A glance at the recommendations
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

At the end of the morning meeting on Friday, 8 May, Ambassador Chidyausiku released his draft recommendations for the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon). The recommendations include specific proposals that identify concrete practical actions; stand a reasonable prospect of commanding consensus; address issues related to implementation of the Treaty; and build upon earlier decisions such as those at 2000 and 1995. He emphasized that they are not a comprehensive summary of all proposals that have been made to the RevCon, nor do they preclude any other item states parties might want to address.

The document attempts to balance the three pillars of the Treaty. Section 2 focuses on disarmament. It calls for the RevCon to consider adopting an action plan “setting practical and achievable and specified goals, and measures leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons,” such as the CTBT, FMCT, verified reductions, greater transparency, reducing operational status, refraining from qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, etc. It specifically recommends the RevCon “[e]xamine, inter alia, ways and means to commence negotiations, in accordance with article VI, on a convention or framework of agreements to achieve global nuclear disarmament, and to engage non-parties to the Treaty.”

The Chair’s disarmament recommendations seek a small but definite step forward in the disarmament agenda, beset by a decade of deadlock. Its inclusion of a nuclear weapons convention would, if adopted, for the first time put on the horizon the means for eliminating nuclear weapons.

The non-proliferation recommendations do not go as far as those on disarmament, though they do emphasize the importance of safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Meeting the call of many delegations to this PrepCom who seek to eliminate double standards and political discrimination, this section suggests the RevCon affirm that export controls should be “implemented in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner ... in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty.” The non-proliferation section also addresses the issue of negative security assurances, where it recommends the RevCon look at ways “to achieve additional assurances that are legally-binding.”

While many governments are justifiably concerned about the emergence of a two-tiered international system, where global rules enforce the division between haves and have-nots and where some “responsible” states are trusted with “sensitive” materials while others are not, the strengthening of non-proliferation norms is a worthy objective. In particular, improvements in the safeguards regime will certainly be vital in ensuring confidence in a nuclear weapon free world.

Section 4, on nuclear energy, calls on the RevCon to reaffirm article IV and to “[r]eiterate that restrictions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be applied for political purposes.” This rather extensive section addresses both the access and security aspects of nuclear energy. It tries to balance these two objectives in a way that supports multilateralization of the fuel cycle while ensuring that states’ decisions in this field, as long as they meet the obligations of the Treaty, do not jeopardize their access to nuclear material and equipment.

The contentious debate between rights and obligations related to article IV will undoubtedly continue, unfortunately distracting attention from dealing with the fact that continued promotion of nuclear power increases the difficulty of achieving or verifying a nuclear weapon free world.

Section 5c, on the Middle East resolution, recommends the RevCon “consider...
The U.S. government’s maintenance of a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons poses a serious risk to U.S. and global security. It also accounts for billions in the national security budget of the U.S.

Unlike other forms of military spending, nuclear weapons funding is not all in the Department of Defense’s budget. In addition to the more than $6 billion for nuclear weapons activities in the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration budget for 2008, Steven I. Schwartz and Deepti Choubey estimated there was at least another $46 billion in nuclear weapons-related spending spread across the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, State and other agencies. Their January 2009 report, Nuclear Security Spending: Assessing Costs, Examining Priorities asserts that overall the United States spent more than $52 billion on nuclear weapons related expenses in 2008.

But now, President Obama has pledged to work for a world free of nuclear weapons and to pursue immediate, concrete measures towards that goal, including: negotiating a new treaty with Russia involving deep cuts in their respective nuclear arsenals; seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); accelerating spending designed to eliminate “loose nukes” and bomb-making materials (plutonium and enriched uranium) in Russia and beyond; and ending all new production of bomb-making materials worldwide.

These steps will take time, but there is something he can do right away: halt plans by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to upgrade the nation’s nuclear weapons complex. Under a plan that it refers to as “Complex Transformation,” the NNSA—a semi-autonomous branch of the Department of Energy charged with running the nuclear weapons complex—wants to spend billions of dollars building new nuclear weapons facilities.

According to Nuclear Bailout II: The Costs and Consequences of Renovating the Nuclear Weapons Complex, a May 2009 report from The New America Foundation’s Arms and Security Initiative, upgrading the complex according to current proposals will cost $7 billion over the next five years. Modernizing and sustaining it over the next two decades will cost up to $175 billion. The plan was crafted during the Bush administration and is obsolete now that the Obama administration has pledged to dramatically accelerate the reduction of the U.S. nuclear stockpile.

In May, Department of Energy Secretary Chu requested $6.4 billion for the NNSA in 2010. Cutting this funding from the fiscal year 2010 budget and rejecting NNSA’s plans will bolster U.S. credibility with other nuclear-armed states, as well as with states that may seek nuclear weapons. It will go a long way towards building the trust that will be needed to proceed on the ambitious and necessary platform of work that President Obama has set out for his administration: the ratification and entry into force of the CTBT, deep reductions in nuclear arsenals, and an end to production of bomb-making materials worldwide.

On deep reductions, Washington and Moscow will need to resolve their differences on key issues like the U.S. plan to place missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. A global consensus will need to be reached on the cut-off of production of plutonium and enriched uranium that can be used to make nuclear weapons—known formally as “fissile materials”.

Obama does not need the world to ratify the CTBT, but recruiting enough Republican Senators to reach the two-thirds majority he needs for treaty ratification may be tougher than working with the Russians or the rest of the global community. But, he is not doing it alone: A wide range of cur-
rent and former government officials ranging from former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, to former Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Sam Nunn, to former Defense Secretary William Perry, to dozens of prime ministers, former defense secretaries, secretaries of state and foreign ministers from all over the world have called for U.S. leadership towards nuclear abolition.

These steps by one of the world’s two major nuclear weapons states will make it more likely that other nations will scale back their own nuclear stockpiles or abandon their pursuit of these weapons, in keeping with the essential bargain set out in the NPT. The fewer nuclear weapons there are, the safer we will be.

Sharp reductions in nuclear weapons spending will also free up money that can be used for other, more constructive purposes. Moving from an active stockpile of roughly 5,000 deployed nuclear weapons to an arsenal of 1,000 total weapons—600 deployed and 400 in reserve—would save on the order of $14.5 billion per year. Net savings after accounting for additional investments in securing “loose nukes” would be about $11 billion per year. This would still leave the United States with a more than adequate deterrent against any existing nuclear-armed state, while providing a first step towards President Obama’s goal of eliminating all nuclear armaments.

Frida Berrigan is the senior program associate and William D. Hartung is director of the Arms and Security Initiative of the New America Foundation.

Resources

Nuclear Bailout II: The Costs and Consequences of Renovating the Nuclear Weapons Complex, http://www.newamerica.net/people/william_d_hartung

Costs and Consequences ... and Opportunities (cont.)

A Nuclear Weapons Convention is the best way to get to zero.

Let’s begin discussing it, here and now. Find out more at www.icanw.org.
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education: Yes, we can!

Dimity Hawkins | International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons-Australia

Friday’s side line event titled “Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education: Yes We Can” was an inspiring and comprehensive look at the issues of educating on these issues. Covering a broad cross-section of views, from the experience of a Hibakusha (atomic bomb survivor) of the Hiroshima bombing, through to presentations of governments and perspectives of students, educators, and diplomats, the session provoked much discussion in the hallways after.

Chaired by Dr William Potter from the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the panel raised practical ways and tools to raise public awareness through education and discussed how this could strengthen the NPT.

Ambassador Sumio Tarui, Permanent Representative of Japan to the CD, opened the panel, reminding participants of the role Japan has played in education around the immense and destructive power of nuclear weapons. The Japanese Government, one of the main sponsors of this event, provided a number of wonderful materials to the participants, including the fourth edition of Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy.

Ms Claudia Garcia, Second Secretary with the Mexican Mission at the CD, listed the steps the Government of Mexico has taken to increase disarmament and non-proliferation education and shared a short list of useful proposals for taking education further in coming times. Such steps included promoting a website with substantive materials for public education and offering retreats and seminars for nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states to find common ground on these issues.

Steven Leeper from the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation gave a measured and compelling visual presentation outlining the realities of what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

Dr Kathleen Sullivan, Consultant to the UN on disarmament and non-proliferation education, spoke of the efforts of the UN Expert Panel on this issue and shared “fragments” from the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. She also spoke of the work of the Peace Boat, which recently toured around 22 nations with 103 Hibakusha on board to promote peace education internationally.

This was followed by a wonderful presentation by Ms Toshiko Tanaka, a Hibakusha, who gave a brief but chilling account of her own experience as a child in the bombings and spoke of the importance of the work of Hibakusha and the Peace Boat in particular.

Nick Pickard, Head of Security Policy Department with the UK, spoke of the way education on these issues is viewed as central to global security, and the need to raise civil society voices and engagement with the issues.

Dr Vladimir Orlov from the Center for Policy Studies in Russia spoke about some of the work of the Russian Government in promoting non-proliferation education to students and the public. He spoke strongly for the need to have public education materials in languages other than English.

Joining him in this call was the next speaker, Vasileios Savvidis, a Monterey Institute student intern at UNODA. His perspective as a student coming only recently to the world of disarmament was valuable.

It was a productive and interesting session and the issue is well worth greater input and discussion by governments and non-government agencies alike. For more information on this issue see: cyberschoolbus.un.org.

The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy invites you to a roundtable on

“TIME TO OUTLAW THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS”

14 May 2009
1.15 to 2.45
Conference Room 8

Chair and Introduction: Dr Rebecca Johnson,
Executive Director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy

The Hon. Max Kampelman, former Ambassador (Geneva) and Chief US Arms Negotiator,
“Time to Recognise the Use of Nuclear Weapons as a Crime Against Humanity”

Dr Patricia Lewis (Deputy Director and Scientist-in-Residence at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies): “The use of weapons and international humanitarian law”

Commentator: Dr Randy Rydell
A youth perspective on disarmament education
Nina Eisenhardt | Ban All Nukes generation

The event on disarmament and non-proliferation education approached this issue from the perspective of how adults can inform the next generation. Institutes are writing treatises on how to educate us, but mostly are not reaching the lives of the youth because they are not including them in the development process of relevant curriculum. It is great to see that the UK Foreign Secretary is writing a blog, everybody is setting up a website and using twitter; however, this creates an overflow of un-filtered information and is not the way to move youth. Education is much wider, in my sense of understanding. Education should be understood as a dialogue. Informative websites are a useful tool to give youth the chance to get more information, but first, the youth must be interested in the topic. Adults should help youth to set up websites, blogs, and twitter and read and listen to them not the opposite.

Further, education is not just about informing youth about nuclear topics. There must also possibilities given that they can use what they had learned, to use their own minds and have opportunities to take part in decision-making processes.

For example, it is even difficult for youth to get accredited to NPT conferences, because of the stipulation that representatives must be 18 or over. Is this the way in which governments are willing to encourage and educate youth? It is always claimed that youth should participate more in politics—but where are the possibilities? We need access, space, and financial support and we will participate.

See www.bang-europe.org for an example how youth are participating in the nuclear issue.

Nina Eisenhardt is a BANg Coordinator.

Role-Playing Verification
Emma Rosengren | IPPNW Sweden
Susi Snyder | WILPF

Imagine: There has been a successful conclusion to multilateral negotiations on the abolition of nuclear weapons. The treaties are written, the implementation support unit charters are drafted, and disarmament is taking place. Or is it?

How to reassure the world that nuclear weapons are irreversibly dismantled is the subject of a joint UK/Norway/VERTIC study. On Friday, Ole Reistad (Norway); Attila Burjan (UK); Dave Chambers (UK); and Andreas Persbo (VERTIC) provided an update on their work.

The panelists reported on the UK-Norway Initiative, a research project with the aim to develop new technological and methodological procedures for verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement. By simulating the implementation and verification of an imaginary bilateral treaty between one nuclear weapon state (NWS) and one non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS), the initiative strives to invent efficient and practical verification procedures based on trust, transparency, and accountability.

Ole Reistad portrayed the model Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Verification, a project based on a mock generic disassembly facility with a radioactive source (Cobalt 60) to be set up in the fictitious NWS, which is to be inspected by the (also fictitious) NNWS. According to Mr. Reistad, the challenges related to the project concern managing proliferation in accordance with Articles I and II of the NPT. In this work, trust, careful planning, and realism are all crucial for success.

Dave Chambers explained the project’s Information Barrier Technology, which strives to solve the problem of proliferation by making sure that the inspectors can deal with national security-sensitive information while still identifying a radiological source in a mutually-accepted way. The Information Barrier takes data from a measurement device, processes the data, and provides information according to predetermined conditions.

Attila Burjan spoke in-depth about the steps taken so far in the model exercise, underlining that key lessons learned are related to access to sensitive facilities while also securing the safety for facility and security personnel. However, the exercise is already considered a success, and will be further presented during the 2010 Review Conference, after the end of the project.
Preparation for the 2010 RevCon

Draft recommendations to the RevCon

- The Chair circulated draft recommendations, drawn from official statements and working papers submitted to the PrepComs. He said his aim was to identify concrete actions that address the implementation of the Treaty and stand a reasonable chance of gaining consensus, building upon 1995 and 200 outcomes. He cautioned that the paper does not constitute a comprehensive summary of proposals.
- The Chair announced that the PrepCom will begin discussing the recommendations on Tuesday morning.

Highlights from the Discussion on Regional Issues and the Middle East Resolution

Middle East

- The members of the quartet continued to link to varying degrees the peace process and steps to achieve a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
- The United States reaffirmed the goals contained in the 1995 resolution and pledged to work toward its implementation.
- Many delegations continued to call for Israel’s immediate accession to the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards. These delegations included the NAM, the Arab Group, and China.
- Several other delegations emphasized either the need to deal with proliferation issues or the need to ensure that regional states adhere to non-proliferation obligations as a requisite for progress toward a WMD free zone in the region. These delegations included the EU, Australia, and Japan.

Iran

- In the context of implementing the Middle East resolution, a number of delegations raised the issue of Iran, including Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- Japan described Iran’s nuclear programme as a concern and called for a peaceful resolution to the situation.
- Canada called on Iran to suspend its nuclear programme and restore confidence.
- The United Kingdom explicitly linked the issue of Iran to the 1995 resolution, stating that resolving the Iran situation would contribute toward its implementation.
- The United States said it had no confidence in peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The United States expressed its commitment to diplomacy, building constructive relations, and addressing the full range of issues between the parties. The United States stated Iran’s failure to suspend its uranium enrichment programme, inter alia, is a matter of concern.

Measures to implement the 1995 Resolution

- Drawing from proposals made by Egypt and the Arab Group, Russia supported the idea of appointing a special coordinator on the Middle East to meet intercessionally and convening a regional conference to explore means of implementing the 1995 resolution.
- In informal remarks, the UK expressed appreciation of the Russian paper and remarks on the subject, stating Russia had suggested some concrete measures that it could support.
- Indonesia and the NAM expressed support for Egypt’s proposal regarding the intercessional standing bureau with a mandate to engage in regional consultations. China noted the Egyptian and Arab proposals.
- A number of delegations, including the NAM, Malaysia, the Arab Group, Iran, and Egypt called for the RevCon to adopt a decision prohibiting nuclear trade with Israel pending its accession to the NPT and placement of all its nuclear facilities under safeguards.
- Egypt proposed a number of practical steps (in addition to those mentioned above), including: reconfirming the 1995 resolution and expressing new resolve for its implementation; sharing information on Israel’s nuclear capabilities; and establishment of a follow up mechanism.
- The EU promoted the role of the Barcelona Process, indicating that it would be an appropriate forum to consider technical and political issues related to establishment of a NWFZ in the region. The EU said the process could involve negotiation of confidence-building measures and a regional seminar involving regional states and the P5.
- Russia suggested regional states should agree to a number of confidence-building measures as a step toward implementing the 1995 resolution, including: ratification of the CTBT; and deciding that regional states should not devol-
Are New Nuclear Warheads Needed for Safety and Reliability of the U.S. Arsenal?

Monday May 11
1:15–2:45 PM
NGO Room
(Conference Room E)
United Nations

Contrary to U.S. President Barack Obama’s goal of a nuclear weapons free world and moves to restrict the mission of U.S. nuclear weapons, his Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, says the proposed U.S. program to build the so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead is “absolutely” necessary for “maintain[ing] a credible deterrent,” for U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and for reduction of the nuclear stockpile.

However, Secretary Gates’ position flies in the face of historical U.S. data obtained from Los Alamos National Laboratory via a Freedom of Information Act request by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research when IEER prepared an analysis regarding the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in 1996.

The unique dataset and IEER’s analysis of it indicate that:
- There have been no aging-related safety defects in the primaries of nuclear weapons in the history of the U.S. nuclear weapons program.
- New weapon designs should not be introduced if reliability is to be maintained.
- Testing becomes more likely if a new design is introduced.

Hence, contrary to views that a Reliable Replacement Warhead will promote prospects for a CTBT, the RRW would actually increase the likelihood of a resumption of U.S. nuclear weapons testing.

This briefing by Arjun Makhijani, Ph.D., president and senior engineer of IEER, will present preliminary findings of a report that will be published in fall 2009.
News in Review

News in Brief (cont.)

- op uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, contingent on the availability of fuel supply guarantees.

Northeast Asia

- Japan and the United States said they would continue to work with the Six Party Talks to implement the 2005 Joint Statement.
- Canada called for the PrepCom to issue a strong statement reaffirming Security Council resolution 1718 and supporting the fulfillment of the Six Party Talks.
- The United States characterized the DPRK as a threat to regional peace and security.

South Asia

- Japan urged India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT, including by upholding a moratorium on nuclear testing and ceasing production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
- Canada said it will strive to ensure expanding nuclear cooperation with India strengthens non-proliferation and disarmament.
- Canada called for India and Pakistan to place the full scope of their nuclear activities under comprehensive safeguards.

Southeast Asia

- China reported it had made progress with ASEAN states toward implementing the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty.

Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
Nicole Phillips | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Co-sponsored by Peace Depot (Japan), Peace Network, and Nautilus ARI (ROK), Friday’s workshop stressed the urgency of establishing a Northeast Asia Nuclear Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ). The speakers argued that establishing such a zone would be beneficial for achieving regional stability in Northeast Asia and would help the ongoing Six Party Talks by fulfilling its goal of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The sponsors of the event suggested a 3 + 3 arrangement in which the ROK, the DPRK, and Japan would form the central parties of the zone and the relevant nuclear weapon states (China, Russia, and the US) would support it through the provision of security assurances. The Democratic Party of Japan Nuclear Disarmament Group has put forward an encouraging draft NEA-NWFZ Treaty, which was discussed in the meeting. Several components of the draft treaty included the above arrangement as well as an obligation of education worldwide for nuclear disarmament.

Progress has been made in promoting a NEA-NWFZ, however, many people believe that it is an unrealistic expectation. However, the event participants agreed enacting a NEA-NWFZ would be possible through collective action and support from both political leaders and civil society.

Come and observe how

We Negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention

Tue May 12, 2009. 10 am-1 pm, 3-6 pm.
Wed May 13, 10 am-1 pm
Conference Room E
United Nations, New York

Ambassador Alfredo Labbé
of Chile (morning sessions)

N.N. (Australian delegation)
(Tuesday afternoon session)

Participants:

30 German university students

In a simulation, 30 young people negotiate on a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In three sessions, they will negotiate Article IV (Phases for Implementation) of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (UN document A/62/650).

Come to observe for an hour or the whole day!

Contact: Regina Hagen, INESAP Coordinator, inesap@hrzpub.tudarmstadt.de
This article surveys proposals to the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), drawn primarily from working papers submitted to the third (2009) Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) session that were available on the Official Document System of the UN as of 10 May. Many proposals reflect recommendations tabled during the current review cycle, though many of the papers elaborate on, refine, or supplement earlier drafts. This review deals with those proposals that concern nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues. The order in which proposals are presented does not necessarily reflect their priority or likelihood of achieving consensus.

**Disarmament**

Toward 2010, a number of governments have put forward various proposals intended to achieve a nuclear weapon free world. During the present PrepCom, the EU and Japan have submitted papers outlining their respective disarmament proposals. The EU action plan, described in WP.26, includes steps related to all three pillars of the Treaty. Japan, in WP.13, forwarded the eleven benchmarks for achieving nuclear disarmament and a nuclear weapon free world, as presented by Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone in April 2009. The benchmarks are divided into three areas, including: steps by the NWS to reduce their arsenals; steps by all states; and steps to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and the Vienna Group of Ten have also introduced papers outlining recommendations to the RevCon on disarmament.

**Further reductions in strategic nuclear forces.** Several delegations have recommended further reductions in nuclear arsenals. The NAC and Japan, in WP.11 and WP.13 respectively, called for negotiation on further cuts to US/Russian arsenals, deeper irreversible and verifiable reductions, and efforts by other NWS to reduce their arsenals. The Coalition also welcomed the US/Russia decision to seek a replacement to START.

**Reductions in sub-strategic nuclear forces.** Following early proposals for inclusion for binding commitments dealing with sub-strategic forces, Japan and the NAC have called for verifiable, transparent, and irreversible reductions in US and Russian sub-strategic forces in their respective papers. The EU in WP.26 called for inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons by states that possess them in the disarmament process.

**Cooperation on missile defences.** Stepping back from measures called for in 2000 in light of subsequent events, Japan in WP.13 called for cooperation on missile defense programmes.

**Reporting on nuclear arsenals and reductions.** Following on calls made during the present review cycle, one of Japan’s benchmarks calls for regular reporting from the NWS on arsenals as a transparency measure. The EU expressed support for unspecified transparency and confidence-building measures in WP.26.

**Entry into force of the CTBT.** For many delegations, entry into force of the CTBT remains a top disarmament and non-proliferation priority. Continued calls toward this end are reflected in the working papers of the NAC (WP.11), Japan (WP.13), the Vienna Group (WP.15), and the EU (WP.26). Pending this step, many have emphasized the need for moratoria on testing to be maintained. The NAC recognized the recent reaffirmation of these goals by the United States and China. The Vienna Group’s paper calls for the RevCon to support the Provisional Technical Secretariat and to ensure the international monitoring system is operation by the time the Treaty enters into force.

**Negotiation of a verifiable FMCT.** Many delegations to the PrepCom have recognized growing momentum for negotiation of a verifiable FMCT. Such a step is one of the benchmarks identified by Japan in WP.13 and an element recommended by the EU in WP.26.

**Banning short and intermediate range missiles.** Support continues to slowly spread for internationalizing the commitments contained in the INF Treaty, as proposed by the United States and Russia in 2007. Japan explicitly expressed support for the US/Russian initiative as part of its disarmament benchmarks in WP.13. The EU in WP.26 called for the start of consultations on a treaty banning short- and intermediate-range missiles and for adherence to the Hague Code of Conduct.

**Implementation of past agreements.** The NAC, in WP.11, emphasized the need to take concrete action to implement the outcomes of past NPT conferences, particularly those from 1995 and 2000. They recommended that the 2010 RevCon reaffirm
past commitments.

**Security Assurances and NWFZs**

Many governments continue to call for the nuclear weapon states to grant legally-binding assurances to the non-nuclear weapon states against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. A subset of these states believe the NPT is the appropriate place for such assurances, which could take the form of an additional protocol to the Treaty.

**NPT Protocol.** Iran, in WP.2 and WP.5, in line with the position expressed by the NAM, called for the RevCon to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a protocol to the Treaty granting security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states. Iran further repeated its past call for the RevCon to adopt a decision holding “that the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States shall be prohibited.”

**Recognition of the Central Asian NWFZ.** The five Central Asian states, in WP.12, recommended a the PrepCom recognize their efforts related to the negotiation and consultation process on the Semipalatinsk Treaty.

**Non-Proliferation**

Western governments continue to advocate for further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime through a variety of measures. Key proposals to this end have been made by the EU and the Vienna Group, which have submitted papers to the present PrepCom outlining many recommendations.

**Verification of Article I.** Iran, in WP.6, reiterated its view that the RevCon should address a mechanism to verify compliance with Article I of the Treaty.

**Action on proliferation cases.** The EU, in WP.26, called for the RevCon to take unspecified resolute action on proliferation crises, in particular in the cases of Iran and the DPRK. The Vienna Group, in WP.14, recommended that the RevCon urge all states to cooperate fully with the IAEA in the expeditious resolution of anomalies, inconsistencies, and questions identified by the Agency. The Vienna Group further recommended that the RevCon stress the need for the IAEA to receive early design information and the need for all states to provide such information on a timely basis.

Determining consequences of non-compliance. The EU, in WP.26, proposed that the RevCon should consider measures that could be taken as a result of safeguards violations or withdrawal from the Treaty, including suspension of technical coop-

**Recognition of the Zangger Committee lists.** The EU, in WP.26, proposed adopting Zangger Committee memoranda A and B as the minimal export controls for nuclear trade under the Treaty. Taking a slightly different approach, the Vienna Group, in WP.16, called for the RevCon to recognize the importance of the Committee and invite all states to adopt its Understandings in all nuclear cooperation. The Vienna Group also called for the RevCon to underline the legitimacy and desirability of export controls.

**Universalization of the Additional Protocol.**

Many delegations have continued to call for, promote, or even require adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol. Calls for universal adherence are reflected in the working papers of the EU and Japan. Similar to a proposal made by the EU at the 2008 PrepCom, the Vienna Group, in WP.14, recommended that the RevCon recognize the Additional Protocol as the verification standard under Article III.1 of the Treaty.

**Additional Protocol as a condition of supply.**

The Vienna Group, in WP.16, called for the RevCon to take a decision to make adherence to the Additional Protocol a condition of supply for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or related processing equipment.

**Nuclear terrorism and physical protection.**

Toward combating the risk of nuclear terrorism, the EU in WP.26 and the Vienna Group in WP.19 recommended that the RevCon call on all states to ratify the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Japan, in WP.13, expressed support for combating the threat of nuclear terrorism, including through a global summit, as proposed by US President Obama.

**Measures to combat and prevent proliferation.**

Toward checking proliferation, the EU, in WP.26, suggested a variety of measures including: supporting national laws to criminalize acts of proliferation; combating proliferation financing; preventing transfer of knowledge; and developing proliferation-resistant technology.

**Nuclear Energy**

During the present review cycle, NPT parties have engaged in lengthy debate over recent proposals to control the nuclear fuel cycle. Toward this end, the IAEA may take action on the establishment of a fuel supply assurance mechanism later in 2009. Amid concerns from developing states regarding the erosion of rights, Iran and Syria have

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continued on next page
tabled recommendations seeking in effect to address sanctions against their nuclear programmes.

**Considering of nuclear fuel supply assurances.** In order to create alternatives to national development of national nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, the EU, in WP.26, recommended the consideration of nuclear fuel supply assurances.

**Reviewing the implementation of Article IV.** Iran, in WP.7, proposed the RevCon consider issues related to the implementation of Article IV, especially in regard to denial of IAEA technical assistance stemming from accusations of non-compliance and decisions adopted by the UN Security Council.

**Cessation of technical and commercial restrictions.** Syria, in WP.9, proposed that the RevCon recommend that the nuclear weapon states stop placing “restrictions and obstacles” to the benefit of peaceful uses of nuclear technology by the non-nuclear weapon states.

**Environmental consequences of uranium mining.** Noting there have been serious environmental consequences from uranium mining and nuclear fuel cycle activities, the five Central Asian states, in WP.29, recommended that the RevCon reiterate its 1995 and 2000 appeals for the consideration of assistance to be given toward radiological assessment and remediation in affected areas.

**Implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East**

Implementation of the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East continues to be a major priority for many states. Following on its concrete measures put forward in 2008, Egypt, in WP.20, submitted a revised comprehensive proposal for steps to be adopted in 2010 toward implementation of the resolution. The Egyptian package generally contains more moderate iterations of similar proposals that have been tabled during the present review cycle. Further, it appears to be carefully drafted in a manner to attract widespread support as a whole. The Egyptian package continues to deal only with establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone, rather than WMD free zone. Elements contained in the Egyptian package, as well as those proposed by others, are detailed below.

**Steps to implement the 1995 resolution.** Several delegations have suggested or supported a general call for the RevCon to adopt practical steps to implement the 1995 resolution, as reflected in working from Iran in (WP.1), Syria in (WP.9), the NAC (WP.11), and Palestine (WP.21).

**Intercessional Standing Committee.** Repeating proposals submitted to previous PrepComs in the current review cycle, a number of states continued to urge the RevCon to establish some sort of standing NPT body—either a committee or a bureau—to follow up on implementation of the 1995 resolution intercessionally and report to the 2015 RevCon. Such calls were reflected in working papers from Iran (WP.1), Egypt (WP.20), and Palestine (WP.21).

Iran further specified that it saw the purpose of such a committee as “monitoring” implementation of the resolution. Egypt’s proposal provided for a committee to be composed of the chair and bureau of the RevCon, plus the sponsors of the 1995 resolution—Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US.

**Nuclear supply to Israel.** Egypt, in WP.20, proposed that the RevCon decide that any supply arrangement to Israel, related to source or special fissionable material, require it to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and place its all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. In contrast, Iran, in WP.5, proposed that the RevCon should decide in effect to adopt a decision to prohibit NPT parties from engaging in any nuclear cooperation with non-party states, especially Israel.

**International Conference.** Egypt, in WP.20, elaborated on its proposal for the RevCon to endorse the convening of “an international conference to launch negotiations with participation of all States of the Middle East on an internationally and effectively verifiable treaty for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.”

**Measures to force Israel to accede.** Iran, in WP.1, repeated its past calls for the RevCon to “make recommendations on measures to force [Israel] to accede to the [NPT] and place its unwarranted nuclear facilities under the full scope of IAEA safeguards.” Adopting a softer tone, Syria and Libya, in WP.9 and WP.10 respectively, requested the RevCon to put pressure on Israel, through unspecified measures, toward these ends.

**Institutional Reform**

Canada provided further details on its campaign to achieve further reform of NPT institutions and the review process. As described in WP.8, Canada designed its proposals either to be budget neutral or to result in significant savings throughout the review process. The overall intent for the proposals is to create a shorter, but more focused and cost-effective review mechanism able to respond in a more timely manner to developments.

continued on page 13
The Role of Parliamentarians in Advancing a Nuclear Weapons-Free World

Lacy Orme | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Hosted by Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (PNND) and chaired by PNND International Coordinator Alyn Ware, this panel featured former United States Ambassador Robert Grey, Canadian Member of Parliament (MP) Bill Siksay, Mayra Gomez of PNND, Japanese MP Hideo Hiraoka, Scottish MP Bill Kidd, and an opening statement by Congressman Dennis Kucinich by video. The participants discussed the pivotal role parliamentarians and their constituents play in the disarmament and abolition movements.

Ambassador Grey spoke passionately of the importance of NGOs as lobbyists of government officials and noted the “unique opportunity” given to the disarmament community with the election of US President Barack Obama. He said we must be be persistent in our efforts but be wary not to “wear out our welcome.”

Mayra Gomez echoed that the push on governments to take action, such as on the ratification of the CTBT, must come from constituents. The opportunities for change are there, Ms. Gomez remarked, citing the PNND network as proof that those at the federal level believe like us that “it is a time for a better world—a world free of nuclear weapons.”

Both in Canada and Scotland, there are promising discussions of abolition issues, including Canada’s relationship with the United States and NATO, as well as Scotland’s relationship with the United Kingdom’s Trident program. Citing the fourteen accidents and two hundred fires on UK Trident ships over the years, Scottish MP Bill Kidd boldly stated that he and his counterparts in the Scottish Parliament stand against misinformation and against maintaining an arsenal that accomplishes nothing more than to make the world a dangerous and uncertain place. He called on constituents and NGO representatives in all countries to make their voices heard and to “stand against this Dr. Strangelove logic” and make our “voices seen and heard.”

In an opening statement to those present, Congressman Kucinich gave a similar appeal. In the end, although the role of parliamentarians in the abolition movement are crucial, they are nothing without the support and activism of their constituents. As Alyn Ware, quoting from a Maori proverb from his native New Zealand, said in his closing remarks, “What is the most important thing in the world? The people. The people. The people.” The panel could not agree more.
A glance at the recommendations (cont. from front page)

the proposal to call upon the nuclear-weapons States to convene a conference of all states of the Middle East region to address ways and means to implement the Resolution.” This call, along with the one made by Egypt and supported by Russia for the appointment of a special coordinator on the implementation of the resolution, seem to be gaining traction among delegations. However, the special coordinator is not mentioned in these recommendations.

As the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 was bound to the Middle East resolution, the implementation of the goals set forth in the resolution may play a major role in the continued vitality of the NPT regime. As such, failing to adopt serious and practical steps toward this end could begin to jeopardize the objective of achieving a permanent peace in the Middle East through disarmament and diplomacy, rather through the politics of arms racing and antagonism.

Regarding Treaty withdrawal, the document simply recommends that the RevCon acknowledge states’ right to withdraw and consider modalities “under which States parties could collectively respond to notifications of withdrawal.” It does not deal with any specific proposal, such as those suggesting response by the UN Security Council.

In terms of strengthening the Treaty, section 7a recommends the RevCon view the decisions from 1995 and 2000 as “embodying principles, objectives, or means” to promote the Treaty’s universality. Section 1 also deals with this issue, urging the RevCon to “[d]eclare that the Treaty is an expression of fundamental principles of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that are universal in scope.” This formulation emphasizes the relevance of customary international law, wherein even non-parties are legally bound by the Treaty’s provisions. It also recommends the RevCon call on all non-parties to “adhere” to the Treaty, rather than to call on them to join as non-nuclear weapon states (as urged by the majority of delegations at the PrepComs).

The rest of section 7 focuses on strengthening the review process, recommending that the RevCon consider “establishing a uniform, practical and cost-efficient reporting system for the implementation of the Treaty.” While it suggests the consideration of other proposals, it does not specifically mention Canada’s ideas of a standing bureau or annual meetings.

Though many continue to be cynical about the merits of institutional reform, implementing any of the thoughtful reforms suggested by Canada would almost certainly improve the quality of NPT meetings while providing governments with an additional incentive to take seriously their obligations under the broader nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation framework.

Finally, section 8 calls on the RevCon to commend the contributions of civil society and to consider proposals for the enhanced participation of NGOs in the Treaty review process. It also encourages the RevCon to underscore the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Last Tuesday, several NGOs presented their own set of recommendations to the PrepCom. Many of those regarding nuclear disarmament overlapped with the Chair’s. However, the NGOs pushed for farther reaching measures, calling for governments to eliminate nuclear deterrence from their security strategies; to establish international controls on delivery systems and anti-missile systems; and to join the International Renewable Energy Agency.

Michael Spies contributed analysis to this article.

Working paper review (cont.)

Annual General Conferences. Canada elaborated on its proposal for annual meetings, calling for the RevCon to replace the PrepComs with seven day annual meetings to be held in each of the four years leading up to the RevCon. The RevCon would be shortened to 10 days. The annual meetings would be empowered with decision-making authority. This change would result in 12 fewer meeting days per review cycle.

Standing Bureau. Canada reiterated its proposal for establishment of a standing bureau to convene starting in 2011, which would be comprised of the two immediate past and present chairs of the NPT meetings. The bureau would also be empowered, under the Canadian proposal, to convene extraordinary sessions of states parties.

NPT Support Unit. Canada proposed establishment of the position of a single NPT Support Officer, to be hosted by the Office of Disarmament Affairs, “whose sole responsibility it would be to support and facilitate Treaty meetings and intersessional work on a full-time basis.” Canada also suggested that, if additional resources could be found, additional officers could be hired to perform substantive, administrative, logistical, and representative support.

Notes

Abolition 2000 Caucus
Where: Conference Room E
When: 8:00–8:50 AM
Contact: Anthony Salloum, Abolition 2000

Cluster Three (cont’d)
Where: Conference Room 1
When: 10:00 AM–1:00 PM

Nuclear Bailout: The Costs and Consequences of Renovating the Nuclear Weapons Complex
Where: Conference Room E
When: 10:00 AM–12:00 PM
Contact: Frida Berrigan, New America Foundation

Are New Nuclear Warheads needed for Safety and Reliability of the US Arsenal?
Where: Conference Room E
When: 1:15–2:45 PM
Contact: Lisa Ledwidge, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research

Nuclear disarmament and human security
Where: Church Center, 777 UN Plaza, 2nd Floor
When: 1:15–2:45 PM
Contact: Hiro Sakurai, Soka Gakkai International

The United States Nuclear Posture Review
Where: Conference Room 8
When: 1:15–2:45 PM
Contact: US Mission

Special Issue: Withdrawal from the Treaty
Where: Conference Room 1
When: 3:00–6:00 PM

What 1540 Could Be: An Equitable Approach to Nonproliferation in a Globalizing World
Where: Conference Room E
When: 3:00–6:00 PM
Contact: Veronica Tessler, Stanley Foundation

NWC Simulation - Preparations (closed workshop)
Where: Conference Room E
When: 6:15–7:15 PM
Contact: Regina Hagen, INESAP

Nuclear Crossword