States parties to the Review Conference did not continue their General Debate yesterday as originally planned. With no agreement on an agenda, President Duarte thought it best that governments continue their consultations behind closed doors in order to reach agreement on the agenda (document number NPT/CONF.2005/CRP.1) and the president’s corresponding announcement (NPT/CONF.2005/CRP.2) upon the adoption of the agenda:

***************OBJECTION***************
The delegation of Greenpeace proposes deleting the words “did not” and replacing them with the words “failed to”.

... States parties to the Review Conference failed to continue their General Debate yesterday as originally planned. With no agreement on an agenda, President Duarte thought it best that governments continue their consultations behind closed doors in order to reach agreement on the agenda (document number NPT/CONF.2005/CRP.1) and the president’s corresponding announcement (NPT/CONF.2005/CRP.2) upon the adoption of the agenda:

***************OBJECTION***************
The delegation of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War proposes deleting the words “With no” and replacing them with the word “Without”.

... States parties to the Review Conference fa—

***************OBJECTION***************
The delegation of the Acronym Institute proposes deleting the words “behind closed doors” and inserting the words “bilateral and regional” before the word “consultations”.

... States parties to the Review Conference failed to continue their General Debate yesterday as originally planned. With no agreement on an agenda, President Duarte thought it best that governments continue their consultations behind closed doors in order to reach agreement on the agenda (document number NPT/CONF.2005/CRP.1) and the president’s corresponding announcement (NPT/CONF.2005/CRP.2) upon the adoption of the agenda:

***************OBJECTION***************
The delegation of the British-American Security Information Council proposes deleting the words “originally planned” and replacing them with “as they were supposed to have done.”

... States par—

***************OBJECTION***************

... If NGO reporting were conducted in a manner similar to that by which governmental delegations devise an agenda, every issue of the News in Review would probably have read as this one did.

It’s not that NGOs don’t know and appreciate the haggles and struggles of multilateral deliberations. For a prime example of how multilateral language negotiations can actually succeed, be sure to attend the NGO presentations to the delegates tomorrow, scheduled for 3-6 in Conference Room IV.
At a panel on Friday afternoon, Daniel Ellsberg announced some breaking news: Germany had announced its intention to ask the United States to remove all nuclear weapons from German soil.

Ellsberg, who became famous in the US in the early 1970’s for leaking secret Pentagon documents on the Vietnam War, participated in the panel “Beyond the NPT: Toward a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World” sponsored by INESAP, the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation.

The news from Germany is astonishing, marvelous,” the biggest unilateral move in nuclear disarmament since US President George H. W. Bush removed nuclear weapons from all US Navy surface ships about 14 years ago, Ellsberg said. He suggested it is no coincidence that this happened now, and he expressed hope that each of Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey might soon follow Germany’s example.

Germany and any who follow would then be empowered to pressure the United States on a no-first-use policy for nuclear weapons, “a crucial element in moving away from nuclear weapons,” Ellsberg said. He recalled that the US did not exclude the possibility of using nuclear weapons in its 2003 invasion of Iraq, if chemical or biological weapons were used against US forces. Thus, it would intriguing to know whether the first President Bush’s policy against nuclear weapons on US surface ships is still in effect, something the Washington press corps should ask, he said.

The rosy scenario that might follow Germany’s latest step, though, is not the only plausible future that Ellsberg sees. Responding to rumors of an impending North Korean nuclear test, he speculated that “the US would like to see a North Korean test;” he had participated himself in discussions of similarly cynical strategies when he was a government insider.

Ellsberg outlined another risk: if the United States or Israel attacked Iran, alleging that Iran was at the verge of making a nuclear weapon, every potential proliferator would learn the lesson that “you can't build a nuclear weapon, you have to buy one,” driving the black market price of nuclear materials “sky high.” In that setting, “if nobody can buy a nuclear weapon out of Russia in the next decade, then the theory of markets is totally gone.”

Ellsberg scoffed at US claims of full compliance with Article VI. These claims stress the percentage reduction of the American nuclear arsenal from Cold War maximums; but, Ellsberg noted, “Reducing forces has nothing to do in an essential way with the elimination of nuclear weapons.”

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*The wars we make* - Nicholas Peters

I gaze into the world with sorrowing eyes
And see the wide-abounding fruits of hate.
We fight, we say, for peace, and find

The wars we make
To be a spring of hate and source of future wars.
Is there no peace for man?
No hope that this accursed flow
Of blood may cease?
Is this our destiny: to kill and maim
For peace?
Or is this ‘peace’ we strive to gain

A thin unholy masquerade
Which, when our pride, our greed, our gain is touched too far,
Is shed, and stands uncovered what we are?
Show me your light, O God
That I may fight for peace with peace
And not with war;
To prove my love with love,
And hate no more!

Poem submitted by Stan Penner
Australian Uranium: Feedstock for Proliferation

- Dr. Jim Green, FoE Australia

Friends of the Earth, Australia supports the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, notwithstanding its flaws, and urges the Australian Government to take a strong stand at the NPT Review Conference in May. Unfortunately, Australia’s engagement in international disarmament and non-proliferation debates is compromised by the US military/nuclear alliance and by Australia’s uranium export industry. This paper addresses just one aspect of the broader debates - the contribution of Australia’s uranium exports to proliferation risks.

The regime designed to prevent military use of Australian-obligated nuclear materials (AONM) - primarily uranium and derivatives such as fissile plutonium - involves:

* All recipient countries must be NPT signatories and are therefore subject to safeguards inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
* Uranium exports are subject to Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) audits, and counterpart organisations must maintain records of inventories and transactions, and submit regular reports.
* Bilateral safeguards agreements must be in place between Australia and recipient countries. This includes a provision that there can be no on-transfer of AONM to a third country without Australian government consent and no reprocessing or high enrichment without consent.

The flawed nature of the IAEA safeguards system was fully exposed by the Iraqi nuclear weapons program from the 1970s to the early 1990s. Other countries have pursued covert weapons programs despite being NPT signatories - examples include North Korea, Romania, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia.

The IAEA Director General, Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, has recently noted that the IAEA’s rights of inspection are “fairly limited” and that the safeguards regime “clearly needs reinforcement.” Motivated by the Iraq fiasco in particular, efforts have been made to improve the IAEA safeguards system. However getting NPT signatory states to sign up to the “Additional Protocols” of the Strengthened Safeguards Program has been protracted and many states have yet to agree to the more stringent (but still limited) requirements.

The NPT-enshrined “inalienable right” to develop enrichment, reprocessing and other proliferation-sensitive technologies is another of the flaws of the NPT/IAEA system. Dr. El Baradei has outlined a number of proposals to be debated at the NPT Review Conference, including a five-year moratorium on the construction of new enrichment and reprocessing facilities, and developing options for multinational control of sensitive nuclear facilities. The USA has proposed similar initiatives to the IAEA. President George W. Bush has called for an end to the horizontal proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing technology.

Other problems remain such as the chronic underfunding of the IAEA’s safeguards program and that of counterpart national organisations including ASNO, even while the scale of the challenge steadily increases. The IAEA is responsible for safeguarding enough fissile material to build over 110,000 nuclear weapons. ASNO tracks over 60 tonnes of Australian-obligated plutonium, enough to build approximately 6,000 nuclear weapons. Claims by industry bodies and ASNO that ‘reactor grade’ plutonium cannot be used for weapons have been disproven.

Despite the obvious flaws in the IAEA safeguards system, ASNO and industry bodies such as the Uranium Information Centre persist with the fiction that there is no risk of AONM being diverted for military purposes.

A detailed critique of the safeguarding of AONM is provided by Prof. Richard Broinowski in his 2003 book Fact or Fission? The Truth About Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions (Melbourne: Scribe). Prof. Broinowski details how Prime Minister Fraser’s 1977 safeguards regime has been gradually weakened in many ways and he argues that accounting for AONM is “tenuous, and subject to distortion or abuse.”

One major problem is Material Unaccounted For (MUF), a recent example being the revelation on February 17, 2005 that 29.6 kgs of plutonium at BNFL’s Sellafield plant in the UK is unaccounted for. Invariably nuclear bodies insist that the problem is simply an accounting error and no material has been misplaced or stolen. Such claims are dishonest: no-one can be certain of the correct explanation for MUF. It is further noted by industry bodies and compliant regulators that MUF is commonplace - but this is hardly comforting!

Another problem tracking AONM is the scale and complexity of the undertaking. AONM exists in many forms in many locations. According to ASNO, AONM held abroad in 2000-01 included 19,045 tonnes of natural uranium, 19,590 tonnes of converted uranium in enrichment plants, 47,787 tonnes of depleted uranium, 7073 tonnes of low enriched uranium, and 56.4 tonnes of plutonium.

Another problem tracking AONM is the ‘fungibility’ of the materials involved. AONM cannot be specifically identified when it enters the nuclear fuel cycle, so tracking AONM is reduced to a book-keeping exercise. When material is unaccounted for, nuclear bodies and compliant regulators insist that none of ‘their’ material was involved. Such claims are disingenuous.

**Australia’s engagement in international disarmament and non-proliferation debates is compromised by the US military/nuclear alliance and by Australia’s uranium industry.**

Australian uranium & North-East Asia

Australia, through its uranium sales and reprocessing policies, is deeply implicated in civil nuclear programs in North-East Asia and in the attendant proliferation risks and

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Challenging and Changing U.S. Nuclear Policy: Political Strategy for NGOs

- Hongwei Chen, WILPF

During the panel discussion on Friday entitled “Challenging and Changing Dangerous US Nuclear Policy,” co-hosted by the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and the Western States Legal Foundation, the mood in Conference Room E swung back and forth between chilled apprehension and hope as a variety of speakers briefed the event’s participants on the ominous nature of America’s military-industrial infrastructure as well as strategies that NGOs should pursue in order to counter it. The speakers, all veterans of the peace and disarmament movements, spoke from both their research and experience of the challenges that US nuclear policy poses for anti-nuclear activists and life on earth.

Jackie Cabasso, Executive Director of the Western States Legal Foundation (WSLF), gave a quick history of the nuclear disarmament movement since the late 80s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, peace activists worldwide uttered a collective sigh of relief, for the specter of nuclear war had been averted, or so they thought. However, almost overnight, new threats such as rogue states and terrorists were quickly constructed by the US government in order to justify ever increasing military expenditures. Meanwhile, the nuclear disarmament movement lost all of its momentum—its demands became narrower and its following was reduced to a closed circle of policy think tanks. The links between the anti-nuclear movement and the popular peace movement were all but severed. During this period, nuclear weapons became reinvested as the cornerstone of US defense policy. Cabasso hopes that events like the May 1st rally can take the issue of nuclear weapons back from the policy circles and reintegrate it with the pace movement.

Andy Lichterman, Program Director of the WSLF, used a combination of US policy documents and statistics from independent research to give a comprehensive view of the US’s plans for global military dominance. He stressed the need for a comprehensive understanding of how the governmental system of arms control works in order to avoid overly narrow demands that accomplish nothing substantial. For example, the ‘successful’ democratic opposition to funding the ‘robust earth penetrator’ merely shifted funds to strategic war-planning programs. Instead one needs to oppose the entire direction of US defense policy that moves towards a new generation of high tech weaponry designed to wage preventative war. Disarmament movements should not succumb to the limited agendas within Congress—such as mini-nukes versus strategic nukes debates—and instead attempt to change the structure of priorities through which the government makes its decisions via mobilization at the local level. He concluded that before any serious move towards disarmament can take place, there must be such a substantial amount of social change that current assumptions about security would become meaningless.

Judith Le Blanc, co-chair of United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ), swung the room’s emotions away from the dark and the ominous and towards an intense hope by highlighting the successes and potential successes of UFPJ in creating an integrated movement for peace and social justice. UFPJ is not an organization but a coalition of diverse interests, from labor unions to religious groups, focused on creating a grass-roots network of education and mobilization. Its aim is to use current issues such as the war on Iraq to build a long-term movement that is well educated about the manifold impacts of US
What’s On: Today’s Calendar of Events

Daily morning interfaith prayer vigil
Where: Ralph Bunche Park, 42nd Street, 1st Avenue
When: May 2-6, 7:30 AM
Contact: Caroline Gilbert, Christian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Abolition 2000 Morning Caucus
Where: United Nations Church Center (44th street and 1st avenue), Boss Room, 8th floor
When: Daily, 8 AM- 9 AM
Contact: Monika Szymurska, Global Coordinator

No Governmental Briefing Today
(Hungary to reschedule)

Where: UN Conference Room E
When: 10 AM- 1 PM
Contact: Manshik Kim, SPARK (Solidarity for Peace And Reunification of Korea)

German NGO Caucus Meeting
Where: CCUN, Drew Room
When: 1pm

The United Nations Capacity for Monitoring Weapons of Mass Destruction
Where: Conference Room IV
When: 1- 3 PM
Light lunch served
Contact: Daniel Nord, WMD Commission
Sponsored by the Permanent Mission of New Zealand

Psychologically Incorrect: the irrationality of nuclear policies, false belief systems and provoking unintended consequences
Where: UN Conference Room E
When: 1 PM- 3 PM
Contact: Diane Perlman, Psychologists for Social Responsibility

UK Government presentation on verification
Where: Conference Room 2
When: 1:15- 2:45
Contact: Alex Pykett, Nuclear and UN Disarmament Desk Officer, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Hibakushas call on a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone -- testimonies and youth actions
Where: Conference Room E
When: 3- 6 PM
Contact: Keiko Nakamura, Peace Depot

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tensions.

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer acknowledged on February 10, 2005, that recent developments on North Korea make it more likely that Tokyo or Seoul will pursue nuclear weapons. Should Japan construct nuclear weapons, it is likely that Australian-obligated separated plutonium would be used.

Even in the absence of a systematic nuclear weapons program, Japan's plutonium program fans regional tensions in North-East Asia and the Australian government is complicit by permitting the separation and stockpiling of plutonium. Diplomatic cables from US Ambassadors in Tokyo describe Japan's accumulation of plutonium as "massive" and question the rationale of the plutonium program since it appears to be economically unjustified. A March 1993 diplomatic cable from US Ambassador Armacost in Tokyo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, obtained under the US Freedom of Information Act, posed these questions: "Can Japan expect that if it embarks on a massive plutonium recycling program that Korea and other nations would not press ahead with reprocessing programs? Would not the perception of Japan's being awash in plutonium and possessing leading edge rocket technol-

ogy create anxiety in the region?"

The mining and export of Australian uranium is highly problematic for a variety of reasons, not least the proliferation risks, and should be stopped. Permitting Japan or any other country to separate Australian-obligated plutonium is indefensible.

Tracking AONM in China will prove all the more difficult because of the nature of the regime. Further, even if no AONM is diverted, the sale of Australian uranium frees up China's limited domestic uranium reserves for potential use in weapons, so Australia could be indirectly feeding weapons proliferation. That John Carlson, the Director-General of ASNO, has recently visited China to progress negotiations underlines yet again ASNO's confusion between promotion and regulation of the nuclear industry.

Dr. Jim Green is the National Nuclear Campaigner for Friends of the Earth, Australia.
It is true that the NPT is facing one of its most formidable challenges thus far. Challenges have emerged in the following areas: compliance, proliferation, universalization, the risk of nuclear terrorism. This year’s NPT Review Conference must appropriately address these issues in order to ensure and reinforce the integrity and credibility of the NPT.

What is the greatest priority for your organization at this Conference?

We need to address the three pillars of the NPT – nuclear disarmament, non-nuclear proliferation and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes – in a balanced manner. In particular, the upcoming Review Conference should send out a clear and strong message concerning compliance with non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty. Measures against non-state actors such as terrorists should also be strengthened. At the same time, nuclear weapons states, in particular, should fully explain the measures they have taken to implement article VI obligations and reaffirm their commitment to the 1995 “Principles and Objectives” and the 2000 Final Document. Japan is also advocating the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as an important means to raise awareness on the dangers of nuclear weapons.

What is your approach towards and hope for this Conference?

A strong message needs to be sent to States Parties and non-states parties to the Treaty to control, curb and eliminate nuclear proliferation. While it is important to review the implementation of the Treaty, the outcome document should be forward-looking, containing concrete measures to be taken over the next 5 years, without negating those that were agreed upon in 1995 and 2000.

In your view, how can NGOs be more effective at these sort of Conferences?

NGOs, as representatives of the public community, have an important task to undertake during this year’s Review Conference to make diplomats and governments understand the importance of going forward in implementing the NPT, and to keep States accountable to their promises. The Japanese Delegation recently provided an opportunity to exchange views with the disarmament-related NGO community here in Geneva in order to gain some invaluable expert input into its preparations for this year’s RevCon.

Efforts made by NGOs through websites, including the Critical Will website and the News Review, to follow the NPT and report on the meetings, also play an important role in the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation and serve to inform the public on what is going on at a governmental level. Japan looks forward to the continued input in these areas from NGOs during this year’s Conference.

How did you get interested in disarmament and non-proliferation issues?

I have always had a strong interest in the cause of peace. Given the history of my country and having seen the devastating effects of war, I am eager to avoid war in the future and the mishaps of war. I am certain we can work together to a successful outcome of this year’s NPT Review Conference towards this aim.

Challenging and Changing continued from page 4

foreign policy. She maintained that it is possible to mobilize millions of people from all sectors of society if we put our minds to it—if we reached out to people in ways that they could relate to. Such a mobilization could drastically change the constitution of the government so that there is a “peace block in congress” that could put a halt to the entire military apparatus.

Carol Ong, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s (NAPF) advocacy and research director, stressed the need to integrate young people into the anti-nuclear movement. She noted that young people are hard to mobilize because they are more attracted to issues with relevance to their immediate lives. Therefore there is a need to launch programs aimed at making connections with young people, such as the NAPF’s radio contest, where youth can submit peace and social justice-related music to be made into an album.

Carol Urner, a long time active member of WILPF, turned the discussion towards legislative lobbying. She maintained that there are about 40-60 good conscientious members of Congress that think the way peace activists do. She urged the participants to keep working for and supporting these representatives. Urner also briefed the participants on two pieces of legislation that have been proposed in the House—H.Res. 291, which demands a radical restructuring of US military policy including the termination of all new nuclear programs, and H.Res. 133, a more modest proposal designed to gain bipartisan support. Both of these resolutions, while not prefect, deserve to be supported.

In the discussion that ensued, participants brainstormed about ways to get started with a disarmament agenda in the senate. Besides a long slew of possible senators that could advance the cause, participants agreed on the need to mobilize both locally and in congress because “legislators are also human beings.”

Hongwei Chen is an intern with the Reaching Critical Will project of the WILPF UN Office.