Treaty deserve to be the focus of an authoritative meeting for at least one week each year, empowering States Parties to discuss and decide on matters more frequently than allowed by the current five year cycle.

The issues that have divided us here will need to be addressed by our respective political leaders. One good opportunity to do so collectively will be provided by the UN Summit to be held in the fall. In this respect, it is important to realize that solutions to the problems of disarmament and non-proliferation already exist. What is needed is simply a matter of working harder on concerting the political will to implement them. Rather than looking back on where we have fallen short, we must look ahead to what we can and must accomplish...

Other statements from the closing debate can be found at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/GDstatements/index.html.

We would like to extend a special thank you to all States which made their final statements available to us for archiving, including Canada, Chile, Japan, New Zealand, Iran, Malaysia and Spain.
Their Children Are Our Children

- Jonathan Granoff, GSI

Our children deserve a world
We had one to dance in
Why live any longer for dancing
The radiation begins to spread
The flash more brilliant than suns explodes
Our children deserve a world
The monster politely turns its blank stare toward a
concrete bunker of a future
The monster thinks it will live forever
The monster thinks it will rise in rapture
Our children deserve a world
We had one
We have danced enough
Unmask the demon and show him in naked propriety for
what he is
Numbers on a blank screen
Numbers indicating an illusion of power over the future
Numbers giving hopes of immortality and protection
Unmask the demon and show how scared he is
Embrace him with care
Laugh at his insecurity
Organize, speak out, vote him out of office,

stop cooperating

Why live any longer for dancing
Find joy in service
Find life in living for our children
and for their children

[comments on the failure of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty Review Conference intended by the United States
diplomacy which effectively thwarted the conscience of
humanity]

Sunflowers Instead of Missiles

- Monika Szymurska, Abolition 2000

On the last day of the NPT Review Conference, UN Con-
ference Room E was filled with 300 sunflowers the NGOs
were planning to give to all delegates heading in for the
final deliberations. Our intent and our message were
clear: think disarmament! Each of the sunflowers had the
following message attached:

There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in
happiness, knowledge, and wisdom. Shall we, instead,
choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels?
We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remem-
ber your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so,
the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there
lies before you the risk of universal death.
(Russell-Einstein Manifesto, London 1955)

Text of Article VI of the NPT:
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date
and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general
and complete disarmament under strict and effective in-
ternational control.

As many of us tirelessly attached notes to each sunflower,
others were speaking with UN security and select dele-
gates to ensure that we had permission for handing out
our symbol of peace and disarmament to delegates head-
ing in to the General Assembly that morning. Our request
was denied, the reason given was that our message may
offend a delegation attending the Conference. It wasn't
until the afternoon, with the help of a few brave souls pet-
titioning on our behalf, that we were allowed to hand out
the sunflowers to delegates heading home.

Monika Szymurska is the Coordinator of Abolition 2000,
a global network of over 2000 non-governmental organi-
izations dedicated to the abolition of nuclear weapons.
www.abolition2000.org
Ten Years of Mad Cowboy Nuclearism

- Alice Slater, GRACE

This is my tenth year with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I was at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference when the nuclear bullies twisted metaphorical arms to get the indefinite extension. If it hadn’t been for the promises made for “systematic and progressive efforts for nuclear disarmament”, together with pledges to sign a CTBT one year later, negotiate a fissban treaty and establish a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, the nuclear powers would not have received their hard-sought gift to make the treaty permanent. Still, the evident reluctance of the nuclear powers to commit to a nuclear weapon-free world inspired NGOs at that meeting to form the Abolition 2000 Network calling for a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and, presciently, recognizing the “inextricable link between nuclear weapons and nuclear power”.

I remember when we stopped the diplomatic clock and hung out for an extra day of negotiations to reach consensus on the 13 steps in 2000. Both China and Russia commented, after the gavel fell, that if we failed to maintain the “strategic stability” of the ABM Treaty, all bets were off. During this 2005 Review, the headlines screamed the news that the US was planning to weaponize space to dominate the earth, having abrogated the ABM Treaty in 2002 under the guise of building a “missile defense”. The good news is that we can’t fool ourselves any longer about the positions of the Nuclear Weapon States. And it’s clear that the United States is setting the pace for unlawful behavior.

I found it extremely curious that there was little mention of the report that appeared in Novosti, during this Conference, that Russia was prepared to negotiate for huge cuts in its arsenal—down to 1500 warheads or less. Here’s an offer to break the logjam on nuclear disarmament! It’s obvious that if Russia and the US actually committed to reduce their arsenals to 1000 weapons or so, we could get all the countries to the table and finally nail down the steps we must take to save our world from a nuclear holocaust.

The shock and dismay of the vast majority of participants at this failed meeting will galvanize us to address the known threat—the persistent military-corporate-scientific establishment in the United States. NGOs and governments have begun planning for parallel processes—in the General Assembly, at the June meeting of NATO, at the World Court, with the new conference of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones parties, and with gathering alliances of law-aboring countries working with NGOs to clear a path forward.

One hopeful note is that we have shaken the foundation of our delusions that we can keep giving nations the key to the bomb factory, spreading “peaceful” nuclear reactors around the world, while still being able to prevent weapons proliferation. Our NGO proposal for an International Sustainable Energy Agency, to provide an alternative to the toxic effects of nuclear power, is garnering new interest. The rising engagement of civil society, as we saw in the May 1st demonstration, in the Mayors Campaign, in the new and growing Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament, in the good news from the Belgian Senate calling for the removal of its US nuclear weapons, is a harbinger of genuine prospects for nuclear disarmament. We’ll still need regime change in the US, but a burgeoning mass of nations and NGOs are ready to start examining the legal, political, and technical steps required to put an end to the nuclear age. We certainly won’t wait five more years. The explicit approbation of the rest of the world for the mad cowboy nuclearism in the wild west of the United States will be very helpful to those of us living in the belly of the beast in mobilizing public pressure to shift US policies towards a saner and safer world.

Youth Activism at the NPT and Beyond

- Julia Kramer, Pressehütte Mutlangen

For the first time, there has been a major youth presence at an NPT Review Conference. Several hundred youth from France, the US, Japan, Australia, Germany, Italy, Sweden and elsewhere have come to the UN to affirm that they don’t accept to be handed over a world in which the threat of nuclear weapons is prevailing. They affirmed this in the youth speech at the official NGO-presentation, as well as at the International Youth Forum in the beginning and at the Youth Caucus at the end of the conference. With actions like the distribution of sunflower seeds and actual sunflowers, the building of the “Protection Wall for International Law”, the “Target Project” at Times Square, daily vigils with colorful banners just across the street of the UN Headquarters, interviews, lobby and press work, they put attention to the pressing issue of nuclear disarmament. Currently, the international youth are cooperatively writing a message to the youth of the world, to spread the word about the non-outcome of the conference and its implicit dangers, hoping to inspire more youth all over the world to get active for peace and nuclear disarmament. The statement will be put on the youth page of the Abolition 2000 Website in the coming days. Representatives of several European youth delegations have made links to work together more closely in the future, creating a youth network for nuclear disarmament. Also, many are planning to go to Hiroshima in summer for the commemorations of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. The French Peace Movement is organizing a youth trip there.

For further cooperation on the issue, there is a list-serve to which anybody interested is invited: please send a blank email to: npt_youth-subscribe@yahoogroups.com. After this non-outcome of the RevCon, we surely won’t keep quiet!
On NGO Strategy

- Karel Koster, PENN

It seems to me that the anti-nuclear weapon movement must carefully consider its options, now that the NPT Review Conference (RevCon) has so resoundingly failed. The work put into the conference by the NGO world was based on the assumption that we could in some way influence the negotiating process. Clearly we did not, or if one wants to be charitable, there were stronger forces at work that neutralised any positive influence we may have had.

What was the goal in NY? We at least agreed on a minimum: some kind of reaffirmation of the 2000 ‘13 steps’ and 1995 ‘principles and objectives’. It was however quite clear beforehand that the US (and some of the other Nuclear Weapon States, NWS) would in no way allow such a reaffirmation of the nuclear disarmament goals. This meant that the central NGO goal had to be to force the US to change its position – patently absurd – or else go along with some compromise put together by a combination of other States parties at the RevCon. The potential allies (the Non-Aligned, New Agenda, NATO or Non-Nuclear Weapon States, NNWS) all failed to come through with anything the US government would accept. The problem after the RevCon therefore remains the same: how to force the US and other NWS to stop sabotaging the NPT.

Forcing the US to do anything is very much dependent on the strength of internal US political forces and their capacity to turn developments around (this touches on the broader issues of US foreign policy, which theoretically do not concern us but of course is closely connected with US nuclear policy). If this is not possible, the only other option is to encourage other alliances that will form a counter-weight to the US. The most effective of these is amongst US allies that are still regarded by the present US government as useful to some extent (although it should be noted that the governments of those countries, like that of the Netherlands, often indulge in wishful thinking about the degree of influence they are able to exert in Washington DC).

This is my prime consideration for calling on NGOs active in those countries counted amongst US allies, to make influencing their own government their prime priority. How this is done differs from country to country, sometimes a common issue can be found which provides a useful lever (with levers defined as an issue on which some parts of government or other political forces, experts, media are already agreed on in a particular country). One such is NATO nuclear policy and as its visible component, the presence of US nuclear weapons on European soil. Campaigning to remove these weapons is useful as an intermediate goal, because it provides the opportunity to put the issue of nuclear weapons on the political agenda and hopefully the public one (not the same thing at all) in a number of NATO countries.

My second point concerns the relative weight given to international fora and the capitals. It is attractive to assume that actual decisions are taken at conferences such as the RevCon, but I would suggest that this is delusional. The central decision-making apparatus remains in the capitals and therefore the right place for NGOs to attempt to influence that mechanism is in the capitals (through parliament, conferences, meetings with officials grass roots events, inspections like the bombspotting campaigns, media, perhaps the mayors for peace campaign etc). In that sense, it might be useful for everyone to think carefully before committing many resources to the next international event.

A Phoenix of Hope continued from page 1

package of decisions and resolution on the Middle East, Isr-

el remains outside of the NPT family, its nuclear weapons continually threatening its neighbors in the region. Egypt sees no reason why it should accept stricter controls on its nuclear energy program while the nuclear facilities of Israel remain unchecked and unsafeguarded.

For Iran, it has been clear that the US- and the other Nuclear Weapon States, for that matter- have no intention of providing binding security assurances to the Non-Nuclear Weapon States parties to the Treaty. The denial of Iran’s objectives are thus prompting it to seek security elsewhere- perhaps through acquisition of its own nuclear weapons, which the Nuclear Weapon States themselves revere as the ultimate source of security.

The vast majority of States, however, still believe that the NPT provides the best road to security. With over 50 working papers put forth at this Conference, there are many issues which do enjoy widespread support. The near-consensus in so many areas only exacerbates the anger and resentment over the time, resources and opportunity wasted at this Conference. Some States parties, including Malaysia, Chile and New Zealand, utilized the last day of the Conference to express their outrage and disappointment with the failed Conference.

Canada’s Ambassador Meyer, usually a perfect reflection of Canada’s patient, bridge-building role, did not attempt to hide his personal outrage and frustration in delivering Canada’s closing statement, in which he summed up the failure of the Conference thus: “We have let the pursuit of short-term, parochial interests override the collective long-term interest in sustaining this Treaty’s authority and integrity. We have seen precious time that might have been devoted to ex-

changes on substance and the development of common ground squandered by procedural brinkmanship… We have been hampered, frankly, by a lack of imagination and will to break with the status quo and adopt new ways of conducting our business.” (see, “A Treaty Worth Fighting For,” page 10.)
The General Assembly (GA) Hall was dead silent as Iran prattled off a list of eight examples demonstrating “the abysmal record, achieved unilaterally by the United States in the short span of five years (that) testifies to a mentality which seeks solutions solely through demonstration of power.” The failure of the Review Conference, said Iran, was clearly the fault of the US, which, they insisted, “tried to create smoke-screens in this Conference to deflect attention from its abysmal record.”

(The US, interestingly enough, did not exercise its right of reply in response to the Iranian statement. Failure to reply to such harsh criticism is an unusual choice by a government at the United Nations, especially when it allows such a statement to constitute the last substantive words of a high-profile Conference.)

With each stalled day, the prospects of an effective outcome grew more and more dim. NGOs struggled to retain their hope in the sea of disappointment. On the penultimate day, refusing to be bogged down in the cynicism and despair of this Conference, some NGOs had decided to present to the delegates, as they entered the GA hall to close the Conference, with a giant sunflower each, a symbolic reminder of the global desire and will for nuclear abolition. (Due to the security set-up of the GA, NGOs were prevented from actually handing them to the delegates, and so we were left holding these symbols of disarmament themselves. See “Sunflowers Instead of Missiles”, page 11.)

Unfortunately, the UN Security decided there was no room in the GA for such symbolic optimism. A squad of security guards burst into the observer gallery, marching up and down the rows, and literally ripped the sunflowers out of the hands, laps and briefcases of the NGO representatives.

You can take the sunflowers out of the peace activists’ hands, but you can’t wipe out all the seeds of hope that these flowers symbolize. As Ambassador Meyer said, “If there is a silver lining in the otherwise dark cloud of this Review Conference, it lies in the hope that our leaders and citizens will be so concerned by its failure that they mobilize behind prompt remedial action.”

NGOs and their governmental partners are wasting no time in strategizing creative ways to tackle the core challenges of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. At an Abolition 2000 press conference on May 26, Alyn Ware, the Coordinator of the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament, asserted that, “negotiations should happen through the NPT or through the Conference on Disarmament. They’re not. So now we’re consulting with governments to look at alternative paths...” He continued to discuss some of the successes of “alternative” processes, including the 1996 International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion, the strengthening of existing Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and the creation of new ones, and the slew of GA resolutions which consistently call for the implementation of disarmament obligations through the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

“We’re not giving up just because of the lack of progress through the NPT,” Ware said. “We believe nuclear disarmament is a political, moral and legal responsibility- and a practical possibility- and we’re going to make sure that happens.”

As we watch the cinders of the failed NPT Review Conference smolder out, a new hope is festering. Out of its ashes will rise a renewed plan for eliminating the nuclear threat, propelled by the raw tenacity and moral urgency of civil society. Even as the men with guns rip the flowers from our hands, or as the men in suits push us, through their inaction, ever more closer to the edge of annihilation, the majority of the world’s people will continue the fight for freedom from fear, inching all the more closer to reaching a critical mass of political will for nuclear disarmament.

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom would like to extend a warm thank you to all contributors to the News in Review throughout the past four weeks. Very special thanks go to the Reaching Critical Will interns, Hongwei Chen and Alex Sundberg. Without their tireless efforts, late nights and early mornings spent monitoring, reporting, creating puzzlers and distributing the News in Review every day, this publication would not have been possible.

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Archived issues can be found at: www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/nirindex.html