Power Politics or Cooperative Security?

Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will

The second day of substance built on the original non-proliferation for disarmament bargain of the Treaty, balancing the goals of the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states. In the morning session, governments focused on nuclear disarmament and security assurances (Specific Issues), and in the afternoon, they discussed non-proliferation and nuclear weapon free zones (Cluster 2). In reviewing this bargain, some states simply sought to maximize national interests, trying to gain as much as possible while giving as little as possible. However, many states sought to enhance global security, recognizing that we need full implementation of and compliance with all the obligations in this Treaty.

Despite disagreement and a continued need to negotiate, it was a remarkably constructive and engaged day of discussion. There was even an opportunity for interactive dialogue during the morning session, which several governments used to react to and build on other governments’ ideas—a valuable thing in a forum designed to build consensus currently operating under such time constraints.

The nuclear disarmament discussions hit hard on the 1995 and 2000 agreements again, which contain practical steps for implementing nuclear disarmament. Many governments called for better reporting on nuclear disarmament implementation. Canada, New Zealand, and Mexico supported Brazil’s proposal that the Secretariat compile a chart of nuclear disarmament measures taken, based on statements delivered by the nuclear weapon states at the PrepCom. New Zealand suggested creating a similar report to assess progress against the benchmarks from 1995 and 2000. Non-nuclear weapon states also posed questions to the nuclear weapon states, and asked them to reflect and respond.

Non-nuclear weapon states called for assurances from the weapon states that nuclear weapons would not be used, or threatened to be used, against them. Since the inception of the Treaty, non-nuclear weapon states have sought these “negative security assurances” (NSAs), but the nuclear weapon states have been loathe to give them. The Non-Aligned Movement made its regular call for “universal, unconditional, legally-binding” NSAs, and nuclear weapon states again insisted that the assurances they have given in the past are sufficient. Many states discussed how security assurances could become part of the NPT’s “core” non-proliferation obligations and compliance with them.

Compliance with the Treaty is of course of the utmost importance, despite its inherent difficulties. Assessing compliance by consensus is rather difficult when the states being assessed are part of the consensus process. Independent technical verification is thus crucial to ensuring collective security, and avoiding discrimination. In this regard, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, the Non Aligned Movement and Cuba identified the International Atomic Energy Agency as the authority in assessing compliance with the NPT’s non-proliferation obligations.

However, there is no equivalent independent technical authority for assessing compliance with disarmament obligations. States parties continue to assert the 13 practical steps as the benchmarks for assessing compliance with disarmament, but they are doing so with the very states whose compliance they are assessing. Who assesses the compliance of the nuclear weapon states? What are the consequences of non-compliance? Assessments of non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations have serious consequences, implicitly recognized by New Zealand’s statement that it had a “strong preference” that the conflict over Iran’s nuclear programme be resolved peacefully. In such a world, independent, technical verification of agreed standards of compliance with all the obligations of the Treaty is necessary. By doing this, the Treaty works an instrument of collective security, and not a theatre for power politics.

Appropriately, Dr. Hans Blix, Chair of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, spoke about cooperative security in between the morning and afternoon sessions. He explained that after the failure of the Iraq war to resolve weapons of mass destruction issues that did not exist, the international community needs to return to a framework of cooperation to deal with these issues. We agree. Playing security as a zero-sum game means we all lose. States need to act with enlightened self-interest—working for collective security is in the interest of humanity, a club to which we all belong.
DIPLOMAT’S DIARY


7.05 am. Man, I look fierce!

9.00 am Regional consultations. There is disagreement. Oh no. This makes me very uncomfortable.

10.00 am. Session? Ha!

10.25 am. I need coffee. I wonder if any other delegates wants to join me in the café for some "consultations"?

10.35 am. Blackberry time. Maybe I have new emails?

10.55 am. Alrighty then. Let’s go morning session.

11.30 am. Drafting tomorrow’s statement. Need a catchy phrase. Thinking about “The NPT is the cornerstone of the multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament regime.”

11.40 am. It is catchy. Cornerstone it is.

14.30 pm. People keep asking me questions. I have no instructions on this so I put on my thoughtful face and say it’s a very complicated issue.

15.00 pm. Waiting for orders from capital. Thinking about playing some solitaire.

16.00 pm. Why aren’t there enough power outlets in this city?

17.00 pm. Losing patience. Can’t we at least agree on an agenda?

18.00 pm. Reception. Really? Can I?

18.15 pm. Alright, ten minutes! Then I’m out of here.

NGO’S DIARY

7.00 am. Getting dressed. I need something that makes me look smart and serious. I’ve got it! A t-shirt with a political message!

7.05 am. Groovy!

9.00 am. NGO consultations. There is disagreement. Doesn’t anyone even know what the ICJ is?

10.00 am. Session time. But where is everyone?

10.25 am. Hello? Anyone?

10.35 am. Seriously!

10.55 am. Finally! You would think saving the world from nuclear weapons was important enough to start on time.

11.30 am. Drafting a statement. Need a catchy theme. Thinking about nuclear weapon states’ non-compliance with Article VI.

11.40 am. It is catchy, NWS and Article VI it is.

14.30 pm. Asking diplomats questions. They seemed to be interested, but apparently it is a complicated issue.

15.00 pm. Waiting in the café. Thinking about the final documents of 1995 and 2000.

16.00 pm. Why aren’t there enough power outlets in this city?

17.00 pm. Losing patience. Article VI anyone?

18.00 pm. Reception. Really? Can I?!

18.15 pm. Free food! Woohoo!

NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON THE LOOSE

As the NPT states debate disarmament and nuclear safety, a truck convoy of live nuclear warheads will leave the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Burghfield (West of London) to travel to Faslane and Coulport (West of Glasgow), where the warheads will be fitted to US Trident missiles, ready to be deployed at sea.

The British government delayed the warhead convoy until after the Scottish elections, but they can’t be bothered to delay it until the non-proliferation PrepCom has concluded. Perhaps they don’t think there’s a connection.

- email submission to NIR
George Orwell couldn’t have said it better himself. In its working paper, “Disarmament”, the United States, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.19), the United States proclaimed:

“Development of the Reliable Replacement Warhead [RRW]... advances the goals expressed in the preamble and article VI of the NPT. The Reliable Replacement Warhead will help permit the United States to continue to meet its deterrence needs, and to assure other States parties of the continued viability of United States extended nuclear deterrence, until total nuclear weapons elimination becomes achievable. It will allow the United States to do this, moreover, with safer and fewer warheads. Consequently, the Reliable Replacement Warhead supports and will help advance the disarmament objectives shared by States parties to the NPT...

The United States is undertaking the ‘Complex 2030’ programme, which is designed to reduce significantly the size and complexity of the United States nuclear weapons production infrastructure, consistent with United States requirements for a smaller stockpile in the New Strategic Triad. A smaller infrastructure, yet one which can be highly responsive to potential future national security needs, may enable further reductions in the United States nuclear stockpile by reducing the current need to maintain some warheads in a non-deployed status in order to guard against the emergence of new strategic threats.”

The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) states that “RRW is not a new weapon providing new or different military capabilities and/or missions,” but according to NNSA chief Linton Brooks in 2006:

“In 2030, our Responsive Infrastructure can also produce weapons with different or modified military requirements as required. The weapons design community that was revitalized by the RRW program can adapt an existing weapon within 18 months and design, develop and begin production of the new design within 3-4 years of a decision to enter engineering development...

Thus, if Congress and the President direct, we can respond quickly to changing military requirements.”

Brooks explained: “As outlined in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, we are moving towards a nuclear deterrent that is smaller, more capable and better able to respond to changing needs. Our Complex 2030 plan... puts NNSA on a path to achieve this necessary national security goal.... In short, I see a future world where a smaller, safer, more secure and more reliable stockpile is backed up by a robust industrial and design capability to better respond to changing technical, geopolitical or military needs.”

Complex 2030 goals include a new nuclear weapon design coming out of Livermore and Los Alamos Labs every five years, production of more than 100 of these weapons each year and a new plutonium pit production facility capable of making 125 certifiable new bomb cores per year. Complex 2030 plans also anticipate identifying sites for joint flight testing operations in which “NNSA and DOD [Department of Defense] hardware is tested to assure compatibility ... for current and future weapons,” along with accelerated dismantlement activities. In other words, fewer but newer nuclear weapons forever.

According to the NNSA, “Once it is demonstrated that replacement warheads can be produced on a timescale in which geopolitical threats could emerge, or the nuclear weapons complex can respond in a timely way to technical problems in the stockpile, further reductions can be made in reducing non-deployed warheads.” This approach renders the disarmament objective implicit in further reductions meaningless.

If not vigorously refuted now, this Orwellian logic, echoed by most of the other nuclear weapon states, portends a dark vision of the future in which nuclear weapons have become a permanent feature of the landscape and their “ultimate elimination” is no longer the goal.

PrepCom Delegates Show P6 Support

Next week, on Tuesday May 15, the Conference on Disarmament will finally formally decide whether to break a decade of deadlock and begin negotiations on a new disarmament treaty. The proposal on the table would initiate negotiations on a fissile materials treaty and continue discussions on preventing an arms race in outer space (PAROS), nuclear disarmament, and negative security assurances (NSAs). Yesterday, many states supported this “P6” proposal. Japan, Australia, Indonesia, Canada, Brazil, Syria, Italy, Argentina, Mexico, the United Kingdom and all spoke in favor of the P6 proposal. Canada suggested the PrepCom send a positive signal to the CD by noting this broad support in the Chairman’s summary. The basic elements of this proposal have been on the table for years, and the CD has been working towards this goal for months. It is time to begin negotiating again.
The Nuclear Posture Review

The classified Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) presented to Congress by the Department of Defense on December 31, 2001 and subsequently leaked to the media, underlines the fundamental policy and technological underpinnings for the Bush administration’s aggressive “preventive war” doctrine, and has served as the administration’s primary justification for all subsequent budget requests for nuclear weapons research, development and testing activities.

The NPR expanded the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy, including the possible use of nuclear weapons in “immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies” against a number of named countries including Iraq, Iran and North Korea, called for indefinite retention of a large, modern, and diverse nuclear force, and rejected ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Significantly, the NPR also elevated the weapons research and development infrastructure – including the nuclear weapons laboratories – to one leg of a “New Strategic Triad,” intended to support both “offensive” and “defensive,” integrated nuclear and non-nuclear high-tech weapons systems that will enable the U.S. to project overwhelming global military force. The NPR specified: “the need is clear for a revitalized nuclear weapons complex that will... be able, if directed, to design, develop, manufacture, and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements; and maintain readiness to resume underground nuclear testing if required.” To accomplish this, the NPR called for the “transfer of warhead design knowledge from the current generation of designers to the next generation” through an “Advanced Concepts Initiative.”

The Advanced Concepts Initiative has been superseded by the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program.

Viewed as part of a continuum, these NPR requirements closely track testimony to Congress by one of the most powerful and influential nuclear weapons scientists, then-Sandia National Laboratory Director C. Paul Robinson. In March 1996 – six months before President Clinton signed the CTBT – Robinson argued the need to maintain laboratory nuclear weapons competencies to Congress:

New designs for components and subsystems will be a continuing requirement which will require all the original core competencies we needed to make new weapon designs, as well as contemporary capabilities in advancing technology... The engineers and scientists who will do that work are probably entering kindergarten this year... They have to design whole systems with real deliverables to fully develop their capabilities... It is my belief that nuclear weapons will remain important for a long time to come.

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For additional information about the NPR from a variety of sources, see the WSLF NPR information page at http://www.wslfweb.org/nukes/npr.htm


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The gravest threat to global security is nuclear proliferation

“Arms Control Today is truly an excellent reporter of arms control news and analysis. ACT is certainly the best journal in the field for this purpose.”

—George Bunn, former first general counsel for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He helped negotiate the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and later became U.S. ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament Conference

“Arms Control Today is a highly professional publication with articles that are of direct relevance to today’s issues.”

—Ambassador Chris Sanders of the Netherlands, President of the Conference on Disarmament, February 16, 2005

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News in Review

Students Strike for Peace
Kathleen Sullivan, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

As delegates meet to prepare for the NPT Review Conference in 2010 — having finally settled on an agenda after more than one week — students in California are preparing to fast for disarmament.

On Wednesday, May 9th, students and alumni at three University of California campuses will go on a hunger strike to demand that the UC system stop designing, engineering and manufacturing nuclear weapons.

“We are calling on the Regents to pass a resolution at their next meeting — scheduled for May 17th — severing all ties to the nuclear weapons complex. We will sustain our fast at least until that meeting,” said UC student Will Parrish.

The hunger strikers note that for over sixty years, the University of California has been the primary manufacturer of nuclear weapons in the United States, making it a de facto branch of the Department of Defense. The UC system has managed the labs at Los Alamos in New Mexico where the bomb was born, and Livermore in California where nuclear weapons continue to be modernised.

UC alumnae, Chelsea Colgone explains: “Every nuclear warhead in the US arsenal was designed by a UC employee. These include the B61-11 ‘bunker busters’ currently deployed in the Persian Gulf, with which the US government is threatening Iran. Now, the University of California is even building a new hydrogen bomb: officially, the first new US nuclear weapon since the end of the Cold War, and setting up one of its labs to actually manufacture nuclear warhead components. While few people are aware of this grave reality, the UC Regents know who they do business with... That’s why we’re striking — to say no more nukes in our name!”

According to their press advisory, the hunger strikers position is this:

“At a critical time in our world, with the survival of our planetary ecosystem hanging in the balance, it is imperative for the UC Regents to stop providing a fig leaf of academic respectability to the creation of the world’s most toxic and deadly weapons, and instead use their position of political leverage to spur the US toward genuine nuclear disarmament, democratization, and demilitarization.”

For more information and to support the campaign please visit www.ucnuclearfree.org

Weapons in Space and the Disarmament/Nonproliferation Regime
Jim Wurst, Global Security Institute

The Global Security Institute (GSI) and the Secure World Foundation hosted a panel yesterday entitled “Weapons in Space and the Disarmament/Nonproliferation Regime.” The session, sponsored by the Government of Sweden, was chaired by the President of GSI, Jonathan Granoff.

Dr. Hans Blix, Chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, contextualized the issue of outer space security in the broader framework of cooperative security. Noting that, even during the Cold War-era of heightened tensions, the major powers managed to engage in “cooperative security”, creating a body of treaties — including the NPT — that defined international relations on military and security issues. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, for instance, “gives us a simple rule, namely that the use of space will be for peaceful purposes.” He noted that, while the militarization of space has been accepted — such as, inter alia, intercontinental missiles, satellites and other military intelligence and reconnaissance systems — the placement of weapons in space should not be permitted. Drawing from the recommendations of the WMD Commission report, he suggested that, in order to avoid such weaponization of outer space, States could convene a review conference of the Outer Space Treaty or bring the issue to the First Committee of the General Assembly.

Dr. Patricia Lewis, Director of UNIDIR, discussed four possible approaches to strengthening our cooperative security regime in outer space. First, she discussed possible transparency and confidence-building measures, such as codes of conduct and cooperative measures, which would establish rules of the road and information exchanges to prevent accidents. Second, she explored the possibilities of a new treaty regime, to be negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament (CD), such as the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space as proposed by Russia. Thirdly, she discussed building on existing international instruments that could “strengthen the space security architecture,” such as the convention on registering objects in space and the agreement governing space tracking and observation. And finally, she proposed what she called “a patchwork quilt” option, which would identify relevant areas already covered by treaties and assess the gaps in the regime. Preferring this option over other such general “panaceas”, she argued that, in this way, “interested states [could] build a patchwork of existing and new measures around the gaps.”

Amb. Robert Grey, Chairman of the Bipartisan Security Group and former US ambassador to the CD, asserted that “the weaponization of outer space would doom the NPT.” He linked the US drive for missiles defenses to weaponization of space, arguing that “breaking the moratorium on space weaponization with such a grandiose and wasteful [missile defenses] scheme makes no sense. Wouldn’t diplomacy and patient negotiation of a treaty regulating space weaponization be a more practical and prudent way to move forward, rather than risking existing space assets through a new arms control race?”

Taking an approach similar to Lewis, Amb. Grey suggested that one approach could be an “agreement on rules of the road - informal agreements to ban certain activities.” While promising, the end result would have to be “an internationally binding treaty supported by all.” He advocated for a group of committed states to convene a working group, along the lines of the New Agenda Coalition, to “come up with a series of suggestions on how to move forward towards a treaty-based regime to prevent weaponization of outer space.” This needs to start now so that “when the logjam in the CD is broken or negotiations begin elsewhere, we have a clear idea of what such a regime would look like.”
Nuclear Disorder or Cooperative Security?
U.S. Weapons of Terror, the Global Proliferation Crisis, and Paths to Peace

$12 (€9) • $3 shipping and handling • 275 pages • soft cover • 2007

We should all be grateful to the authors, who remind us so powerfully of the dangers that remain from our own government’s nuclear weapons, and of the vital centrality of international law as our weapon to abolish them.
- Phyllis Bennis, Institute for Policy Studies

This book is an important contribution to the effort to rid our planet of weapons of mass destruction, and I encourage my colleagues in Congress to read it.
- Congresswoman Barbara Lee

With clear prose, the authors add cogent analysis and new urgency to the often uneven, stalled, and ill-informed discourse on the provocative U.S. role in nuclear proliferation.
- Frida Berrigan, World Policy Institute

This assessment of our Final Report and its 60 recommendations is exactly the kind of response we were hoping for.
- Hans Blix, Chairman, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission

This lucid, compelling book presents concise, detailed directions for reducing nuclear dangers on the path to disarmament, a reliable road-guide away from the nuclear abyss. But it simultaneously reports that the current U.S. administration is reading the map upside down. There is no time to lose for the passengers on planet earth to take hold of the wheel, reverse course, turn this map right-side up and let its authors pilot us to safety.
- Daniel Ellsberg

With professional clarity, Nuclear Disorder or Cooperative Security unpacks the policy issues and international security principles at stake in the debate about nuclear weapons.
- Jonathan Granoff, Global Security Institute

Nuclear Disorder or Cooperative Security offers in-depth analysis and recommendations regarding U.S. policy in relation to the international security framework, nuclear weapons R&D, missiles and weapons in space, climate change and nuclear power, and demilitarization and redefining security in human terms. A response to the report of the Hans Blix-led Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, it is the product of collaboration between the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, Western States Legal Foundation, and the Reaching Critical Will project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.

Copies are available from Jacqueline Cabasso

An Assessment of the Final Report of the WMD Commission and Its Implications for U.S. Policy

www.wmdreport.org
NATO’s nuclear sharing: A cold war anachronism that undermines the NPT
Rebecca Johnson and Martin Butcher, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy

Though the cold war ended nearly two decades ago, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) retains policies that promote the role of nuclear weapons and undermine the NPT. According to NATO’s current Strategic Concept – up for review by 2009 – nuclear weapons provide the “supreme guarantee” of Alliance security.

Three NATO members – the United States, Britain and France – between them deploy more than 10,000 nuclear weapons. Six NATO members that are non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) parties to the NPT – Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Turkey and Greece – maintain “nuclear sharing” arrangements under which they could be given wartime use of some of the 480 American-owned and controlled nuclear free-fall bombs stored at US bases in their countries. In addition, despite serious concerns raised by Russia, the US wants to put bases on the territory of new NATO (former Warsaw Pact) members, Poland and the Czech Republic, for missile interceptors and tracking radar to support US ballistic missile defence (BMD) deployments.

It’s time for a new NATO Strategic Concept, more appropriate to the 21st century. NATO needs to end nuclear sharing and work more closely with Russia to strengthen existing Treaties and withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.

What does NATO nuclear policy entail? NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept states that war prevention requires “widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements.” As a consequence, the participating countries (with the recent exception of Greece) host US nuclear bases and tactical weapons on their soil; some of their aircraft are equipped to carry nuclear weapons and their pilots are trained to fly nuclear missions. Since Britain deploys its own nuclear weapon system, which is assigned to NATO, it does not participate in nuclear sharing per se, but hosts some US nuclear weapons at the Lakenheath airbase in East Anglia.

NATO nuclear sharing in the 1960s has been credited with persuading countries like Germany and Italy to give up their national nuclear weapons programmes and join the NPT. But it now stands in the way of more effective nonproliferation approaches and progress towards nuclear disarmament.

Breaching Articles I and II
NATO members hold that their nuclear sharing is in compliance with Articles I and II of the NPT, arguing that the arrangements predated the NPT and that “general war” would end the validity of the NPT. Both interpretations are open to challenge.

If any other NPT states (Russia with Belarus? China with North Korea?) tried to share nuclear weapons using similar arrangements, NATO countries would be the first to condemn them for breaching Articles I and II of the NPT.

In 1985, the NPT Review Conference agreed as part of its Final Document that the Treaty remains in force “under any circumstances”. Though not made explicit, this language was intended to constrain the NATO nuclear sharing policy. Since then, a growing number of NPT Parties, including more than 100 nations in the Non-Aligned Movement, have called on NATO members to transform their doctrine and policies to bring them into conformity with their NPT obligations.

Backdoor Proliferation in Wartime
NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements would amount to de facto proliferation in times of war. This is particularly destabilizing in the post 9/11 context: the US has declared a ‘war on terror’ and then changed military doctrines to provide for nuclear weapons to be used in pre-emption or retaliation. Accordingly, the non-nuclear-weapon states may become vulnerable targets for weapons that they have themselves renounced.

In 1999, rhetorical criticisms were translated for the first time into diplomatic action aimed at NATO when Egypt proposed “that the PrepCom recommend that the 2000 Review Conference state in clear and unambiguous terms that Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons allow for no exceptions and that the NPT is binding on State parties in times of peace and in times of war alike.” Such ideas need to be put back on the NPT table.

The Principles and Objectives adopted as part of the decisions to extend the NPT in 1995 contained a number of commitments relevant to the Alliance, including the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones and further steps to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. NATO’s nuclear policies have constituted an obstacle to improving negative security assurances and to any initiative to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Europe.

Similarly, NATO policies run counter to much of the Programme of Action adopted by NPT states at the 2000 Review Conference, notably the commitments to transparency, further reductions in non-strategic weapons, reductions in the operational status of these weapons, and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.

Next steps
NATO’s non-nuclear members should cease training and equipping their aircraft to use US nuclear weapons in times of war. This would be timely, since Germany and Belgium and possibly others are now in the process of replacing their ageing fleets of aircraft, and could use this opportunity to give up the anachronistic nuclear role.

As part of the forthcoming review of NATO’s Strategic Concept, NATO should decide to withdraw US sub-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe. Tactical nuclear weapons are portable, vulnerable and readily usable. They are potentially destabilizing and create additional risks and insecurities. NATO should use its decision in a leverage strategy to persuade Russia to eliminate its tactical nuclear forces from Europe as well.

At the 2010 Review Conference NPT states should strengthen the Treaty by declaring that it is binding on all State Parties “under any circumstances”.

www.reachingcriticalwill.org
What’s On
Calendar of Events

Thursday, May 10

Governmental Briefing with Germany, Mr. Rudiger Ludeking
Where: NGO Room in the Austria Center (02 C 246)
When: 8-9 am

Abolition Caucus Strategy Meeting: Open
Where: NGO Room in the Austria Center (02 C 246)
When: 9-10 am

Implementing Disarmament Education
Where: NGO Room in the Austria Center (02 C 246)
When: 1:15-2:45
Contact: Kathleen Sullivan
Website: www.disarmamenteducation.org

CTBTO’s "Putting an end to nuclear test explosions: 10 years of building the verification regime and the lessons learned from the 9 October 2006 event in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea"
Where: The New Operations Centre of the CTBTO, Vienna International Centre, E-building, 6th floor
When: 2-3 pm
Contact: info@ctbto.org; +43 (1) 26030 6200
Website: www.ctbto.org
Space is limited. Please sign up with one of the CTBTO officers at the CTBTO information desk in Foyer A or contact us at info@ctbto.org or +43 (1) 26030 6200.

Nuclear Crossword- Answers

Valentines for Tlatelolco

The Atomic Mirror congratulates the countries party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco on its 40th anniversary this year on February 14 as the world’s first Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. In 2005, our colleague and UK Director of the Atomic Mirror, Janet Bloomfield, said in the General Assembly Hall of the UN to NPT delegates:

"We believe that true security does not come from the ability to kill but from the ability to provide an abundant life for all in order that humanity can flourish... We want you to know that we are ready to support any initiatives that will move us toward a world free of nuclear weapons."

Countries of the world’s NWFZs have already accomplished in their zones the abolition of nuclear weapons that we seek for the whole world. We applaud the efforts at the NPT Prep Comm in Vienna to expand these zones. Throughout this anniversary year, we are inviting citizens to learn more about the positive contributions of NWFZs to a nuclear-free world by sending a "Valentine to Tlatelolco." Our aim is to flood the office of OPANAL with 40,000 valentines by February 14, 2008 -- 1,000 for each year of the treaty. Please go to the following link to download a Valentine in English or Spanish to send.

http://www.atomicmirror.org/valentines.htm