Nearly every seat in the conference hall was filled; most every State party had several delegates sitting behind their respective nameplate. The observer galleries were overfilled with NGOs and journalists. The statements delivered were chock full of substantive information, views and recommendations for moving the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime forward.

If only the governmental plenaries were conducted in this manner.

On Wednesday, the Conference held its official session dedicated to presentations from international civil society. These 15+ state-ments had been drafted, edited, re-written, re-written and re-written amongst dozens of NGOs. The speakers represented only a fraction of the amount of people who had been working on these statements for months, in an open process that took place online in listserves, conference calls and in-person meetings.

Xanthe Hall of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War opened the session by outlining seven truths that demonstrate “Why Nuclear Weapons are Obsolete.” “If you point nuclear weapons at anyone,” said the British-German representative of IPPNW, “then they are pointed at you.” Sometimes these simple, obvious facts are the much-needed splash of cold water needed to wake the delegates up from their procedural sleepwalk.

WILPF’s Alexandra Sundberg spoke on the issue of transparency, highlighting the need for increased reporting and NGO participation in and access to the NPT meetings. Judging by the way the delegates swarmed the new table of NGO information papers, Sundberg’s call for increased interaction with NGOs resonated well with States parties, which have been equally thirsty for more interaction with NGOs than had previously been accorded at this Conference.

Two US affiliates of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms teamed a presentation on Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) Compliance to Article VI. Jackie Cabasso of Western States Legal Foundation tackled the first segment of Article VI - the cessation of the nuclear arms race; Michael Spies of Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) analyzed the NWS’ compliance to nuclear disarmament; and John Burroughs of LCNP assessed their compliance to the final segment of Article VI - general and complete disarmament. These three presentations, supersaturated with evidence of NWS vertical proliferation, should have confirmed (if anyone was still in doubt), that the international disarmament regime is facing its greatest crisis of noncompliance in its history.

Helen Caldicott decried the dangers of nuclear energy while Tony de Brum offered his perspective, as a Marshall Islander, on the nuclear age. Lou Zeller, of the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, outlined the dangers of reprocessing military plutonium wastes into fuel: a very timely speech given the massive radioactive spill at the UK’s Sellafield reprocessing plant that occurred just two days ago.

Two young women, Natalie Wasley and Tina Keim, delivered a riveting speech on behalf of the youth of the world, followed by an overview of NATO nuclear share-
Open Letter to the Conference Secretariat and States parties

To: Mr. Jerzy Zaleski Secretary General of the 2005 NPT Conference S-3140A

Dear Mr. Zaleski,

I am writing on behalf of the NGOs who attend the Abolition Caucus which meets daily each morning during this Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference to exchange information, plan, and strategize for civil society participation at this 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. More than 150 NGOS have attended our morning meetings since the conference began. We are appalled at the ill-treatment we have received in this 60th Anniversary year of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Because of the critical world environment for progress on curbing nuclear proliferation and eliminating nuclear weapons as promised by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, an unprecedented number of NGOs registered for this year’s conference, 1,752-- magnitudes larger than has been witnessed in any past year. Yet for the first time in the ten years I have been attending these meetings, we were assigned the smallest available meeting room in the UN basement, Conference Room E, with no room to display our literature and constant threats by UN Security to close down our panels and presentations if people tried to sit on the floor because we have exceeded the limit of 42 people for that room. People are turned away each day.

Committed activists have collectively spent tens of thousands of dollars to travel to New York to make their case known to the delegates for nuclear abolition and to present them with expert information carefully prepared to educate the world’s governments about practical and meaningful solutions to the nuclear scourge and to help in analyzing the implications of the security policies of the various state actors. Yet we have had virtually no access to the delegates during the opening debate. We are not permitted near the General Assembly Hall where we could meet the delegates and give out our literature and no facility was made available in reach of the delegates where our literature could be placed. There is no access to hard copies of the public documents such as speeches of the delegations which we have always had in the past.

Registration for the conference itself involved extremely long waiting times, as long as two hours at times, which resulted in many NGOs missing the opening session of the NPT. Relegated to the fourth floor balcony, high above the proceedings below, we were limited to one ticket per delegation, while a whole gallery on the second floor of the Assembly Hall remained empty of visitors. We were told to get tickets not only for the morning session, but to come back and get tickets for the afternoon session as well. As a result many NGOs no longer attended the public sessions, which in turn created the wrong impression of lack of interest. This situation was created by the way access was restricted.

We urge you to correct these disgraceful conditions to the extent possible by assigning a larger room to the NGOs for their use, or an additional space to display our literature, leaving one room free for the many informative panels that are still to come while allowing access to each other’s literature during the times the panel room is in use. We would also like access to the delegates during the meetings, including a literature display table and physical proximity to permit us to engage with them in discussion. We are available to discuss these issues further.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Alice Slater
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment
aslater@gracelinks.org
212-726-9161

artwork by Thomas Hudson

Missed an issue of the News in Review? Fear not! All issues are archived at: www.reachingcriticalwill.org

To order a compendium of the News in Reviews, contact Alex Sundberg at: alex@reachingcriticalwill.org. Both color and black and white compendia are available!
Background
Since the end of the Cold War, the momentum toward nuclear disarmament has been fitful. But the obligation to bring about nuclear disarmament does not rest solely with the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS). A belligerent and fearful atmosphere after the Cuban Missile Crisis in the early 1960s prompted the countries of the Latin American and Caribbean Region to create the world’s first Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWZ) Treaty. The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco set the standard for all subsequent NWZ treaties, predating and preparing the way for the most widely agreed treaty in the world: the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Since 1967, three more NWZs have been created:
• the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga, covering the South Pacific;
• the 1996 Treaty of Bangkok, covering Southeast Asia; and
• the 1997 Treaty of Pelindaba, covering Africa.

The continent of Antarctica is a de facto NWZ under the provisions of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which bans all nuclear explosions and radioactive waste disposal. Similarly, the Earth’s orbit, the moon and all other celestial bodies, are also de facto NWZs under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

Each succeeding treaty has been stricter than previous ones, adding to and building on the strengths of earlier ones. The Treaty of Rarotonga, for example, forbids nuclear test explosions. The Treaty of Bangkok prohibits nuclear transport within the Economic Exclusion Zones of treaty parties, and the Treaty of Pelindaba renounces nuclear weapons research. Within existing NWZs, New Zealand and the Philippines have added national legislation to strengthen protection of their territory. In addition, Austria (1999) and Mongolia (2000) are each single-state NWZs.

Shared Characteristics of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
All existing NWZs:
• ensure the absence of nuclear weapons in a regional zone of application defined within the treaty;
• exemplify a regional effort to create a common security structure; contribute to nuclear non-proliferation, promote nuclear restraint and general and complete disarmament;
• use nuclear materials and facilities under the jurisdiction of the treaty parties for exclusively peaceful purposes;
• commit the parties to abstain from carrying out, promoting, or authorising, directly or indirectly, the testing, use, fabrication, production, possession, or control of all nuclear weapons or to participate in these activities in any form;
• prohibit the receipt, storage, installation, deployment or any form of possession of all nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly by any of the parties, by order of third parties or by any other means;
• place all regional facilities under the inspection regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and
• enjoy security assurances granted to them by the NWS through NWZ treaty protocols.

Current Status of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
Twenty-two years after the first use of nuclear weapons in 1945 the world witnessed the creation of the first NWZ, thereby grounding the hope for a nuclear weapon-free world.

Today, one NWZ treaty or another covers virtually the entire Southern Hemisphere of our planet. In 2000, under the sponsorship of Brazil and Aotearoa/New Zealand, the UN General Assembly called for the creation of a Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas NWZ treaty, uniting the current zones around the planet. The next NWZ may well be the Central Asian NWZ covering the countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This treaty needs only the signatures of the NWS on its protocols to enter into force.

Throughout the world, hundreds of cities and municipalities have declared themselves nuclear-weapons-free. While without international legal status, these zones generate significant political will and public support for nuclear disarmament and larger regional NWZs.

Regional bodies can negotiate NWZs as preventive disarmament measures, thereby taking action independent of the NWS to create a common security structure. Unfortunately, the package of agreements agreed at the NPT Review Conference in 2000 includes no reference to NWZs despite the following reference in Article VII of the NPT that encourages the creation of these progressive alliances:

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Future Prospects
As we near the NPT Review Conference in May 2005, and hear calls to rein in nuclear proliferation, we would do well to remember that many parts of the globe have already given us a tested and flexible model that provides for both non-proliferation and disarmament.

Regional NWZs form the heart of the untold success story of the road to a nuclear weapon-free world. They are one of our best hopes for bringing it into being. We can expand upon and link these zones as part of the global menu to achieve nuclear abolition. NWZs in the Middle East, South Asia, Northeast Asia, and Central Europe are cur-

continued on page 4
A Mathematician Views the Nonproliferation Regime

- Chuck Baynton, WNPJ

Everybody everywhere has a large stake in the prevention of nuclear war. Though governments and NGO’s here have divergent views of almost everything, there’s one point of broad consensus: the nonproliferation regime is struggling. It’s precious, and it’s in peril. If a new and different perspective might help us find the way forward, it’s probably worth a look.

In that spirit, here’s one rooted in mathematical thinking.

Game Theory

The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a famous, relatively simple construct from 20th century game theory. Two partners in crime are taken prisoner and separated. Each is offered leniency in exchange for betraying them both. If neither betrays the other, the case against both collapses, and they go free; but if one is unrepentant and betrayed by his partner, his treatment will be doubly harsh. What course of action best serves their interests?

It’s called a dilemma because it is one. The best outcome for each of them occurs when neither confesses. One simple feature of the scenario transforms that choice from obviously best to deeply problematic: they are prevented from cooperating.

Here’s the point: it’s a simple exercise to construct a circumstance where cooperative action opens up the possibility of a better outcome for every party than individual pursuit of self interest can do. In a complex world, it is no surprise that we are surrounded by such situations. Indeed, it is just such situations that call for treaties. Where individualistic conduct serves everyone well, there’s no harm in just letting it operate.

But the Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrates a second lesson that matters more for this Conference. When cooperation is an option, the possible gains occur only as the result of actual cooperation. Nothing at all is gained from a pledge to cooperate that goes unfulfilled.

The Risk Mushrooms

In 1968, there were five nuclear-weapon states. At this conference, everyone is thinking “nine.” Almost twice as bad? Think again.

In a world with n nuclear-weapon states, there are n(n-1)/2 potential conflict pairs of nuclear-weapon states. You can convince yourself this formula is right by listing all possibilities when n = 2, 3, and 4.

In 1968, then, there were 10 such pairs; today, 36, almost four times as many.

What if we get the uncontrolled cascade of proliferation that concerned Secretary General Annan’s High Level Panel? If n grows from 9 to 40, we’d have 780 potential conflict pairs. That is, since 1968, not just an eightfold increase from 5 to 40 nuclear-weapon states, but a 78-fold increase from 10 to 780 potential nuclear confrontations.

Some will protest this crude estimate of risk. This is partly fair, but not entirely so. It is true, for instance, that among 36 potential conflict pairs today, there are pairs that cause us genuine concern, but many others don’t.

Perhaps the ratio of worrisome pairs to all pairs is 1 to 3. Whatever that ratio is, there is no reason to expect it will change if n increases over time. The central issue remains: we should expect that if the number of nuclear-weapon states grows, the risk of nuclear war between two or more of them will grow faster.

Furthermore, alliances among nations are quite stable from month to month, but unstable from decade to decade. The reassuring notion that most potential conflict pairs aren’t a concern is good month-to-month thinking, but month-to-month thinking is the right framework only if the risk of nuclear war is a concern for months, not decades, to come. Who here thinks that?

Hidden Paradoxes

“This statement is false.” Well, is it? It’s a piece of verbal trickery called a self-referential statement. To consider it either true or false leads to an immediate contradiction. It shows that straightforward-looking words can hide a paradox.

When nuclear weapons get involved, unrecognized paradoxes are dangerous.

The core paradox of nuclear deterrence can be stated in many ways. Here is one:

To believe that nuclear deterrence keeps us safe, we must simultaneously believe two opposites: first, that nuclear war is unthinkable, which is what gives the perceived deterrent effect its strength; second, that it is thinkable, for a weapon that we would not actually use is no deterrent at all.

This is more than verbal trickery. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence potentially confronts each leader of a nuclear-weapon state with the real choice whether to kill millions of non-complicit civilians in an attacking country, knowing that to do so won’t improve his own country’s outcome. The doctrine presumes to know that every leader faced with that choice will see no choice and will attack massively, merely because doctrine requires it.

Shall we return from New York and tell the people of our respective countries that that doctrine is still the best we can do?

Chuck Baynton is a member of Wisconsin Network for Peace and Justice.
Making the Connection Between Disarmament and Conflict Prevention

- Susi Snyder, WILPF

Wednesday’s panel sponsored by Global Action to Prevent War (GAPW) and the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) was aimed at bridging the severe gap between the disarmament and conflict prevention communities. The panelists discussed using arms control as a tool of conflict prevention as well as the ways in which preparations for war inevitably result in war.

A dominant theme of the panel was the need for a strong civil society voice articulating the disarmament component of conflict prevention to governments and also the UN.

GAPW, formed in 1999 at the Hague Appeal for Peace, is an emerging transnational network of organizations and grassroots activists in 53 countries. Global Action focuses on a programme that grounds the goal of conflict prevention in specific integrated phases over a three to four-decade period. This plan demonstrates, with 72 concrete proposals, how to move from an international system based on conflict and power relations to one based on law and multilateral institutions.

GPPAC, a worldwide civil society-led process to generate and build a new international consensus on peace-building and the prevention of violent conflict, was initiated in 2002 in response to the UN Secretary-General’s call to non-governmental organizations in his Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict (2001) to organize an international conference on the role of NGOs and their interaction with the UN in conflict prevention. GPPAC aims to support a shift from reaction to prevention through the following goals:

1) To create a sustainable network of individuals and groups committed to prevention and peace-building at global, regional, and national levels. This network will include multi-stakeholder partnerships involving diverse civil society organizations (CSOs), governments, Regional Organizations and the United Nations to enable effective engagement.

2) To develop and work towards the implementation of a policy change agenda, as articulated in this Global Action Agenda and Regional Action Agendas, that will strengthen the effectiveness of conflict prevention and peace-building.

3) To raise public awareness around the world and generate constituencies that actively support human security as an alternative to militarism, are informed about prevention and peace-building, and the important role of civil society in achieving it.

Speaking on the panel were Nobuyasu Abe Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Vandy Kanyanko, conference coordinator of the Global Conference From Reaction to Prevention, Akira Kawasaki, GPPAC North East Asia coordinator, Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director of Western States Legal Foundation and Jennifer Nordstrom, Coordinator, Global Action to Prevent War.

Susi Snyder is the Secretary-General of WILPF
Daily morning interfaith prayer vigil
Where: Ralph Bunche Park, 42nd Street, 1st Avenue
When: May 2-6, 7:30 AM
Contact: Caroline Gilbert, Christian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Abolition 2000 Morning Caucus
Where: United Nations Church Center (44th street and 1st avenue), Boss Room, 8th floor
When: Daily, 8 AM- 9 AM
Contact: Monika Szymurska, Global Coordinator

Governmental Briefing- Ambassador Rivasseau (France)
Where: UN Conference Room E
When: 9-10 AM
Contact: Rhianna Tyson, WILPF

International Youth Meeting
Where: UN Conference Room E
When: 10am-1pm
Contact: Felix Grädler, International Law Campaign, Germany

Forum: Can International Treaties Promote the Goals of Disarmament and Development?
Where: United Nations Church Center (44th street and 1st avenue), 2nd floor
When: 1:15- 2:45 PM
Contact: Gordon Bennett, Alliance for the Global Wellness Fund Treaty

Briefing with Thomas Graham and Richard Rhodes: An overview of current challenges facing the NPT and measures needed to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime
Where: UN Conference Room E
When: 1:15-2:45 PM
Contact: Jaya Tiwari, Physicians for Social Responsibility

Where: UN Conference Room E
When: 3-6 PM
Contact: Manshik Kim, SPARK (Solidarity for Peace And Reunification of Korea)

Contributors to this edition of the News in Review include:

Chuck Baynton, WNPJ
Nigel Chamberlain, BASIC
Alice Slater, GRACE
Susi Snyder, WILPF
Rhianna Tyson is the Editor of the News in Review.

What's On: Today’s Calendar of Events

NWFZ Continued from page 3

rently under discussion in respective regions and at the UN. These proposed NWFZs differ significantly from previous ones in that they all include or border on de facto or declared NWS. They also indicate a transition from a passive but legally protected region to a region where active disarmament is carried out. Establishing a Central European NWFZ, for example, would require the actual withdrawal, dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons. Establishing such a zone in Northeast Asia would require the folding and withdrawal of the US nuclear umbrella. While it is important and necessary to create new NWFZs, strengthening existing zones contributes to the creation of a nuclear weapon-free world. In this regard, Mexico has called for an International Conference of the Parties to NWFZs treaties to take place in April 2005, just prior to the NPT Review Conference. Such a conference, which has never before been convened, would bring together over 110 countries with a strong, shared agenda.

At a time when people and governments of nearly every persuasion look for better ways to be safe and create the conditions for their children and societies to flourish, the citizens and governments of the world’s NWFZs have much to teach us. In a post 9/11 world, it is more important than ever to create regional zones of safety and security that foster co-operation and trust among neighbouring states. Sustaining and expanding NWFZs can lead the way to nuclear abolition and the fulfilment of the NPT promises.

Recommendations

1. All NWS sign extant protocols for the existing NWFZ treaties.
2. All relevant states sign and ratify the NWFZ pertaining to their region.
3. New NWFZs are established in the Middle East, South Asia, Northeast Asia, Central Asia, and Central Europe.
4. All States Parties support the creation of a Southern Hemisphere (and Adjacent Areas) NWFZ.
5. All States Parties support the International Conference of the Parties to NWFZs treaties in Mexico City from 26 to 28 April.
6. All States Parties put the development and expansion of NWFZs on their agenda of the forthcoming NPT Review Conference.
7. All governments and civil society organisations continue to educate and raise public awareness about NWFZs and their potential for the creation of a nuclear weapon-free world.

This article is the second briefing paper in the series, “Breakthrough or Bust in ‘05?” from the British-American Security Information Council and the Oxford Research Group. See www.basicint.org for more information.