Yesterday, governments tackled two of the most contentious contemporary political issues: the Middle East and nuclear energy. The tone was largely diplomatic, and delegations even engaged in some interactive debate during the morning session. Yet, observing from the corner, one has the sense that states are not hearing each other. There are many diverse, nuanced, fluctuating views about these two subjects, dependent on changing political, economic, environmental, and social factors. The debate here at the PrepCom, however, is largely stationary – there is a lack of acknowledgment of each other’s perspectives, and a lack of flexibility in reexamining one’s own position or understandings.

The main focus of the morning session was the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution, which calls for the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in the region. Many states recalled that the resolution was an integral part of the decision to indefinitely extend the NPT in 1995, and lamented that it has not yet been realized, despite the 2000 Review Conference’s affirmation that the resolution is still valid.

In determining why progress has stalled, most states pointed to the political environment in the Middle East, and the lack of determination by the nuclear weapon states to decisively participate in changing this environment. Israel’s nuclear weapon programme was frequently indicated as the number one impediment to a NWFZ in the region, and many states called for Israel’s immediate accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and to the IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards agreements. Some states also called for NPT member states to cease all nuclear cooperation with Israel, arguing that double standards are being applied in the region. In Libya’s words, some states are “judging small creatures” while elephants act aggressively with the support of a gang.

The US argued that Iran’s alleged violations of its safeguards agreements were responsible for holding up the creation of Middle East NWFZ and the universalization of the NPT. The US delegate said, “We cannot hope to attract new parties to the Treaty if the non-proliferation assurances offered by the Treaty are not seen to be credible.”

Other states had very different perceptions of actions that undermine the Treaty. Some states questioned how the proposed US-India deal will affect the non-proliferation regime. For example, Canada said it wants “to ensure that any developments in this regard do not weaken the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and recall the positions already taken by the NPT membership regarding conditions of supply to non-nuclear weapon states.” NGOs have also invited the US to explain to the PrepCom how the US-India deal is in compliance with NPT. Other states argued that the failure to implement the Middle East resolution undermines the NPT, as it indicates a bias in implementing some of the Treaty’s provisions over others, and encourages further nuclear proliferation in the region.

States also disagree about how to implement the Middle East resolution. While the US argues that “progress toward [a Middle East NWFZ] requires progress toward a political and security environment in the Middle East that is conducive to creating this condition,” many other states, including South Africa, the Republic of Korea, Cuba, and Malaysia, believe that the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East would help create an atmosphere conducive to sustainable peace in the region. As South Africa said, “the possession of nuclear weapons provides only an illusion of security for those who possess, but in reality it only serves to increase insecurity.”

This discord of perceptions continued in the afternoon session, when delegates discussed the “peaceful” uses of nuclear energy. In WILPF’s perspective, New Zealand correctly posited that “nuclear power is not compatible with the concept of sustainable development, given the long term costs, both financial and ecological, of nuclear waste and the risk of nuclear proliferation.” In contrast, France described nuclear power as “protective of the environment”. New Zealand has rejected nuclear energy for itself, while France profits from the sale of nuclear technology. South Africa, unfortunately, announced it is aiming to restart fuel cycle activities, while Jordan mentioned it is planning to begin a nuclear energy programme. Most other states remained silent on this issue.

Some delegations argued that “non-compliance with non-proliferation commitments” voided NPT member states’ “inalienable right” to nuclear technology. Others expressed concern that there is an emphasis on non-proliferation at the expense of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, at a time when many developing countries are hop-
Inalienable Right: What’s Wrong With This Picture?

Alice Slater, Abolition 2000

In discussions of social contract theory, “inalienable rights” were said to be those rights that could not be surrendered by citizens to the sovereign. Such rights were thought to be natural rights, independent of positive law. Natural rights date back at least to the Roman Empire, and were recognized during medieval times, but in this context are an element of the classical liberalism of the 18th and 19th centuries.

Thomas Jefferson incorporated this concept into the United States’ Declaration of Independence when he wrote that “all men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights—life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness—and peaceful nuclear technology?!? Which one of these does not belong?

Life
Liberty
Pursuit of Happiness
Peaceful Nuclear Technology

Just as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty rendered the Article V right of the NPT to “peaceful” nuclear explosions inoperative, the establishment of an International Sustainable Energy Agency, (see www.abolition2000.org) should override any “inalienable” right to “peaceful” nuclear technology.

NPT by the numbers
I Repeat: Inalienable

States parties to the NPT PrepCom used the phrase “inalienable right” 34 times in yesterday’s debate on peaceful uses. This is four more times than the number of Articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which includes the right to “life, liberty and security of person” (Article 3).

Shades of Grey, continued from page 1

States parties to the NPT PrepCom used the phrase “inalienable right” 34 times in yesterday’s debate on peaceful uses. This is four more times than the number of Articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which includes the right to “life, liberty and security of person” (Article 3).

Similarly, some states argued that multilateral controls of the fuel cycle would discourage proliferation, while others pointed out such controls would be in violation of Article IV of the NPT, which affords member states the right to develop, research, and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

In the end, both sessions revealed important fault lines between nuclear weapon states’ and non-nuclear weapon states’ positions on the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The NWS continue to prioritize non-proliferation, while the NNWS believe that the double standards placed on the NNWS and with respect to non-states parties are the true regime-eroding factor.

A fundamental discord of perception lies at the root of the current impasse in the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It is apparent in questions of reductions versus elimination, rights versus obligations, security first versus disarmament first, or Iran versus Israel – we are all looking at the same situation, but some are seeing it black and others white. We all need a little more grey.
I just heard an IAEA diplomat at the NPT PrepCom describe the ‘enormous complexity’ of the so-called ‘nuclear-fuel-cycle’. In the same breath he referred to the ‘front’ and ‘back ends’ of that ‘cycle’. What a complex phenomenon indeed! a cycle that has ends! Is he genuinely oblivious to this oxymoron, or is it merely part of the nuclear mass-marketing exercise to misrepresent the linear nature of the whole nuclear project? There is nothing ‘cyclical‘ about it. The front end is uranium mining; a process which leads inexorably to the extensive mobilization of radioactive isotopes into the surrounding habitat.

Even in ‘normal operations’, a surge of decaying toxins is liberated into surrounding eco-systems then dispersed widely according to wind, water and biological activity. Uranium-238 has a half-life of over 4 billion years. Each U-238 atom will slowly decay through a cascade of daughter isotopes, including much ‘hotter’ descendants like radon-222, a gas which emits alpha particle radiation. Alpha particles are minuscule but they have the capacity to rupture the links in the DNA helix which forms the core of all living organisms. DNA is the message delivery system in all our cells, dictating precisely the form and function of all life. Damaged DNA gives false messages and leads to abnormal cell growth. The warped DNA and the resulting cell defects are passed on to the next cell generation. This warping is the trigger for cancer growth (carcinogenesis) and birth defects (mutagenesis).

The nuclear industry and its devotees rely on the capacity of our habitat to disperse and absorb its toxic legacy, treating our environment as a giant eco-sponge masking the fact that they have mobilized mountains of contaminants. The numbers of its victims, with their cancers and congenital abnormalities and generational mutations, are hidden by this dispersal over geography and over time. As an example, the ongoing atmospheric fallout from the nuclear weapons testing in the 50’s and 60’s adds an average extra dose of 0.02 millisieverts per year to us all. IPPNW research estimates 2.4 million people will die of cancer as a result of this ‘silent’ exposure.

This process of disseminating DNA-toxins into our environs is intrinsic to the nuclear industry at every step, including at the ‘back’ end: radioactive waste. While the industry protests that it has solutions to waste management, these projects are logically nothing more than experiments, with us and our habitats as the guinea pigs. Whatever technologies they employ must function for tens of thousands of years and we cannot know how effectively they will perform. It is a giant speculative exercise, a perpetual pilot project, whose conclusions will be drawn many millennia from now. The nuclear energy industry, with its uranium mines, reactors and waste are like a lingering mega-time bomb, whose poisonous legacy will be suffered and calculated in all its enormity by future generations.

Many observers have choked on the enthusiastic celebration of nuclear power by delegates on the floor of the NPT PrepCom this week. Such fervour is but a natural response to Article IV of the Treaty, which embeds the right of states to nuclear technologies. Further, the NPT empowers the IAEA to promote whilst simultaneously regulating this dissemination. This is perhaps best understood as the ‘pimp-as-policeman’ paradox whose corrupted bouquet should not greatly surprise us.

There is nothing ‘cyclical’ about nuclear power. It is a chain: a chain around our collective necks. Like the Abolitionists of old, we must break the chain. Now more than ever we need a comprehensive legal instrument which binds the international community to a program for the phased total elimination of nuclear weapons, which does not promote the nuclear power industry. Now is the time for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

IPPNW’s new initiative - the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear weapons (ICAN) - will mobilize global concern about nukes and focus that concern on the achievement of total abolition via a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Now is the time to pressure our political representatives to instruct their functionaries to reject the banality of evil – to stop ‘loving the bomb’ – to liberate the eco-sphere from the mutagenic madness of militarism.

Together we can achieve this. You can. ICAN.
A Page from History:

The First Proposal for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

*submitted by Thomas Schoenfeld, World Federation of Scientific Workers*

At its first session in London, 24 January 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution setting up the UN Atomic Energy Commission to "make specific proposals: (a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful purposes; (b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes; (c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; (d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions." The UN Atomic Energy Commission began with meetings in New York in June 1946, which continued into 1949. Because there was no agreement reached on any key points of its mandate, it did not continue after 1949.

Andrey Gromyko of the Soviet Union presented a remarkable proposal to the Commission at its second meeting on 19 June 1946, the "Draft International Convention to Prohibit the Production and Employment of Weapons Based on the Use of Atomic Energy for the Purpose of Mass Destruction".

The key provisions, contained in Article 1, read as follows: "The high contracting parties solemnly declare that they are unanimously resolved to prohibit the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy, and for this purpose assume the following obligations: (a) not to use atomic weapons in any circumstance whatsoever; (b) to prohibit the production and storage of weapons based on the use of atomic energy; (c) to destroy, within a period of three months from the day of entry into force of the present convention, all stocks of atomic energy weapons whether in a finished or unfinished condition. "Article 2 read: "The high contracting parties declare that any violation of Article 1 of the present convention is a most serious international crime against humanity." (see 1, 2). The main provisions of this first proposal for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, in the two articles and in other articles, are also key elements of later proposals, including most recent ones.


**Mediterranean Anti- Nuclear Watch**

a new Non Governmental Organization, was founded in Rhodes on May 2005, under the Technical Chamber of Greece initiative, and took its legal form in January 2006.

**The goals of the Watch are:**

*The observation and publication of the developments in the field of nuclear weapons, nuclear power plants and in general nuclear industrial activity, which form a threat against Life, Peace and the Environment.*

*The information, raising of common awareness and the activation of the People for the release from the nuclear threat in the Mediterranean and the whole planet.*

*The promotion of renewable and environmental friendly energy sources and the enactment of measures for energy saving policies and the change of the present over-consuming living standards. And in general,*

*The protection of the paramount goods of Life, Peace, Environment and Ecological Equilibrium of the Planet in the framework of respect to the human dignity and the maintenance of qualitative life conditions for the present and the future generations.*

With the support of the Local Authorities, the Mediterranean Anti-Nuclear Watch has developed intense activity since its foundation. Among others, we organized an International Meeting for the prevention of the installation of new nuclear plants, in May 2005, with the participation of scientists and organizations from Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria and Cyprus. As an outcome of the aforementioned meeting, "Rhodes' Appeal", the declaration of a common campaign in the above mentioned countries which was signed by more than 8000 people in Rhodes.

In May 2006 of the 1st International Anti-Nuclear Festival of Rhodes, which took place in May 7-14, 2006. Titled "We have the right to live in a Nuclear-Free World", the festival included many activities: lectures, discussions, film projections, theatre plays, musical concerts and a peaceful march on May the 13th, in which many citizens and visitors of our Island participated, aiming to the raising of common awareness of the citizens and the thousands of visitors of Rhodes along with the coordination of actions of the anti-nuclear forces all over the world.

Meanwhile, Mediterranean Anti Nuclear Watch takes responsibility for maintaining the campaign "1 Million Europeans Against Nuclears" for the Rhodes region, till the end of the campaign. 2007 is for MANW a year dedicated to the Renewable Sources of Energy, as dedicated to this subject will the 2nd International Anti Nuclear Festival of Rhodes, held during the week 24-30 of September 2007.

During the aforementioned Festival a Protocol of Cooperation for the Creation of a Network Against the Nuclear Threat in the wider area of the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East will be signed. One of the goals of the Protocol is «the transformation of the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East into a Nuclear-free Zone of Peace»
During the space security event on Monday morning, Jessica West from Project Ploughshares and Götz Neuneck of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg discussed the link between space security and the weaponization of outer space, and its challenges to nuclear disarmament.

West outlined the context of the debate by explaining the concept of space security – secure and sustainable access to and use of space, and freedom from space-based threats – and the challenges to it. Military posturing is one of the biggest threats to space security. Civil space programs have been shifting towards strategic, high-level cooperative initiatives that mirror the rivalries between the major space powers, determined by military tensions. Outer space is becoming another theater of defense: war on Earth could lead to the targeting of space assets (such as civil, commercial, or military satellites), or vice-versa, anti-satellite attacks could provoke conventional or nuclear wars on Earth.

The imbalance of military supremacy in space also leads to asymmetric threat response. The US has already expanded its nuclear posture to include responding to WMD attacks with nuclear weapons; it could further include attacks on its space infrastructure as grounds for a nuclear response.

Neuneck elaborated that the increasing militarization and possible weaponization of outer space could change (for the worse) the strategic nuclear relationship between the major powers. Pointing out that the US Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system is designed to be a layered approach, incorporating ground, sea, air, and space aspects, he argued that while it can be operated as a “defensive” system, in combination with US offensive arsenals it could also be used as a defensive shield after a first strike by the US. The offensive elements of all the layers of the BMD system could be used to launch an attack, and then defend against a counterattack, or second strike.

Missile defense undermines nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. For example, the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the disappearance of START II and the unlikelihood of START III, and the end of SORT in 2012, all demonstrate the lack of interest in arms control, let alone disarmament. Neuneck also pointed out that the US has emphatically rejected any arms control measures in outer space, which it views as limiting its ability to control outer space. In response, he argued, less space-capable states (kept in this submissive position by US dominance) could respond to US military forces with “simpler” methods, including nuclear attack. If the US has complete supremacy in outer space, it might be easier for other states to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and compete from the ground.
Don’t Miss a Single Issue

“I read every line in the latest issue of Arms Control Today, which I think was superb.”

—Hans Blix

“Arms Control Today is a highly professional publication with articles that are of direct relevance to today’s issues.”

—Ambassador Chris Sanders of the Netherlands

“Like many on Capitol Hill, I turn repeatedly to Arms Control Today for background, insight, and authoritative analysis.”

—Congressman John M. Spratt, Jr., (D-S.C.)

Original reporting
Ground-breaking analysis
In-depth interviews

Arms Control Today is the source on nonproliferation and global security!

To subscribe to the print edition of Arms Control Today please visit www.armscontrol.org/subscribe.asp
North Korea may have gotten all the attention, but all the nuclear weapons states were busy flight-testing ballistic missiles for their nuclear weapons during 2006. According to a preliminary count, eight countries launched more than 26 ballistic missiles of 23 types in 24 different events.

Unlike the failed North Korean Taepo Dong 2 launch, most other ballistic missile tests were successful. Russia and India also experienced missile failures, but the United States demonstrated a very reliable capability including the 117th consecutive successful launch of the Trident II D5 sea-launched ballistic missile.

The busy ballistic missile flight testing represents yet another double standard in international security, and suggests that initiatives are needed to limit not only proliferating countries from developing ballistic missiles but also find ways to curtail the programs of the existing nuclear powers.

The ballistic missile flight tests involved weapons ranging from 10-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles down to single-warhead short-range ballistic missiles. Most of the flight tests, however, involved long-range ballistic missiles and the United States, Russia and France also launched sea-launched ballistic missiles (see table in the original article, posted December 22, 2006, at: http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2006/12/nuclear_missile_testing_galore_1.php).

The Putin government's reaffirmation of the importance of strategic nuclear forces to Russian national security was tainted some by the failure of two consecutive launches of the new Bulava missile, but tests of five other missile types shows that Russia still has effective missile forces.

Along with China, Russia's efforts continue to have an important influence on U.S. nuclear planning, and the eight Minuteman III and Trident II missiles launched in 2006 were intended to ensure a nuclear capability second to none. The first ICBM flight-test signaled the start of the deployment of the W87 warhead on the Minuteman III force.

China's launch of the (very) long-awaited DF-31 ICBM and India's attempts to test launch the Agni III raised new concerns because of the role the weapons likely will play in the two countries' targeting of each other. But during a visit to India in June 2006, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, downplayed at least the Indian issue saying other countries in the region also have tested missiles. In a statement that North Korea would probably find useful to use, Gen. Pace explained that "the fact that a country is testing something like a missile is not destabilizing" as long as it is "designed for defense, and then are intended for use for defense, and they have competence in their ability to use those weapons for defense, it is a stabilizing event."

But since all "defensive" ballistic missiles have very offensive capabilities, and since no nation plans it defense based on intentions and statements anyway but on the offensive capabilities of potential adversaries, Gen. Pace's explanation seemed disingenuous and out of sync with the warnings about North Korean, Iranian and Chinese ballistic missile developments.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) seeks to limit the proliferation of ballistic missiles, but that vision seems undercut by the busy ballistic missile launch schedule demonstrated by the nuclear weapon states in 2006. Some MTCR member countries have launched the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation initiative in an attempt to establish a norm against ballistic missiles, and have called on all countries to show greater restraint in their own development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and to reduce their existing missile arsenals if possible.

All the nuclear weapons states portray their own nuclear ballistic missile developments as stabilizing and fully in compliance with their pledge under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith. But fast-flying ballistic missiles are inherently destabilizing because of their vulnerability to attack may trigger use early on in a conflict. And the busy missile testing in 2006 suggests that the "good faith" is wearing a little thin.

-December 22, 2006
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp /2006/12/nuclear_missile_testing_galore_1.php

Minuteman III launch, Vandenberg Air Force Base, USA
What’s On
Calendar of Events

Friday, May 11

Abolition Caucus Strategy Meeting: Open
Where: NGO Room in the Austria Center (02 C 246)
When: 8-9am

Governmental Briefing with Australia, Ambassador Caroline Millar
Where: NGO Room in the Austria Center (02 C 246)
When: 9-10 am

Across
6. Chair of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission
9. Call for an Ad Hoc Committee on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
10. World’s oldest women’s peace organization
11. What convention is missing a verification instrument?
12. Region of the most recent nuclear weapon free zone

Down
1. What kind of regime is the MTCR?
2. Kofi Annan’s term for the current state of nuclear disarmament: “mutually assured _____”
3. Another word for a hydrogen bomb

Support Reaching Critical Will

On www.ReachingCriticalWill.org you can find:
- This News In Review, and all others
- All statements, working papers, and documents from this and all NPT conferences since 2000. (including the NGO presentations)
- All statements and documents from the Conference on Disarmament, including regular reports
- All statements, documents, and voting results from the UN GA 1st Committee (including weekly thematic reports)
- Summaries and analyses of the sessions of all these disarmament fora

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom created the RCW project in 1999, in order to increase the quality and quantity of civil society at international disarmament fora, such as those that take place at the UN. We believe that nuclear disarmament will require coordinated and sustained effort on the part of governments, non-governmental organizations and the United Nations. Reaching Critical Will is WILPF’s initiative to encourage people to act and contribute to a variety of international fora. For non-governmental organizations and concerned individuals to act, they need information, primary documents and analysis.

www.ReachingCriticalWill.org is your primary source for information, documents and analysis of the NPT, CD, UNGA 1st Committee and more. All governmental statements, working papers, and documents distributed at these meetings are available, in almost real-time, on our website. In order for this service to continue, Reaching Critical Will needs your support. If you would like to make a donation to sustain and develop the project, please contact: info@reachingcriticalwill.org