On Tuesday morning, the ambassador of Indonesia said nuclear disarmament should not only be seen as reducing the number of weapons, but also preventing the use of those that do exist. Civil society could not agree more. Tuesday afternoon was reserved for NGO presentations, all of which reflected this goal. The statements covered a wide variety of topics related to the NPT, including compliance (and lack of compliance) with Article VI; NATO nuclear sharing; the US-India deal; operational status of nuclear weapons; nuclear power; and nuclear weapon delivery systems. Delegates also heard statements from mayors, youth, and Hibakusha, and an explanation of gender analysis as it relates to nuclear weapons, security, and disarmament. These presentations are available on www.reachingcriticalwill.org and the conclusion has been reprinted in this edition of the News in Review, on page 4.

NGOs offered several recommendations to all government delegations—many of which are also applicable to members of civil society—urging them to conditionally reject all arguments that are put forward for the continued existence of nuclear weapons; to support negotiations of a nuclear weapons convention; to cease (and in terms of civil society, oppose and resist) all programmes for the research, design, development, and production of nuclear weapons; and to provide or continue providing detailed information about the size and composition of their nuclear arsenals and on their actions to implement the provisions of the NPT each year of the NPT review process as required by Step 12 of the 13 Practical Steps.

We have heard similar recommendations from many delegations so far this PrepCom. On Tuesday morning, the representatives of Costa Rica and Malaysia called for a nuclear weapons convention. Norway’s ambassador argued that reporting is an obligation, not a matter of choice. The representative from Jordan called for increased transparency and accountability and Morocco’s representative called for a verifiable plan to implement the 13 Practical Steps by the 2010 Review Conference. The United Kingdom’s ambassador urged others to remember the sense of shared purpose from negotiating the NPT and to reaffirm all of their commitments to the Treaty. Ambassador Streuli of Switzerland emphasized that the NPT has always been characterized by compromise, citing the compromises between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states in 1968 and 1995.

However, Ambassador Streuli noted, the “philosophy of compromise today seems to be reaching its limits. Too many States parties are now expressing their frustration because, in their view, the promises made during key phases of the history of the NPT have not been kept in each of the three pillars of the Treaty.” He argued that the focus on Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have drawn more and more attention to non-proliferation issues, “thus masking the slowness of nuclear disarmament and indiscriminately fueling fears about the development of civil nuclear programmes throughout the world,” and that no significant disarmament has taken place since the last PrepCom.

Yet in a colourful brochure distributed by the United States’s delegation on Tuesday, the government emphasized its commitment to Article VI of the Treaty, highlighting some of the “dramatic and unprecedented steps” it has taken toward the goal of nuclear disarmament—including “working to resolve destabilizing global and regional tensions; reducing its nuclear forces and nuclear weapons stockpile . . . and working cooperatively . . . to reduce nuclear threats.”

The gulf between the United States’ perception of its behaviour and the perception of the vast majority of other states and citizens in the international community is striking. When there is so much space between parties’ understanding of a situation, let alone their varying approaches to it, reviving a spirit of compromise seems unlikely.

Yet that is exactly what is needed. During the recent Disarmament Commission session, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon renewed his call for delegations “to move forward in a spirit of compromise and accommodation.” He argued that the “solemn duty” of pursuing disarmament and non-proliferation cannot be fulfilled through confrontation, condemnation or the adoption of intractable policy positions. There is little doubt that we will not go far if each delegation proceeds expecting to achieve—here and now—nothing less than 100 per cent of their desired objectives. The pursuit of maximalist goals by some will yield only minimal results for all. It is not a defeat to move forward today on those issues where progress is possible, and to pursue other goals tomorrow. There is no shame or loss of pride in acting according to the laws of reason.

In her statement, Ambassador Thompson of Costa Rica quoted Hegel: “The only thing humankind ever learns from history is that humankind never learns anything from history. Diplomats and civil society alike cannot forget the history of compromise—and failure—of the NPT. We have to remember how we managed to agree on the Treaty in the first place, how it was extended and strengthened over time, as well as what led to the failure of the Review Conference in 2005 and what has led to stagnation throughout the disarmament regime and to the global instabilities that jeopardize the Treaty’s, and our, future.”

Philosophy of compromise
Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will
US-India Nuclear Agreement: Bad for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Bad for Nuclear Disarmament

Philip White, Abolition 2000 US-India Deal Working Group

The US-India nuclear agreement will be the topic of a workshop in the NGO Room from 10:00 am on 2 May 2008. The agreement has attracted a great deal of attention and concern since it was announced in 2005 by President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Many believe that it involves substantial international nonproliferation and disarmament problems.

The most authoritative and credible statement about the implications of the agreement for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament was a letter sent in January this year to more than four-dozen governments by a prestigious and broad array of more than 130 experts and nongovernmental organizations from 23 countries. Among the experts who signed the letter was Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala, the former UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs and President of the 1995 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference. Nongovernmental organizations from South Asia, East Asia, Australia and New Zealand, Europe, Africa, and North America endorsed the letter, which was organized by the Abolition 2000 network’s US-India Deal Working Group and the Washington-based Arms Control Association.

The letter formed the basis of the NGO presentation on the US-India nuclear agreement delivered at this PrepCom. It provides a litmus test against which proposals for allowing India to participate in nuclear trade should be measured.

The letter said the US proposal to exempt India from longstanding global nuclear trade standards “would damage the already fragile nuclear nonproliferation system and set back efforts to achieve universal nuclear disarmament.” The signatories wrote that “the proposed arrangement fails to bring India into conformity with the nonproliferation behavior expected of other states. India’s commitments under the current terms of the proposed arrangement do not justify making far-reaching exceptions to international nonproliferation rules and norms.”

What is at issue here are the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) ban on providing direct or indirect assistance for another state’s nuclear weapons program and the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines that severely restrict trade with states, such as India, that do not allow comprehensive international safeguards over all nuclear facilities and material in their territory. The United States seeks to exempt India from these restrictions even though India detonated a nuclear test in 1974 made with plutonium harvested from a Canadian and US-supplied reactor in violation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

As part of the agreement with the US, the Indian government has finalized with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) secretariat the text of a safeguards agreement to cover those reactors that India chooses to be civilian, leaving its military nuclear program and its fast breeder reactor program outside safeguards. This safeguards agreement has not been made public. Meanwhile, obstructions by some political parties on whose support the ruling coalition in Delhi depends, in addition to opposition from the opposition parties, has so far prevented India from submitting the text to the IAEA Board of Governors for approval.

If the IAEA and India sign a safeguards agreement, the matter will then go to the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). By virtue of their veto power, each NSG member state has a pivotal role to play. It is not clear when the NSG will be asked to make a decision. The matter then goes to the US Congress for final approval of a US-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.

At the time of writing this article, it was looking unlikely that all these steps would be concluded within this year. However, negotiation of the agreement has been characterized by last minute fixes and sudden changes of tactics, so a sudden unexpected development should come as no surprise.

Given the damage the US-India agreement would do to the already fragile nuclear nonproliferation system, there is much at stake for all NPT states and the nonproliferation regime as a whole. Indeed, by rights the matter should not be decided by the NSG at all. It should be fully debated within the context of the NPT.

Several countries made references to the US-India agreement, either directly or indirectly, during the 2007 NPT PrepCom, but the issue was not given the attention it deserves. Delegates at this year’s PrepCom should thoroughly debate the issues raised by the US-India agreement, and any proposal to allow the agreement to proceed should be submitted as a recommendation to the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

What is “Good Faith”?  
John Burroughs and George Farebrother, World Court Project to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

In the 1990s, the World Court Project sought to demonstrate that the horror of use and threatened use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with rules governing the conduct of warfare. We campaigned in support of the General Assembly request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on this question. In its 1996 advisory opinion, the Court did not go as far as we thought warranted in declaring threat and use contrary to international law, holding them “generally” illegal but declining to rule on all circumstances. However, unexpectedly, interpreting NPT Article VI, the judges unanimously declared the obligation “to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament”.

Now, inspired by the Court’s statement of the obligation, and based on the wide consensus that the world needs to move beyond the age of nuclear weapons, we have reconstituted our coalition as the World Court Project to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, and turned our attention to the requirements of good-faith negotiation of nuclear disarmament. We have not forgotten that the use of a single nuclear weapon on a city would be (and was) an atrocity, and that doctrines contemplating use amount to a sort of state terrorism. But it seems right to shift the focus to a new terrain, that of good faith: why and how to employ reciprocity and cooperation to achieve the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

On May 1, at the Hotel Warwick, a conference will explore the nature of the good-faith disarmament obligation (see announcement on p. 4). In the keynote address, Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, president of the Court in 1996 and more recently Algerian foreign minister, will examine the 1996 opinion, the concept of good faith in international law, and its application in the nuclear context. Ambassador Jaap Ramaker, chair of CTBT negotiations in 1996, will describe the political and legal conditions for successful negotiations. International law professors, lawyers, and NGO representatives will also speak, addressing among other things the state of compliance with the obligation.

The last panel of the day will concern a strategy we are recommending: adoption of a General Assembly resolution asking the International Court of Justice to clarify legal aspects of the disarmament obligation and to assess whether states are complying with that obligation. Thus the Court could be asked whether a substantial failure to implement measures and principles agreed at the 1995 and 2000 NPT conferences constitutes a lack of compliance, and whether negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament should already have been commenced.

More generally, in our view, based on ICJ cases and other international law, good faith requires commencement of negotiations, and honesty, sincerity, and flexibility in working through them to reach the desired result—global nuclear disarmament. That objective must be pursued consistently with real political will. It must be attained with all deliberate speed. The parties must avoid actions and policies that contradict achievement of the objective. In a case on the disarmament obligation, the Court would be called upon to assess these contentions and the relevant policies and practices of nuclear weapon and other states.

We believe there are genuine legal disputes to be resolved. The United States and Russia essentially say that gradual reductions in their arsenals—even as they plan and prepare to maintain them for decades to come—suffice to demonstrate compliance with the disarmament obligation. On the other hand, almost all governments support UNGA resolutions and NPT commitments specifying disarmament measures and principles that despite their very wide support still have not been negotiated or implemented. In some cases, e.g. the CTBT, the ABM Treaty, the principles of verification and reversibility, they have been rejected by the United States.

Further, a large majority of governments say the adoption of a timebound framework, a nuclear weapons convention, or a framework of instruments on elimination, is required. Their express or implied contention is that the elimination of nuclear weapons should be accomplished within the foreseeable future. But Russia and the Western nuclear powers resist identification of a time frame for elimination or initiation of a process that would establish a time frame.

We also believe that returning to the Court would demonstrate that the 1996 opinion is not an anomaly, but rather a living reality; would allow non-nuclear weapon states to regain the initiative; and would revitalize the civil society movement for a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The World Court Project to Abolish Nuclear Weapons encourages diplomats and NGOs to attend our conference, first to gain insight into the requirements of good faith, and second to consider the strategy of a return to the ICJ.

John Burroughs is executive director of the New York-based Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy and director of the UN office of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms. George Farebrother is secretary of the World Court Project UK.
In the last 165 minutes we have tried to present to you both the horror and the hope of the nuclear dilemma: Why the continued existence of nuclear weapons is incompatible with a just and peaceful world, why it impinges even on such central values as gender equity, protection of the environment and a just global economy. At the same time, in the preceding presentations and in the recommendations shortly to be offered, we are putting before you a number of steps apt to reduce and embark on the elimination of the nuclear danger. The most important of these is the commencement of good faith negotiations for the adoption of a nuclear weapons convention, a model of which has been produced by civil society and made available to diplomats.

Please note that the recommendations do not aim to comprehensively cover all aspects of disarmament and non-proliferation. Without devaluing standard measures like the test ban, a fissile materials treaty, and verified and deep reductions, this year we decided to focus on other areas for action, some of which, for example missiles and missile defenses, do not receive enough attention.

One point which needs to be made at the conclusion of the presentations concerns the relationship between nuclear weapons and war. It used to be conventional wisdom that nuclear weapons served to deter both conventional and nuclear war, although empirical evidence for the validity of this proposition is entirely lacking. On the other hand, there is now ample evidence that the fear of nuclear proliferation has itself become a principal cause of war.

It was the false belief in Saddam Hussein’s nuclear ambitions that led to the disastrous and still ongoing war in Iraq. It was saber rattling of the all-options-are-on-the-table variety that brought the West close to war with Iran and, earlier, with North Korea. And it is the fear of the acquisition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by so-called rogue states which has led five of the most senior western military commanders to call for a “grand strategy” including preemptive nuclear strikes.

With the end of the cold war, deterrence has become instigation.

At the beginning of his new book, The Seventh Decade—The New Shape of Nuclear Danger, Jonathan Schell, the author of The Fate of the Earth, which first alerted the world to the dreadful nature of nuclear weapons, has this to say: “The nuclear age has entered its seventh decade. If it were a person, it would be thinking about retirement.” We of civil society respectfully but urgently call on you to take the steps which will bring about, in the shortest possible time, the retirement of nuclear weapons from the world scene.

This conclusion was delivered to the PrepCom on Tuesday, 29 April by John Burroughs of the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) as part of the NGO presentations. Peter Weiss is president of LCNP and former president and current vice president of IALANA, the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms.

### World Court Project to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

A global citizens’ coalition working for good-faith implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligation upheld by the International Court of Justice

#### Good Faith, International Law, and the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons:
The Once and Future Contributions of the International Court of Justice

Warwick Hotel, 14 Rue de Lausanne, Geneva (opposite the main train station) Thursday 1 May 2008, 10.00-18.00. Registration at 9.30.

**Keynote speaker (10.15):** Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui
President, International Court of Justice, 1994-1997
Algerian Foreign Minister, 2005-2007

Other speakers include Amb. Jaap Ramaker, 1996 chair of CTBT negotiations; international law professors Marcelo Kohen and Karima Bennoune; international lawyers; and representatives of civil society organizations.

With a focus on the theme of good faith, the conference will examine the obligation to achieve the global abolition of nuclear weapons contained in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and rooted in humanitarian and other international law.

**Conference co-sponsors:** International Peace Bureau; International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms; International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War; The Simons Foundation; World Court Project UK; Western States Legal Foundation; International Law Campaign; Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy; International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility; Abolition 2000 Europe; World Federation of United Nations Associations, Mayors for Peace
Highlights from Day Two of the General Debate:

**Article II- Non-Proliferation**
- Without further addressing allegations that it maintained a secret nuclear reactor program, Syria blandly reaffirmed its “continual commitment” to its obligations under the NPT.

**Article III- Safeguards and Compliance**
- Indonesia called for states to urgently rectify the situation of the UN Security Council judging and enforcing NPT compliance. Indonesia warned the Council’s motives were political, noted the Council was unlikely to enforce compliance with Article VI, and suggested the Council was undermining the authority of the IAEA.
- Without specific reference to Iran, Malaysia stated outstanding issues at the IAEA should not be politicized as they have legal and technical solutions. Malaysia further affirmed the centrality of the IAEA in dealing with safeguards and verification matters and that the agency should not be subject to undue interference.
- Norway stated acceptance of the Additional Protocol should be a condition of supply.

**Article IV- the Nuclear Fuel Cycle**
- Indonesia stated the process for establishing fuel assurance must be conducted in a non-discriminatory, multi-lateral, comprehensive, and transparent way under the auspices of the IAEA. Indonesia further stated that no proposal should discourage peaceful nuclear activities or undermine Article IV.
- South Africa stated that access to fuel assurances should not contain conditions requiring states to forgo rights.
- Related to proposals for the fuel cycle, Argentina warned that any restriction or reinterpretation of Article IV would undermine the Treaty.
- Argentina called for the adoption of measures to penalize states that violate the Treaty and subsequently withdraw.

**Article VI- Disarmament**
- Three delegations called for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
- Without reference to Russia or China, Iran accused the United States, France, and the United Kingdom of numerous violations of Articles I, III, IV, and VI of the Treaty. In a right of reply, the United Kingdom defended its decision to renew its Trident system.
- Norway and Romania reaffirmed that the seven nation initiative of 2005 should still be considered a basis for consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.
- Norway described the outcome of its February 2008 disarmament conference, outlining five principles and ten recommendations made in the summary, including proposals for a Fissile Material Control Initiative and a high-level Intergovernmental Panel on Nuclear Disarmament. Norway also announced it would host a side event on its verification project with the UK on Monday, 5 May.
- Costa Rica promoted and described the Model Nuclear Weapon Convention it introduced to the 2007 PrepCom and the 2007 UN General Assembly.

**Article X- Withdrawal from the Treaty**
- Argentina called for the adoption of measures to penalize states that violate the Treaty and subsequently withdraw.

**Strengthening the Treaty**
- Norway expressed the view that states’ reporting on their implementation of the Treaty is a requirement.
- Switzerland called for institutional issues to be dealt with in the current session of the Preparatory Committee.
- Costa Rica expressed the view that five year reviews are insufficient and called for establishment of active implementation mechanism apart from Article III.

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**Preventing a new nuclear arms race:**

_ opposing Trident replacement and the US missile defence system_  

**Wednesday, 30th April ‘08**

NGO Room, from 3:00 – 6:00pm

**Chair:** Jeremy Corbyn MP (UK)

**Vice-Chair:** CND

**Speakers:**

- Dr Rebecca Johnson, Director, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy
- Professor Dave Webb, Vice-Chair CND
- Marian Hobbs MP (New Zealand), Assistant Speaker and Co-President of the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament (PNND)
- Dr Alan Mackinnon, Chair, Scottish CND
- Jackie Cabasso, Executive Director Western States Legal Foundation

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**Abolition 2000-Europe General Assembly**

Friday, 2 May 2008, 3:00-5:00 pm

NGO Room, United Nation, Geneva

**Agenda:**
1. News of the network
2. Abolition 2000-Europe and PNND
3. Abolition 2000-Europe and BANg
4. Abolition 2000-Europe and the World Court Project
5. Meeting at the EU parliament, July 1st 2008
6. Project of campaign on the NWC in the EU
7. Update secretariat organisation
8. Odds and ends

**Contact person:** Dominique Lalanne

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Website: www.abolition2000europe.org
On the opening day of the 2008 PrepCom, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung co-hosted a panel discussion on the current status of the NPT. The opening speech by the Chair, Mr. Joon Oh, (Deputy Minister for Multicultural, Global and Legal Affairs, Republic of Korea), set the tone emphasizing the serious consequences which nuclear weapons can have upon our civilization.

The Hon. Gernot Erler (Minister of State, German Federal Foreign Office) reflected on the “grand bargain” underpinning the NPT and the equal weight accorded to all three pillars: nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the context of increasingly unilateral interpretation of the Treaty, he called for a shared respect for common purpose and joint vision of this grand bargain. Mr. Erler reminded us that gradual progress, rather than an “all or nothing” approach, was essential. Practical measures such as ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), honoring the 13 practical steps, negotiating the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and reducing US/Russian arsenals were critical to such progress. Reflecting on the radical shift in the security milieu which now includes the prominence of non-state actors, terrorism, Middle East insecurity, and both renewed and emerging conflicts, Mr Erler endorsed bold and immediate action to strengthen the NPT.

Ambassador Sergio Duarte (United Nations High Representative for Disarmament) recalled that a resolution in the first UN General Assembly called for the elimination of all weapons capable of mass destruction. The NPT was therefore a means, rather than an end, to achieve these long held objectives. Ambassador Duarte noted two converging challenges before the NPT: the crisis of confidence (non-compliance with treaty obligations under all three pillars) and a crisis of legitimacy (concerning the indefinite nature of the disarmament obligations). To ameliorate the mistrust and improve accountability, Ambassador Duarte recommended that the US and Russia should work towards transparent, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament while remaining nuclear weapons states should improve safeguards over fissile materials and resist modernization of weapons; reliance on nuclear weapons in national strategic postures should be reduced; and states must progress entry into force of the CTBT and negotiations on FMCT. Ambassador Duarte surmised that the NPT was destined for eventual and inevitable collapse unless member states could engage in a sincere “give and take” process.

Professor William Potter (Director, Monterey Institute of International Studies) lamented the barren outcomes in 2005, and the complacency by delegates at the 2007 PrepCom reflecting the possibility that capitals perhaps do not appreciate the severity of this nuclear crisis. While noting limited positive developments, Professor Potter highlighted the ever increasing challenges facing the NPT, including the uncompromising positions of member states; selective disregard for disarmament or non proliferation principles when they collided with economic and political priorities; perceived rewards received by non-NPT nuclear weapons states (India and DPRK); insufficient attention paid to nuclear terrorism, and the need of every country to objectively undergo a cost/benefit analysis of nuclear energy. In a forum where the measure of success has become the avoidance of disputes rather than the achievement of meaningful resolutions, Professor Potter urged delegates to recognize the gravity of the nuclear danger and address both inactivity in disarmament and indifference towards non-proliferation. As time is now of the essence, all member states were urged to engage in substantive debate and forge common ground on corrective action for the NPT.

City and civil society good-faith initiatives in Europe and the Mediterranean Area in preparation for the U.N. Decade for Disarmament, 2010 to 2020

Chaired by Mayor Luc Dehaene, this panel was comprised of Mayor Tadotoshi Akiba, City of Hiroshima, Japan; Mayor Wolfgang Leidig, Schwäbisch Gmünd Germany; Mayor Stefano Del Cont-Bernard, Aviano, Italy; and Mayor Luciano Monticelli, Pineto, Italy. Mayor Patrice Mugny, City of Geneva, Switzerland, welcomed the participants and the audience, and encouraged governments to take strong positions in the interest of peace.

Mayor Akiba gave a brief summary about why cities can never be allowed to be targets, based on Japanese history. He pointed out that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the only cities attacked with nuclear weapons, though a great number of other cities were used as battlefields and exposed to conventional weapons, traumatizing generations to come. There is thus a need to challenge the moral vacuum in the 20th century and to call for a total ban on nuclear weapons as well as the illegitimacy of attacking cities.

Mayor Leidig referred to the development in his own region and the Mutlangen Manifesto—a manifesto demanding the maintenance and multilateralization of the INF-Treaty as well as other steps to achieve nuclear disarmament (see News in Review No. 2, 29 April 2008). By acting locally through educational campaigns as well as regionally through lobbying politicians, Mr. Leidig hopes to achieve the goal of total disarmament. He added that small cities can also make a difference in working for a nuclear weapon free zone in Germany, and eventually in the whole world.

Mayor Cont-Bernard highlighted another regional example, explaining the situation in Aviano, a city hosting an American base with 15 nuclear arms. For many citizens in Aviano, the US base means employment, and public awareness of the negative aspects of the base is low. However, negative trends in law and order, noise, pollution, traffic, road accidents, etc. are problems connected with the base. By being aware of this broader picture, Mayor Del Cont-Bernard wants to change institutional as well as public obstacles to nuclear weapons disarmament.

Mayor Luciano Monticelli emphasized that since 2010 to 2020 will be the decade of disarmament, the Mediterranean Area should be a nuclear weapon free zone. That would mean that harbours, surface water, and deep water should be protected from nuclear weapons, with no submarines or ships transporting nuclear weapons in the Mediterranean waters. Promoting this would also make it possible to create more nuclear weapon free zones in Europe and the Middle East. New political opinion should be brought in order to make the goal become reality.
Analysis: Update on Globalizing the INF Treaty

Michael Spies, Arms Control Reporter
(This editorial updates an article written on behalf of the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy for the 2007 First Committee Monitor)

At a Tuesday side-event, delegates from Russia briefed governments and NGOs on their initiative to globalize the US-Russia Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF). The briefing and power point presentation, conducted by Ambassador Antonov and a Russian General, drew directly from Foreign Minister Lavrov’s 12 February 2008 statement to the Conference on Disarmament, adding little detail. As described by Lavrov, the core of the proposal calls for a new multilateral agreement based on the relevant provisions of the existing INF Treaty [to] be elaborated and concluded. Such an international legal arrangement could comprise the following basic elements: Firstly, the obligation of the parties not to conduct flight testing and not to manufacture medium- and shorter-range missiles or their stages and launchers; Secondly, the undertaking by states parties to eliminate, by an agreed deadline, all their medium- and shorter-range missiles, launchers thereof and associated supporting facilities and equipment; Thirdly, the arrangement should set rules for counting and defining the types of medium- and shorter-range missiles, their deployment and movement, in the process of getting them ready for elimination, procedures for their elimination and compliance verification.

Beyond this description, Amb. Antonov outlined provisions of the Treaty, which could include: restrictions on movement; information exchanges; elimination procedures; compliance and verification procedures; enforcement mechanisms; and would be of unlimited duration. In promotion of the proposal, the Russian joint statement delivered to the UN General Assembly on 25 October 2007 US-Russian joint statement followed from an 25 October 2007 US-Russian joint statement delivered to the UN General Assembly First Committee, which called on interested states to discuss the possibility of internationalizing the Treaty. Although many European delegations to the UN First Committee, including Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, and Italy, welcomed the joint statement, Amb. Antonov conceded that in their consultations, states have expressed differences of opinion on the proposal and were not ready to join the initiative. During the presentation, however, delegates from Kyrgyzstan and Belarus made supportive and optimistic statements regarding the Russian proposal.

Altruistic international norm building or political gesture?

It seems that the Russian proposal has experienced a tepid reception. Amb. Antonov, however, dismissed many concerns expressed by non-government representatives as merely reflecting “philosophical” points. While the Russian proposal tends to come across as an empty political gesture, as noted by Rebecca Johnson of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, the substantive implications of the proposal are worth (re)exploring.

As Amb. Rocca noted in October, “Today’s world is far different.” Yet, this is not the first time we have heard calls for internationalizing the INF Treaty. This position initially gained popularity in the period immediately following the end of the Cold War, at a time when the former superpower rivals were engaged in verifiable reduction of their overall strategic inventories, not just those of intermediate-ranges. It was also a time when very few countries other than the United States and Russia fielded missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 km. But in the past decade and a half, the strategic sands have begun to shift. Eight countries now deploy missiles that would be affected by extending the missile ban covered by the Treaty, including China, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. As a complication to possible verification of an expanded INF regime, most of these countries have developed an indigenous capacity to manufacture ballistic missiles and a number of them, along with several states not included in this list, are developing independent space launch capabilities. It is unclear what the Russian strategy would be to induce these states into joining its proposed missile regime, and Ambassador Antonov declined to address this point when questioned about it during his briefing.

This proposal also faces a number of other issues. Although Ambassadors Rocca and Antonov cited missile proliferation as a concern to regional stability, in many cases it is insecurity that has been a key driver of both missile proliferation and arms races in several regions, particularly in the Middle East and South and Northeast Asia. As the evolving situation with North Korea demonstrates, it is often necessary to address the underlying political causes of insecurity before considering steps affecting strategic stability. However, in these cases one could argue that missile controls could play a positive role in easing regional tensions.

Also important to the credibility of this proposal are the policies and proposals of its proponents and other NPT nuclear weapon states. As noted by Jackie Cabasso of the Western States Legal Foundation, Russia and the United States continue to modernize and develop more advanced intercontinental and ballistic missile systems (ICBMs). The United States is even considering placing conventional warheads on certain ICBMs previously used only for nuclear missions. Beyond this, there are US programs for next generation strategic weapons, such as Prompt Global Strike, which, according to US Air Force planning documents, involves the possibility of a “range of system concepts to deliver precision weapons with global reach, in minutes to hours.” Such programs are likely incompatible to the goal of internationalizing any regime governing missiles.

While we must certainly acknowledge the achievement by Russia and the United States in eliminating a whole class of weaponry, thereby ensuring more stable security especially for the peoples of Europe and the former Soviet Union, the present reality points to the need for a comprehensive approach to missiles. That said, there are aspects of the present proposal worth considering, especially if it could add an international character to a verification regime on missiles, which would put in place the procedures, institutions, and knowledge necessary to verify further reductions in ballistic missile inventories. It is clear, however, that much more thought is needed on these issues.

Regardless of the merits of the proposal, it is good to see some attention being paid to a subject that has slowly become the elephant in the room of arms control. Despite the Russian gesture, in light of the complicating factors highlighted above and, in particular, the current atmosphere of superpowers that seem allergic to verifiable and irreversible reductions in their strategic forces, any proposal that tends to accentuate existing imbalances in the international strategic framework without ameliorating root causes of insecurity seems a bit cynical and empty. •
What’s On
Today’s Calendar of Events

NGO Strategy Session
Where: NGO Room (Room XXV, Building E)
When: 8:30 - 9:00am
Contact: Anthony Salloum, Abolition 2000
Website: www.abolition2000.org

Government Briefing: Ambassador Jürg Streuli of Switzerland
Where: NGO Room (Room XXV, Building E)
When: 9:00 - 10:00am
Contact: Susi Snyder, WILPF
Website: www.wilpf.int.ch

International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN):
How NGOs Can Mobilize for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
Where: NGO Room (Room XXV, Building E)
When: 10:00am - 1:00pm
Contact: John Loretz, IPPNW
Website: www.ippnw.org

Protecting Cities from the Scourge of War
Where: Auditorium of the International Red Cross Museum
When: 10:00am - 1:00pm
Contact: Aaron Tovish, Mayors for Peace
Website: www.2020visioncampaign.org, www.mayorsforpeace.org

2010-2020: from Survival to Success!
(in English, French, German, and Italian)
Where: Assembly Hall
When: 1:15 - 2:45pm
Contact: Aaron Tovish, Mayors for Peace
Website: www.2020visioncampaign.org/www.mayorsforpeace.org
Co-organized with Middle Powers Initiative, and sponsored by the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations, Geneva

Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education
Government of Japan and UNIDIR
Where: Room XI
When: 1:15pm - 2:45pm
Contact: Nicolas Gerard, UNIDIR
Website: www.unidir.org

Preventing a new nuclear arms race: opposing Trident replacement and the US Missile Defence system
Where: NGO Room (Room XXV, Building E)
When: 3:00 - 6:00pm
Contact: Sam Akaki, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
Website: www.cnduk.org

NWC Simulation Game - Preparations (closed workshop)
Where: NGO Room (Room XXV, Building E)
When: 6:00 - 7:00pm
Contact: Regina Hagen, INESAP
Website: www.inesap.org

The New Nuclear Threat? Engaging Youth to End the Danger
Where: Ecumenical Center, 150, Rte de Ferney, Grand Saconnex
When: 6:00 - 8:00pm
Contact: Beatrice Merahi, World Council of Churches
Website: www.oikoumene.org

Across

3 Which Minister presented a draft of a PPWT to the Conference on Disarmament on 12 February 2008?
5 The seabed beyond a 12-mile coastal zone, outer space, and what other area have been declared off-limits to nuclear weapons?
7 In 2006, the IAEA safeguard costs amounted to how many million dollars from the regular budget?
9 How many types of on-site inspections are there under START?
10 Which isotope is used to create enriched uranium?

Down

1 Which country declared its nuclear weapon free status through enacting domestic legislation in 2000?
2 Which country ratified the CTBT on 28 January 2008?
4 The Pentagon spends $1.25 billion in approximately how many hours?
6 Who was the first UN Secretary General?
8 Which UNSC Resolution requires all states to prohibit and prevent WMD proliferation?

Please note: There is no meeting tomorrow, Thursday, 1 May. The UN will be closed. Please consider attending the World Court Project’s conference at the Warwick Hotel (see page 4 for details). On Friday, 2 May, there will be no NGO Strategy Session or Government Briefing, but instead a panel discussion with the International Panel on Fissile Materials, in Room IX.