We have emerged on the slightly brighter other side of the first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) in this review cycle of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Governments managed to wrestle a qualified success out of a meeting that teetered on the edge of failure. After four days of fighting over the agenda, governments discussed the NPT, disarmament, and non-proliferation in a relatively congenial atmosphere. The conference adopted a consensus factual summary, but was not able to agree on the Chair’s Factual Summary, which was submitted as a working paper (WP 72). The summary Chair’s Paper contains a reference to a Nuclear Weapons Convention (introduced as a working paper during the session), support for the P6 proposal for a programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament, positive reference to the 1996 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, and more. Nuclear disarmament is officially back on the table, which was clear in substantive discussions, and the agenda for the next two PrepComs includes discussing previous disarmament commitments. During the PrepCom, it was also clear that the role of Non-Governmental Organizations has been strengthened; all of this PrepCom’s debates remained open to NGOs, following the 2004 practice. States parties set the next PrepCom for 28 April – 9 May, 2008 in Geneva.

Of course, this success is qualified. The NPT is still rife with divisions and challenges. The conflict between the US and Iran is one of the major divisions affecting the entire disarmament and non-proliferation regime. This conflict delayed the PrepCom’s work for 4 days and will continue to affect disarmament negotiations until it is resolved. Additionally, nuclear weapon states continued to downplay their obligations to disarm and non-nuclear weapon states continued to struggle to balance the emphasis placed on non-proliferation with nuclear disarmament. Governments also placed a disheartening emphasis on nuclear energy, despite its production of unending poisonous radioactive waste and its intrinsic link to nuclear weapons production.

Governments struggled to secure both of the PrepCom’s major successes: adopting an agenda and then working according to it, and adopting a final report that included the Chair’s Paper. Iran made adopting both very difficult, although the Non-Aligned Movement also had problems with the Chair’s summary. Iran did not want to have its nuclear programme censured by the PrepCom, and was willing to delay or destroy the process to avoid such censure. Iran objected to language in the agenda that referred to compliance with the Treaty, perceiving that phrase to be aimed solely at Iran. After four days of procedural wrangling, the PrepCom adopted the agenda with a compromise proposed by South Africa, in which the PrepCom decided that “compliance” meant compliance with all provisions of the Treaty. Although it took several days to adopt, this official agenda will be used for the next two PrepComs. It refers to both the 1995 and 2000 landmark agreements, putting the resolution on the Middle East and the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament back on the agenda. The agenda also includes an official understanding that states parties need to assess compliance with disarmament obligations.

The Chair’s Factual Summary, now called the Chair’s Paper, had a little something in it to irritate everyone, but it was the Non-Aligned Movement that objected to it being annexed to the report. It was instead submitted as a Working Paper. The NAM did not believe the summary was balanced, and particularly objected to suggesting that the Model Additional Protocol be used as a precondition for new supply arrangements (Paragraph 30), and that solving the Iranian issue could help with establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, without mentioning Israel (Paragraph 36). The NAM also thought the summary did not include enough nuclear disarmament. Iran, a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, objected to a paragraph (37) saying that states parties expressed serious concern over Iran’s nuclear programme and strongly urged it “to comply with all the requirements in the UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747 and the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors”. Although the NAM did block the Chair’s Paper from being annexed to the report, it did not prevent the Paper from being included in the list of Working Papers from the PrepCom, as Iran reportedly wanted it to do. Other successes came with less of a struggle. Although Non-Governmental Organizations

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were allowed in the thematic discussions at the 2004 PrepCom, at that time, the doors were initially closed and then opened by supportive states. This year, NGOs were allowed in all the thematic discussions, and the doors were never closed. It is gratifying that governments are recognizing our value-added and that this is no longer a controversial issue.

While the atmosphere was tense during the struggles over the agenda and the Chair’s Paper, the tone was quite congenial during the thematic debates. However, discussions revealed serious fault lines in the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Nuclear weapon states continued to downplay their disarmament commitments (although China noted that the 13 practical steps “provide important guidance in promoting nuclear disarmament process.”) The vast majority of states recognized the particular significance of the 1995 and 2000 agreements, and called for the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the 2000 13 practical steps. The US and Russia, for instance, could implement Step 9 by making the Moscow Treaty verifiable and irreversible, a suggestion many states made during the PrepCom. Nuclear weapon states did discuss the type of security environment needed for nuclear disarmament, showing willingness to envision a nuclear weapon free world. We agree that we need cooperative collective security, but we encourage the nuclear weapon states to participate in creating that environment by implementing their disarmament obligations, and working with the rest of the world to get to abolition.

Governments also discussed the “inalienable right” to nuclear energy contained in Article IV of the Treaty ad nauseam. Nuclear energy, with its poisonous radiation and bomb-making potential, is an interest many states share. Nuclear weapon states and nuclear-capable states can make a huge profit from exporting nuclear materials and technology, and non-nuclear weapon states can gain a nuclear-weapon capability by developing a full fuel cycle. Some states may believe that nuclear energy can help with growing energy needs and climate change, even though investment in sustainable energy is the best long-term solution. New Zealand was one of the only states that said nuclear energy was not compatible with sustainable development, noting that they had made a national decision not to invest in such technology. Kyrgyzstan, on behalf of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan submitted a working paper noting the environmental damage caused by uranium mining and calling on states to provide assistance in remedial efforts (WP 62).

There are several lessons to take into the next PrepCom:

First, nuclear weapon states need to get in line with the majority of the world and own up to their commitment to disarm. They need to implement the 13 practical steps from 2000, and comprehensively report to the international community on how they are doing so.

Second, the ideas put forward in more than 70 working papers cannot be left untouched until 28 April 2008. They need to be reviewed and discussed in regional groups, capitals, and cross-regional settings. Governments then need to build on these ideas to create consensus in 2010.

Third, it helps to address potential problems early on. Consultations conducted by a sole chair are not always adequate. Had the Bureau for this cycle been in place, a cross-regional team could have worked to gain early agreement on the agenda. The institutional deficit of the NPT was made clear during this PrepCom, and plans to rectify this can and should begin. Even bringing an informal “friends of the chair” group, possibly comprised of the last cycle’s Chairs, could have better served this conference.

Finally, NGO involvement in this work is valuable, in the general and thematic debates, and in parallel events. States parties should continue to embrace this un controversial cooperation with us, and we should be included in all debates of the upcoming PrepComs.

We have begun another review cycle, and with it, have another chance to make this system work. As Thomas Edison said before creating the light bulb, “I have not failed. I have just found 10,000 ways that don’t work.” We still have some time to succeed in turning on the light—but we have to survive long enough to find and agree on the way that does work. May this be the review cycle that we make the NPT do its job, and lead us to a nuclear weapon free world.
Execution by Consensus: Assessing Compliance and the NPT Review Process

Michael Spiers, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy

On the opening day of the plenary, Canada stated, “NPT States Parties should also address the issue of Iran’s compliance with Article III during this PrepCom,” implying that the committee should censure Iran in some way in light of its past violations of safeguards or continued defiance of UN Security Council to cease its uranium enrichment programs. Iran objected to being singled out, thus setting the stage for the lengthy dispute over the agenda, in which Iran single-handedly and effectively blocked all work for more than one week of the two-week meeting. This outcome underscores the problem posed by the lack of measures in the treaty for assessment and enforcement of compliance with its provisions, and the folly of states parties attempting to conduct compliance assessment by consensus in the context of the treaty review process.

The treaty regimes governing biological and chemical weapons vary on the scope and extent of their implementation measures, but both possess more a comprehensive institutional structure than that found in the NPT. On this point, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission observes:

In fact, the NPT is the weakest of the treaties on WMD in terms of provisions about implementation. The IAEA and its Board of Governors are not the secretariat of the treaty.... The NPT has no provisions for consultations or special meetings of the parties to consider cases of possible non-compliance or withdrawal, nor to assist in the implementation of the treaty between the five-yearly Review Conferences. ... [T]he periodic meetings of the treaty review process cannot offer an effective substitute for ... needed institutional reform.1

A model of a successful WMD treaty regime can be found in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). CWC states parties meet annually, with provisions allowing for the convening of special sessions within 30 days. The CWC creates a standing organ, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, designed to promote and coordinate the implementation of the treaty. A feature notably lacking from the NPT machinery, the CWC possesses an Executive Council with the competence to consider, address, and act upon concerns and cases regarding compliance.

In contrast, Article VIII.3 of the NPT provides for states parties to meet only once every five years, should they choose, in order to review the operation and implementation of the treaty. In 1995, in agreeing to extend the duration of the treaty indefinitely, NPT states parties decided upon a strengthened review process, reaffirming that Review Conferences should continue to be held every five years. The 1995 decisions also allowed for the establishment of subsidiary bodies within the review process to mildly provide “focused consideration” on issues related to the treaty, and provided for intercessional Preparatory Committee meetings to make procedural arrangements for the Review Conferences and recommendations on the implementation of the treaty.2 The decisions adopted in 1995 do not address matters of compliance assessment and enforcement.

Compliance Assessment in the Review Cycle

For non-nuclear weapon state parties, compliance assessment and enforcement of non-proliferation objectives are dealt with obliquely through IAEA safeguards required by Article III. In contrast to the Article II obligation not to manufacture a nuclear explosive, the scope of these safeguards is limited, seeking only to verify that no nuclear material in each non-weapon state has been diverted to weapons or unknown use. These safeguards allow for the IAEA to report a case of non-compliance to the UN Security Council only if nuclear material is found to have been diverted. Under a traditional view, the authority of the UN Security Council to adopt binding resolutions backed by sanctions or military action is limited to cases that have been found to constitute a threat to international peace and security. There is no mechanism for dealing with cases that do not either directly involve nuclear material, a breach of safeguards, or that do not rise to the level of a threat to the peace. More broadly, no mechanism currently exists to assess or judge compliance with the treaty generally, especially beyond its non-proliferation provisions.

The matter of compliance assessment and enforcement thus falls to the states parties. Despite the fact that the NPT does not explicitly provide for a review conference to conduct compliance assessment, nothing precludes states parties from bringing up compliance matters in the context of the review cycle. However, the reliance on making decisions by consensus is an obvious barrier to a review conference effectively addressing and responding to compliance concerns and cases. In addition, the infrequency, short duration, and broad substantive scope of these meetings—addressing any matter affecting the operation and implementation of the treaty—also present a barrier to relying on a Review Conference as an appropriate forum for compliance matters. We have now seen the vulnerability of this approach in the week-long dispute over the agenda, which was held up because just one state sought to avoid censure regarding non-compliance. Effective enforcement of all provisions of the NPT thus requires institutional reform.

Institutional Reforms

In addition to general calls for consideration of new institutional reforms of the treaty,3 there have been a variety of specific proposals made toward addressing the institutional deficit of the NPT. These have generally been limited to modest procedural adjustments:

Standing Bureau: Proposed by Canada and arguably one of the mildest and least controversial reforms on the table, this would help provide continuity between review meetings and would be a start in the direction of providing institutional structure for the treaty.4 The Canadian proposal would also empower the bureau, composed of the chairs of the Review Conference and each Annual Conference (see next proposal), to call special and extraordinary sessions of states parties.

Annual Meetings of States Parties: Another facet of the Canadian proposal, this reform would put the NPT on par with other treaty regimes, which generally meet annually. The annual meetings would have authority to “to consider and decide on any issues covered by the Treaty.” However, in light of the decision above, more frequent meetings alone would not be sufficient to address the institutional and procedural difficulties in dealing with compliance cases.

Secretariat: The WMD Commission calls for the creation of a standing secretariat to provide administrative support for the treaty and the
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.”

“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”

“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master -- that's all.”

- Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland

“When NPT parties have been able to reach consensus upon the way ahead, which has occurred at fewer than half of the Treaty’s Review Conferences, they have issued resolutions, decisions or Final Documents. Such documents, which are statements of political rather than legal agreement upon certain policy positions, have provided an important window into the thinking of the parties at the time and have served as valuable guideposts to policy for as long as they have remained relevant to the challenges facing the Treaty regime....

During the last NPT review cycle, much controversy arose over the present day import of certain positions related to nuclear disarmament, i.e. the “Thirteen practical steps”, which were articulated in the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference held in 2000. The security environment has changed substantially since 2000, and we cannot assume that all suggestions made then necessarily remain relevant today.”


In its working paper, the United States avoids referring to 1995 Decision 2, Principles and Objectives for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, adopted in connection with 1995 Decision 3, indefinite extension of the treaty. Perhaps this is because the significance of a decision – including adoption of the measure of “systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally” - made in that context can hardly be dismissed as a “suggestion”. Also unremarked by the United States is that Practical Steps agreed in 2000 were closely linked to the Principles and Objectives. The Final Document states: “The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement ... the 1995 Decision on ‘Principles and Objectives ...'.” (Emphasis supplied.)

But even aside from the linkage of the Practical Steps to the 1995 extension-related decisions, it is nonsense to characterize them as “suggestions.” Their key measures and principles have been approved in subsequent General Assembly resolutions, for example the “Renewed Determination” resolution, by overwhelming majorities. As a matter of international law set forth in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Practical Steps, as agreement and practice of parties to the treaty regarding its implementation, provide criteria for interpretation and application of Article VI.

(See Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, “The Thirteen Practical Steps: Legal or Political?” May 2005, http://lcnp.org/disarmament/npt/13stepspaper.htm) Finally, in substance though not always in form (e.g. regarding the ABM Treaty and the START process), the Practical Steps are as important today as a roadmap for global reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals as they were in 2000.

Notwithstanding the debate over the agenda, the NPT review process is not Alice in Wonderland, and the United States is not a Humpty Dumpty who can decree that past decisions and agreements are mere suggestions.

Artwork by James McPartlin, WWW.JAMESMCPARTLIN.COM
In 1946 the United States detonated two atomic weapons in the Marshall Islands. In 1947, the United Nations designated the Marshall Islands a United States Trust Territory. Over the next eleven years the US conducted another sixty-five atmospheric tests in the Marshalls, blanketing the nation with fallout, including some 3 billion curies of iodine-131. To understand this figure, consider that over the entire history of nuclear weapons testing at the Nevada Proving grounds some 150 million curies of iodine-131 were released. Varying analyses of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster estimate an iodine-131 release of 40 to 54 million curies.

The largest of the US tests, a 15-megaton hydrogen bomb code named “Bravo,” was detonated on March 1, 1954. The wind was blowing that morning in the direction of inhabited atolls, including Rongelap and Utrik, some 100 and 300 miles from the test site at Bikini. These communities, and Japanese fishermen aboard the Daigo-Fukuryumaru (a tuna ship working in near-by waters), were exposed to near-lethal doses of radiation. Documents released to the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) in 1999 demonstrate that the entire Marshall Islands nation experienced this “Bravo” fallout.

Nuclear War and Human Health

Following their acute exposure to Bravo fallout, the US evacuated and studied the people of Rongelap, documenting beta burns, loss of hair, depressed red cell and leukocyte counts, flu-like symptoms, nausea, fingernail discoloration, radioactivity in the urine, and changes at the cellular level in blood and bone marrow. In 1957 the Rongelapese were returned to their contaminated atoll and over the next four decades US scientists monitored the movement of radiation through the foodchain and their bodies. This classified research documented the emergence of immune-deficiency diseases, metabolic disorders, growth impairment in children, cancers, leukemia, premature aging (dental decay, cataracts, degenerative osteoarthritis), miscarriages, congenital birth defects, and sterility. This long-term study also confirmed what other classified research suggested: iodine-131 adheres to and accumulates in the thyroid, stimulating the production of benign and cancerous nodules and interfering with the production of hormones, leaving children and pregnant women especially vulnerable. Thyroid cancer and other radiogenic changes occur not only in people exposed to an acute level of ionizing radiation but also in those who were born or moved into contaminated areas long after the initial blast and fallout had occurred.

Attempts to “Repair” the Damages from Nuclear War

In 1983, as part of a Compact of Free Association granting the Marshallese their independence, the U.S. recognized the contributions and sacrifices made by the people of the Marshall Islands in regard to the Nuclear Testing Program and accepted the responsibility to provide compensation for loss or damage to property and person resulting from that testing. The Compact created a compensation fund of $150 million. In 1988 an administrative court was established to distribute these funds (the Nuclear Claims Tribunal). Since 1991, the NCT has recognized some 37 forms of cancer and radiation-related illnesses, and paid a portion of the personal injury awards granted to Marshall Islanders alive during the atmospheric testing period.

For the people of Rongelap, property damage claims were initially filed in 1991. Developing these claims required amassing the evidence that demonstrated the extent of radioactive contamination; cost to repair or remediate; injuries associated with acute exposure, evacuation and eventual return to a contaminated atoll; and, servitude as human subjects in radiation-effects research. Developing the claim took many years. For the Rongelap community, one milestone in this process was the 2001 Consequential Damages hearing. In the fall of 2001 expert witness reports were presented with testimony from Marshallese survivors establishing the traditional way of life, the chain of events as experienced by a downwind community, the pain and hardship of radiation exposure, evacuation, and serving as scientific objects in a scientific research study that went for some four decades, and the struggles to understand and adjust to the many new health problems that increasingly constrained life in a radioactive world.

Finally, on April 17, 2007, some sixteen years since the first claims were filed, the NCT issued their decision in the Rongelap case. As laid out in the 34-page judgment: "The Tribunal has determined the amount of compensation due to the Claimants in this case is $1,031,231,200. This amount includes $212,000,000 for remediation and restoration of Rongelap and Rongerik Atolls. This award reflects the pain, suffering and hardships from loss of property value of Rongelap, Rongerik and Ailinginae Atolls as a result of the Nuclear Testing Program. Finally, it includes $34,731,200 to the Claimants for consequential damages."

Notably, values for lost property include "loss of way of life damages" and the loss of the means to live in a healthy fashion on the land (people were on island, but exposed to high levels of radiation). The consequential damages award reflect the pain, suffering and hardships from loss of a healthy way of life, and personal injury awards to subjects who received chromium-51 injections which were "an additional burden to the already considerable exposure from consuming contaminated foods and living in a..."
Reparations for Rongelap, continued from page 1

radioactive environment.” With regard to the four decades of medical research using Rongelap subjects, the Tribunal found that “the emotional distress resulting from the participation in these studies and the manner in which they were carried out, warrants compensation, and is a component in the consequential damages related to the period of time the people spent on Rongelap from 1957 to 1985.”

The NCT halted payments in 2006 due to a lack of funds. Today there is approximately $1 million left in the fund. The Rongelap award, prior awards to Bikini, Enewetak, and Utrik, as well as a huge portion of the personal injury awards - will not be paid unless US Congress acts on the RMI’s “changed circumstance” petition filed in September 2000. When the initial Compact was negotiated and a compensation fund established, the US failed to disclose the full extent of damage to the four atolls, and withheld documentation that the nuclear weapons tests had adversely affected the entire nation. Furthermore, new scientific evidence demonstrates that low-level exposures to radiation produces significant health risks. In 2004, the US National Cancer Institute predicted some 500 cancers will occur in years to come in the Marshall Islands as a direct result of the testing program. In 2006, the Bush Administration, responding to the RMI’s “changed circumstance” petition, argued no new information has come to light, circumstances have not changed, and the US has fulfilled all its obligations with regards to the nuclear weapons testing program damages. Given this impasse, local governments for Bikini, Enewetak, Utrik, and now Rongelap are appealing to the US Court of Federal Claims seeking payment of these NCT-ordered awards.

Reparations

Despite the questions surrounding payment of the award, judicial findings in the Rongelap Claim are significant and create precedents that other cases may build upon. For the people of Rongelap, who began their petitions for help and justice more than 50 years ago, a formal decision has been announced to the world and the injustices they suffered have been acknowledged.

This is reparations: the years and decades and lifetimes of struggle to insure that historical injustice is not pushed aside, dismissed, and denied. The ceaseless efforts to secure your day in "court." To stand face to face with responsible parties and have experience accepted. To have the consequences of injustice assessed and the pain, suffering and hardships understood. To hear culpable parties acknowledge their wrong. To see judgments issued against those parties. To be asked "how can we make amends" and to have your voice heard. Reparation is about the process as much as it is about the outcome. And most of all, more than all the money in the world, reparation is about insuring never again. Now, more than ever, this world needs to consider what the Marshallese know all to well.

States parties must also have the capacity to look beyond the legal and technical machinery, which is necessary but not always sufficient to ensure compliance and implementation of the treaty. In an on-the-record briefing for NGOs, US Ambassador Christopher Ford, pointing to the preamble of the NPT, stated that the easing of international tensions should be read as contextual qualification for implementation of disarmament obligation. A similar argument could be made for the need to view the implementation of non-proliferation objectives in a larger context. The IAEA recognizes the need to address perceptions of insecurity as a root cause of proliferation. Likewise, the disarmament agenda will remain imperiled in part as long as states fail to make preparations for security without nuclear weapons. An executive council or analogous body thus could be empowered to explore related topics and make recommendations on all issues affecting implementation of the NPT, beyond the legal and technical measures flowing directly from obligations and requirements of the treaty.

Execution by Consensus, continued from page 3

convening of its review and preparatory meetings. These functions are presently performed by the recently downgraded UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, at the behest of the UN General Assembly.

Reporting: Egypt and other states have called for the creation of a reporting mechanism. Such a measure would require all states parties to submit annual reports or declarations on their implementation of the treaty, and would constitute a useful starting point in assessing compliance. However, while this would facilitate the implementation of the treaty by institutionalizing a minimum level of transparency, absent mechanisms for verification and compliance assessment, the value of this proposal toward achieving the purpose and objectives of the treaty will be ultimately limited.

Executive Council: A much more ambitious project would be the establishment of an executive council, modeled on similar bodies such as that found in the CWC or the IAEA Board of Governors. Such a body would be empowered to make decisions on matters affecting the implementation of and compliance with all provisions of the treaty, and indeed might be the only institutional reform capable of achieving this. To avoid procedural blockages, such a body would be composed of some subset of states parties and would take decisions by majority vote. However, due to the discriminatory nature of the treaty, there would be some difficulty in creating a council that does not privilege the interests of the nuclear weapon states, as is the case with the UN Security Council, and such a reform might not be possible absent a genuine and universal commitment to disarmament. As a political body, the impartiality of an executive council could be called into question, absent sound criteria and procedures for verification and the impartial assessment of cases concerning compliance.

Footnotes: