Bargaining for Agreement

By the end of the day on Monday, every Main Committee (MC) and subsidiary body had circulated some form of a draft text to be submitted for possible inclusion into this Review Conference's Final Document.

Judging from the leaks and rumors that filter out from these tightly closed-door debates, the struggle for agreement on these drafts has only barely begun. Some have proposed language that will surely elicit an allergic reaction from the United States. In turn, the US is proposing to eliminate references to principles and objectives that the vast majority of States refuse to abandon. Still others propose watered-down text that lack the strength to correct the problems they were intended to address. How these bargains will play out in a Final Document is yet to be determined.

In the debate over the report from subsidiary body I, the Non-Aligned reportedly insisted on inclusion of language over a time-bound framework for disarmament, a position that they have consistently held for years. The US had a much longer list of complaints against Chairman Caughley’s text, and reportedly insisted on deleting several phrases, including many that were already agreed upon in the past, such as: further progress to reduce nuclear arsenals; restricting the deployment of nuclear weapons and their operational status; reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines; foregoing any research and development on new types of nuclear weapons; undertaking new or further development of verification capabilities; and more. The US also rejected any reference to the “unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals,” a vow that they, well, already unequivocally undertook in 2000.

By completely gutting the 2000 Final Document and voiding many of its paramount objectives, the US is, in effect, proposing to hollow out and weaken the international disarmament and nonproliferation regime as a whole.

Chairman Sudjadnan’s draft report from MC I included some laudable elements at which the US and its NATO allies surely scoff, such as barely veiled language that would prohibit nuclear sharing under any military arrangements. While the expulsion of US nuclear weapons from Europe is not too far in the future— if the recent Belgian Senate resolution is any indication—such language is far from likely to be included in this Review Conference’s Final Document.

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) proposed a paper in MC III, which would affirm the cessation of transport of nuclear materials as the ultimate desired goal of these States. CARICOM also proposed initiating consultations of a comprehensive international regime that will provide for the full protection and safety of these States, which lay in the route paths of these deadly nuclear cargoes.

Egypt circulated a non-paper on Article IX to be included in the report on MC III, which would reaffirm that non-parties may only accede to the Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). Egypt’s paper calls on India, Israel and Pakistan— by name— to accept safeguards and accede to the Treaty as NNWS, a universalization strategy that is not unanimously accepted. It also requests the President of the Conference to “convey formally” these views and then report back to States parties on the responses from the hold-out States.

Some issues that many hoped the Review Conference would take action on are watered-down in the dissensus. The draft report of MC continued on page 4
In a statement on US Implementation of Article VI and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament presented in Main Committee I on May 20, Ambassador Jackie Sanders proclaimed: “[B]y any measure,” United States actions over the past 20 years have established an enviable record of Article VI compliance.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force thirty-five years ago. At that time, the United States, along with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, promised to negotiate in good faith towards both the early cessation of the arms race and the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Nonetheless, for almost two decades, the nuclear superpowers expanded their arsenals by many thousands of nuclear weapons, and developed an array of new ways of delivering them from the air, land, and sea. By the late 1980’s, there were approximately 70,000 nuclear weapons on earth, with more than 24,000 in the US arsenal. The United States also possessed the most powerful and technologically advanced conventional forces.

The approach now taken by the United States towards its own disarmament obligations asks us to look only backward, towards those immense Cold War stockpiles. It expects us to accept the possession and constant modernization of thousands of nuclear weapons for many decades to come as consistent with progress towards disarmament. But this backward looking approach fails to address the nuclear dangers we are facing in the 21st century, including the normalization of still very large nuclear arsenals, efforts to modernize nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons states outside the NPT, and – perhaps most dangerous – the integration of nuclear weapons into global war-fighting systems that are taking a quantum leap in complexity.

There is the possibility in the long run of a bewildering array of interlocking arms races, and if these systems are used against each other by several states with high tech arsenals, of a fog of war that increases the danger of a slide into nuclear catastrophe.

The current US nuclear stockpile is estimated at over 10,000 warheads. Of these, approximately 5,300 are operational, including 4,350 strategic and 780 non-strategic warheads. Almost 5,000 additional warheads are retained in a “responsive reserve” status or on inactive status, with their tritium removed. It is believed that 480 operational US nuclear bombs are deployed at eight bases in six NATO countries, for delivery by US and NATO bombers.

The United States asks us only to look at the numbers, and to measure progress mainly by a partial descent from the heights of insanity that the Cold War arsenals represented. They ask us to accept as “enviable” the “achievements” of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, (SORT), which requires only that the United States and Russia reduce deployed strategic nuclear arsenals to between 1700 and 2200 warheads and bombs by 2012. Thousands more will be kept in various states of storage and readiness. There is no requirement that a single bomb, warhead, or delivery system be destroyed. There are no transparency or verification mechanisms and no milestones for reductions prior to 2012, when the treaty expires. There will also be unspecified numbers of non-strategic nuclear weapons, which may grow more diverse in capabilities and intended missions.

The United States insists that disarmament progress has been more than sufficient, and that the key issue facing the NPT parties is efforts by non-nuclear weapons states, particularly Iran and North Korea, to acquire nuclear weapons.

Yet the United States plans to acquire strategic weapons and delivery systems with new capabilities. These efforts aim to exploit advances in a wide range of missile, computing, and space sensing technologies that allow either conventional or nuclear weapons to be delivered over great distances with increasing accuracy. While claiming that it is reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, it appears that the US military planners aim to replace nuclear weapons with more accurate, powerful conventional weapons where possible, while expanding the capabilities of its nuclear weapons to destroy targets that conventional weapons cannot.

These efforts include:

- Modification of existing nuclear warheads to achieve additional capabilities.
- Retooling of the nuclear weapons research, design, and production infrastructure to allow maintenance of a downsized nuclear arsenal still numbering in the thousands of weapons for many decades to come, while enabling the production of nuclear weapons for the “post-Cold War” missions envisioned by military planners.
- Exploration of a different paradigm for nuclear weapons de-
Megatons to Megawatts: US-Russian Briefing

Matt Martin, BASIC

In the outside world, the US and Russia might have serious ongoing disagreements over a range of strategic issues these days, such as the weaponization of space, the encroachment of NATO, and the advance of US missile defense plans. But you’d never know it sitting in the UN, listening to the two most powerful members of the P5 talk about the historic HEU-LEU Agreement, a.k.a. “Megatons to Megawatts” (or better yet, “M2M”). When expanding on how well they are meeting their nonproliferation and disarmament obligations under the NPT and how M2M contributes to that, the US and Russia representatives act like old chums in full agreement.

Monday afternoon, Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov led a panel discussion on M2M with Vladimir P. Kuchinov, Head of Russia’s State’s Department of the International and External Economic Cooperation, and his counterpart, Paul Longsworth, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration, US Department of Energy. M2M is a bilateral agreement between the US and Russia, signed in 1993, to convert 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) taken from Russian nuclear warheads into low-enriched uranium (LEU) which is then used for civilian reactor fuel in the US. As both representatives were keen to point out, this is enough HEU for 20,000 warheads, and the LEU produced will contribute to 50% of all US civilian LEU or 10% of all electricity produced nationwide. M2M is, quite literally, “turning swords into ploughshares.”

While touting the real and significant achievements of M2M, both Mr. Kuchinov and Mr. Longworth took this NPT Review Conference briefing opportunity to highlight another advantage they confer on the M2M agreement— that it significantly contributes to their Article VI obligations to negotiate toward nuclear disarmament. As HEU stockpiles have a fixed size— neither country has produced enriched uranium for decades— they argue that each shipment of HEU toward the M2M (and related) programs reduces the overall size of the stockpile and so is moving toward reductions. At a time when clearly the Nuclear Weapon States feel they are unfairly being criticized by the global community for not fulfilling their disarmament obligations, M2M presents an opportunity to prove the NWS adherence to Article VI. In particular, the US delegation

War is Peace continued from page 2

· Revamping systems used to plan and execute nuclear strikes.
· Modernizing ballistic missiles and other nuclear delivery systems, and beginning development of a new generation of systems to replace existing ones in coming decades.
· Developing a “Global Strike” capability that will allow the delivery of either conventional or nuclear weapons anywhere on earth in a few hours or less.

There is no way to predict exactly what mix of nuclear weapons and other high-tech “global strike” technologies the United States will develop. Near term military spending priorities may shift towards non-strategic forces if the United States attempts to sustain military occupations for long periods of time. It is clear, however, that the US intends to retain a large and constantly modernized nuclear arsenal for the foreseeable future.

By taking the position that nuclear weapons are acceptable tools of warfare that it will use to achieve a variety of goals, the US has severely undermined the NPT’s status as partial codification of an emerging global norm against nuclear weapons possession and use. The implication that the selective use of nuclear weapons in ordinary warfare is lawful and legitimate signifies acceptance of the end of nuclear non-proliferation as a normative and legal enterprise.

2005 marks the passage of 60 years since the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The survivors of atomic warfare are dying off, and with them the living memory of what cannot be imagined, of what nuclear weapons really are and can do. They leave behind a world ruled by people who appear to have lost all understanding of the immediacy of the danger that nuclear weapons at every moment represent. Each one can generate a horror that will echo down through generations. Together they can end everything. There are no new arguments and no magical diplomatic formulas that will save us from ourselves. We must recapture the simple, true urgency of the time before the realities of nuclear warfare could be obfuscated, denied, and forgotten. As Lewis Mumford wrote in 1946:

“You cannot talk like sane men around a peace table while the atomic bomb itself is ticking beneath it. Do not treat the atomic bomb as a weapon of offense; do not treat it as an instrument of the police. Treat the bomb for what it is: the visible insanity of a civilization that has ceased to worship life and obey the laws of life.”

This article is drawn from War is Peace, Arms Racing is Disarmament, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the US Quest for Global Military Dominance, a Special Report by Western States Legal Foundation, May 2005. It is available at: http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/warispeace.pdf
Preventing Nuclear Terrorism

- Yukiko Tanaguchi, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security

On Monday, May 23rd, Tom Selinsky presented his documentary “Is America Safer?” focusing on the threat of nuclear terrorism. The documentary featured a number of experts who discussed the danger posed by unsafely guarded nuclear weapon materials and the measures needed to be taken to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack. These experts included Graham Allison, William Potter, Matthew Bunn, Joseph Cirincione, Sam Nunn, Lawrence Korb, Stephen Van Evera and Lloyd Hession.

The film drew attention to the fact that it is fairly easy to obtain a grapefruit-sized amount of highly enriched uranium in order to make bombs. It discussed the ways in which that nuclear terrorism can be prevented, such as the through locking up all current nuclear weapons and materials, ceased the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, getting nuclear material out of vulnerable facilities, stepping up the pace of work with Russia on the vulnerability of its stockpiles and expanding efforts to quickly secure stockpiles and create fast-paced global partnerships around the world. Action needs to be taken as soon as possible.

Joseph Cirincione said that the “Atoms for Peace” program implemented by President Eisenhower was “the dumbest US policy”, spreading nuclear technology world-wide without receiving any benefits in return. Stephen Van Evera noted the alarming and clear rise in “millennialist” thinking in regards to world religions; it is not just Al-Qaeda that poses a threat to international security. Lloyd Hession said that the US should not put faith in the incompetence of their opponents; it doesn’t take much competence to put a bomb together.

Overall, Tom Selinsky’s documentary was both informative and insightful. There are two more parts to his series, which include the rebirth of nuclear power plants. Selinsky wants to compile his documentary series and package it as an educational tool to bring into high school and college curricula. His DVD documentary, “Is America Safer?” can be purchased online at www.amazon.com. He can be reached at Tom Selinsky Productions: 1730 Minnesota Avenue, Duluth, MN 55802, or through his website at tomselinsky.com. The NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace, and Security has a copy of the DVD and may be borrowed.

Bargaining continued from page 1

II will simply note that “some States parties” support making the IAEA Additional Protocol a condition of supply, rather than affirming it as such, as many hoped the Conference would. Other issues that were to have been debated substantively in this Committee, such as reforming the Review Process, optimizing NGO participation and increasing reporting, are left as discussions to be taken up in the next Preparatory Committee meeting in 2007.

A draft text from subsidiary body III on withdrawal is also a bit weaker than many had hoped. This text encourages supplier States to “consider” inserting dismantle and return clauses (to be enacted in the case of withdrawal) in future nuclear technology transfers.

How the Final Document will incorporate these draft texts remains to be seen. Whether or not there will even be a Final Document is also up for debate. At this point, it is critical that the majority of States define their irreducible minimum—the principles and objectives that they recognize as imperative for this Conference to affirm. For if no agreement on a Final Document can be reached, and this Conference adjourns on Friday without a consensus text, the 1995 and 2000 agreements will remain the binding interpretations for subsequent assessment of the NPT. And that just might be the best bargain of them all.
RevCon WordSearch

R K F J P T N L R V Y E C S P L H T M V C W P
H I I L O P M B N R T H F C V U Y R B L O P D E
W H S O K I L P U R Y W M K O S E C U R I T Y L
K O S M O R A T O R I U M L R T Y N V G P U T I
J T I O L G F P L N C X R E C D Y B L O W D I B
Q X L B Y G B N H O K L V G R T E D C Z I L L P
Y N E K O T L D R D K T Y B K P B T R Q V N I P
L K E V C R R E P O R T H W E V A T B N X P B U
V G L K K A E A W S N C X H I D K L O P M D A E
T Q I B W U O L N E V G T E N W F Z M O P I T T
X C M Y H N I T M S A E L E P O I S O T V I N E
M U I N G H A A U L P I G T R U T K K L O I U N
P O N D E T M S V U I A L K H F Y P R C H N O E
Y H A L E R V S S E C O R P E R Y B N K O T C E
O K T B A R T E R K L G O E U T C D R J O N C M
O K E S T G U I C D N U R A N A I C O W A N A M
Y R I N M H O R W C U O L P O C P O L I S R P I
U D G B U N I V E R S A L I T Y Y O L K I S E C
Y W C U N D E P E E E B O B Y N P E P A L M E A N
S O L S K E E N R D I U M O I T M G R O W L C I
K O M M A N E T L U O Y N R L O P R E V E N E R
V U N N T E R A L O K I E H C I T H I P R U N G
E V U P T Y U N C E F V R E X J S I L G D E I M
P O L T E R D I E S B I N G T E I H K N S H I L

Find the following words (in all directions: left to right, right to left, upwards, downwards and diagonal):

TRANSPARENCY
FISSILE
DISARMAMENT
CTBT
COMPLIANCE
REPROCESS
ACCOUNTABILITY
NPT
PEACE

MORATORIUM
UNIVERSALITY
VERIFY
REPORT
AGENDA
SECURITY
WITHDRAW
NWFZ
REDUCE
ELIMINATE
ABOLISH

Return or fax a completed WordSearch to the WILPF Office and receive a prize!

777 UN Plaza
6th floor
fax: (212) 286-8211

Contributors to this edition of the News in Review include:
Jaqueline Cabasso, WSLF; Felicity Hill, WILPF; Ralph Hutchinson, OREPA
Lisa Ledwidge, IEER; Andrew Lichterman, WSLF; Matt Martin, BASIC;
Alex Sundberg, WILPF; Yukiko Tanaguchi, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security

Rhianna Tyson is the Editor of the News in Review.
Youth Caucus Vitamins for Conference Room IV

- Felicity Hill, WILPF

The Youth Caucus painted Conference Room IV with enthusiasm today. Dancing, singing, clapping, cheering and actual joy in THAT room – can you imagine? Try.

The theatre group called IMPACT was fabulous! Instead of warming up by congratulating the Chair on his assumption of power, they sang a song called “Keep the Faith, Reach Up”: “I’m young and I’m smart and I want more, we remain in chains but I want to be free.”

Instead of hip-to-be-miserable sedative sandwich speeches, these kids were just hip in their hope and belief that nuclear disarmament will occur. Youth were encouraged by other youth to continue spreading the word, organizing events, exposing friends, family and peers to information about the NPT and the nuclear threat.

Some of the poems read expressed fear of nuclear war, but others defended the right to just live. “I am deeply in love with life. Although I didn’t ask for my life, President Bush or anyone does not have the right to take it away from me…” Sometimes it’s hard to be the only one making change, but that’s not the case here. We are many.”

High school kids shared their reactions to what they had learned in workshops about nuclear weapons, what happened to them when they met hibakusha, and expressed a strong sense of urgency to DO something about the nuclear insanity invented by suicidal, genocidal and ecocidal white men. “Turn off the reality shows and see what reality shows … open your eyes … the death camp is on TV.”

“I’m only 17 but I’m ready to take on the world’s problems with words as my weapon of choice. We revolt with our minds. We can change the world; it’s not cliché, if we follow the paved and peaceful way.”

M2M Briefing continued from page 3

has been particularly vocal and clear on the measures, including M2M, that they argue prove their commitment to disarmament obligations.

However, M2M is not without its detractors. Clearly for those who want to do away with nuclear power, whether for security, environmental, or economic reasons, M2M runs contrary to these goals by offering up civilian nuclear reactor fuel as a good. And without greater transparency and accountability, it is difficult to ascertain whether M2M contributes significantly to the disarmament goals of Article VI. As neither the US nor the Russians make the overall size of their uranium stockpile public-as was reinforced in Monday’s discussion- it is unclear what percentage of the total Russian stockpile 500 metric tons of HEU represents. Moreover, with both countries engaging in activities that raise the level of unease among observers, whether M2M is significant enough to outweigh the more provocative actions is questionable. In the US, for example, the administration’s desire to study building new nuclear weapons with new designs and missions, while failing to ratify CTBT and make good on many confidence-building steps outlined in previous Review Conferences has raised serious doubts about US commitment to disarmament. In Russia, the increased reliance on strategic nuclear forces in light of decreasing conventional capability and an equivocal stance on no first use policy raises similar concerns.

Whether or not the NWS can convince the NNWS of their determination to hold up their side of the grand bargain of the NPT- by holding up M2M as a prime example of nuclear disarmament may well influence whether we will have a significant Final Statement come Friday night. Whatever weights and measures States Parties use in negotiating their balancing act, that’s now only three days away. Is it too much to hope for M3M (Megatons to Megawatts to Meganegotiating)?

Matt Martin is the Deputy Director of the British American Security Information Council.

What’s On: Today’s Calendar of Events

Daily morning interfaith prayer vigil
Where: Ralph Bunche Park, 42nd Street, 1st Avenue
When: May 2-27, 7:30 AM
Contact: Caroline Gilbert, Christian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Abolition 2000 Morning Caucus
Where: UN Conference Room E
When: Daily, 9 AM-10 AM
Contact: Monika Szymurska, Global Coordinator

Lessons for the Future: From the Crucible of Experience featuring Robert McNamara, Ted Sorensen and Thomas Graham
Where: Conference Room IV
When: 1:15 -- 2:45 PM
RSVP: Matt Werner at 610 668 5480 or matt@gsinstitute.org. co-sponsored by the Global Security Institute and Economists for Peace and Security

Missile Defense, Space and the NPT
Where: Mission of Iceland, 800 Third Avenue (at 49th St.), 36th floor
When: 3 PM
RSVP: Lucy Webster, Economists for Peace and Security

An appeal to Japan for leadership—Call for an indefinite postponement of the Rokkasho Reprocessing plant
Where: UN Conference Room E
When: 3-4:30 PM
Contact: Akira Kawasaki at kawasaki@peaceboat.gr.jp, Peace Boat